THEIMPACTOFTHECRIMEANWARONTHEOTTOMANSTATE:RE
FLECTIONSINTHEGERMANPRESS
MustafaGENCER*
Abstract
HistoriansconsidertheCrimeanWarfrom1853to1856astheturningpointinthepoliticsofthe
GreatPowersinEuropeinthe19thcentury.TheCrimeanWar,whichalsoaffectedthecontinen
talEurope,constitutesthefirstwarbetweentheNapoleonicWarsandWorldWarIinwhich
morethantwogreatpowersparticipated.Eventhecountrieswhodecidedtobeneutralfeltthe
effectsofthiswar.Thiswaralsointroducednewmethodsandtechniquesfortheworldhistory
ofwarandpolitics.Thisresearchpaperexamineswhyandhowthiswarbrokeoutandwhatthe
consequenceswereforOttomansandespeciallyfortherelationswithBritain.Ratherthandelv
ingintomilitaryoperationsofwar,thispaperwillfirstanalyzethepoliciesofEngland,France
andotherEuropeanstatestowardstheOttomanEmpire.Thenitwillpresentananalysisofnews
appearedintheGermanpressregardingthereactionoftheOttomanpublicandgovernment
duringthepreandpostwarperiod.Inthefinalpart,problemsandnoveltiesintroducedbythe
warwillbestudiedwithspecialreferencetotheiroutcomesfortheOttomanEmpire.
KeyWords
OttomanEmpire,CrimeanWar,EuropeanGreatPowers,GermanPress,Ottomanpublicopinion
KIRIMSAVAININOSMANLIDEVLETNEETKS:
ALMANBASININAYANSIMALARI
Özet
18531856KrmSavaTarihçilertarafndan19.yüzylAvrupalBüyükGüçlerinPolitikalarnda
birdönümnoktasolarakkabuledilmektedir.KrmSava,NapolyonSavalarileBirinciDünya
SavaarasndakidönemdetümAvrupa’ykapsayanveikidenfazlabüyükgücünkatldilk
savatr.Tarafszkalanülkelerdahibusavatandolaylolaraketkilenmilerdir.Ayrcabusava
dünyasavavesiyasettarihiaçsndandabirçokilkiberaberindegetirmitir.Buaratrmasava
nnaslveniçinpatlakverdiiniveOsmanllariçinsonuçlarn,özelliklengiltereileilikileri
* Associate Professor at the Department of History of the Abant zzet Baysal University in Turkey.
mustafa.gencer@gmx.de
Revised and edited version of my paper presented and printed in Turkish for the 150th anniversary congress of Crimean War at the Historical Research Center of University of stanbul in 2006-2007.
1 Gerd Fesser, “Europas erstes Verdun. Im Sommer 1853 begann der Krimkrieg. Zum ersten Mal zeigte sich der Krieg in seiner neuen, industriellen Gestalt [The first Verdun of Europe, the Crimean War started in the summer of 1853, as the first of the wars presenting itself in new, industrial form]”, Die Zeit, Aug. 7, 2003.
Sayfa:163182 Page:163182
açsndanelealmaktadr.Çalmaönceliklesavanaskerioperasyonlarndanziyadengiltere,
FransavedierAvrupadevletlerininOsmanlDevleti‘neyönelikpolitikalarnözetlemektedir.
ArdndanKrmSavaöncesivesavanilkaylarndaOsmanlkamuoyuvehükümetiningeli
melerkarsndakitutumuhakkndaAlmanbasnndaçkanhaberleranalizedilmektedir.Sonuç
ksmndaisesavangetirdiisorunveyeniliklerileOsmanlDevletiaçsndansonuçlartahlil
edilecektir.
AnahtarKelimeler
OsmanlDevleti,KrmSava,AvrupaBüyükGüçleri,AlmanBasn,OsmanlKamuoyu
1.INTRODUCTION
Everyerahasitsownjargonofwords,concepts,phrasesandmetaphors.Thus
inthe19thcenturyofEurope,everynewspaperreaderandpoliticianwasfamiliar
withthemeaningofthe‘sickmanofEuropeandtheEasternQuestion’.Whilethe‘sick
manofEurope’wasusedinreferencetotheOttomanEmpirethatruledoverageo
graphicalareafromtheBalkanstotheentireArabicPeninsula,andfromMesopo
tamiaintheeasttoTunisiainthewest,the‘EasternQuestion’expressedtheprob
lematicofitscontinuityordisintegration.
With the beginning of the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire had entered a
general process of disintegration during which its economic status receded to a
semicolonyimportingitsrawmaterialsfromdevelopedcountriesofEurope.The
mostimminentthreatintheprocesswasposedbyRussia.Relateddevelopments
leading to the Crimean War, one of the most horrific war ever witnessed in
Europe,surfacedasearlyasthebeginningof1853andultimatelycostthelivesof
numerous Russian, French, British and Turkish soldiers. The exact number of
Turkish casualties has not been precisely determined. The driving force behind
thismountingcrisiswastheautocraticRussianCzarNicholasI,alsoknownasthe
‘GendarmeofEurope’forhisbloodysuppressionofthePolishrebellionin1830/31,
andtheHungarianrebellionin1849.Anticipatingtheinevitableendforthe‘sick
manofEurope’,theCzarwasdeterminedtorealizethehistoricalRussianaimsof
expansionstartingwiththecaptureofstanbulandtheBosphorus2.
Inthesummerof1853,theEuropeangreatpowersadoptedthepolicyofsup
porting the Ottoman Empire against the aggressive policies of the Russian Czar
andforcedRussiaintonegotiationsinordertoprotecttheirowninterestsinthe
contextofthe‘EasternQuestion’.
TheCrimeanWar,whichalsoaffectedthecontinentalEurope,constitutesthe
firstwarbetweentheNapoleonicWarsandWorldWarIinwhichmorethantwo
greatpowersparticipated.Eventhecountrieswhodecidedtobeneutralfeltthe
effectsofthiswar.Thiswaralsointroducednewmethodsandtechniquesforthe
worldhistoryofwarandpolitics.Thecourseofthewar;apartfrombeingthefirst
emplacementwarofthemodernera,itbecamethegroundforthefirsttimeappli
cationofthelandmineandthearmourplatedwarshipsinweaponry.Moreover,
the reelpolitik model was developed in reference to the concept of interests that
emergedininternationalrelationsasopposedtoidealism.
Ontheotherhand,theEuropeanstatesconfrontedanewproblemwithinthe
frameworkoftheCrimeanWardevelopedinthekindofattitudetoadoptagainst
* Associate Professor at the Department of History of the Abant zzet Baysal University in Turkey.
