Turkey-EU relations and the Cyprus question

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BILKENT UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

‘TURI<£Y-EU RELATIONS AND THE CYPRUS QUESTION’

BY

BESTAMİ SADİ BİLGİÇ

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

AUGUST, 1999

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I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate,

in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree on Master o f International

Relations

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Assistant Professor Hasan Ünal

Thesis Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate,

in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree on Masteylof International

Relations

A ssistai

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Professor Hakan Kırımlı

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate,

in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree on Master o f International

Relations

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to analyse the connection between the two very important foreign

policy issues o f Turkey, namely the Turkey-European Union Relations and the

Cyprus Question.

Turkey’s relations with the European Union is o f utmost importance for Turkey. Since

the establishment o f M odem Turkey, it has sought ways to integrate itself with

Europe, and its main institution the European Union. There is no doubt that

integration with the EU will contribute much to Turkey’s development in many fields,

like trade, democratic institutionalisation and human rights. While on the other hand

Turkey’s position in the Cypms dispute is again o f vital importance. The Turkish

community living in the North is perceived as an extension o f the motherland.

Secondly, the island of Cypms has a strategic significance for Turkey. In Turkey, it is

believed that if Cypms is lost, then Turkey would have no access to the

Mediterranean. Moreover, after the 1990s, we see another actor in the Cypms

question: the EU, with which Turkey aspires to be integrated. At this point, the writer

aims at analysing the policy preferences of Turkish decision-makers as regards the

Turkey-EU Relations and the Cypms question.

One o f the major aims o f this study is to show that Turkey’s relations with the EU and

its involvement in the Cypms question are two separate issues. Improvement in the

Turkey-EU Relations and positive results in the Cypms question might be yielded if

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ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı Türkiye’nin çok önemli iki dış politika konusunun,

Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri ile Kıbns Sorunu, arasındaki bağlantıyı incelemektir.

Türkiye’nin AB ile ilişkileri Türkiye için çok önemlidir. Modem Türkiye,

kumluşundan bu yana kendisini Avmpa, ve tabii onun en önemli kummu olan Avrupa

Birliği ile entegre etmek için yollar aramıştır. Şüphesiz ki AB ile entegrasyon

Türkiye’nin ticaret, demokratik kummlaşma ve insan haklan gibi birçok alanda

gelişmesine fazlaca katkıda bulunacaktır. Diğer taraftan Türkiye’nin K ıbns

somnundaki pozisyonu da yine Türkiye için fazlasıyla önem arzeder. Adanın

loızeyinde yaşayan Türk toplumu Türkiye tarafından ‘Anavatan’ m uzantısı olarak

algılanmaktadır. İkinci olarak ise, stratejik olarak Kıbrıs Türkiye için yine çok

önemlidir. Türkiye’de, eğer Kıbrıs kaybedilirse Türkiye’nin Akdeniz’e çıkışı da

kaybedilmiş olur inancı hakimdir. Bütün bunlara ilaveten, 1990larda Kıbrıs somnunda

bir başka aktör daha görmekteyiz: Türkiye’nin bir parçası olmak için can attığı AB.

Bu noktada yazar, Türkiye’nin karar-alıcılannm Türkiye-AB İlişkileri ve Kıbns

Sorunu konusunda politika tercihlerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Eserdeki temel amaçlardan birisi de Türkiye’nin AB ile ilişkileri ile Kıbns

Sorunundaki rolünün iki farklı konu olduğunu ortaya koymaktır. Türkiye bu iki

konuyu ayn ayn ele alırsa hem AB ile iişkilerinde hem de K ıbns Soranunun

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I am deeply grateful to Asst. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal, my supervisor, for all Avhat he did

to encourage me to complete this thesis. Without his guidance and encouragement, it

would be sure that this thesis could not be realised. His academic insights and visions

did help me construct my thesis, as well as my future plans. I am also very grateful to

Eugenia Ünal because o f her off-the-office contributions.

My thanks go also to Asst. Prof Dr. Hakan Kinmli and Asst. Prof Dr. Gülgün Tuna

who were included in my juiy and guided me through their deep knowledge on the

matter and the academic abilities they have.

I feel also grateful to my friend H. Tank Oğuzlu, who always led me to widen my

horizons through extensive discussions, which I had with him.

Last, but not least, I would like to thank my family, especially my brother Osman, and

my fiancee Tuba for their encouragement. Although they were not present here with

me, they injected me moral and patience through long phone calls.

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4 9

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11 12 12 14 15 15 18 18 19

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22 26 28 28

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2.2. Negotiations 2.2.1. Material Issues 2.2.2. Constitutional Issues 2.3. The EU Involvement 2.4. Recent Developments 2.5. Conclusions

C H A P T E R 3: CYPRUS AND THE EU

3.1. Introduction

3.2. The Commission’s Opinion on Cyprus

3.3. From the Opinion to the Luxembourg European Coimcil

3.4. Moves to Overcome the Division

3.5. The Opening o f Accession Negotiations

3.6. Turkish Reactions to the EU Approach

CO NCLUSIO N B IB LIO G R A PH Y 32 34 35 38 41 46 51 51 51 53 55 56 60 64 71

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INTRODUCTION

Among the Turkish foreign policy issues, the long-running Turkey-EU relations and the

Cypms Question seem to be competing to acquire the top o f the list. Turkey has always

attributed great importance to its relations with Europe since the establishment o f the

Republic. Both in political and economic sense, it has always wanted to be part o f

Europe.

