the Iranian state between the military-nationalist wing of
Ahmadine-jad and the ultra-conservative wing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
tified the very same means now that the target shifted towards a foreign institution. As a matter of fact, this placable response is in stark contrast to the reaction to previous state-critical student protests in the aftermath of the controversial elections in 2009. This fact may serve as an evi-dence for the thesis that the move from Iranian officials to renounce their involvement in the attack on the British embassy might have been merely an act of paying lip service rather than a genuine condemnation from the violent attacks conducted by the Basiji militia. Instead, we see the storming of the British embassy utilized to reinforce historical hostile images, depicting Great Britain as an interventionist colonial pow-er that threatens the sovpow-ereignty of the Iranian nation.11 In this regard we note a common sense among the ultra-nationalist religious wing that it was essential to unconditionally side ranks with the Ayatollah to fight back British aggression. In fact, this statement can be also understood as a reproach against the Ahmadinejad-led
govern-ment, which had made efforts to re-establish a dialogue with the West to overcome isolation on an international level.12
Institutional power struggle between the na-tionalist-military wing and religious-conser-vative wing
We witness a struggle for power in the institu-tions of the Iranian state apparatus, which might emerge as a far serious threat to the Islamic Re-public than its conflict with activists of the green movement. It is rather a struggle between the Shi’i clergy led by Ayatollah Khamenei against the military-nationalist wing of President Mah-moud Ahmadinejad. First tension erupted when Ali Khamenei defied Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s decision to dismiss the Minister of Intelligence, Heydar Moslehi, and reappointed him single-handed per decree. Following this unilateral de-cision that openly challenged the sovereignty of the presidential office, Ahmadinejad remained
The Basiji militia owe the duty of unconditional loyalty to Ayatollah Khamenei.
absent from his office and, consequently, court-ed resentment from religious dignitaries such as Mesbah Yazdi, who raged that disobedience against Khamenei was sheer apostasy and would turn most of his supporters into enemies. This general tendency was also shared by the revolu-tionary guards which advocated a petition that compelled the president to follow the orders of the Ayatollah. After ten days Ahmadinejad had to give in to the overwhelming institutional might of the clergy and noted the failure in his attempts to gain control over the ministry of intelligence. In case of a success, Ahmadinejad could have obtained sensitve information on contract killings and cases of torture in prisons, which he could use as a leverage against his po-litical opponents.13 Incited by this abasing move of the Ayatollah, Ahmadinejad caused again out-rest in May, 2011, as he decided to merge eight ministries into four within the frameworks of a state reform to reduce the number of ministries from 21 to 17. In spite of Ali Larijani’s objec-tion, who intervened and argued that taking a decision that entailed the dismissal of four min-istries without the approval of the parliament was lawbreaking, as well as the explicit criticsm raised by Ayatollah Khamenei, Ahmadinejad implemented this law imperturbably. Nervosity is rising among the Iranian leading elite in face of parliamentary elections in March this year and presidential election in May, 2013. Both his nationalist-conservative wing and the religious-conservative wing of Ayatollah Khamenei do not expect the reformist movement to reassemble themselves and run elections following repres-sive measures in the aftermath of the controver-sial presidential elections in 2009. For this, both sides envisage a dualistic power struggle and commenced preparations. In this regard, sup-porters of Khamenei are likely to decide in favor of Ali Larijani, who himself gained popularity as a die-hard opponent of Ahmadinejad. Presi-dent Ahmadinejad himself, is likely to back his close confidant Esfandyar Rahim Mashaei from whom he did not withdraw support even in face of plain diverging views in foreign affairs. In fact, Esfandyar Rahim Mashaei triggered a contro-versy in Iranian politics as he openly declared on behalf of the Iranian state that “we are friends
of the people of Israel”.14 This general tendency was also reflected in a controversial visit to Jor-dan, a country that signed a peace treaty with the Israeli state in 1994.15 In fact, Rahim Mashaei’s relatively liberal views and the desolate current state of the green movement, the Rah-e Sabz-e Omid, might also hSabz-elp him to sSabz-ecurSabz-e support from the spheres of reform-advocators, the so called Eslahtalebha. Moreover, Mashaei’s explic-it emphasis on the pre-islamic legacy of persian culture is seen as an eye of contention among the majority of the clergy.16 As a matter of fact, already in August, 2009, Ayatollah Khamenei prevented his appointment as a vice-president by a legally under-pinned command. Mashaei is determined to cut back the influence of the theocracy and wants to strengthen the power of elected offices. Some experts see in his attempts to restrict the power of the clergy the first step in a fundamental re-structuring process of the Islamic republic. Set against this background, many pro-Ahmadinejad supporters regard the current diplomatic crisis as tactical move initi-ated by the religious elites to provoke the further tightening of sanctions, which would eventually stalemate Ahmadinejad’s government.17 Further-more, the prevailing display of solidarity shown by the majority of pro-Khamenei members of the parliament can be also interpreted as a policy launched to regain control over the Basiji mili-tia, exploiting the opportunity that emerged as pro-Ahmadinejad groups distanced themselves from the Basiji members involved in the violent protests and condemned the attacks on the Brit-ish embassy. Thus there is evidence to conclude that the ultra-conservative clergy rather than the Ahmadinejad-led government benefited from the current diplomatic crisis in British-Iranian relations.
