Conflicts over Locally Unwanted Land Uses (LULUs): Reasons and solutions for case studies in Izmir (Turkey)

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ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect

Land

Use

Policy

jou rn al h om ep a g e :w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / l a n d u s e p o l

Conﬂicts

over

Locally

Unwanted

Land

Uses

(LULUs):

Reasons

and

solutions

for

case

studies

in

Izmir

(Turkey)

˙Ilgi

Atay

Kaya

a,∗

_,

_Nursen

_Kaya

_Erol

b

a_Dokuz_Eylul_University,_Faculty_of_{Architecture,}_Department_of_City_and_Regional_Planning,_Tinaztepe_Kampusu,_Dogus_Cad._No:209,₃₅₁₆₀_Buca,_Izmir,

Türkiye

b_Izmir_Institute_of_Technology,_Faculty_of_{Architecture,}_Department_of_City_and_Regional_Planning,₃₅₄₃₀_Urla,_Izmir,_Türkiye

a

r

t

i

c

l

e

i

n

f

o

Articlehistory: Received21July2015

Receivedinrevisedform4July2016 Accepted14July2016

Availableonline25July2016 Keywords:

LocallyUnwantedLandUses(LULUs) Landuseplanning

Conﬂictresolution Solidwastefacilities Fisheries

Quarries

a

b

s

t

r

a

c

t

Landuseplanningaffectsmanydifferentandusuallyconflictinginterests.Whileeverylanduseplanning decisionhasapotentialofcreatingconflicts,LocallyUnwantedLandUses(LULUs)arethemostconflict facingsubjectsinurbanlanduseplanningprocesses.Thispaperaimstoanswerthequestion“whatare thereasonsandsolutionsforconflictsintheplanningprocessesofLULUs”.Thispaperisbasedona researchexaminingLULUcasesin ˙Izmir,Turkeyincludingsolidwastefacilities,fisheriesandquarriesto findoutthereasonsandthesolutionsforLULUconflicts.Theresearchfindingssuggestthattheconflicts stemnotonlyfromnegativeeffectsofLULUsonenvironmentandcommunitybutalsofromprocedural deficienciessuchaslackofknowledgeandlackoftrust.Thefindingsalsocallforplanningprocesses withmoreconsiderationoflocallevelandpublicparticipationseekingforconsensus.Meanwhile,the conclusionsunderlinethelimitationsforthesuccessofparticipatoryprocessesinwhichconflictsare resolvedwithattemptsincludingsymbolicbenefitsratherthanconsideringexactinterestsoflocalpeople. ©2016ElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved.

1. Introduction

Landuseplanningisbotha technicalanda politicalprocess

inwhichmanydifferentinterestgroupsareaffectedbyplanning

decisions(Kaiser et al.,1995; Chabot and Duhaime,1998).The

interestgroupsincludeelectedandappointedofﬁcials,developers

andlandowners,localresidents,representativesofspecialinterests

suchasneighborhoodpreservationandenvironmental

conserva-tionandlandplanners(Kaiseretal.,1995;Jonesetal.,2005),and

otherpeopleaffected byplanningdecisions.Land useplanning

faceswithconﬂicts(Jonesetal.,2005;PeltonenandSairinen,2010)

becauseofthesedifferinginterests.

Conﬂictsemergeinlanduseplanningespeciallywhiledealing

withLocallyUnwantedLandUses(LULUs).LULUsarelanduses

withapotentialoffacinglocalconﬂictsintheirsiteselection

pro-cesses.Theyarelandusesordevelopmentprojectswhich“may

beregionallyornationallyneededorwantedbutareconsidered

objectionablebymanypeoplewholivenearthem”(Popper,1985)

becauseoftheirnegativeexternalitiessuchasbeingnoisy,

dan-∗ Correspondingauthor.

E-mailaddresses:ilgiatay@gmail.com(˙I.AtayKaya),nursenkaya@iyte.edu.tr

(N.KayaErol).

gerous, ugly, smelly;polluting; increasingtrafﬁc; and lowering

propertyvalues(Popper,1983,1985;Nordenstam,1994;Peyton,

2007).Peopleaffectedbysuchexternalitiesusuallyopposetothem (Popper,1985;IshizakaandTanaka,2003;Roggeetal.,2011).

Recentresearchesshowedthattheproblemsinsiteselection

processesofLULUsareusualinmanycountriesaswellasinTurkey.

Whilemanystudiesproposedsiteselectionmethodssuchas

multi-criteria analysis methods (Vasiloglou, 2004; Banar etal., 2006;

Ekmekciogluet al., 2010), many other studies focusedon

con-ﬂictsin thesiteselection processesofLULUs.Theytriedtoﬁnd

outthereasonsfortheconﬂicts(Llurdesetal.,2003;Chungetal.,

2008; Kaliampakos etal., 2011), factorsaffectingacceptance of landuses(Sellers,1993; SteelmanandCarmin,1998)andways

tosolveconﬂicts(IshizakaandTanaka,2003;Llurdesetal.,2003;

KikuchiandGerardo,2009;Kaliampakosetal.,2011;Chiouetal., 2011;Simseketal.,2014).Thesestudiessuccessfullyexempliﬁed

thetheoreticaldebates intheircaseareas; however,onlyafew

studiesmadeacomparisonofvariousLULUtypes.Besides,onlya

fewdiscussedtherelationshipbetweenplanningprocessandland

useconﬂictsbyusingexamples.TheresearchesinTurkey

includ-ingthecasesofNIMBYsyndromerelatedwithLULUs(Palabıyık

etal.,2010),siteselectionmethodsofunwantedlanduseswithout

focusingontheirconﬂicts(Banaretal.,2006;Ekmekciogluetal.,

2010),amediationpracticeinresolvingthedisputesaboutpower

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.07.011

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84 AtayKaya,N.KayaErol/LandUsePolicy58(2016)83–94

plantproject(Müezzino˘glu,2000),areexamplesoftheattempts

toevaluatetheconﬂictresolutionpracticesofTurkey.The

legisla-tioninTurkeyisclaimedtoinadequatelyhandlethecollaborative

approaches,participationandalternativedisputeresolution

tech-niques(Ozceviketal.,2010;Yılmaz,2012).Ratherthanlegislations,

informal mediationpractices are used in Turkish society when

honorandself-respectareatstake(Yılmaz,2012).

Thispaperisbasedonaresearchexamining27LULUcasesin

˙Izmir,Turkey(AtayKaya,2014).Thecasestudiesinclude

exam-plesofthreedifferentLULUtypesexperiencingthreedifferentsite

selectionprocesses.Theresearchexaminessolidwastefacilities,

ﬁsheriesandquarrieswhichmightbeconsideredasthemost

fre-quentlymentionedLULUconﬂictsin ˙Izmirinrecentyears.Withthis

study,weaimtoﬁndoutthereasonsforconﬂictsandtoemphasize

theissuestobeconsideredinplanningprocessesforpreventingor

resolvingtheseconﬂictsin ˙Izmircase.

2. PlanningforLULUs

LULUsincludemostofthelandusecategoriessuchas

indus-try,transportation,technicalandsocialinfrastructureandhousing.

Whilenoteverylandusetype inthesecategoriesisaproblem,

someofthemlikelowincomehousing,slumsandsheltersforthe

homelessforhousingcategoryordrugtreatmentcentersand

men-talhealthfacilitiesfor healthcategory arenotdesirable forthe

neighboringcommunity.

LULUsaremostly related withNIMBY(not inmy backyard)

movement(Schively,2007;Peyton,2007).PeoplehavingNIMBY

approacharemostlyawareoftheneedofthefacilitybutdonot

wantitnearthemselvesintheirneighborhoods,districtsor

vil-lages.WhenthereisaNIMBYmovementagainstLULUs,theland

allocationprocessbecomesmorecomplicated.Ontheotherhand,

ithasaprogressiveeffectondecisionsbyaddressingissuesweakly

concernedbylocalcommunities.