On the other hand, Cyprus has also occupied an important place both for Turkey and the

Turkish people. The Turkish community in Cyprus has always been regarded as an

extension o f the motherland. Turkish people see no difference between these respective

cormnunities, and feel that it is their duty to defend the rights of the Turkish Cypriots in

all aspects o f life.

The reason why I choose to write a thesis on the relationship between Turkey-EU

relations and the Cyprus question relates to my endeavour to understand why there exists

such a relationship, and why it is maintained so. Is this relationship natural or created? I

think the interesting point stems from the irony that there could have been no relevance o f

these two issues, but in one way or the other, there exists one. Both issues are very

important from the perspective of Turkish Foreign Policy, but I think the policy-makers

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over Turkey’s position in the Cyprus dispute, despite the fact that these two have their

own peculiarities.

I try to deal with these two issues separately. As shown in the second chapter, the

dimensions o f the Turkey-EU relations are set forth. How does Turkey see Europe and

how does Europe see Turkey? What does Turkey expect from Europe and what does

Europe expect from Turkey? How do they respond the expectations respectively? I tried

to bring answers to these questions. But, special emphasis was made on the 1990s. As it

is put, there are two critical events which has since shaped the bi-lateral relations: the

Customs Union in 1995 and Luxembourg European Council Summit in 1997. With

regard to the results o f these events, some projections are also made.

In the third chapter, a general outlook at the Cyprus Question is made. The parties o f the

dispute are TRNC, the Greek Cypriots, Turkey and Greece. I mainly touch upon the

international mediation efforts, after giving a precise history o f the dispute. The UN, the

EU and the United States are the main actors of the international mediation. However, the

term mediation needs to be elaborated carefully. All these three mediators recognise the

Greek Cypriots as the sole representative of the whole island by disregarding the Turkish

Community which has been living there for more than four hundred years. 1 think this is

one o f the main reasons why the negotiations always end up with no solution. I especially

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very effective on the parameters o f the dispute. At the end o f the chapter, I try to list the

latest efforts to reach a settlement on the island.

Cyprus-EU relations alone deserves some attention. The EU recognises the South as the

‘Republic o f Cyprus’. Moreover, this recognised ‘Cyprus’ is number one candidate for

the EU membership in the near future. However, even the initiation o f the accession talks

is very against the international treaties signed by the Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, the

EU responds positively to the Greek Cypriot efforts to have the Turkish Cypriots involve

in the accession talks on behalf of a country which they form no part. Turkish reactions as

well as the international reactions are also put forth in the fourth chapter.

The concluding chapter is an assessment of the ideas studied in the preceding chapters.

Some reflections on prospects regarding the course o f Turkey-EU relations and the

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CHAPTER 1: RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

1.1. INTRODUCTION: BEGINNING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EEC/EC/EU

The interaction between the Turks and Europe has a history o f approximately ten

centuries. However, the role played by the Turks in the past in relation with Europe is

not adequate for explaining the position o f Turkey, which has been working hard to

join the EU'. Nevertheless it can provide us with some clues to understand the current

developments.

As known, Turks were confronted with the Europeans first at the battlefields, and the

image o f ‘Turk’ appeared in the minds o f the Europeans in an atmosphere like that.

The conquest o f Istanbul in 1453 was a very important turning point in the Turkish-

European relations. With the conquest, the Turks acquired the upper hand in the

Turkish-European strife, but at the same time ‘westernisation’ was initiated.

Therefore, a famous sociologist^ in Turkey points to the conquest as the starting point

o f ‘westernisation’ in Turkish history.

When we look at the configuration of the Ottoman Empire, we see that it was like a

mosaic in which the Asian and the European, the Muslim and the non-Muslim

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geographically and culturally semi-European, in and after the 1800s, commenced a

‘wind o f change’ inspired by the Western model. The new reforms, be it in the legal

system or in the education system, were all done in accordance with the European

norms.

With the establishment o f Modem Turkey, the ‘westernisation’ has been adopted and

carried out in full-swing. Atatürk had pointed out the direction o f the new republic as

follows: “We want to bring our country to the modem level. All our efforts are for the

establishing a ‘western’ country. We know that there is no country, who wishes to be

civilised, could not turn a blind eye to the western world.”^ Turkey is the only

pluralist secular democracy in the Moslem world and has always attached great

importance to developing its relations with other European countries.

The Turks have been ‘westernising’ their economic, political and social stmctures

since the 19th century. Following the First World War and the proclamation o f the

Republic in 1923, they chose Western Europe as the model for their new secular state.

As a matter o f fact the Swiss Civil Code, the Italian Criminal Code and the German

Commercial Code were adopted with only few amendments. The Turkish society has

tried to reshape itself in all aspects, from education to clothing, in accordance with

European understanding.

' D. Barchard, Turkey and the West. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985, p .l. ^ E. Kongar, Kültür Üzerine.. Istanbul: Çağdaş Yay., 1982, p. 50.

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Turkey has ever since closely aligned itself with the West and has become a founding

member o f the United Nations, a member of NATO, the Council of Europe, the

OECD and an associate member o f the Western European Union. It has played a vital

role in the defence o f the European continent, and the principal elements o f its foreign

policy have mostly converged with those o f its European partners. For instance during

the late G ulf crisis in 1991 Turkey played a pivotal role in assisting the UN efforts at

considerable costs to its economy.