Revised and edited version of my paper presented and printed in Turkish for the 150th anniversary congress of Crimean War at the Historical Research Center of University of stanbul in 2005. E-mail: mustafa.gencer@gmx.de
2 Gerd Fesser, “Europas erstes Verdun. Im Sommer 1853 begann der Krimkrieg. Zum ersten Mal zeigte sich der Krieg in seiner neuen, industriellen Gestalt [The first Verdun of Europe, the Crimean War started in the summer of 1853, as the first of the wars presenting itself in new, industrial form]”, Die Zeit, Aug. 7, 2003.
the Ottoman Empire. The Paris Treaty of 1856 did indeed declare the Ottoman
EmpireasamemberoftheEuropeancommunityunderthelawoftheEuropean
states.However,despitemaintainingcontrolovertheBalkansforanotherquarter
of a century by means of this treaty, the Ottoman Empire was consequently
draggedintomultipleproblemssuchasthecollapseofitseconomyfollowingthe
firstforeignloansandtheforeigninterventioninitsreformpolicy.
Ratherthandelvingintomilitaryoperationsofwar,thispaperwillfirstana
lyzethepoliciesofEngland,FranceandotherEuropeanstatestowardstheOtto
manEmpire,therelationsbetweenthemandtheprocessleadingthemintohelp
ingtheOttomansintheCrimeanWar.Thenthispaperwillpresentananalysisof
newsappearedintheGermanpressregardingthereactionoftheOttomanpublic
andgovernmentduringthepreandpostwarperiod.Inthefinalpart,problems
andnoveltiesintroducedbythewarwillbestudiedwithspecialreferencetotheir
outcomesfortheOttomanEmpire.
1.1ResearchReport
TheOttomanRussianwarof185356andtheParisConferencehavebeensuf
ficiently studied by American and European historians in terms of the relation
shipsbetweentheEuropeangreatpowers,theirjointpolicypursuedagainstthe
Ottoman Empire, and the formation of national states (Germany and Italy) in
Europeinitsaftermath.AlthoughtheCrimeanWarisoneofthemostintensely
studied subjects by European historians, there is a lack of comparative studies
thoroughlyconductedinTurkey.Theavailableonesmostlyexaminethecontext
ofprewardiplomaticdevelopments,strugglesofthegreatpowers,warfrontiers
(EuropeandtheCaucasus),theSinopraid,oreconomicandtechnologicdevelop
ments associated with the war such as housing and migration policies3. Despite
constitutingoneofthefirst‘mediatic’warsofworldhistory,theconcernofTurk
ishhistoriographywiththeCrimeanWarhasbeenextremelylimitedintermsof
itsreflectionsinpress.4
Hence,theattempthereistoexaminehowtheprocessleadingtotheCrimean
WarwasreflectedintheGermanpress.AlthoughGermanyfollowedapolicyof
impartialitythroughoutthewar,itwasnothardlyindifferenttoit.Infact,alead
ingGermannewspaper,‘BerlinerZeitung,’conveyedtheattitudeandpreparations
oftheOttomanState,andthestanceofthepublic,religiousscholarsandgovern
menttotheGermanpublicthroughtherelatednewsitreportedfromstanbul.Itis
3 The articles on the Crimean War in the recent Turkish encyclopedias are very limited. David M. Goldfrank, “Osmanl mparator- luu ve Krm Sava’nn Çk Nedeni: Kaynaklar ve Stratejiler.” Türkler 12, 826-839; Özcan Yeniçeri, “Krm Sava, Islahat Fer- man ve Paris Bar Antlamas”, Türkler 12, 840-858; Besim Özcan, “Krm Sava (1853-1856)”, Osmanl 2, 97-112.
4 In remembrance of 150th anniversary of the Treaty of Paris the Ottoman Archive in stanbul has published the Ottoman docu- ments on the Crimean War under five sections which are diplomatic relations, reforms, military activities and finally war and econ- omy. Osmanl Belgelerinde Krm Sava (1853-1856), Ankara 2006.
evenpossibletoarguethatfavourableevaluationsofthenewspaperontheposi
tionoftheOttomanStatepositivelyinfluencedtheEuropeanpublicopinion.
Therefore, the contexts of both Berliner Zeitung (Newspaper of Berlin), pub
lishedinBerlin,andthewiderGermanpressareworthexaminingintermsoftheir
potential in instilling new depths into fields of international relations, political
historyanddiplomaticstudies,aswellasjournalismandculture.Thisarticlealso
dealswithsomeveryimportantconceptsoftheOttomanGermanrelationsofthe
secondhalfofthe19thcenturysuchasimageandpublicopinion.Overall,theOt
tomanStateasperceivedthroughtheGermanpressatamostcriticaltimeperiod
isstudiedhereingreatdetail.
2.PREWARDIPLOMACY,ECONOMY,ANDPUBLICOPINIONINTHE
GERMANPRESS
Berliner Zeitung transmitted the events in the Ottoman Empire at the eve of
andduringtheCrimeanWarundertheheading‘IstanbulandEgypt’.Thenewspa
perdidnotonlypublishnewssubmittedbyitsownreportersbutalsocommuni
catednewsgatheredfromotheragenciesintheregiontoitsreaders5.
This study concentrates on the analysis of newspaper articles starting from
April1853,sixmonthsbeforethewarstarted,whenitseemedinevitable.Thewar
formallystartedonOctober4,1853.Manyconcernsoftheperiodfoundtheirvoice
innewspapersasrepresentedinthefollowingheadlines:Thediplomaticrelations
developedwithRussiaontheissueoftheholyplaces,theconfirmationofrights
andprivilegesgrantedbytheOttomanStatetoitsnonMuslimsubjectsaswellas
thestate’sattemptstorestrainannoyancesofthesesubjects,theviewofthenon
Muslimsonthedefenseofthecountry,theattitudeassumedbytheGreekOtto
man subjects against the Russian expansionism, opinions of Muslim inhabitants
regardingnonMuslimsandlimitationsoftoleranceshowntothem,callsformod
erationbythegovernmentagainsttheEuropeanandChristianinhabitantsofthe
EmpireknownasFrenks(Europeans),armamentanddefensemeasures,theOtto
man military preparations for the war and the request from the community for
riding animals and extra help, soldierprocurement, fortification of castles in the
warzonesincludingtheStraits,financingofthewar,thecharacteroftheTurkish
soldiers and army, and theattitude of the European public opiniontowards the
OttomanState,negotiationsofforeignambassadorsinstanbulwiththeirsuperi
orsandtheOttomanState.
5 The exact identification of the Newspaper of Berlin (Berliner Zeitung) is “Königlich privilegierte Berlinische Zeitung von Staats- und gelehrten Sachen”. Berliner Zeitung besides mobile correspondents, also publishes the articles of the other correspondents, European Journal such as Times, Galignani’s Messenger, Impartial and Ottoman Journals such as Journal de Constantinople.
The semi-official Ottoman publication, Journal de Constantinople, is explained as the journal which ‘receives 50 thousand lira an- nual grant from the government, published 6 times a month and is distributed heavily in Beyolu and Europe’. (Berliner Zeitung, Aug. 19, 1853). The journal generally locates the origins of the news articles as Beyolu (Pera), Bursa (Brussa), zmir (Symrna),
stanbul (Konstantinopel), Selanik (Salonika), Trapezunt (Trabzon), and Varna.