Conclusion
In the aftermath of the crisis triggered by the storming of the British embassy in Tehran and the corresponding dismissal of Iranian diplo-mats from London, it was striking to see that we note rather diverging responses on this issue, with the Ahmadinejad-led government taking a cautious stance, while the ultra-conservative
wing close to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei utilized the incident to adopt a popularizing rhetoric based on the historical anti-Western sentiment shared among conservative and ultra-nationalist groups in Iran. In this regard, there is much evi-dence that the current diplomatic crisis in Brit-ish-Iranian relations served as an indicator to re-veal an exacerbating institutional power struggle within the Iranian state between the military-nationalist wing of Ahmadinejad and the ultra-conservative wing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
In this regard, the overall placable response of Khamenei-backed politicians such as Ali Lari-jani towards the violent protests can be inter-preted as a tactical move to win over the Basiji militia and to withdraw it from the control of the Ahmadinejad-led government. Moreover, bear-ing in mind the colonial past of Iran, xenophobic
rhetoric based on a reinforcement of the threat-ening image of interventionist Western powers has always proved successful to secure majority support. Thus, the current diplomatic crisis and its further aggravation by the provoked dismissal of Iranian diplomats from London might create a convenient environment for the theocratic re-gime to overcome its legitimacy crisis. The harsh response from Great Britain can be utilized to fortify the image of an exterior enemy in order to distract from interior issues and to instill into the people the need for a strong hand and divine guidance in face of international crisis.
This again would strengthen the position of the spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, vis-à-vis the government and challenge the power of the nationalist-military wing led by Mahmoud Ah-madinejad.
1 “In Tehran, Protestors Storm British Embassy” – New York Times Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/
world/middleeast/tehran-protesters-storm-british-embassy.html
2 “Attack on UK Embassy had support of the state” – BBC News Online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16010547 3 “Britain expels Iranian diplomats and closes Tehran embassy” – Guardian Online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2011/nov/30/britain-expels-iranian-diplomats-tehran
4 “Ezeharat-e gheyr-e diplomatik-e sefir-e englis ghabel-e peygiri ast“ – Khabar Farsi: http://khabarfarsi.com/
ext/1648672
5 “Jasarat u kostakhi-ye taze-ye safir-e ekhraj shude-ye englis” – Siyasat Rooz: http://siasatrooz.ir/vdci3vaq.t1a3y-2bcct.html
6 “Diplomaten-Krieg: London weist Irans Diplomaten aus, Berlin zieht Botschafter zurück.” – Zeit Online: http://
www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2011-11/grossbritannien-iran-botschaft
7 “Angriff auf Botschaft: Cameron kündigt ernsthafte Konsequenzen an” – Zeit Online: http://www.zeit.de/politik/
ausland/2011-11/cameron-iran-botschaft
8 ”Niru-ye Moghavemet-e Basiji“ – Global Security: http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/basij.htm 9 “Niru-ye Moghavemet-e Basiji“ – Global Security: http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/basij.htm 10 “Ahmadinejad hails election as protests grow” – CNN World: http://articles.cnn.com/2009-06-13/world/iran.
election_1_street-protests-voter-irregularities-iranian-president-mahmoud-ahmadinejad?_s=PM:WORLD 11 “Jasarat u kostakhi-ye taze-ye safir-e ekhraj shude-ye englis” – Siyasat Rooz:
http://siasatrooz.ir/vdci3vaq.t1a3y-2bcct.html
12 “Ahmadinejad backs plan for resuming atomic dialogue“ – NTI News: http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/ahmadine-jad-backs-plan-for-resuming-atomic-dialogue/
13 “Regierungskrise in Iran: Wenn der Präsident streikt.” – Frankfurter Rundschau: http://www.fr-online.de/politik/
wenn-der-praesident-streikt,1472596,8451210.html
14 “Iranian VP: We are friends of the nation in Israel” – Ynetnews: http://www.ynetnews.com/
articles/0,7340,L-3570266,00.html
15 “Treaty of Peace between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel” – Jordan Goverment Official Homepage: http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/peacetreaty.html
16 “Ahmadinejad grooms chief-of-staff to take over as Iran’s president” – Guardian Online:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/21/ahmadinejad-iran-successor-wikileaks
17 “Pro-Ahmadinejad sites condemn attacks on British embassy” - APA Xəbər Agentliyi: http://www.en.apa.az/
news.php?id=161007
ENDNOTES
O
Kaddafi’nin hatalarından biri de servetin paylaşım şekliydi. Resimdeki grafitide, Kaddafi’nin “Keşke zenginliği halka adil biçimde dağıtsaydım” şeklindeki sözleri görülüyor.