It was inevitable for a country like Turkey, which had been resolved to have close

relations with Europe, as a state policy in economic, political and cultural sense, to be

closely interested in the European Economic Community. The 1950s, during which

the EEC was being established were important years for Turkey in the sense that

multi-party democracy was being tried, and that a new entrepreneur class was

In the 1950s, the Democratic Party was in power. The DP, despite the fact that it had

come to power with the support o f ‘the fringe’ rather than ‘the center’ -which was

then advocating close relationship with Europe, did not waiver from the policy o f

‘westernisation’. In fact, the ruling elite of the DP was from a tradition renowned for

being the representative o f ‘Europeanisation’ in Turkey.^

See Mete Tunçay, “Siyasal Tarih (1950-1960)” in Türkiye Tarihi Vol. 4 İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1990, pp. 177-184.

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Democratic Party government, which had accepted “liberalism”, at least theoretically,

as one o f its main principles, applied to the EEC for associate-membership^ in a big

hurry ju st after the Greece’s application in 1959. It was apparent that Greece’s move

was the main factor determining Turkey’s move. In fact, the statement o f Fatin Rüştü

Zorlu, the then Foreign Minister o f Turkey is indicative of that, “...if Greece ju m p s

into an em pty pool, it should not be left alone and we should also ju m p w ith no

h esitation...”’ This explains the main thrust behind Turkey’s aspirations. At that time,

the DP elite did not contemplate seriously on what Europe was and was not." On the

other hand, the entrepreneur class, which was then supporting the DP, was so weak

and even unaware of the developments. There was neither democracy tradition in the

society; nor non-governmental social power circles, which could have shared the

political power with the government.’ Therefore, the EEC membership application

was carried out completely by the initiative of the government.

In the 1950s, Turkey and Greece were exporting same goods. Moreover, 40.5 % o f

Turkey’s exports was going to the Common Market.'® Naturally, the DP government

felt uncomfortable with Greece’s application. Again in this period, the DP had

initiated a rapid development process. The government got into foreign debt in order

In the EU Law, we cannot find a precise definition o f ‘associate-membership’. This concept was for the fist time described by the European Council Law Commission in 1952. According to this, a country who is prepared to have close cooperation with the Community is considered as ‘associate-associes’. The boundaries o f this kind o f cooperation are defined according to special arrangements. This means that the content o f associate-membership may vary from 1% to 99% o f that o f full-membership. So, associate-membership can be considered as a limited full-membership or a step to that. (See R. Karluk, Gümrük Birliği Dönemecinde Türkiye. Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1997, p.3.)

^ Karluk, Ibid., p. 6

* M. Ali Birand, Türkiye’ nin Gümrük Birliği Macerası 11959-19951. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınlan,

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to sustain this planned development. However, since Turkey felt uneasy in finding

foreign credit in the second half o f the 1950s, the EEC was perceived as a new foreign

debt-provider. So, under Turkey’s will to transfer its sovereign rights to a

supranational authority like the EEC lies the ‘economic interest’, ju st like that o f other

European countries. However, this was done not in accordance with the pressure o f

the interest groups which would then compel the government to realise the

application, but was carried out by ‘from above’ methods, since in this period, neither

the employers nor the other interest groups could acquire autonomy against the

govermnent. Their survival and development mostly depended on the support o f the

government. On account of this, it could be said that the government made the

application on 8th of June 1959 with no pressure coming from the bottom.

On the other hand, the Community was in a dilemma. For them, there existed two

Turkeys. One Turkey was a country which had a population increase o f 3 million

people per year and a foreign debt of 500 million US dollars; and whose exports were

mainly agricultural products (80 % of total export); and whose gold-US dollar

reserves did not exceed 14 million US dollars (Greece’s was then 166 million US

dollars); and which had a social unrest inside the country. The other Turkey was a

country which had an unnegligible strategic importance; and which was a market for

the EEC, and a country with which they should have a strong ‘political liaison’. The

EEC gave its decision. Just from the beginning they never expected to accept Turkey

as a full-member. Their strategy was to keep Turkey under control, not veiy close and

’ Metin Heper and E. Fuat Keyman, "Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey" in Turkey before and after Atatürk (ed. Sylvia Kedourie), London: Frank Cass, 1999, p. 262.

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not very far,“ as one expert put it: “ ...yes, Turkey is in the European farm, but in the

sheep-fold not in the shepherd-house. The shepherds o f the farm has shown us the

sheep-fold, and we are satisfied with th at...”.'^ Since the begiiming o f EU-Turkey

relations, the EU has pursued the same particular approach, which can be summarised

as the idea o f protecting its interests in the region with the help o f Turkey at the

minimum possible cost in terms o f political or economic commitments.'^

The membership negotiations lasted four years, and took place in three phases.‘‘‘ The

first phase was between 28‘'’ of September 1959 and 2 r ‘ of October 1960. In this

period, the parties reached a compromise on customs union only, but they put forth

different suggestions about the transition period and mutual duties. The second phase,

which occured in the period 10-22 April 1961, showed no signs of improvement in the

bi-lateral talks since, while the Turkish side was insisting on the customs union, the

Community brought very different plans on the membership. The last phase started on

18‘'’ o f June 1962 and ended with the signing o f the Ankara Treaty on 25“' o f June

1963.