Resolvingconﬂictsrequiresatﬁrstadeepunderstandingoftheir

reasons.Reasonsmaybesubstantialandrelatedwith

characteris-ticsofconﬂicts.Levels,focuses,typesofconﬂict,partiesinvolved,

strategiesofopponents,andimpacts ofconﬂictsoncommunity

indicatecharacteristicsofconﬂicts(Kaiseretal.,1995;Jonesetal.,

2005;LamandWoo,2009;WhettenandCameron,2011).Conﬂicts

mayhaveloworhighlevelsofdisagreement.Theymaybe

exter-nalorinternal. Theymayoccurbetweentwo parties orwithin

largegroupsof people.Theseissues provideinsightsfor

under-standingcharacteristicsoflanduseconﬂicts.LULUconﬂictscanbe

causednotonlybytheirenvironmentalimpactssuchasodoror

noisebutalsobyotherproceduralfactorssuchasdistrust,

politi-calreasonsandlackofknowledge.Thereforeunderstandingthese

factorsaffectingthemisessentialforconﬂictresolution(Popper,

1985;Bassettetal.,2002;IshizakaandTanaka,2003;LamandWoo, 2009;vonderDunketal.,2011;Roggeetal.,2011;Whettenand Cameron,2011).

For a smooth process there is a need for utilizing conﬂict

minimizationand resolution strategies. Thestrategies basedon

technical and ethical concerns include competent siting

prac-tice,consideringlocal,environmental,socialcriteria, developing

trust, utilizing from multi-disciplinary approach (Nordenstam,

1994;Been,1994;Forester,1999;Carpenter,1999;Elliottetal., 2003;Healey,2003;Klosterman,2003;Llurdesetal.,2003),and

usingcompensationandtechnology(Ozawa,1999;LamandWoo,

2009; Chiou et al., 2011;Lesbirel, 2011).Besides,participatory

approaches suggestconﬂictresolution methods suchas

media-tion,facilitation,negotiation,collaborationandconsensusbuilding

(Forester,1999;Innesand Booher,1999; Straus,1999; Andrew, 2001;Margerum,2002;GoldsteinandButler,2010;Cullenetal., 2010).

3. LULUsin ˙Izmircase

Withatotalpopulationof4.168.415(TurkStat,2015) ˙Izmiris

thethirdlargestpopulatedcityin Turkey.Composedof30

dis-trictsthismetropolitancityinvolves35conﬂictfacingLULUtypes.

Amongthose,threeLULUswithongoingsiteselectionconﬂictsare

examinedinthisstudy(Fig.1):

1.Solidwastefacilitycases:forthistypethestudyexaminesthe

existingsolidwastefacilityinHarmandalıandproposedareas

inTorbalı,Menemen,Gökdere-Kaynaklar,Menderes,Yamanlar

andÖdemis¸.Theexistingfacilitybuiltin1992hadcompletedits

capacityin2007.Sincethenprotestshavebeenlastingtoclose

theareaassoonaspossible.Ontheotherhand, ˙Izmir

Metropoli-tanMunicipality (IMM) is searching for alternative sites but

couldnotﬁnalizetheprocessastheproposedlocationsarenot

acceptedbytheirlocalities.

2.Fishery cases: the study examined the ﬁsheries in

Demir-cili, Sı˘gacık, Saip-Ambarseki, Küc¸ükbahc¸e, Ildırı-Gerence and

Mordo˘gan.Anotiﬁcation abouttheirlocationcriteriais

pub-lished in 2007 and a protocol determining potential ﬁshery

locationsissignedin2008.Despitenotiﬁcationsabouttheir

loca-tions, transfertodeeper waterand permissioncancellations,

protestsremainsince2005withreasonssuchasseapollution

andeffectstotourism.

3.Quarrycases: theconﬂictfacingquarriesare locatedor

pro-posedtobelocatedinGermiyan, Ya˘gcılar,Nohutalan,Özbek,

Karaburun,Kösedere,Pınarbas¸ı,Belkahve,Gökdere-Kaynaklar,

C¸akmaklı,Yenmis¸-Akalan-Ansızca,C¸ambel,

Karakuyu-Yeniköy-C¸ilemeandAhmetbeyli.Theconﬂictsaboutthequarriesbegan

inBelkahve in1992and resolvedthroughtheirtransfertoa

moreacceptablelocationin2010;howevertheconﬂictsinother

locationscontinue.

3.1. Method

Theresearchstartswiththequestion“Whatarethereasons

ofandsolutionsforconﬂictsinplanningprocessesofsolidwaste

facilities,ﬁsheriesand quarriesin ˙Izmircases?”.Toanswerthis

questionthestudyappliedqualitativetechniquesincluding

doc-umentanalyses,mediasearch, in-depthinterviewsandcontent

analysis.Thedataiscollectedfromthearchivesoflocal

institu-tions,chambersandnewspapers. ˙IzmirMetropolitanMunicipality,

ProvincialDirectorateof Environmentand Urbanism,Provincial

Directorate, ˙IzmirBarAssociationand ˙IzmirBranchesofChamberof

CityPlannersandChamberofEnvironmentalEngineersarevisited.

Theweb-basedarchivesofnationalandlocalnewspapers,related

organizationsand blogsare searched.Thedocumentsincluding

reports,books,plans,photos,inventories,pressreleases,court

deci-sionsaresearchedandtheopinionsoftheexpertsandlocalpeople

arenoted.

Thispreliminaryresearchguidedtodeterminethecase

loca-tionsandinterviewees.35conﬂictfacingLULUtypesare found

andrankedduetotheconﬂicts’intensities.Amongthose,ﬁrstly

nineLULUswhichwereprotestedbylocalpeoplewithmeetings

andtookplaceinmediamoreareselected.Theseareminesand

quarries, electricitygeneratingstations, communication towers,

watchingstations,loudentertainmentfacilities,dams,shopping

malls,solidwastefacilitiesandﬁsheries.Thenthreeofthem–solid

wastefacilities,ﬁsheriesandquarries-arechosen.Ratherthanall

solidwastefacilities,ﬁsheriesorquarriesinthecitythestudy

con-sideredonlyconﬂictfacingLULUs.Sevenconﬂictcasesaboutsolid

wastefacilities,sixcasesaboutﬁsheriesandfourteencasesabout

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AtayKaya,N.KayaErol/LandUsePolicy58(2016)83–94 85

Fig.1. ThreeconﬂictfacingLULUsin ˙Izmir(Photosbyauthorsontheleft;photosfromMilliyetarchive(Milliyet,2004–2012)ontheright).

Table1

Numberofintervieweesduetocasesandgroups.

Cases InterviewedGroups

MetropolitanMunicipality PublicInstitution DistrictMunicipality Headmen(Muhtar) Privatesector NGOs University Total

SolidWasteFacilities 6 6 8 5 0 4 1 30

Fisheries 0 5 7 9 2 6 3 32

Quarries 0 5 11 14 3 4 1 38

Totalwithoutduplications*₎ ₆ ₈ ₁₇ ₂₅ ₅ ₇ ₄ ₇₂

*_Duplications_occur_when_an_interviewee_answers_for_more_than_one_cases.

Theresearchaimedtoreachtheknowledgeandopinionsof

dif-ferentpeoplefromdifferentpartiesandtofacilitatethecomparison

ofvariouscasesbyusingasetlistofquestions.Withthisaim

in-depthstructuredinterviewtechniqueisemployed.19open-ended

questions(AppendixA)areaskedtoall72intervieweesfromthe

partiesinvolvedintheprocessincludingpublicinstitutions,local

people,non-governmentalorganizations,privatecompaniesand

universities(Table1).Foradeepunderstandingoftheconﬂictsthe

casestudiesareexaminedthroughcontentanalysis.

Thereasonsandproposalsare discussedoncase ﬁndingsby

referringtorelatedliterature.Thefollowingﬁndingsincludeboth

actors’perspectivesandourobservations.

3.2. Reasonsforconﬂicts

Conﬂictsin threeLULU casesin ˙Izmir arecaused by several

substantiveandproceduralfactors.Insubstantiveandprocedural

distinctionbysubstantivewemeanthereasonsdependingon

out-comesandbyproceduralwemeanthereasonsonprocessesasin

thedistributionalandproceduraljusticedistinction(Been,1994;

Cutter,1995).Whilethesubstantivereasonsarebasedon

charac-teristicsofLULUssuchastypes,locations,impactsofthemandtheir

economicorpoliticaloutcomes,theproceduralreasonsarerelated

withdecisionmakingprocesssuchasdecisionmakingapproach,

technicalprocedures,roleofactorsintheprocess.