TheOttomanStateremainedinconstantdiplomaticcontactwiththeEuropean
greatpowersbeforeandaftertheCrimeanWar.Theambassadorsandjournalists
from the Great Powers in stanbul constantly reported the developments of the
wartotheirgovernmentsandpublic.
InhisreportsenttoFriedrichWilhelmIVonMarch29,1853,theGermanAm
bassadorLudwigvonWildenbruchinBeirutstatedthatRussiahadreclaimedits
activeeasternpolicyinlinewiththeambassadortothePortein1853Alexander
Sergeievitch Menschikoff’s mission to rival the influence that Britain and France
had acquired within the Ottoman State. He claimed that from then on, Russia
couldatanytimeprovokeindependencemovementsoftheBalkannations.Asa
matter of fact, Menschikoff had aimed to not only solve the issue of the holy
places,butalsotogainthesympathyoftheGreekOrthodoxchurchandtorestore
theRussianinfluenceinMontenegroandSerbia.ThereturnofStratfordtopower
signifiedtheheraldofasevererivalrybetweenBritainandRussia6.
As early as thebeginningof the OttomanRussian crisis, the Britishand the
French ambassadors had made it clear that their governments would not leave
TurkeytothehandsofRussia.ItwasexpectedfortheSublimePortetoresistthe
RussianrequestsonceitreceivedthesupportoftheFranceandBritan7.
TheOttomanpublicopinionwasinterestedmoreinthereactionofthesefour
greatpowersthanintheactualRussianthreats.Indeed,theGermanAmbassador
WildenbruchinterpretedtheSublimePorte’stakeonthedraftagreementsigned
withRussiaonMay5,1853inthefollowingmanner;theOttomansbelievedthat
BritainandFrancehadabandonedtheOttomanStateandthattheOttomangov
ernmentsoughtsupportalsofromPrussiaandrefusedMenschikoff’sdemandson
May108.
ThedayfollowingMenschikoff’sdeparturefromstanbulandthetermination
ofdiplomaticrelationswithRussia,theSultan,whowasforcedtorejecttheRus
sianrequestsonMay23,repeatedlyaskedinastateofemotionaldistress;‘isthere
noothercoursetofollow?’Whentheongoingprocesswasonceagainexplainedto
him,heexpressedhispainwithtearyeyesinthefollowingwords:‘Idonotknow
what they want from me. I want the best of everything for any member of any religion
amongmynonMuslimsubjectstotheextentthathasneverbeenwishedbyanySultan
before.Inspiteofthis,nomatterhowmuchIcareaboutthewelfareofmynonMuslim
subjects,IreceivelessandlessgratitudefromtheneighbouringChristianprincipalities’.
Havingsignedtheimperialedictinthisspirit,theSultanreceivedmuchsympathy
fromhisMuslimsubjects9.
6 Winfried Baumgart (Hg.), Preußische Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkrieges, Band 1, 25. Januar 1853 bis 8. August 1854, München 1991, Wildenbruch an Friedrich Wilhelm, 29 March 1853, Nr. 8, 79-84.
7 Berliner Zeitung , May 1, 1853 (News from stanbul on April 10, 1853).
8 Baumgart, Preußische Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkrieges, Band 1, Wildenbruch an Friedrich Wilhelm, 12 May 1853, Nr. 14, 95-100.
9 Berliner Zeitung, June 7, 1853.
MenschikoffdepartedtoOdessafollowingtheSublimePorte’srefusalofthe
notethatsummarizedhisdemandsforalasttime.Afterhisdeparturefromstan
bul on May 26/27, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Drouyn de Lhuys
pointedouttotheFrenchAmbassador,AlexandreWalewskiinLondonthatthe
RussianattackonOttomanindependenceandEuropeanbalancecouldbecoun
teredonlybyacommonstanceofthegreatpowers.Themostimportantdutyof
FranceandBritainwastodefendstanbulandtheStraitsagainstasuddenRussian
assault.ViennaandBerlinalsostoodbytheWesternforcesindiplomaticterms10.
Meanwhile,theFrenchBritishFleetwasstillalertattheBeikeBayinaposi
tiontoreachstanbulwithin29hours.Accordingtothenewsreportedfromstan
bul on June 27 with reference to Turkish newspapers, a regular army unit of 80
thousandsoldiersinErzurumandamobilearmyinTrabzonconsistingofCircas
sians,whoweretemporarilysettledinTurkey,weregatheredtobedirected,dur
ing a possible war, to the service of Sheikh Shamil, who was preparing a great
militarycampaignsimilartothatofGenghisKhan11.
When the news of the Russian occupation of WallachiaMoldovia (July 3,
1853)officiallyreachedstanbul,theSublimePorteprotesteditinfrontoftheallied
powers.Thenecessarydefensemeasureswereimmediatelytaken,asthisactwas
perceived as an intervention in the Turkish territories and a declaration of war.
ParticularlytheBritishandAustrianambassadorspreacheddiscretiontotheSub
limePorteinthemidstofadiplomatictrafficacceleratinginthecapitalcity.While
admittingthattheSublimePortehadalegitimaterighttodefense,theyalsoad
vised to wait for Russia’s reply to the peace proposals and for their possible
evacuationofWallachiaMoldovia12.
BerlinerZeitungcommentedthattheMinisterofForeignAffairs,ReitPasha,
hadbeensuccessfulinturningtheissueoftheunannouncedWallachiaMoldovia
occupationintoaEuropeanproblemratherthanasimpleOttomanRussiancon
flict.Accordingly,themoderatereplyoftheSublimePortetoRussia’snoteexacer
batedtheantiRussiansentimentwithintheEuropeanpublicopinion.Againstthe
manifestooftheRussianCzar,theOttomanCouncilofStateinvitedMuslimsto
treattheChristiansubjectsinmoderationandwithtolerance13.
Encountered in another newspaper article of early September attributed to
once again Turkish newspapers, the following commentary clearly addressed
Europe:‘IfEuropebelievesthattheTurkishRussianconflict,whichisfedbythefourgreat
powers,willendwiththemediationofAustria,thenitisamistake.Thejournalistsmay
spread conciliatory news to the world; however, the situation in Istanbul appears to be
differentfromwhatiswrittenintheEuropeanjournals’.Onwidespreadbulletinsad
10 Winfried Baumgart (Hg.), Französische Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkrieges, Band 1, 18. Dezember 1852 bis 27. März 1854, München 2003, Drouyn de Lhuys an Walewski, 26/27 May 1853, Nr. 71/72, 231.