1.2. ANKARA AGREEMENT

This agreement, which entered into force on 1 December 1964, aimed at securing

Turkey’s full membership in the EEC through the establishment in three phases o f a

H. Seyidoğlu, Uluslararası İktisat Istanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1986, p.412. “ Birand, o p .c it, p.69.

Erol ManisalI, “Avrupali mi olmak Avrupa’da mı olmak?” in Cumhuriyet, 2 December 1997 Jesus A. Nunez Villaverde, “Turkey and the EU: an endless hurdle-race” in Perceptions, September- November 1998, p. 20

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customs union, which would serve as an instrument to bring about integration

between the EEC and Turkey. With this treaty, Turkey has become an associate

member. However, the word ‘member’ needs some clarifications. Turkey might be

called an ‘associate’ rather than a ‘member’, since should Turkey be called a member

to the Community, then it must have a say about the decisions taken by the EC/EU,

but because Turkey has not had no say in decision-taking process, it cannot be

considered as a member. Therefore the word ‘association’ in English or ‘Assoziemng’

in German or ‘Associazone’ in Italian has been used.‘^

The treaty came into force on 1 December 1964. The main purposes o f the agreement

could be summarised as:'®

-to strengthen the mutual trade and economic relations in a step-by-step and

balanced maimer in order to augment Turkey’s economic development and citizens’

life standards,

-to establish a customs union between Turkey and the Community,

-to facilitate Turkey’s full-membership to the Community,

-to strengthen the relationship between the Turkish people and the peoples o f

the Community member states,

-to guarantee democracy and peace.

ATKEB, Türkive-AET İlişkileri. Doğuş Matbaası, p.l8 Karluk, op.cit.. p.5.

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The Ankara Treaty has taken its main principles and ideological elements from the

Rome Treaty o f 1957, and was prepared mostly in accordance with the ‘laissez-faire’

spirit o f the same treaty. There are three main phases foreseen as follows*’;

L2.1. Preparation;

This period began with the enactment o f the treaty. As it is stated in the Article 3, it

was decided to be five years, but it could be increased to ten years if necessary. In this

period, the main goal was to strengthen the Turkish economy with the help o f the

EEC. For this reason, the Community provided customs facilities for Turkey’s four

main export goods; namely hazelnut, dry fig, tobacco and sultanas. In addition to this,

by giving Turkey an aid o f 175 million ECU from the European Investment Bank, it

tried to prepare Turkey’s economy for the customs union. But, Turkey, on her part,

had not undertaken anything.

1.2.2.Transition;

This period, different from the preparation, foresaw reciprocal and balanced

obligations. In order to have a customs union between Turkey and the Community, it

had been decided that economic policies o f Turkey be converged with those o f the

EEC. The duration o f the transition period to attain the customs union for some goods

was determined as twelve years, and for some others as twenty-two years. The

conditions about the transition were set forth by the Additional Protocol signed on IS*

o f November 1970 and came into force on T‘ o f January 1973. This means that the

year 1995 was foreseen as the beginning o f the customs union thoroughly.

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1.2.3. The Last Phase;

The Ankara Treaty determines that with the accomplishment o f the tasks set forth for

the transition period, the last phase begins. In this period, the parties will have

achieved the customs union. After that, they are supposed to pass beyond the customs

union and start the negotiations for full-membership.

1.3. THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

The Additional Protocol o f 13 November 1970 set out in a detailed fashion how the

Customs Union would be established. It provided that the EEC would abolish tariffs

and quantitative barriers to its imports from Turkey (with some exceptions including

fabrics) upon the entry into force o f the Protocol, whereas Turkey would do the same

in accordance with a timetable containing two calendars set for 12 and 22 years. It

also called for the harmonisation o f Turkish legislation with that o f the EU in

economic matters. Furthermore, the Additional Protocol envisaged the free circulation

o f natural persons between the Parties in the next 12 to 22 years.

In the 1970s, because o f the economic crisis Turkey found itself in, Turkey was not

able to fulfill its obligations that it had undertaken with Ankara Treaty. The articles in

the Additional Protocol could not be processed.

The Additional Protocol brought significant advantages for Turkey’s agricultural

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regim e.”' However the developments afterwards on the EEC side began to make

things disadvantageous to Turkey. The Community signed agreements allowing new

agricultural free-trade-zones with EFTA in 1972-1973. In addition to that, in 1973,

new countries joined the EEC. The EEC, as a result, abolished the tariffs and customs

barriers for the industrial products, which they had imported from Turkey, however,

the EEC signed with third countries similar agreements by which the same privileges

accorded to these countries. Therefore, Ankara Treaty has gradually become

meaningless for Turkey. Besides, if you consider the customs facilities that Turkey

promised to the EEC, it can easily be understood that the treaty has turned not in

favour o f Turkey, but o f the EEC. To sum up, it can be said that the foreign trade

deficits o f Turkey have increased, and that the spread of the Community’s foreign

relations to the Mediterranean countries eroded the consents given to Turkey by the

Community. The General System of Preferences, which was introduced in 1971, was

also very harmful for Turkey’s exports because Turkey was not allowed to entertain it.