3.2.1. Substantivereasons

OnecategoryofsubstantivereasonsforconﬂictsareLULUtype

relatedreasonsincludingthreeissues:(i)someLULUtypesare

pri-vateinvestments,soconceivedasawayofgettingprivaterevenue

fromnaturalresourcesasin ﬁsheryand quarrycases,(ii)some

typesarenotconsideredasnecessitiesforthecommunity(i.e.

ﬁsh-eries),(iii)forsomeLULUtypesalthoughtheyarenotconsidered

asproblemthemselves,theiradditionalfacilitiesareopposedby

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Fig.2. LocationsofthreeconﬂictfacingLULUsin ˙Izmir(producedbyauthorsonGoogleEarthimage).

AsecondsubstantivereasonisLULUlocation.Puttingafacility

inthewronglocationisoneofthefailuresofthesitingprocesses

(O’Hareetal.,1983).Locationbasedconﬂictcreatingissuesare(i)

geologic,topographicandothernaturalcharacteristicsofthesites

hostingLULUsasinﬁsheriesinclosedbaysorsolidwastefacilities

insiteswithpermeablegrounds,(ii)LULUsnearsensitivelanduses

suchasresidentialarea,agriculturalland,forestsandolivegroves

(i.e.solidwastefacilityproposalnearTahtalıBasinConservation

AreainMenderes,quarryproposalnearantiquecityinAhmetbeyli

andﬁsheriesnearfertilityzonesofsealsinKaraburun),(iii)LULUs

closetoadministrativeboundariesmayaffectthepeopleresiding

inneighboringsettlementsandnotconsideredindecisionmaking

processes(i.e.ﬁsheriesinSı˘gacıklocatedinUrlaboundaries),(iv)

thepossibilityoflosingthepositiveimageofthedistrictorcity(i.e.

CittaSlowimageinSı˘gacık),(v)LULUslocatedonprivatelyowned

landsobjectedbythoseowners(i.e.solidwastefacilityinÖdemis¸).

ThethirdsubstantivereasonisbasedonLULUimpactssuchas

impacttoecosystem,environmentalpollution,possiblediseases

causedbypollution,dust,noise,odorproblems,visualpollution,

environmentalstress,trafﬁcproblems andpsychologicaleffects

(i.e.odorandmosquitoproblems,seagulls,explosionriskofthe

existing disposalsite in Harmandalı, poured waste fromwaste

transfervehicles,proximity oftheproposedsolid wastefacility

topublicsportsareaandyouthcenterinYamanlarinsolidwaste

facilities;seapollution,eradicationofspecies,damagetosealsand

disturbanceofquietnessinﬁsheries;anddustandvibrations,

pos-sibledamageto1000yearsoldtreesinKaynaklar,anincreasein

cancercasesinYa˘gcılar,electricalenergycuts,damageinroadsin

quarries;economiccostsincludingvaluelostinlands,effecttolocal

sectorssuchasﬁshingandlivestockfarming).

The fourth reason is related with

politicalandeconomicexpectationsandoutcomes (Campbell

etal., 2000).Somegroups havingdifferentpolitical approaches

than IMM opposed to theirproposals (i.e. solid waste facility).

Similarly, groups having different political positions than the

centralgovernmentopposedtotheactionsoftheirpolicies(i.e.

quarries).Competinginterestsofvarioussectors(i.e.ﬁsheriesvs.

tourism),rivalcompaniesof thesamesector (i.e.quarries)and

expectationofpersonaleconomicgainsincreasedLULUconﬂicts.

3.2.2. ProceduralReasons

Procedural reasons affect conﬂicts as much as LULU

char-acteristics based reasons. One of the procedural reasons is

the decisionmakingapproach. The top-down decision making

approaches causeconﬂicts (Roggeet al.,2011).Local peoplein

many cases criticized the top-down approaches describing as

decision making “from theirofﬁces” or “from Ankara”without

investigatingorseeingthesite.AnintervieweefromKemalpas¸a

Municipalitysaid:“Itisnotaskedtolocal.WhenonlyAnkara

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canimmediatelycompletetheirworks.Mostly,local(people),local

governmentandmunicipalityshouldbeactive.”

Conﬂictsaboutdecisionmakersareseveral.Whileinsolidwaste

caseslocal intervieweesthink that“the mayorand hisfriends”

decide,inﬁsheriesandquarriesprotestorscriticizetheprocessas

theprivatecompaniesdecidethelocationsoftheirinvestments.

Anotherissueisabouttheinvolvementoftheplannersasdecision

makers.Somegroupscriticizedthedecisionmakinglacking

plan-nerswhichisperceivedtoresultwithsiteselectionsinappropriate

toplanningobjectives.Insolidwastefacilitycases,previous

deci-sionsweremadewithinaplanningprocessinwhichplannersonly

controlthedecisionsmadebyengineers;whereasrecentdecisions

weremadebyacommissionincludingplanners.Ontheotherhand,

inﬁsheryandquarrycasesthesiteselectionprocessesdepended

onpermissionsandthelocationsdidnothavetobeincludedin

urbanplans.Therewasnoroleforplannerinpracticeofﬁsheries

andquarries.TheparticipationmeetingsinEnvironmentalImpact

Assessment(EIA)processaretoldtobesymbolicbysome

oppo-nents.An academicianfromFaculty of Fisheriesmentioned his

negativeimpressionaboutthismeetingas:

“MinistryofEnvironmentorganizedameeting(todecidepotential

locationsforﬁsheries)inC¸es¸me.Allstakeholdersattendedtothe

meeting.MarineCounsellorship,ProvincialDirectorateof

Agricul-ture,Military...Theworkshoptookthreedays.Inthelastday,a

counselorfromAnkaracameandannouncedthetextinhishand.9

EylülUniversitywasthere.IwasparticipatedfromEgeUniversity.

Everythingwasalie.Theyputallthestakeholderstogetherand

thenamancomesandmakesatextaccepted.Andhesays‘isthere

anyacceptersandrejecters?’.Theyexcludeduniversitiesfromthe

signaturelist.Suchantidemocratic...”

Lackofopenandtransparentprocessesalsofacewithconﬂict.

SomeopponentsofsolidwastefacilitiescriticizedtheIMMnotto

betransparentinsiteselectionprocessofsolidwastefacilities(i.e.

Bornova).

Technicalproceduresanddeﬁcienciesareotherprocedural

rea-sons.Someconﬂictsemergedbecauseofthelackofinvestigation

according tosome groups. In Bornova solid waste facility case

someactorsweresuspiciousaboutthecriteriaofconsideringwind

andsundirectionsinsiteselection.InMenemensolidwastecase

site selection was blamed tobe doneby looking fromGoogle.

SomeLULUsfacedconﬂictsbecauseoftemporaldeﬁciencieslike

weaknessesinmeetingdeadlines(Kunreutheretal.,1991,1993;

Andrew,2001),beinglateintheirsitedecisionsortimeofinforming

localpeople.AnalternativesitetoHarmandalısolidwastefacility

shouldbefoundbeforeitscapacityexpired.Anothertechnical

deﬁ-ciencyistheinconsistencywithexistingplans/regulations.Assome

landusedecisionsaremadeincrementally(i.e.solidwaste

facili-ties)oronlywithpermissionsofsomeinstitutions(i.e.quarries)

theymaybeinconsistentwithupperscaleplans.

Roleofactorsintheprocessisalsoregardedasoneofthe

proce-duralreasons.Personaldifferencesareoneoftheimportantsources

ofconﬂicts(WhettenandCameron,2011).Characteristicsand

per-spectivesoftheactors,theirapproachestotheproblemandto

eachothercausevarietiesinapproacheswithinandbetweenactor

groups.

• Approachesofpartiestothereasonsofproblems:opponentgroups

usuallyfocusedontheeffectsofLULUstolocalpeople.Actors

fromIMMfocusedontechnologicaldevelopments.Therewere

both opposingand supportingactors frompublicinstitutions

whomainlyemphasizedtheconsistencywithregulations.While

someheadmen(electedofﬁcialsinvillagesordistricts,mukhtars)

toldthatﬁsheriesincreasedtheamountofﬁshhuntedbylocal

ﬁshermen,someotherstoldthattheyaffectedbadly.Private

sec-tor’scritiquesontheprocessweresimilarthattheyhadtoface

protests althoughtheyacted appropriate toregulations. They

calledforgovernmentinterventionandcontrolforsolvingthese

problems.