11 Berliner Zeitung, July 12, 1853.
12 Berliner Zeitung, July 21, 1853.
13 Berliner Zeitung, July 31, 1853.
dressing Sultan Abdülmecid, which were most probably penned by the Ulema
(religiousscholars),thefollowinglinesspokeout:‘Yourpeoplehavearmedthemselves
withtheavailablearmsinordertodefendtheirrights.Ifyouarebearingthehonourofyour
ancestorsandyourthrone,girdyourselfwithyourswordandleadusintowar.Otherwise
dethrone yourself and leave your throne to somebody with more honour.’ Even though
SultanAbdülmecidwasnotreallyanadvocateofwar,herealizedthatitwasto
becomeinevitableunlessthepowerofthereligiousscholarswasbroken14.
Withthewarencroachinguponstanbul,MuslimsubjectsweretreatingChris
tiansinacongenialmannerdespitetheirowninclinationforwar.Itisworthnot
inghowtheBritishandFrenchgovernmentsassumedanattitudeexactlycontrary
to their former discourse, when the war was officially declared by the Ottoman
State.FranceimmediatelyannouncedthatithadnoobligationtoassisttheOtto
mans.WhiletheBritishambassador,LordRedclifferecommendedapeacefulsolu
tiontothegovernment,healsopromisedtoprovidenavalsupporttotheOttoman
Stateincaseofawar15.
The European public opinion had impact over their governments about the
OttomanRussianWarinboththepreandpostwarperiods.TheBritishgovern
ment,inparticular,hadtorespectopinionsandpressuresofitsownpublicopin
ion.AlthoughtheonsetoftheCrimeanWarwasnottriggeredbythepublicopin
ion,itisthefirstEuropeanwarthatwasactuallyencouragedbyit.Thecourseof
thewarwasnotmonitoredbyonlytheGermanpress,butalsotheBritishjournal
istswhoinformedtheirpublicwiththeavailableinformation.Forinstance,Punch
Ltd.,establishedinLondonin1841,hadacquiredasignificantpositioninsidethe
British public within a short time with the help of its political cartoons. Even
thoughitpublishedacartoonentitled‘TurkeyinDanger’forthefirsttimeduring
the Crimean War on April 9, 1853 with the aim of addressing the approaching
crisis,thejournaldidnotreacttothedestructionoftheTurkishnavalforcebythe
Russian fleet with a surprise attack on November 30, 1853 at Sinop. In fact, this
‘massacre’wouldnotbesufficienttostirthealliedforcestoactionforanotherfew
months16.
TheCrimeanWarcouldalsobeconsideredasthefirst‘mediatic’warinthe
courseofhistory.Thefirsttelegraminstalledatfrontsenabledtheinterventionof
politicians and commanders from long distance and thereby, it caused interrup
tions in operations. The first professional war correspondent was W.G. Russel
fromTheTimesandthefirstwarphotographerwasRogerFenton.Fenton’simages
of the war had a serious impact over the public opinion. James Robertson, who
14 Berliner Zeitung, Sept. 18, 1853.
15 Berliner Zeitung, Oct. 20, 1853.
16 Anthony Cross, “The Crimean War and the Caricature War”, Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 84, Nr. 3, (July 2006), 459-480, 462.
substituted the sick Fenton, was able to take pictures of stanbul during the last
twoyears(185355)17.
2.1NewsonNonMuslimOttomanSubjects
ThesituationofnonmuslimsinOttomanEmpireafterTanzimathadbecome
averyimportantissuefortheEmpire’srelationswithGreatPowersandinitsin
ternalpolitics.ThestateofOttomanChristianandJewswereintensivelydiscussed
inthepress.
BerlinerZeitungofMay19,1853analyzedtheattemptsoftheOttomanGreek
communitytowinovertheprotectionofRussiafromdifferentperspectives.Ac
cordingtothesenews,someoftheGreeksubjectscouldnotunderstandwhythe
Sublime Porte resisted the Russian demands, which asked no more than what
MehmedtheConquerorhadalreadygrantedtoGreeksinhisimperialedict.Most
oftheGreeksexplainedthatthestatusofnonMuslimssubjectswasalreadysatis
factory and that therefore, they should not be complaining. The Turks, on the
otherhand,wereextremelyangryatthefinalthreatofRussia18.
While the zmir Greeks were initially certain of a Russian victory, they ap
pearedreadytodefendtheircountrywhenitbecamecertainthattheTurkswould
receiveforeignsupport.Thesamesourcealsostatedthatthenewsonthesocalled
Christianmassacreperformedbythe‘fanatic’TurksinBursashouldnotbegiven
credit,sincetreatingbelieversofdifferentreligionswithtolerancewasoneofthe
chiefvirtuesoftheTurksthatallowedvariousreligionstocoexistwithintheTurk
ishterritories19.
FearingtheincreasingrageagainstRussiaamongtheTurkishpopulation,the
OttomanStateestablishedmorecheckpointsinstanbultopreventattacksagainst
Christians.Moreover,imperialedictsdeclaredatmosquesannouncedtoMuslims
thatChristiansubjectswithintheOttomanEmpirewerenotRussians,thatsome
werebefriendedwiththeTurkswhilesomeotherswereenemiesofRussians,and
thatduetoallofthesereasons,noneofChristiansshouldbeverballyorphysically
harmed.Thepersonsactingotherwisewouldbepunished20.
OnOctober13,1853HalilRfatPasha,GouvernorofProvinzHüdavendigar,
receivedanorderfromtheSultanwhichordersPashatonotdiscriminatethesub
jectsofotherstatesandoftheEmpirebaseonreligion,sectorracesonthepretext
ofwar.21
ThepublicopinioninstanbulwasinsupportoftheCouncilofState(Meclisi
umumî). In general, Muslims seemed to advocate war, whereas the Christian
population remained noncommittal or impartial. Two factors were perceived as
17 Gowing, op. cit., p. XII. These first photos of stanbul were published by Sedat Hakk Eldem, Boaziçi Anlar, stanbul 1979.
18 Berliner Zeitung, June 2, 1853.
19 Berliner Zeitung, June 7, 1853.
20 Berliner Zeitung, June 15, 1853.
21 BOA, HR.SYS. 903/2-80, Nr. 30, Osmanl Belgelerinde Krm Sava, 102-104.
assurancesforthepreparationandexecutionofthemassivereformsandthepro
tection of the necessary peace; the Imperial Rescript (Hatt Hümayun of 1856 or
IslahatFerman)aimedtoequalizethestatusoftheChristianswithintheOttoman
StatetothatofMuslimsubjects.OnJuly3,adelegationconsistingoffourmetro
politanmembersandothernotablefiguresvisitedtheMinisterofForeignAffairs
todelivertheirsatisfactionwiththisimperialedictformulatedinfavourofChris
tianandJewishOttomansubjects22.
Localauthoritiesinprovincesalsoreceivedordersfromthecapitaltopreserve
peaceandorder.Inaddition,governorswerechargedwithguardingtheproperty
and lives of Christian subjects and preventing at all costs the excessive anti
Christian rowdiness by Muslims. Berliner Zeitung commented that this attitude
sufficientlyrevealedthegoodintentionsoftheSublimePorteandthatundersuch
conditions,otherimprovementsandreformssuchasmakingofnewconcessions
to Christians beyond the Imperial Edict would not be considered. Such an act
would be perceived as an indication of weakness for the Turkish government,
whichwouldbedisgracedintheeyesofMuslimpublicopinion23.