Had the Additional Protocol been implemented in full, the free circulation o f goods

and services and the harmonisation o f Turkish legislation with that o f the EEC in a

multitude o f areas would have been achieved at the end o f the 22 year timetable, as it

was envisaged.

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1.4. TURK EY‘S APPLICATION FOR FULL MEMBERSHIP IN 1987

On 24 January 1980 Turkey shifted its economic policy from an autarchic import-

substitution model and opened its economy to the operation o f market forces.

Following this development in the economic area and the multi-party elections in

1983, the relations between Turkey and the Community, which had come to a virtual

freeze following the military intervention o f 12 September 1980 in Turkey, began

returning to normality.

In the light o f these positive developments, Turkey applied for full membership in

1987, on the basis o f the EEC Treaty’s article 237, which gave any European country

the right to do so. Turkey’s request for accession, filed not under the relevant

provisions o f the Ankara Agreement, but those o f the Treaty of Rome, underwent the

normal procedures. The Council forwarded Turkey’s application to the Commission

for the preparation o f an ‘Opinion’. This has reconfirmed Turkey’s eligibility, whilst

it stated the idea that it was not the appropriate time for integration. The

Com m ission’s Opinion was completed on 18 December 1989 and endorsed by the

Council on 5 February 1990. In the Commission’s argumentation no reference was

made to any o f the obstacles previously mentioned, nor was the fear expressed that

with its accession Turkey would become the largest and one o f the most populous

countries o f the Community, with the economic and political implications that would

entail. Conversely, the recommendation to wait for a more timely opportunity was

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existence o f important structural disparities, very acute macroeconomic imbalances, a

high-level of protectionism in the industrial sector and a low level o f social

protection.” It also mentioned that Turkey’s accession was prevented equally by the

EC ’s own situation on the eve o f the Single M arket’s completion which prevented the

consideration o f further enlargement. It went on to underpin the need for a

comprehensive cooperation program aiming at facilitating the integration o f the two

sides, and added that the Customs Union should be completed in 1995 as envisaged.^“

Although it did not attain its basic objective, Turkey’s application revived Turkey-EC

relations: efforts to develop relations intensified on both sides, the Association’s

political and technical mechanisms started meeting again and measures to complete

the Customs Union in time resumed. Meanwhile, the Commission’s promised

cooperation package, known as the ‘Matutes Package’, was unveiled in 1990, but

could not be adopted by the Council due to Greece’s resistance.

1.5. THE CUSTOMS UNION

l.S .l.T h e Technical Aspects of the Customs Union

Following its full membership application in 1987, Turkey began catching up its

delay in implementing the timetable set for the progressive abolition o f customs duties

stipulated in the Additional Protocol. On 6 March 1995, the Turkey-EU Association

Council, the highest ranking organ o f the association composed o f the Foreign.

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Ministers o f Turkey and the 15 EU Member States, adopted its decision 1/95 on the

completion o f the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU in industrial and

processed agricultural goods by 31 December 1995.^' At the same meeting, another

Resolution on accompanying measures was adopted and the EU made a declaration on

financial cooperation with Turkey as part o f the customs union ‘package’.

W ith the entry into force o f the customs union, Turkey abolished all duties and

equivalent charges on imports of industrial goods from the EU. Furthermore, Turkey

has been harmonising its tariffs and equivalent charges on the importation o f

industrial goods from third countries with the EU’s Common External Tariff and

progressively adapting to the EU’s commercial policy and preferential trade

arrangements with specific third countries. This process was to be completed in 5

years.

As a result o f these measures, Turkey’s weighted rates o f protection for imports o f

industrial products originating in EU and EFT A member states have fallen from 5.9%

to 0%, and from 10.8% to 6% for similar goods originating in third countries. The

latter rates will further drop to 3.5% when the EU fulfils its obligations under the

Umguay Round.^^

Although basic agricultural products have been excluded from the initial package, a

preferential trade regime for these products has been adopted on 1 January 1998.

Villaverde, Ibid., pp. 27-28 R euters. 7 March 1995 Karluk, op.cit.. p. 188

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Further efforts are expected to be made in the same direction. Moreover, Turkey has

been progressively adopting many aspects o f the Common Agricultural Policy. On the

other hand, under the Customs Union Decision, the EU is expected to take as much

account as possible of Turkey’s agricultural interests when developing its agricultural

policy.

Turkey’s efforts towards harmonising its legislation with that o f the EU are under

way. These efforts include, in commercial matters, monitoring and safeguarding

measures on imports from both the EU and third countries, the management o f

quantitative restrictions and tariff quotas and the prevention o f dumped and subsidised

imports. As to competition rules, subsidies through State resources in any form

whatsoever which distort or threaten to distort competition will be banned. A special

Competition Authority has been set up for this purpose. Assistance to promote

economic development in Turkey’s less developed regions and assistance intended to

promote cultural heritage conservation, and which does not adversely affect

competition will, however, be allowed. Furthermore, Turkey is progressively

adjusting its legislation regarding state monopolies o f a commercial nature so as to

ensure that no discrimination exists in the conditions under which goods are produced

and marketed between nationals o f Turkey and EU Member States. Turkey is also in

the process o f harmonising its laws with EU legislation eliminating technical barriers

to trade during a transitional period that is expected to last five years, as foreseen in

the Customs Union Decision. Effective cooperation between Turkey and the EU in the

fields o f standardisation, calibration, quality, accreditation, testing, and certification

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the EU on intellectual, industrial and commercial property has been realised and laws

for consumer protection are now being put in place. It is noteworthy that both parties

are banned from using internal taxes as indirect protection mechanisms and from

using tax reductions as export subsidies.