• Approaches of parties to the level of disputes: some parties

approached to conﬂicts asmovements of all peopleliving in

the district whereas some parties approached to conﬂicts as

small movements of a few shouting people (i.e. in C¸akmaklı

caseheadmantoldthatallvillagersopposetoquarrieswhereas

intervieweefrommunicipalitytoldthat10–15peopleopposeto

them).Prejudicewasalsoareasonofconﬂictsforsomeactors.As

LULUsare“unwanted”,hearingtheirnamesmaybeenoughfor

protestinginsomecases(i.e.solidwastefacility).

• Approachesof partiestootherparties:approachesexcludingor

forcing localpeople increasedconﬂicts.There wasa problem

aboutforcingandrudeapproachesinquarrycases.Eventhere

weresomeheadmenfacedwiththreatsofmineowners.Trust

ordistrustingovernmentalsoaffectstheemergenceofconﬂicts

(O’Hareetal.,1983;Baxteretal.,1999;IshizakaandTanaka,2003; Elliottetal.,2003;LamandWoo,2009).Whenlocalpeopledid

nottrusttodecisionmakersorthecompanies,theconﬂictsget

biggerandharder.Insomecases,localpeopledidnotbelievethat

theprecautionsinEIAreportswouldbetaken(i.e.quarries)and

thepromisedtechnologywouldbeused(i.e.solidwastefacility).

Allgroupsstateddistrustasunderlyingfactorofconﬂicts.The

distrustisusuallyrelatedwithexistingbadexamplessuchasthe

proximityofsolidwastefacilityinHarmandalıtoresidentialareas

becauseofthedevelopmentpermissionsgiven afterits

estab-lishment,theirregularandtechnologicallypoorﬁsherieslocated

inshallowwaterbeforetheregulation,andquarriespermitted

withouttechnicalexpertsandenvironmentalprecautionsbythe

previousregulation.Aheadmanopposingoneoftherecentcases

ofthesolidwastefacilityexplainedtheiroppositionreason:

“Weprotested.Why?Becauseofthat ˙IzmirMetropolitan

Munici-palitydidnotfulﬁllthepromises.Forexample,levelcrossingand

overpasswerenotbuilt.(...)Wewillnotbeopposedintheevent

thatMunicipalitywilldo(waste)facilitiesashe(theMayor)said.

Itwillhavebeneﬁtsforthedistrict.Weareagainstthisbecausewe

donottrustMunicipality.”

Onthecontrary,anotheropponentintervieweeinthesamecase

toldthattherewasnodistrustandIMMhaddonethenecessary

feasibility.

• Effect of political actors: politicization of development issues

(Bassettetal.,2002),lackofbalancebetweenparties(Andrew,

2001) and siting decisions inﬂuenced by political pressures

(O’Hareetal.,1983)causeconﬂicts.Theinvolvementofpowerful

politicalactorstomanipulatethedecisionsinbothsiteselection

andconﬂictprocessesincreasedthelocalmovementsinthecases.

It issaidthat potentialﬁshery locationsaredecidedbythose

actors.Also,MinistersexplainedthatTorbalıwasnotsuitablefor

solidwastefacility.Changeindecisionsthroughthose

interven-tionsarosethequestionofwhytheychangedwithpoliticalpower

iftheywerescientiﬁcallysuitable.

• Effectofmedia:theroleofmediainconﬂicts(Bassettetal.,2002;

Roggeetal.,2011)hadtwo-foldeffectsincasestudies.First,it

increasedtheeffectivenessandrecognitionofthelocal

move-mentsandprotests.Second,itspreadbiasednewsdirectedby

powerfulsectorgroups(i.e.ﬁsheries).

• Characteristicsofthecitizensin ˙Izmir:peoplelivingin ˙Izmir

dif-feredfrommany othercitiesin thecountryin termsof their

responsesandlevelofbeingoriented. Someintervieweestold

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problems;theywouldﬁghtfortheirrights,takepartinprotests

fearlesslyandlearnthewaysofgettingtheirrights.

• Actors’levelofknowledge:theeffectofinadequateinformation

inconﬂicts(O’Hareetal.,1983;Roggeetal.,2011;Whettenand

Cameron,2011)interpretedinseveralwaysincasestudies.Some

partiestoldthatthepeoplewhoknowtheirrightsparticipate

inprotestsandotherswithoutknowledgedonot.Ontheother

hand,someparties toldthattheyprotestbecausetheydonot

knowthetechnology(i.e.solidwastefacility)orcharacteristics

offacilities(i.e.ﬁsheries).Thelessinformationandknowledge

interestgroupshaveabouttheissue,thebiggerproblemsget.In

ﬁsherycases,somepartiesincludinguniversity,publicinstitution

andprivatesectorblamedopponentstohavewrongknowledge

abouttheﬁsheriesandtheireffectstoseas.Anengineerfrom

ProvincialDirectorateofAgriculturementioned:

“(People opposeto ﬁsheries)because theyarewronginformed.

Becausetheythinkitpollutes;thatistheapparentreason.Thereal

reasonistheshareofplaceandnottodominatethatplace.The

coastusersdonotwant.Thereisnothingscientiﬁcthatﬁsheries

createpollution.Thereisknowledgepollutioninthissubject.The

expertsofthissubjectdonotsayitpollutes.”

3.3. Resolvingconﬂicts:whatisdone,whatshouldbedonefor

˙Izmircases?

LULUconﬂictscanbeminimizedandresolvedbyusingseveral

strategies.Casestudiesareanalyzedtoclarifywhetherdecision

makersusedthesestrategies.Therearesomeattempts of

deci-sionmakerstominimizeandresolveconﬂicts.Howeverinallcases

theseattemptswerefoundinsufﬁcientbythemajority.The

follow-ingpartpresentsmainstrategiesappliedbythedecisionmakers

andthendiscussesappropriateproposalsforcasestudies.

Themainconﬂictminimizationandresolutionstrategiescanbe

categorizedintwogroups:

3.3.1. Strategiesbasedontechnicalandethicalconcerns

(i)Recognitionofconﬂicts is the preliminary step for solution

(Forester,1999);however,someintervieweesfromdecision

makinginstitutionsincasestudiesunconsciouslytoldthatthe

processwassuccessfulandsmooth.Decisionmakersshouldbe

awareofthereasonsforconﬂicts,conﬂictingpartiesandtheir

interests.

(ii)Consideringtechnicalcriteria is a requirement for

compe-tentsitingpractices(Nordenstam,1994;Elliottetal.,2003).

Decisionmakersinallcasespaidattentiontotechnical

require-mentsforthefacilitiesbuthadweaknessesinadditionalethical

principlesandparticipatoryapproacheswhicharedetailedin

thefollowingparts.

(iii)Principlesoftrustandequity: besidetechnical criteria there

isalsoaneedforfulﬁllingtheprinciplesoftrustandequity

to minimize conﬂicts about LULUs (O’Hare et al., 1983;

Kunreutheretal.,1991,1993;Nordenstam,1994;Elliottetal., 2003; Llurdes etal., 2003).TheLULU site selection criteria

weretechnical;therefore,lackingtheequityprinciple.

How-ever,therewerenoproofsofinequityinallcases.Developing

trustwasalsoalackingprincipleinthesethreesitingprocesses.

(iv)Considerationofpost-sitingandexternaleffects (Been,1994;

Klosterman, 2003) andusingmitigationmeasures (Lam and

Woo,2009)areessentialforconﬂictminimization.Decision

makerstendtoimprovetheconditionsoftheexistingfacilities

(i.e.rehabilitationprojectforHarmandalısolidwastefacility,

transferofquarriesinBelkahvetoamoreacceptablelocation

withoutavisualpollutionandtransferofﬁsheriestodeeper

water) andprefertousenewtechnologytosolveconﬂicts.

Thereshouldbefurtherprecautionsforexternaleffectsand

regularcontrols.

(v)Community opposition can be prevented by

consideringthelocalconcerns(LamandWoo,2009).Interests

oflocalpeopleareexcludedfromthecurrentdecisionmaking

processesinmanycasesforﬁsheriesandquarries.Itshould

betheresponsibilityof publicinstitutionstoconsiderlocal

needsandinterests.