2.2Economy,PublicOpinionandPoliticstowardstheWar
Thenewspaperincludedalsonewsonthefinancingoftheapproachingwar
startingfromthemidJune1853.OneparticularpiecereportedtoKölnischeZeitung
fromBeyoluinthebeginningofJulyexhibitssomestrikinginformationregard
ing financing of the war. It looks into the interrogation of means of the govern
menttocoverdefenseexpensesconductedbythosepeopleawareofthecorrupt
economic status of Turkey. Rumours of the period suggested that the majority
believed properties of rich foundations would be confiscated or loans would be
borrowedfromprobablyBritaininreturnforthepledgeofoneofthebigislands
intheArchimedesregion24.
ThecashshortageinSeptemberseemedtoputtheSublimePorteinconstraint.
Therefore, the Ministry of Finance was allowed to be indebted up to 40 million
liras25. By midOctober, a further tightening of the economic bottleneck was ob
served. Another proposal offered to the government to reduce the costs was for
wealthyTurkstoarmvoluntarysoldiers,topaythemacertainsalaryandthento
placethemundertheserviceoftheMinistryofWar.However,theSublimePorte
startedwithconfiscatingsomeofpropertiesoffoundation(Waqfs).Itwasbelieved
by public that more measures would include further confiscation of foundation
propertiesandtheincreaseinrealestatetaxes.TheOfficersofferedhorsesoftheir
cartsandracehorsestotheserviceofthegovernment26.
22 Berliner Zeitung, July 3, 1853.
23 Berliner Zeitung, Aug. 11, 1853.
24 Berliner Zeitung, July 17, 1853.
25 Berliner Zeitung, Sept. 18, 1853.
26 Berliner Zeitung, Oct. 25, 1853.
Attitudesandreactionsadoptedbythepublic,religiousscholars,andpolitical
andbureaucraticsegmentsofstanbul,Anatolia,andArabiaattheeveoftheCri
meanWaralsohadtheirrepercussionswithinthenewspapercolumns.Suchnews
discussedthedefenseofthecountryandthefortificationofthearmy.ThePrussian
LieutenantBlum,whowasinchargeoftheSchoolofEngineeringinstanbul,de
parted to Silistra in order to inspect fortifications. The government planned to
maintain40thousandKurdsandCircassiansintheCaucasusinordertobeableto
encircletheRussianArmyandtodrawdissidentRussianvillagerstotheirside27.
BytheendofMay,itwasalsoobservedthatuncertaintyinweatherconditions
damagedthecommerciallifeinstanbul.SummermansionsintheBosphorusand
the Prince’s Islands, wherethe elite of stanbul passed their summers, remained
empty since practically no one had the courage to leave the city. On the other
hand,theBosphoruswasfilledwithbattleshipsandtheOttomanswereinacou
rageous preparation against the ‘moskof gavuru’ (Infidel Moscow), their eternal
enemy.AllvolunteersweredraftedatabureauinTophanewithoutanydiscrimi
nationonthebasisofreligionandnationality.Interpretingthispracticeasanactof
greatinattentiveness,BerlinerZeitungnotedthatimmigrantswouldprobablyrush
theretocreatefurtherproblemsfortheSublimePorteastheyhaddonebefore28.
Turkishpeoplewerebecomingincreasinglywarorientedwiththeexpectancy
ofavictory.Instrumentalinthisspiritwereopencommentariesofreligiousschol
arsandsomefanaticsatthetraditionalRamadangatheringsinhousesandpublic
places. In addition, theatrical shows organized to entertain the public often in
cludedscenesinwhichaTurkwouldkillthousandsofRussianswithhissword
and the defeated Russian Czar would kneel at the sultan’s feet begging for for
giveness.EventhejoyofthereligiousfestivalscelebratedbyMuslimswithenthu
siasmwasshadowedbythehatefosteredagainsttheRussians29.
InthemiddleofJuly, BerlinerZeitungwrotechangesintheEuropeanpublic
opinioninfavouroftheOttomanState.Accordingtothesedetailednews,those
whohadbeenespeciallyinterestedinthedisintegrationofTurkeyuntilthatpoint,
thosewhohadworkedtoweakenit,andthosewhohadbeenpreparingtoblow
thefinalstrike,hadrecentlyadoptedacompletelycontraryattitudeforsomerea
son.WhiletheMuslimpresenceintheOrienthadappearedtobeoldandweak,
thesituationhadnowaltered.ThestrikingOttomanproblemofstandingupright
atthefaceoftheWestwasreplacedbytheimageofastatewithawillandcourage
toendure.Anobviousfanaticismhadencompassedtheentirepopulationdownto
thelowestlayer.Accordingtothenewspaper,itwaspossibletohearthefollowing
from the Turks, who possessed nothing more than a rusty knife: ‘We conquered
Istanbulwithourswordsandwealsoknowhowtodefenditwithourswords’.Therapid
27 Berliner Zeitung, June 7, 1853.
28 Berliner Zeitung, June 15, 1853.
29 Berliner Zeitung, July 17, 1853.
recruitmentofnovicesandthesuddenrushofdischargedsoldiers,whichwould
havenormallyconsumedalongtimeandeffort,weregoodindicatorsthatthese
wordsdidindeedhavethepowertoassertthemselves30.
Meanwhile, a mechanical telegram line was installed over rock cliffs of the
Black Sea at the Bosphorus with the purpose of closely observing the Russian
navy31. Many vessel guides, who were well informed about the Black Sea, were
alsorecruitedunderthecommandofthenavy.Manypilgrimsontheirwaytothe
holylandsreturnedhalfwaythroughtobevoluntarilyenlistedtotheMinistryof
War.Inthemidstofthesepreparations,however,thenewscomingfromErzurum
wasnotbright.RussiawasmovingalongtheArmenianborder,whileatthesame
timeprovokingIranagainstTurkeythroughitsagents32.
Inaddition,defensemeasuresweretakenattheBlackSeashores.Wallsand
forts were constructed along the coastal line in Trabzon. Inhabitants of the city
were summoned through official announcements to halt their businesses and to
participateinfortificationworks.AlloftheChristians,includingpriestsandmet
ropolitans,joinedinhelpingthegroundworks33.
ThePrussianofficersundertheOttomanserviceinspectedfortificationsinthe
Danube,BlackSeaandAsiaMinor.TenbattleshipsfromtheTurkishnavalfleetat
theBosphorusaccompanied10thousandsoldiers,whohadbeentransferredfrom
thearmiesinArabiatoBatumi.Moreover,observertroopsweredeployedatthe
TurkishGreekandIranianborders.