1.5.2 The Resolution on Accom panying M easures

Apart from these rather technical provisions related to the establishment and the

proper functioning o f the Customs Union, the package also comprised an Association

Council Resolution providing for the intensification o f cooperation between Turkey

and the EU in such areas not covered by the Customs Union as industrial cooperation,

Trans-European networks, energy, transport, telecommunications, agriculture,

environment, science, statistics, as well as matters relating to justice and home affairs,

consumer protection, cultural cooperation, information etc. These provisions also

aimed at ensuring that the higher degree of integration achieved between Turkey and

the EU through the Customs Union was not limited solely to economic/trade matters,

and that the Customs Union did serve its purpose under the Ankara Agreement:

constituting an important cornerstone towards Turkey’s accession to the EU.

1.5.3.Financial C ooperation

The third element o f the Customs Union package was the statement on financial

cooperation that the EU delivered at the Association Council meeting where Decision

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over a five-year period, aimed at alleviating the burden that the opening up o f the

economy to EU competition would bring to Turkish economic operators on the one

hand. On the other, it also aimed at improving Turkey’s infrastructure and reducing

the economic disparities between the parties. Yet, the transfers envisaged within this

framework have so far failed to materialise due to the lack o f political will on the part

o fth e E U .

1.5.4. The First Results of the Customs Union

Trade figures after the completion of the Customs Union reveal that, in 1996,

Turkey’s imports from the EU rose by 34.7% compared to 1995 and reached 22.7

billion dollars, while Turkey’s exports, amounting to 11.477 billion dollars, rose by

only 3.6%. The EU preserved its place as Turkey’s biggest trading partner with a

52.9% share in its imports and 49.5% in its exports. Figures for 1997 show that

Turkey’s exports rose by 5.5% to reach 12.114 billion dollars, while its imports

increased by 5.9% to reach 24.013 billion dollars.

Since the EU had already abolished its tariffs for imports from Turkey before the

Customs Union, the only trade barriers being quotas for textiles that could not be

filled by Turkey, the Customs Union did not bring about a significant liberalisation

for Turkey’s exports to the EU.^^ Since 66% o f Turkey’s exports to the EU consist o f

consumer goods, they are very sensitive to changes in European demand. The very

Mustafa Çalık, “Jakoben Devlet ve Bürokrasi Paradigması Ahlaken Yanlış, Pratik Olarak da İflas Etmiş Bir Modeldir” (interview with Yahya Sezai Tezel) in Türkiye Günlüğü. Sayı 49. Ocak-Şubat 1998, pp. 23-27

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the EU aims at Turkey’s full membership in the EU, as underlined once again with the

Customs Union whose dynamics aim at bringing about further integration between the

two Parties. This is why official Turkish policy kept the question o f inclusion in the

E U ’s enlargement process on the agenda of Turkey-EU relations. At the last

Association Council o f 29 April 1997, the EU reconfirmed Turkey’s eligibility for

membership and asked the Commission to prepare recommendations to deepen

Turkey-EU relations, while claiming that the development o f our relations depended

on a number of factors relating to Greece, Cyprus and human rights. However this

kind o f EU decisions about Turkey should, as usual, be considered within the

framework o f EU’s attempts to keep Turkey in the ‘begging room ’.^®

The Commission, however, excluded Turkey from the enlargement process in its

report entitled “Agenda 2000”^’ which it disclosed on 16 July 1997. While the report

conceded that the Customs Union is functioning satisfactorily, and that it has

demonstrated Turkey’s ability to adapt to the EU norms in many areas, it repeated the

same political and economic arguments against Turkey and made no reference to

Turkey’s full membership objective.

The fact that the EU confirmed Turkey’s eligibility for membership but excluded

Turkey from the enlargement process has been seen as a bitter contradiction. The

General System o f Preferences See Çalık, op.cit.. pp. 7-28

See Hasan Ünal, “Türkiye’ye bir parmak bal’’, Zaman . 19 September 1997, and “AB ile zıtlaşmaya gerek var mı?”, Zaman. 16 January 1998.

See Doc/97/6 Agenda 2000-Volume 1 Communication: For A Stronger And Wider Union , Strasbourg, 15 July 1997 in ‘W hite Paper On the Enlargement o f the European Union’ Volum e I- Part 2 Official Texts of the European Union Institutions, p.l 1

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slow growth rate recorded in Germany, Turkey’s biggest trading partner within the

EU, impeded the growth o f Turkey’s exports to that country in 1996. Turkey’s exports

to the EU are expected to rise with a return to higher growth rates in the Union, but

when it would take is unknown.