(vi)Multi-disciplinaryapproaches (Nordenstam, 1994) and

multi-criteriaanalysismethods(Vasiloglou,2004;Banaretal.,

2006;Ekmekciogluetal.,2010)arerequiredfor technically

competentdecisions.EIAprocessinvolvesvariousdisciplines;

however,plannersare excludedfromprocessesof ﬁsheries

andquarries.AstheLULUconceptrelatesvariousdisciplines

suchassociology,economy,environmentalmanagementand

planning,theirexpertsshouldbeinvolvedindecisionmaking

processandtheircriteriashouldbeconsidered.

(vii) Comprehensivenessinapproachingtotheproblemisneeded

topreventconﬂicts.Locationdecisionsofcasestudiesaremade

withanincrementalapproach.Suchlargepublicservice

deci-sionsshouldbemadewithintheplanningofthewholecity;

thus,furtherdevelopmentpermissionsandneighboring

dis-trictswouldnotbeaproblem.

(viii)Alternativezoningtechniques(Roberts,1988;Levy,2000)may

facilitateminimizingconﬂicts.Landuseplanningregulations

inTurkeyaresostrictthatdonotprovidechancesforthem.

Withsuchtools,hostingcommunitiesmaygetsomeincentives

aboutdensities,theirdevelopmentrightsmaybetransferred,

somecontractsmayspecifytherequirementsforLULUs,and

someimpactfeesmaybepaidforlocalcosts.

(ix)Among various forms of compensation stated in literature

(O’Hareetal.,1983;LamandWoo,2009;Chiouetal.,2011;

Lesbirel,2011),casestudiesin ˙Izmirusedstrategies

includ-ingprovidingawantedlanduse,bargainingthroughmoney

and improvement of facilities, and suggesting gifts. Money

paymentsareunlikelytosolveoppositionsdependingon

inter-ests‘notforsale’asO’Hareetal.(1983)mentioned.Decision

makersshould“focus onbargainingratherthangift-giving”

(O’Hareetal.,1983).Asthegiftsweregivenwithout

query-ingtheexactinterestsoftheopposinggroups,thispointﬁt

Fainstein(2000)critiqueofnegotiationsincludingresults

sat-isﬁedtheonlysymbolicbeneﬁtsbecauseofthreatandbias

intheprocess.Besides,negotiatedcompensationafter

fulﬁll-ingthemitigationandcontrolmeasuresmayimproveconﬂict

resolutionprocesses (O’Hare etal.,1983; Kunreutheretal.,

1993).

3.3.2. Strategiesbasedonparticipatoryprocess

(i)Publicparticipation,deliberationandlearning: the ongoing

decisionmakingprocessesofmanyLULUsinTurkeyissimilar

tothe“decide-announce-defend”process(Ducsik,1978,cited

inO’Hareetal.,1983;Forester,1999).However,itisawrong

waytochoosea‘bestsite’andadvocateit(O’Hareetal.,1983).

TheintervieweefromMenemenLeftBankIrrigationAssociation

hadasimilaropinioninwhichhesaid

“MetropolitanMunicipalityshouldnotdecidealone.Theyshould

ensureconsultationwithnongovernmentalorganizationsandlocal

administrators.Onelocationisnotenough.It(wastefacility)should

beinfour different locations. Opinionsof everybodyshouldbe

taken.Ifwelivetogetherweshoulddecidetogether.Conﬂict

reso-lutionshouldhavecompromise.”

Participatoryapproaches(Kunreutheretal.,1991;Nordenstam,

1994; Baxter et al., 1999; Carpenter, 1999; Forester, 1999; Margerum,2002; Healey,2003)couldnotbesuccessfully

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man-AtayKaya,N.KayaErol/LandUsePolicy58(2016)83–94 89

agedbydecisionmakersinthecasestudies.Indeed,theongoing

regulationsdonotrequireparticipatoryplanningprocessesexcept

EIAprocess.Theregulationsweremainguidesfordecisionmakers.

Theoppositionswerenotconsideredwhentheprocessislegally

competent.EIAprocessisseenasasuccessfulparticipatory

pro-cessbysomegroupswhileforsomeothersthisparticipationwas

forthesakeofformalitybutnotanefﬁcientone.Someopponents

criticizedtheprocessinwhichprivatecompaniestook‘EIAisnot

needed”reportbyshowingtheircapacitieslower.

Asstatedintheproceduralreasonsforconﬂicts,the

participa-toryaspectsofthemeeting forpotentialﬁsherylocationswere

indoubt.Althoughvariouspartiestookpartandaprotocolwas

signed,theinterviewsfrompublicinstitutions,universityand

pri-vatesectorcriticizedtheprocessandtoldthatnegotiateddecisions

oftheparticipantswerenotapprovedbutthetextbroughtbya

counselorwassigned.Thesenegativejudgementsshowedthatthe

successoftheparticipatorydecisionmakingattemptforﬁsheries

wasquestionable.

IntervieweesfromIMM haddifferentviews onparticipatory

conﬂictresolution.Whileoneexpertpromotedparticipatory

pro-cesses,anotheradvocatedthatthedecisionmakerhasarightto

selectthesite;thereforethereisnoneedtocompromisewithlocal

peopleifthesitefulﬁllstechnicaldetailsandregulations.Similarly,

anotherintervieweestatedthattherewouldbenosolutionifthe

processisparticipatoryandanothersaidthattherewouldbepeople

whocannotbeconvincedwhicheverparticipatorymodelisused.

Theseperspectivesmightbethereasonof lackingparticipatory

approachesinsolidwastecases.Theirattemptsincludeﬁeldtrips

andsitevisitswhichareregardedasfactorspreparingindividuals

toparticipatebyCarpenter(1999).IMMorganizedsitevisitsfor

ChambersanduniversitiesandatriptoGermanyforgood

exam-ples.Theseattemptsincreasepositiveopinionsandovercomethe

conﬂictreasonbasedonexistingbadexamples.

Foreffectivedeliberationthereisaneedforconsideringboth

substantiveissuesandproceduralissuestogether(Forester,1999).

Decisionmakersinall ˙Izmircasestriedtosolveconﬂictsbymostly

consideringsubstantivereasons.InsolidwastefacilitycasesIMM

attemptedtopersuadeopponentsbyfocusingonthetechnology

andqualityofthenewfacility.Inquarrycasesthereare

improve-mentsofthebadconditionssuchasdecreasingdustbyusingwater

orrehabilitationoftheareaafterleaving.Inﬁsherycasesdecision

makerstriedtoexplainthattheﬁsheriesdidnotpollutetheseas.

Manydecisionmakersin ˙Izmircasesdonotconsiderprocedural

problemsanddonotproposeproceduralsolutionsenough.

(ii)Collaborationandconsensusbuilding:collaborativeprocesses

bringingstakeholderstogethertoreachconsensusagreement

ondecisionsarepromotedinseveraltheories(Kunreutheretal.,

1991;InnesandBooher,1999;Elliottetal.,2003;Cullenetal.,

2010).Whilesomeattemptsapproximatingtheseapproaches

aretriedincasestudies,mostofthemfailedbecauseofusing

themafterthedecisions.Face-to-faceinteractionamong

stake-holdersisarequirementofconsensusbuilding(Susskindand

Cruikshank,1987,2006).Communicationwithstakeholdersas

astrategyforcompetentsitingpractices(Nordenstam,1994;

Elliottetal.,2003)wasusedinallthreecases;however,itwas

doneafterthedecisionmade.IMMorganizedsomeface-to-face

meetingswithlocalpeopleandchamberstosolvetheconﬂicts

about proposed location of new solid waste facility;

how-ever,theaimofthesemeetingswereinformingtheopponents

aboutdecisionsratherthanbuildingaconsensusona

mutu-allyacceptable decision.Chamber ofCityPlanners toldthat

thesemeetingshadonlyapersuasionaimaftermaking

deci-sionsandmainfocuswasontechnologyratherthanlocation.

Nevertheless,itisastepforsolutionintermsofstakeholder

involvement.Ontheotherhand,somelocalpeoplethoughtthe

MayorofIMMhadcollaborationsuggestions;forexamplean

interviewedheadmantoldthat:“Thewasteof ˙Izmir...He(the

MayorofIMM)hadtoﬁndawayout.Heaskedforhelpviamedia.

Hesaid“let”sﬁndalocationtogether’.”