TheTurkishpopulationinandaroundstanbulwasnowresistingrumoursof
peace with the belief that the government had betrayed them. According to an
other news article in Berliner Zeitung, the Turkish defense did not seem like it
would be easily terminated by the Russians and that Christian subjects did not
seemtobeinclinedtosidewithRussia.Thus,Russia’sdeclarationofa‘WarofRe
ligion’hadbecomemeaninglessandthewarhadbecomereducedtoastrugglein
whichRussiansoldiersalonefacedTurkishsoldiers34.
OnAugust11,aninterestingarticle,entitled‘aselfrespectingpeaceoranurgent
war’appearedinJournaldeConstantinople,theofficialbroadcastorganoftheTurk
ishgovernment.Itwasstatedherethatanurgentdecisiononwarshouldbepre
ferred to an unacceptable peace. According to the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in
1774,Russia’sdemandforpatronisingtheGreekChurchwascontrarytotheinde
pendence of Turkey and to the Straits Convention of 1841, which gave the four
greatpowerstherighttohandletheRussianrequestsattheirowncourts.These
courtswouldrefuseRussia’srequestsonthegroundsthattheywereunjustifiable.
‘IfthefourgreatpowershadshowedthattheywouldnotavoidenteringwaragainstRus
30 Berliner Zeitung, July 21, 1853.
31 Ibid.
32 Berliner Zeitung, July 31, 1853.
33 Berliner Zeitung, Oct. 5, 1853.
34 Berliner Zeitung, July 31, 1853.
sia,thecouncilofministersofPetersburgwouldhaveactedinamoreforesightedwayand
another European war could have been prevented from the start. Turkey did everything
possibletopleaseRussia.Now,whatshouldbedone,althoughitislate,istostandagainst
theunjustrequestsofRussia.ShouldTurkeynotbeabletoprotectanhonouredpeace,it
willfightwiththecourageofitssoldiers,thejustnessofitsassertion,andthetangibleand
intangiblesupportofitsallies’35.
Turkeyhadnotgatheredsuchahugearmypowersincethemilitaryreformof
1826. Such enthusiasm observed in the capital city also spread over to Christian
groups.ThreethousandvolunteersfromtheleadingBulgarianfamiliesproposed
toentertheserviceoftheOttomansagainstRussia36.ThesolidstandoftheCoun
cilofStateandtheMinisters,theexcitementoftheTurkishnationandtheopti
mism of Christians indicated that the Ottoman State had the power and will to
live,whichwerevitalforsurvival.RespectfultreatmentofimpartialChristiansin
EuropebyTurkishsoldiersdemonstratedthattheSublimePortewasnotmaking
concessionstofanaticism.Fidelitytothesultan,thefaithinthecontinuityofthe
Empire,andthepotentialtosacrificelivesandpropertiesforthissakewouldhelp
Turkeytoresisttheenemy37.
BythebeginningofOctober1853,theRussianTurkishconflictdidnotseem
possible to be resolved through peaceful means. Religious scholars (Ulema) and
medresestudentsinandaroundstanbulcollected60thousandsignaturestoshow
thattheywouldresorttoallmeanstostandagainstRussia.Theentireyouthhad
assumedaprowarattitude38.
Finally, the sultan seemed like he would submit to the pressures of the war
supporters. The rage against him had mounted to such an extent that mullahs
threatened not to preach the Friday sermon in his name unless he assumed the
roleoftheprotectorofIslam39.SheikhulIslamannouncedthatincasetheproblem
wasnotresolvedwithin14days,hewouldbreakoutarevoltundertheflagofthe
Prophet.Afterthispoint,eventhepeaceadvocateReidPashadid nothavethe
powertostopthefanaticismofthewarsupporters.Thefinaldecisiononwarwas
reachedunanimouslybytheCouncilofState,highbureaucrats,religiousscholars
and medrese teachers. The army commander in Danube, Ömer Pasha, and Selim
PashainErzurumwerebothorderedtogetready.Thedecisionofwartakenby
theCouncilofStatewasdeliveredtoambassadorsofthefourgreatpowersand
theRussianembassyfollowingitssignaturebytheSultan.Althoughtheproper
tiesoffoundationwerenotyetutilizedasanecessarysourceofincome,Sheikhul
Islamgrantedthenecessaryconsent40.
35 Berliner Zeitung, Aug. 25, 1853.
36 Berliner Zeitung, Sept. 1, 1853.
37 Berliner Zeitung, Sept. 6, 1853.
38 Berliner Zeitung, Oct. 2, 1853.
39 Berliner Zeitung, Oct. 11, 1853.
40 Berliner Zeitung, Oct. 13, 1853.
BritishandFrenchambassadorsreceivedtheorderforthealliednavalforces
tocrosstheDardanelleswiththepossibleconsentoftheSublimePorte41.Mean
while, the press in stanbul and zmir transmitted the opinions of the European
presstotheirreaders.TheNewspaperImpartialstatedthatRussiahadthenotion
ofdismantlingTurkey;however,Turkeywouldprotectitspoliticalpresenceuntil
theend,andEuropewouldhelpinemergencysituationsinordernottoriskits
ownfuture42.
3.ATTITUDEOFEURPEANSTATESDURINGTHECRIMEANWAR
Allsuspicionsofthemid19thcenturyaboutthefutureoftheOttomanEmpire
having become an inseparable component of European concerns were totally
eliminatedwiththeCrimeanWar.IdentifiedwiththeCrimeanpeninsulaatafirst
glance,theCrimeanWarfirsteruptedasanOttomanRussianwarfollowingthe
Russian occupation of the WallachiaMoldovia principalities on October 4, 1853.
However, it expanded over two years to an area from Kars to the banks of Da
nube.DespitetheinitialBritishandFrenchpromisesforsupportattheeveofthe
war,theiractualinterventionoccurredayearafteritbrokeout.Infact,thisinter
ventionwasonlyactualizedfollowingthewarsintheBalkansandtheCaucasus,
and the Sinop raid. Ottoman provinces excluding the Caucasus were indirectly
affected by the war. One factor related to this development was the presence of
westernmilitaryandcivilianpersonnelinstanbul,whotransformedthestructure
ofthecityandthecitydwellersinafewyears.Inthiscontext,westernclothing,
furniture and architecture in stanbul acquired new dynamics. The area of Be
yolu,whichwasconnectedtoEuropeviaatelegramline,becameanewadminis
trativemodelinmodernterms43.
AsthethirdOttomanRussianwarofthe19thcenturythatpreoccupiedtheOt
tomanStateforthreeyears,theCrimeanWaralsoconstitutedvitalsignificancefor
Europeanstates.Twofactorsseemtooutweighothersamongthewar’scauses;the
aggressiveandexpansionistpolicyadoptedbyRussiatowardstheOttomanState
since the 17th century, and the problem of the holy places. The latter acted as a
triggeringmotiveratherthanadecisivereasonespeciallyinconnectionwiththe
historicalroleofFranceinprotectingtheCatholicChristiansoftheOrient44.