Turkey’s efforts to align itself to the EU’s commercial policy towards third countries

produced the Free Trade Agreements with EFTA, Israel, Romania, the Czech and

Slovak Republics, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia and Lithuania. Similar agreements with

Latvia and Bulgaria have been signed recently. Negotiations with Poland have

advanced considerably and those with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Macedonia are

expected to begin soon. Furthermore, preparations for alignment to the EU ’s GSP^“*

are also under way. Agreement has been reached with the EU to further liberalise

trade in agricultural products and a Free Trade Agreement with the ECSC (European

Coal and Steel Community) entered into force on 1 August 1996. The Customs Union

is expected to constitute a step towards Turkey’s full integration with the EU, even

though many political economists argue that it does not seem so. “

1.6. THE EUROPEAN UNION‘S ENLARGEMENT PROCESS AND TURKEY

Turkey attributed particular importance to the EU ’s last enlargement process for two

main reasons. First, having played an active role in the demise of the Soviet bloc, it

was only natural for Turkey to aspire for inclusion in the new European architecture

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Commission opted to propose measures that would reinforce relations with Turkey

within their current framework and complemented these measures with the idea o f

inviting Turkey to the European Conference,^’’which is invented to constitute a

platform for keeping Turkey in contact.^’ In the light o f the EU’s claims that all

candidates would be judged according to the same objective criteria, and that there

would be no prejudice in their evaluation, Turkey found the Commission’s approach

unjust and discriminatoiy.

As a result, even though the Commission argued that the same criteria were applied to

Turkey and the other candidates, they produced logically diverging conclusions, and

no plausible explanation could be provided so far for this situation.

1.7. THE LUXEMBOURG EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE FOLLOWING PERIOD

Although the decisions o f the Luxembourg Summit reflected by and large the contents

o f the Commission’s “Agenda 2000”, the following points related to Turkey need to

be highlighted:^“

.Turkey’s eligibility has been reconfinned.

Reuters. 21 November 1997

Ten clays before the Luxembourg European Council, the Prime Minister o f Luxembourg, who was also the tlien EU Term President, Jean-Claude Junker, confessed tliat ‘Pennanent European Conference” Iiad been invented just to form a platfonn for relations with Turkey, and it had not any other puipose. (Sec Zaman. 3 December 1997)

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•The EU has decided to set up a strategy to prepare Turkey for accession and

to create a special procedure to review the developments to be made.

•Turkey has been invited to the European Conference, but a number of

unacceptable pre-conditions have been put forward.

.The development of Turkey-EU relations has been made conditional on

certain economic, political and foreign policy questions.

.The Commission has been asked to submit suitable proposals to enhance

Turkey-EU relations.

As it is easily seen, the EU did not give Turkey any perspective for full-membership,

though it refrained from giving an image of excluding Turkey completely from the

European integration.^'

In a statement issued the day after the Summit, the Turkish Government criticised the

EU’s attitude, stated that Turkey’s goal of full membership and Association would,

nevertheless, be maintained, but not as the first priority o f the Turkish foreign policy.

It is also stated that the development of the relations depended on the EU’s fulfilling

its commitments^^, and that Turkey would not discuss with the EU issues remaining

outside the contractual context of the relations as long as the EU did not change its

attitude.^^

Şükrü Elekdağ, “Türkiye’nin Avrupa Rüyası” in Milliyet. 15 December 1997

The same point was also mentioned in Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem’s article in International Herald Tribune, which was published two days before the Luxembourg European Council, (see Ismail Cem, “Isn’t Europe Ambitious Enough to Admit Turkey?” in International Herald Tribune. 10 December 1997.

” Hürriyet. 14 December 1997, and Posta. 14 December 1997, and Aksam . 14 December 1997, and Zam an. 14 December 1997, and Yeni Yüzyıl. 14 December 1997, and Radikal. 14 December 1997, and Türkiye. 14 December 1997.

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The outcome of the Luxembourg Summit has dealt a double blow to Turkey’s desire

to belong to the western world. First, Turkey has felt snubbed and effectively pushed

out o f the queue of the EU candidates. This has led to growing anti-EU sentiments in

Turkey and strengthened its perception of the EU, largely following a Greek-inspired

anti-Turkish policy. Second, the decision to begin membership negotiations at the end

o f March 1998 with the Greek Cypriot administration has forced Turkey to strengthen

its ties with the TRNC in its role as a Guarantor Power o f the Turkish Cypriot

Community.

In line with the aforementioned statement Turkey did not participate in the inaugural

meeting of the European Conference held in London on 12 March 1998.^“’ Turkey has

thus made it clear that the way out of this difficult situation in the relations depended

on the political will to be displayed by the EU.

The Commission has published its recommendations for a “European Strategy” on 4

March 1998.^^ Its contents are more-or-less similar to former packages that the EU

promised but failed to deliver in the past. Moreover, the ambiguity over how this

package would be financed prevents Turkey from being optimistic. The Commission

itself conceded that the implementation of this package would necessitate

considerable financial resources. On the other hand, if it materialises, the package will

lead to important progress in Turkey’s integration with the EU, if it is really wanted.