Collaboratingapproachismorepreferableinreachingall-gain

agreements than theother kinds ofapproaches including

forc-ing,accommodating,avoiding and compromising(Whetten and

Cameron,2011);howeverincasestudiesofallthreeLULUs,

par-tiesdidnothavethisapproachandtheyhadavoiding,forcingand

compromisingapproaches accordingtointerviewees.Anexpert

takingpartinEIAprocessasapublicofﬁcerexplainedapproaches

ofprivatesectoronconﬂictresolutionwiththesewords

“Entrepreneurstrytoﬁndawayforsolutionwhentheyfeelthe

response.Theysay that‘we shalllistento the publicand their

desires’.However,therearealsosomeofthemwhodonotmake

this.Therearethosewhosay‘thisismyrightinregulationsandI

willdothis’.Therearethosewhosearchforcollaborationwithlocal

people.”

Givingupisakindofaccommodatingapproachinwhichthe

party neglectsits ownneedsand attempts tosatisfytheneeds

of other parties (Whetten and Cameron, 2011). Some location

decisionsweregivenupbydecisionmakersandsomelocal

inter-vieweesregardedthisattemptasasolution.Somedecisionmakers

toldthatcancellationofthedecisionswerenottheresultofprotests

buttheresultoftechnicalorlegaldeﬁciencies.Besides,thereis

aneffectofpoliticalinterventionsinthecancellationofdecisions

and approachesof partiesin theconﬂicts.Aninterviewee from

Kars¸ıyakaMunicipalityexplainedthisfortheYamanlarcase:

“Maybe,the centralofﬁce (ofthe political party)will say ‘stop

thisdispute’andtheissuewillﬁnish.Itmaynotbedone.Another

locationmaybesearched.Wecannotguesswhathappensin

pol-itics.Otherwise,MetropolitanMunicipalityisinsisting.Karsıyaka

Municipalityisopposing.Compromisewillhappenonlyifthereis

apoliticalthing(intervention).”

Consensus buildingincreased the possibility and success of

implementationofthedecisionwithitsattemptofﬁndingmutual

gain solutions (Susskindet al., 1999;Susskind and Cruikshank,

2006).Thereweresomeimplementationproblemsincase

stud-iesespeciallyinsolidwastefacilityandquarryproposalswhich

arecancelledagainandagain.Suchproblemsmaybesolvedwith

consensusbuildingprocesses.

Factorsaffectingthesuccessofconsensusbuildingbadlyinclude

complexity and number of issues and people, threats (Elliott,

1999), metropolitanscale (Fainstein, 2000), distrustand lackof

willingness to participate, contextual issues including cultural

and social factors (Carpenter, 1999), perceptions on consensus

buildingasa difﬁcultandtime-consumingprocessandexternal

barriersdisruptingtheprocess(SusskindandCruikshank,2006),

and power imbalances among stakeholders (Carpenter, 1999;

Fainstein,2000).(i)Thecasestudiessufferfromcomplexitywhere

the participantsin most of those disputes includedthe people

fromthe entiredistricts or villages. (ii)Thereare two casesin

whichheadmentoldaboutthreatsfromminingcompanies.(iii)

Besides thesebarriers,participatoryprocesses face obstaclesin

metropolitanareasas ˙Izmirdoes. (iv)In thecase studies,some

opponentshavingnowillingnesstoparticipatetoldthattheywill

nevergiveuptheiropposingpositions.Besides,someinterviewees

frompublicinstitutionstoldthatwhenthedecisionswere

techni-callycompetenttherewillbenothingtobediscussedwithlocal

people.Miningcompanieshavingtheirrightsand powers from

existing legalproceduresdo notmostly wanttonegotiate.This

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byCarpenter(1999).(v)Theethnic,racial,religiousoreconomic

backgroundsofintervieweeswerenotaskedinthecasestudies

butthereweresomecluesshowingthisvarietyandtheeffectof

contextualissues.Forexample,oneheadmantoldthatthe

quar-riesweresupportedbylowincomegroupstogetfreematerials

fromthecompanies;anotherheadmantoldthat thepeoplenot

opposing to quarries were from an ethnically minority group.

(vi)Interviewed decision makersin thecase studies think that

theprocesseswouldbedifﬁcultandtime-consuming if allactors

participate.(vii)Powerimbalancesamongstakeholdersaffectthe

qualityofconsensusbuildingprocessinﬁsheryandquarrycases.

Someintervieweessufferedfromtheeffectofpowerfultourism

sectorinmediaandorganizationoflocalpeopleagainstﬁsheries.

Theconsensus point shouldbe rethought herein terms of the

qualityofdecisions.Arethedecisionssuccessfulwhenthereare

noopponents?Whatiftherearequietedopposingvoices?Then,

governmentauthorityindecisionmakingandconﬂictresolution

processesofLULUsis aneedtoprovidetheconsiderationofall

voicesinthecommunityonlyifthegovernmentissociallysensitive.

Foraneffectiveprocess,facilitiesshouldbelicensedafter

nego-tiations produce written ‘siting agreements’ as legal contracts

betweendecisionmakers,developersandthecommunity(O’Hare

etal.,1983;Kunreutheretal.,1991,1993;SusskindandCruikshank,

2006). Thereare no suchwritten documentsproduced in case

studiesin ˙Izmir.Indeed,licensingproceduresdonotrequiresuch

agreements.Thetimingandrequirementsofthelicensing

proce-duresshouldberearranged.Theneedforawrittencommitmentis

emphasizedinaninterviewwithaheadmanas

“IftheMetropolitanMunicipalitypromiseswithawritten

commit-mentthatit(thewastefacility)willhavelatesttechnologyanda

notarizedguaranteethattherewillbenoodor,localpeopleofthe

districtmaybepersuaded.”

(iii)Jointfact-ﬁnding: it increasestrust and decreases

disagree-mentsabouttechnical issues (Ehrmannand Stinson, 1999).

Thereisadisagreementaboutinformationincasestudies.In

Yamanlarsolidwastefacilitycase,bothdecisionmakerand

opponentmunicipalitieshiredtechnicalexpertisefrom

uni-versitiesaboutsuitabilityorunsuitabilityofthefacility.Also,

inﬁsherycasesthereisadisagreementonpollutingornot

pol-lutingeffectsofﬁsheries.AheadmanfromKaraburunstated

thatthecourtexpertinvestigatingtheﬁsherieswas“aman

ofthecompany”andgaveareportinfavorofthecompany.

Theheadmandidnottrustthereportsofeventheexpertsof

thecourt.ThissituationﬁtstheprocessthatO’haredescribed

as“opponentsoftenclaimthatthelocalofﬁcialsare‘inbed’

withthedevelopers”.Therefore,inclusionofthepartiesinto

thefactﬁndingprocesswouldsolvetrustproblemsintermsof

technicalissues.

(iv)Mediatorsandfacilitators: they support dispute resolution

processes (Forester, 1999; Susskind et al., 1999; Elliott,

1999;Straus,1999;McCorkleandReese,2005;Susskindand Cruikshank,2006)especially incases sufferingproblems of

communicationandtrust(Elliott,1999)asinthecasestudies

in ˙Izmir.Therearesomeinformaltypesofmediationusedby

severalpartiessuchaspublicinstitutionsandpoliticalactors.

AnintervieweefromProvincialDirectorateexempliﬁedthese

interventionsinquarrycaseswiththesewords

“Whenlocalpeopleclosetheroadstohinderthefacilitiesofmine

quarriesandpreventvehiclestowork,bureaucratsandpoliticians

intervenesandensuresthecollaborationbetweenlocalpeopleand

managersofminesandquarries.”

Forester(1999) stated professional servicesﬁrms doing this

mediationand facilitation;however,thistype ofﬁrmsdoesnot

existinTurkeybutthereareadvisorybureausservingfor

provid-ingexpertknowledgeratherthanservingmediationorfacilitation.