TheOttomanStatehadgrantedvariousprivilegestoboththeCatholicandthe
OrthodoxChristiansregardingtheholyJerusalemanditssurroundings.By1853,
RussiaandFrancehadenteredaconflictovertheseprivileges.Intheprocess,Rus
41 Berliner Zeitung, Oct. 25, 1853.
42 Berliner Zeitung, Oct. 29, 1853.
43 Klaus Kreiser, “Das große Versprechen: Vor 150 Jahren wurde die Türkei in das Konzert der europäischen Mächte aufgenom- men. Zur selben Zeit entwickelte sie ein erstaunliches Reformprogramm [Great Promise: 150 years ago Turks were accepted into the European Union and synchronously realized an imposing reform program]”, Die Zeit, March 9, 2006.
44 Georg Franz, “Der Krimkrieg, ein Wendepunkt des Europäischen Schicksals”, Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 7 (1956), 448-463, 450.
siaimplementedtheimageof‘thesickmanofEurope’inreferencetotheOttoman
Stateandmanipulatedtheproblemoftheholyplacesinanattempttorealizeits
ambitions over this geography. Yet it had to manoeuvre alone due to disagree
ment with Britain regarding these policies. Britain, on the other hand, acted in
coordinationwithFranceinprotectingtheterritorialintegrityoftheOttomansby
meansofdiplomacyandmilitary45.
Britain’smainprioritywasmaintainingthebalanceofpowerinEurope.Upon
Czar’sreattempttosharetheterritoriesoftheOttomanState,Britainrealizedthat
its own stakes were put at risk. After all, the Ottoman Empire had been turned
intoamarketinwhichthedemandforBritishindustrialproductshadincreased
eightfoldfollowingthe1838BaltaLiman(BaltaPort)CommercialTreaty.Britain
sidedwiththeintegrityoftheOttomanStateagainsttheriskofRussiaintervening
inthesecommercialinterestsandtheroutestoIndia46.TheBritishpressalsosup
portedtheOttomanState,whichitperceivedtobeweakandliberalcomparedto
Russia.
WhatfurtherstirredanantiRussianauraintheBritishpublicwerethebloody
suppressionoftheHungarianrevoltbyRussiain1849andthemaltreatmentofthe
Poles.ThefactthattheOttomanStatehadwelcomedtheHungarianimmigrants
regardlessoftheAustrianandRussianprotestsworkedinfavouroftheOttoman
sultanandTurkstoimprovetheirprestigeineyesoftheBritishpublicopinion47.
By being admitted into the service of the Ottomans, these immigrants further
strengthenedtheantiRussianfeelingsinstanbul.SomewereconvertedtoIslam
andevenbecameferventdefendersof Turkishnationalism.Forinstance,Michal
Czajkowski(18041886),alsoknownas‘SadkPasha’,foughtonthesideoftheal
liedforcesduringtheCrimeanWar48.
OntheotherhandtheOttomangovernmenttriedtoinfluenceBritishpublic
opinion in case British support was needed. Turkish Ambassador in London,
KostakiMusurusBey,receivedaconfidentialmemorandumonAugust9,1853to
influenceBritishpublicopinion,informoforganizingmeetingsorsendingletters
regarding to the situation of the Ottoman Empire to the Members of the Parlia
ment49.
Napoleon IIIalso stood firm against the Russian expansion in an attempt to
declare French superiority in Europe. The French end of the conflict revolved
aroundSt.PetersburgandtheissueoftheholyplacesinPalestine.TheCrimean
War, in this sense, became instrumental for both Britain and France in keeping
45 Mahir Aydn, “Krm Sava”, Sanat, Tarihi, Edebiyat ve Musikisiyle Krm, Oktay Aslanapa (ed.), Ankara 2002, 123-127.
46 Fesser, op. cit.
47 Emin Ali Çavl, Krm Harbi ve Paris Muahedesi 1956, stanbul 1957, 9. See also: Bayram Nazr, Osmanl’ya Snanlar: Macar ve Polonyal Mülteciler, stanbul 2006.
48 Fikret Adanr, “Der Krimkrieg von 1853-1856”, Handbuch der Geschichte Russlands, Band 2: Vom Randstaat zur Hegemonial- macht, hrsg. Von K. Zernack, Stuttgart 2001, 1196-1197. See also: vo Andriç, Ömer Paa, (trans.) Ali Berktay, stanbul 2004, 35- 36.
49 BOA, HR.SYS. 903/2-26, Nr. 6, Osmanl Belgelerinde Krm Sava, 24.
RussiaoutsidetheEuropeancontinent.Assuch,thewarcanbeperceivedasthe
19th century equivalent of the ‘cold war’ that is associated with the 20th century.
Napoleon III believed that, through a coalition of great powers, the balance of
powerinthecontinentalEuropecouldbemaintained,theuntimelydisintegration
oftheOttomanStatecouldbepreventedandFrancecouldultimatelyacquireits
superiorpositioninEurope.ThecoalitioncouldalsotoppledownRussia’sposi
tionasa‘greatpower’bykeepingitoutsideofEuropeandreestablishPoland.
Apartfromthisstrategicalliance,Prussia’spolicy,asaCentralEuropeanstate,
wastopursueimpartiality,sinceitconsideredthepossibilityofresortingtoRussia
forassistancewhilerealizingitsgrandprojectofGermannationalintegrationin
nearfuture.BoththealliedforcesandRussiastrovetodrawAustriaandPrussiato
their sides in the process. Regarding entrance into the war, these two countries
werethemselvesdividedintotwoassupportersofthealliedforcesandsupporters
ofRussia.DuetotheultimateimpartialityofPrussiaandAustria,ithadbecome
impossibleforBritainandFrancetoinvadeRussiaoverland.
Even though Austria allied with Russia in the beginning of the conflict, it
turned impartial towards the middle by abandoning the Metternich policy and
later joined the Western ultimatum. Conducting secret negotiations with Russia
duringthefirstyearofthewar,SwedenalsoswitchedtotheleagueofBritainand
Francein1855.Despitebeingtoanextentthevictimofcircumstances,theOtto
manStatewasgrantedrepresentationattheParisPeaceTreatyasarewardforits
victoryinthewartogetherwiththeAlliedforces.However,asidefromnotoffer
ingadditionaladvantagestotheOttomans,thispoliticalactfellshortofbringing
viablesolutionstotheongoingproblemsofthestate50.
AstheonlywarinwhichtheOttomanscoredavictoryoverRussiansinthe
19th century, the Crimean War officially ended on March 3, 1856 with the Paris
PeaceTreatythroughwhichtheindependenceandtheterritorialintegrityofthe
OttomanStatewereguaranteedbytheparticipatinggreatpowersincludingBrit
ain,France,Italy,AustriaHungarianEmpireandPrussia.TheCrimeanWarabol
ished the status quo formulated at the Vienna Congress of 1815. Moreover, the
HolyAlliancewasdissolved.ItalsoendedtheroleofRussiaastheleadingmili
tarypowerandthe‘GendarmeofEurope’.Russians,inthisrespect,wererefrained
fromposingathreattotheirneighboursforawhile.Thedeterminingfactorinthis
firstindustrialwarwasthesuperiorityofequipment.Theusageofriflesinwarfare
wasfirstwitnessedinCrimea.Fromthispointonwards,therewouldbelessem
phasis put on human lives. For instance, in a few years, two hundred thousand
soldiers and four hundred thousand civilians would lose their lives during the
50 Oral Sander, Anka’nn Yükselii ve Düüü. Osmanl Diplomasi Tarihi Üzerine Bir Deneme, 2. Basm, stanbul 2000, 225-227.
American civil war. The First World War also cost lives of ten million people,
whilebeingmarkedinhistoryasthefirstatrocityofthe20thcenturyEurope51.
Fromabroaderperspective,theParisTreatyconstitutesaturningpointinthe
historyofEurope,ifnotintheBalkansandtheNearEast.Thetreatyfocusedon
twoproblemsregardingtheOttomanEuropeanrelations.Thefirstwasrestraining
theRussiancontrolovertheBlackSeaandthesecondoneconcernedthesatisfac
tion of the Balkan people through widescale reforms against the possibility of
Ottoman disintegration. The solutions on table, however, could not remain per
manent52.
InhisreportssentonApril3and18,1856fromstanbultotheMinisterofFor
eignAffairs,EarlofClarendon,theforemostBritishdiplomatinstanbul,ambas
sadorViscountStratforddeRedcliffeCanningreportedtheobstaclesintheappli
cationoftheabovementionedreformplans.Accordingly,FuatPashawantedto
initiatetheprogramwithmeasuresofinfrastructureandpromotionofcommerce
andeconomy.InCanning’sview,thewarhadremovedonlyoneoftheobstacles
blockingtheTurkishreform,whiletheactualproblemstillexisted.TheOttoman
Statepresentedapowervacuumforexpansionistpoliciesofthegreatpowers,and
sinceitssoleattemptatresistanceoperatedthroughitscallforreform,Britainhad
toassistTurkeybyallpossiblemeans53.Ontheotherhand,theCrimeanWarwas
the first example of the West allying in favour of the Sublime Porte. What mat
tered more, however, was that this war strengthened the image in minds of the
OttomanbureaucracythatgiventhealliancewithChristianstatesremainedper
manent;thestatewouldsurviveforalongertimethanexpected.
4.CONCLUSION
AlthoughtheCrimeanWardidnotcausealossofterritory,itdamagedOtto
manpoliticalinterests.TheAlliedForcesemergedaspoliticalvictorsofthiswarin
whichbothsidessufferedmorethantwohundredandfiftythousandcasualties.
TheCrimeanWarallowedBritaintodiverttheinterestofthegreatpowersaway
fromIndiaandthereby,todevelopitscommercefurther.Newrightsweregranted
to nonMuslims in the Ottoman Empire with the Imperial Rescript. Prepared in
LondonandParisandknownastheImperialEdictofPrivilegebyMuslims,itwas
simplyarepetitionoftheformerIllustriousRescript(TanzimatEdictorHatterif
of1839)thattooktheinequalitybetweenMuslimsandnonMuslimstoaninterna
tionalplatform.Provisionsregardingfullfreedomtoallreligiousfaithsandcus
toms,andtheeliminationofdeathsentenceforMuslimsconvertingtootherrelig
51 Gülen Demir (trans.), Bir Kraliyet Piyadeleri Çavuunun Kaleminden Krm Sava, Ankara 2005, X-XI., see also; Winfried Baumgart, Der Friede von Paris 1856: Studien zum Verhältnis von Kriegsführung, Politik und Friedensbewahrung, München 1972, 233-241; Fuat Andç, Krm Sava. Âli Paa ve Paris Antlamas, stanbul: Eren Yaynlar, 2002; Fesser, op.cit.
52 Sava Aktur (trans.), Avrupa Tarihinden Kesiter 1789-1980, Ankara 2002, 88-89.
53 Winfried Baumgart (Hg.), Englische Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkrieges, Band 4, 10. September 1855 bis 23. Juli 1856, München 1998, Nr. 606/637, 961; 995-996.
ionswereincludedintheImperialEdicttoservetwopurposes;toremovethelast
tracesofthemilletsystemandtogivethemissionaryactivitiesalegalstatus.Utiliz
ing these openings very artfully, Francebrought about the events of the Middle
East that have lasted up to this day. Italy completed its unification by receiving
political assistance from the allies. Although defeated in war, Russia acted con
trarytothetermsoftheParisTreatytopursueitsgrandidealfirstpoliticallyand
thenphysically.
Discussions on bestowing the island of Cyprus to Britain as a pledge for its
helpinthefinancingoftheCrimeanWarwerementionedearlierinthispaperin
termsoftheircoveragebytheGermanpressinthesummerof1853.Whatisalso
important is how this case can be perceived as almost a quarter century earlier
prototypeofthetransferoftheisland’sadministrationtoBritaininreturnforits
diplomaticsupporttotheOttomanStateduringtheBerlinConferencein1878.Itis
interestingtoencountertherevivalofthisthemeasaresultoftheOttomandefeat
attheOttomanRussianWarin1877/1878.
Asexplainedabove,itbecameimportantattheeveoftheCrimeanWarforthe
decisionstakenonissuesconcerningthepublictobesharedbackwiththewider
publicopinion.Ontheagendaweredevelopmentssuchasopenselfcriticismof
theSultanatebeforethepress,incorporationofthepublicopinionintothedecision
making process, survey of public opinion, accountability before the community
and the renewal of legitimacy. The alliance treaty signed in March 1853 opened
doors of the Ottoman capital city to the allied forces, which paved the way for
modernexpansionsthatquestionedthetraditionalstructuresuchasthesharingof
the military campaign with the public and thereby, the granting of legitimacy.
Apart from the European press, publications of the Ottoman press such as first
nonofficialnewspaper,theCerideiHavadisandTakvimiVekayiwereusefulinre
flectingtheseeventsintothesocialmemorybymeansofaclosemonitoring.The
creation of a rudimentary public opinion in Ottoman Empire was supported
moreover through publication of books, pamphlets and in secular and western
izededucation54.
Today,theCrimeanWarthattookplacemorethan150yearsagosuffersfrom
a major indifference especially in comparison to the 1915 victory in the Darda
nellesinTurkey.However,ithastobeacknowledgedthattheOttomanStatebe
cameafullmemberofEuropeanConcert.Thisperiodalsowitnessedthedevelop
ment and application of the great reform plans by prominent Ottoman bureau
crats. At the same time, the war and its outcome revealed the obligation of the
Ottoman State and Russia had to go through a series of reforms, and thus both
countriesacceleratedtheirmodernizationattempts.
54 Ann Pottinger Saab, The origins of the Crimean alliance, Charlottesville, Va., 1977, 4-5.
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