There are recent attempts to increase mediation processes in

Turkeysince theapprovalof relatedlaw (No.6325)in 2012.A

MediationDirectorateisestablishedinMinistryofJustice.Anew

professionof mediators started tosolveconﬂicts alternativeto

courts.Howeveritis differentfromwhatForestertoldbecause

ofseveralreasons:itisapublicinstitutionnotaprivateﬁrmor

nonproﬁtorganization,mediatorsareselectedfromonly

gradu-atesoflawfaculties,anddisputesrelatedwithpublicinterestsand

requiringdiscoveryandexpertassistancearenotallowedtobe

solvedwithmediationprocessandcourtdecisionsareneededfor

suchsituations.Thereforetheexistingmediationinstitutionseems

notsuitableforsolvingLULUdisputesandplannerscannotactas

mediatorswithintheongoingproceduresandlegislation.Planners

shouldbeincludedinmediationprocessinTurkey.

3.4. Evaluation:intensityofconﬂicts

Conﬂictsinthe27LULUcasesin ˙Izmirhadbothsimilaritiesand

differences.Maincharacteristicsofthecasesaresummarizedin

Table2.Thedistinguishingcharacteristicsand reasonsforthese

conﬂictsaffectedtheirintensitiesandresults.

Partiesinvolvedintheconﬂictsmainlychangedtheintensity

ofconﬂicts.Theamountofprotesters,thevarietiesofpartiesand

theirorganizationlevelaffectthedurationofdisputesandtheway

theyarehandledbythedecisionmakers.Theconﬂicts incases

withrelativelysmallamountoflocalprotesters(i.e.quarrycases

ofC¸akmaklı,C¸ambelandÖzbek,andsolid wastefacility caseof

Ödemis¸)werenotasintenseastheconﬂictsincasessupported

byexternalgroupsandfamouspeople(i.e.ﬁsherycaseofSı˘gacık).

Theintensityattractedmediaandtheeffectofmediaincreased

theamountofpeopleinvolved(i.e.thesecondaryhousing

own-ers)andtheintensityofconﬂictsinSı˘gacıkcase.Besides,organized

protestersestablishinginitiativesincreasedtheconsiderationof

theirinterestsbydecision makers(i.e.solidwastefacilitycases

ofTas¸kesikandKaynaklar,andquarrycaseofÖzbek).Theways

ofshowingoppositionandthestrategiesusedbyopposing

peo-plehadaneffectonresultsofconﬂicts.Forinstance,protesters

applyingforconservationdecisionstocancelquarryproposalsin

Gökdere,AhmetbeyliandKösederemanagedtostoptheunwanted

decisions.

Impactsandintensityofconﬂictshadmutualeffects.Whereas

tiring and psychological effects increased the intensityof

con-ﬂicts(i.e.solidwastefacilitycase ofHarmandalı, ﬁsherycaseof

Sı˘gacıkandquarrycaseofYa˘gcılar),theintensityincreasedpolitical

lossesinsolidwastefacilitycasesandeconomiccoststo

compa-niesinﬁsheryandquarrycases.Theunusualimpactonheadman

threatenedbyminingcompanydecreasedthepossibilityofconﬂict

resolutionbecauseoftenserelationshipsinonequarrycase.

Theintensityofconﬂictsisalsorelatedwithreasons.Whenthe

impactsofLULUsgotworse(i.e.extremedamagesinquarrycaseof

Germiyaninwhichstonesburstfromquarriescametoschool

gar-denanddamagedthewallsandwindowsofhouses),theopposing

voicesgotraised.Notonlylocalimpactsbutalsogeneral

environ-mentaleffects(i.e.eradicationofspecies)increasedtheintensity

ofconﬂictsbyinclusionofexternalenvironmentalgroupsinthe

process(i.e.ﬁsherycaseofSı˘gacık).

Thereasonstakingplaceinlegislationshadastrongeffecton

cancellationofLULUdecisionsandresolutionofconﬂicts,atleast

forawhile.ProximitytoolivegrovesstoppedtheLULUproposals

insomecases(i.e.quarrycaseofYa˘gcılarandsolidwastefacility

ofTas¸kesik);however,thesecancellationsdonotsolvethe

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Table2

IndexofConﬂictsinCaseStudies.

Conﬂicts Cases

Inall3LULUcases Insolidwastefacilitycases Inﬁsherycases Inquarrycases Partiesintheprocess - Publicinstitutions,hosting

orneighboring

municipalities,localpeople, NGOs,privatesectorand universities

- MetropolitanMunicipality - Localﬁshermen,secondary housingownersandtourism sector

- Rivalcompaniesas supportersofprotesters

Waysofshowingopposition - Mobilizations,petitions, lawsuits,attractingmedia attention

- Establishinganinitiative group,contactingwith Ministersandclosingroads

- DisturbingEIAmeetings, keepingguardinthesea

- Establishingcivilinitiatives, applyingforconservation decisionstocancelquarry proposals

Reasonsforconﬂicts - EffectsofLULUsdepending ontypeandlocation, especiallywhenthereare sensitiveneighboringland uses(pollution,health effects,etc.)

- Top-downdecisionmaking processfullofinvestigation deﬁciencies

- SymbolicparticipationinEIA process

- Involvementofpowerful politicalactorsto manipulatethedecisions - Temporaldeﬁciencies - Inconsistencywithupper

scaleplans

- Lackofknowledgeabout technologyand characteristicsofLULUs - Effectofmedia - Prejudice - Distrust

- Existingbadexamples

- Exclusionofaffectedpeople outofformalboundaries - Planners’exclusionin

decisionmakingprocess - Disagreementabout

pollutingeffects

- Expectingjobopportunities

- Planners’exclusionin decisionmakingprocess - Forcingapproachesof

companies

- Expectingjobopportunities andpersonaleconomic beneﬁts

Impactsofconﬂicts - Fear,psychologicaleffects, invectivestopublicofﬁcers

- Politicallosses - Economiccoststocompanies - Economiccoststocompanies andthreatstoheadmenby miningcompanies SolutionAttempts - EIApublicmeetings

- Consideringtechnical criteria

- Communicationwithparties butafterthedecisionmade - EIAreportsignedbyvarious

expertsfromvarious disciplines

- Rehabilitationofexistingsite andproposinga

“prestigious”recreational area

- Proposinganewfacilitywith improvedtechnology - Face-to-facemeetingswith

localpeopleandchambers butforpersuasion - Sitevisitswithchambers

anduniversity - Atripabroadforgood

examples

- Participatorymeetingfor potentialsitesbutfullof criticism

- Transfertodeeperwater

- Transfertomoreacceptable locations

- Proposing“wanted”facilities suchascafé

- Givingmoney

- Promisingexplosionhours, dustpreventionsystemsand repairingofthedamaged roads

- Proposinggiftstolocal peoplesuchasinvestments totheschoolsormosques, constructionmaterialsand employmentopportunities

licensesfor aneighboring areaagainand theconﬂictremained

unsolved).Proceduralreasonsincludingdistrust,lackofknowledge

andtop-downdecisionmakingprocessalsoaffectedtheintensity

ofconﬂicts.Theinvolvementofpowerfulpoliticalactorsand

Minis-tersintheprocess(i.e.solidwastefacilityofTas¸kesik)increasedthe

recognitionoftheconﬂictsoutofurbanboundaries.Ontheother

hand,theconﬂictsinvolvinglocalpeopleexpectingjob

opportu-nitiesandpersonaleconomicbeneﬁtscouldbesolvedrelatively

easierbyusingattemptsofseveralcompensationtypessuchas

proposinggiftstolocalpeoplesuchasinvestmentstotheschools

ormosques,constructionmaterialsandemploymentopportunities

(i.e.somequarrycases).

Thereweremanysolutionattemptsofdecisionmakers

decreas-ingtheintensityofconﬂicts.Transfertodeeperwaterinﬁshery

casesandtransfertomoreacceptablelocationsinquarrycasesare

examples.Atripabroadforgoodexamplesinsolidwastefacility

caseof Tas¸kesikwasseenasanattemptdecreasingconﬂictsby

someintervieweeswhereassomeotherintervieweestolditmade

nodifference.

It would be reduced evaluation to say one LULU type was

moreintensethanother;however,thereareseveralcircumstances

explainingintensitycomparisonof3LULUtypesin ˙Izmir.Interms

oftheyeartheprotestsstarted,quarries facedthelongest

con-ﬂictprocessstartedin1992withBelkahvecaseandsolvedin2010

withthetransferofquarries.Asanothercircumstancelocation

vari-etymadethesolidwastefacilitycaseshavingthemostintense

conﬂicts.Solidwastefacilitycasesfacedconﬂictsineverytrialof

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ﬁsh-92 AtayKaya,N.KayaErol/LandUsePolicy58(2016)83–94

eriesandquarriesfacedconﬂictsfordifferentlandusedecisionsin

theirownlocations.Intermsofhavingnationalandinternational

support,thefisherycasesgainedthefirstrankinconflictintensity

withSı˘gacıkcaseinwhichprotesterscamefromdifferentcitiesand

theItalian“fatherofCittaSlow”signedthe“nototunnyﬁsheries

inSı˘gacık”campaign.Indeed,conﬂictintensitieshadvarietiesin

casesinthesameLULUtypes.

4. Conclusion

TherearevariousreasonsforLULUconﬂictsin ˙Izmir.Findingsof

thecasestudiesdemonstratethatthereasonsforconﬂictsmainly

include external effects ofLULUs onlocalpeople byincreasing

density,pollutionandtrafﬁc;forinstanceodorofsolidwaste

facil-ities,visualpollutionofﬁsheriesanddustandvibrationeffectsof

quarries.ThemostusualsourceofconﬂictsaboutLULUsis

envi-ronmentalstress,becauseplanningis aboutresource allocation

and when there is anurban land scarcity,the localpeople act

againstlargeprojects.Decisionmakersinallcasespaidattention

totechnicalrequirementsforthefacilitieswithinlegalframework;

howeverthereareproblemsaboutproposedlocationswithin

sci-entiﬁcframework.Therearealsoproceduralreasonsforconﬂicts

includingtop-downdecisions,symbolicparticipation,lackof

inves-tigation,effectofpoliticalactors,inconsistencywithregulations

andlackoftransparentprocess.

Theconﬂictsresultednotonlywithnegativeandbutalsowith

positiveimpacts.Thenegativeimpactsarefear,tiringand

psycho-logicaleffects,negativeattitudestopublicofﬁcers,politicallosesof

decisionmakersandeconomiccostsduetomovingorclosingthe

facility.Positiveimpactsandsocialbeneﬁtsarewithdrawalofthe

wronglocationdecisionsonsensitiveareas,collectivelyactingof

localpeopleinvillages,personalandpoliticalbeneﬁts,increasein

organizationlevelofmobilizationsagainstLULUswiththesupport

ofNGOs,politicalactors,universitiesandprivatesector.

ComparativesurveyonthereasonsforconﬂictsonthreeLULU

typesin ˙Izmirindicatesthattherearebothvarietiesand

similari-ties.Whilesolidwastefacilitiesandquarriesareregardedasneeds,

ﬁsheriesareregardedas‘notnecessity’andunwantedbecauseof

this.Theimpactsofquarriesandsolidwastefacilitiesareperceived

morecertainthanthoseofﬁsheriessincethereisadisagreementin

thepollutingeffectsofﬁsheries.Theproceduralreasonsaresimilar

inallthreeLULUcasesexceptthelocalityoftheresponsible

insti-tutionandtheroleofplanner.Thesolid wastefacilitydecisions

aremadebyacommissionincludingplannersinlocalmunicipality

whereasﬁsheriesandquarriesproposedbyprivatecompaniesare

decidedwithpermissionsgivenbythepublicinstitutionsno

mat-terhavingaplanner.Theseproceduresincreaseconﬂictsinﬁshery

andquarrycases.

Foreffectivesolutionsubstantiveandproceduralissuesshould

beconsideredtogether.Decisionmakersinall ˙Izmircasesdidnot

payattentiontoproceduralreasonsasmuchassubstantivereasons.

Participatoryapproachescouldnotbesuccessfullymanagedasthe

regulationsdonotmandateparticipatoryprocesses.Thisdoesnot

meanthatnoeffortwasmade.Itisfoundthatsomeconﬂict

res-olutionmethodsareusedbydecisionmakersincludingattempts

suchascommunicationwithstakeholders,face-to-facemeetings

andengagementwithchambersandexpertsinsolidwastefacility

case,participatorymeetinginﬁsherycaseandsuggestinggiftsto

possiblelocalopponentsinquarrycase;however,theopponents

werenotsatisﬁedwiththeseattemptsas itwasdoneafterthe

decisionsmade.

Theparticipatoryapproachesinplanningprocessesmay

mini-mizeandresolveconﬂictsinsuchcasestudies.Theconﬂictfacing

location decisions may be renewed to minimize effects to the

environment,thesocietyandtheindividualsevenifnot

remov-ing all negative impacts. A process providing supportfrom all

related parties and ensuring theircomprehension of the

solu-tionopportunitiesandlimitationsmayresolveconﬂictsandbring

properdecisions.Inthiscontext,planners’responsibilitiesbecome

important asthey shouldinform and supportthe educationof

theparticipantstoplanningprocessandactasmediatorsin

con-ﬂictresolutionprocesses.Thesolutionproposalscouldbetriedfor

˙Izmirorsimilarcases.Howevereachpracticeneedsitsown

solu-tiondependingonmultiplefactorsandtemporalcircumstances.A

furtherstudyevaluatingtheresultsofthistrialwouldbe

comple-mentary.

Acknowledgements

˙IzmirInstituteofTechnologyprovidedﬁnancialsupportinthe

datacollection processof this researchas a Scientiﬁc Research

Projectwithnumber 2013-˙IYTE-35.A partof thisresearch,the

planningprocessofsolidwastefacilitiesin ˙Izmir,waspresented

inthe26thInternationalAnnualCongressofAESOP(The

Associa-tionofEuropeanSchoolsofPlanning)inAnkarainJune2012anda

paperinTurkishwaspresentedinCitySymposium(˙Izmir2.Kent

Sempozyumu)in ˙IzmirinNovember2013.

AppendixA.

EnglishTranslationoftheInterviewQuestions(Linthe

ques-tionsindicatethenameofthelocationorvillagehostingtheland

use,forexampleHarmandalı)

1.Which stage(s) of the process (site selecting, protesting

decisions, ﬁnding solutions) of the solid waste

facili-ties/ﬁsheries/quarriesinLdidyou(individuallyor

institution-ally)participate?

2.Do you know how the sites of solid waste

facili-ties/ﬁsheries/quarries in L are selected by whom? Could

youexplainifyouknow?

3.Doyouthinkthissiteselectiondecisionwasright?Why?

4.Doyouthinkthesiteselectionmethodwassuccessful?Why?

(Wasitparticipatory,just,etc.)

5.Who opposes and who supports the solid waste

facili-ties/ﬁsheries/quarriesinL?(Aretheylocalorexternal?Arethey

individualororganized?)

6.Howmanypeoplearethereintheseconﬂictprocesses?

7.Whataretheoppositionreasonsofdifferentopponentsforthe

solidwastefacilities/ﬁsheries/quarriesinL?(Damageto

envi-ronment,damagetohealth,etc.)

8.Whatkindoffactorsaffectedtheoppositioninadditiontothe

damagesofsolid wastefacilities/ﬁsheries/quarries? (Lackof

knowledge,politicalreasons,media,lackoftrust,etc.)

9.Doyouthinkthereasonforoppositionistheselectionofwrong

siteorwrongdecisionmakingmethodorboth?

10.Whydidthenon-opponentsnotoppose?(Weretheyhappy,

threatened,gotmoney,etc.)

11.Howdidtheopponentsshowtheirresponses?(Whatkindof

meetingdidtheyorganize?Weretherelawsuits?)

12.Ifthesolidwastefacilities/ﬁsheries/quarriesinLarecancelled,

werethereasonsforcancellationsthemovementsorother

rea-sons?

13.Whatwerethemainsubjectsofthisconﬂictprocess?

(Environ-ment,propertyownership,participation,etc.)

14.Wasanybodyharmedinthisconﬂictprocess?

15.How werethe approaches of parties toconﬂictresolution?

(Forcing,collaborating,etc.)

16.Whatdidthedecisionmakersdoforresolvingconﬂicts?(Face

(11)

17.Doyouthinktheattemptsofdecisionmakersforconﬂict

res-olutionweresufﬁcientand efﬁcient?Ifnot,what shouldbe

done?

18.Wouldyouliketoaddanythingelse?

19.Whatdoyouthinkabouttheconﬂictsinsiteselectionprocesses

ofotherLULUsinvariouslocationsin ˙Izmir?(Thermalplants,

windenergyplants,watchingtowers,etc.)

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