’“ Zaman, 13 March 1998

’’ For tlie full text o f the report visit the web page “httn://curona.cu.int/scadnlus/ lcg/lvb/c40113.litnil”

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The EU ’s last summit held in Cardiff on 15-16 June 1998 offered a good opportunity

to ameliorate the difficult period which Turkey-EU relations entered into following

the Luxembourg Summit. Before the summit five strong members, Britain, France,

Germany, Italy, and Spain, met secretly without informing Greece in Paris to discuss

matters related to Turkey.^*^ They tried to find solutions to by-pass the Greek veto in

order to better the relations with Turkey. However, they could not find an outlet

because o f the Greek tlireat of vetoing the ED enlargement. Although certain positive

developments were achieved with regard to the language used for Turkey in the

Presidency Conclusions o f the Summit, these were not o f a degree that would prompt

Turkey to modify the policy outlined in the Government Statement issued following

the Luxembourg Summit.^’

In the Statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs following the Cardiff

Summit, EU’s quest for finding the financial resources required by the “European

Strategy” was interpreted as an indication of the EU’s awareness of the need for

fulfilling its obligations towards Turkey with due emphasis on the importance o f

concrete steps in this area.^” The Statement, nevertheless, underlined the contrast

between the pre-accession strategy devised for the other candidates and the “European

Strategy” for Turkey which consists simply of a set o f ideas and whose financing

remains uncertain. It also stressed the fact that Turkey would not accept the subjection

o f its candidacy to additional political pre-conditions, that the parameters put forward

Zaman . 3 June 1998

” See Turkish Foreign Ministiy’s Spokesman Necati Utkan’s daily press briefing in Anadolu Agency. 18 June 1998

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in the Government Statement of 14 December 1997 remained valid, and that Greece’s

4

persistent obstructions would continue to have negative effects on Turkish-Greek

relations.

1.8. CONCLUDING REMARKS

From the above analysis, it can be seen that the EU just from the beginning, has not

had any intention to accept Turkey as a full member. Turkey assesses the Customs

Union as a step towards full membership, whereas the EU considers it as the final

point in the bi-lateral relations. The EU is fully aware that the preconditions they have

brought before Turkey are unacceptable for Turkey. They mean that whatever Turkey

does is not enough for Turkey to be admitted. The kind of relationship the EU wishes

to have with Turkey is probably economic and trade relations.

On the other hand, until recently, or up to the Luxembourg decisions, Turkey had

tliought that if it conceded to what the EU dictated, the Union would have easily

welcomed it. Turkey had always made concessions in order to become a full member

o f the EU. In the early 1980s, Turkey allowed Greece to return to NATO without

making any political gains. On the contraiy, Turkey had to pay a very high price for

this. Greece vetoed almost all of the financial aid that the EU intended for Turkey.

However, after the Luxembourg decisions, the Union made it clear that in the near

future, o f twenty or more years, they were not inclined to integrate with Turkey. Now

Turkey seems to be detemiined not to talk with the EU anything ‘political’. Turkey

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lost confidence in the EU. The EU liad kept saying that, should Turkey fulfil all the

commitments it had undertaken, it would have accepted Turkey. But now, Turkey has

fully understood that it is impossible for it to be accepted even if it does more than

wanted.^’ Under these circumsatnces Turkey only wants to have better economic

relations with the EU countries. Turkish officials, in many platforms, openly stated

that Turkey would not stay in the ‘begging room’ any longer. Anlcara is detennined to

catch up with the western criteria of development, which draws the new Turkish

foreign policy towards Europe. These days Turkey seems to be talking about another

‘Europe’ beyond the European Union boundaries.''“ We will see in the coming two to

three years whether this new Turkish approach'" will be successful and contribute well

to the relations with the EU.

The Economist. 31 July 1998

From Bülent Ecevit’s lecture at a conference on the “Latest Developments on Cyprus and Turkish- Greek Relations” organised by Ankara University, Faculty o f Language, Histoiy and Geography. (Anadolu Agency. 29 April 1998)

Some Greek intellectuals perceive this new approach as detrimental to Greece’s foreign policy interests, since they think that the Greek veto is gradually becoming meaningless as long as Turkey stays out o f the ‘begging room’, (see Kostas lordanis, “September will be critical...”,in Kathimerini.

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CHAPTER 2: CYPRUS QUESTION

2.1. INTRODUCTION: EMERGENCE OF THE CONFLICT

The Cyprus issue has to begin with history. This is because for the Greek Cypriots

and the Turkish Cypriots the past is still veiy much alive.' It is kept alive by the

political elite of both sides because each side firmly believes that the history has done

a grave injustice to them. The Turkish Cypriots have a particular grudge against the

Greek Cypriots for their sufferings at Greek Cypriot hands from 1963 to 1974.^ They

do not easily forget that the Greek Cypriots made a determined and ruthless attempt in

1963 to 1964, especially, to intimidate them by violence, if not to kill them all.^ This

led to many hundreds of deaths and to the flight of the Turkish Cypriot population

into tiny eirclaves for safety

The Greek Cypriots did not have any major complaints against the Turkish Cypriots

before 1960. After the establishment o f the Republic of Cyprus with two politically

equal founding communities, their uneasiness with the Turkish Cypriots started.^ They

also have held a belief that the Turkish Cypriots should never have been regarded as

' For tlic historical background o f the Cyprus problem, see Necati Ertekün, The Cyprus Dispute and tlie Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Nicosia North; K. Rüstern, 1984, pp. 1-5 and Salahi R. Sonyel, Cyprus: The Destruction of a Republic. Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1997, pp. 1-13

^ Polyvios G. Polyviou, Cyprus-conllict and negotiation. 1960-1980. New York; Holmes&Meier PublLshers, 1980, p. 26 and Zenon Stavrinides. The Cyprus Conflict: national identity and statehood . 1975. p. 11

’ Eycnina Standard. 13 February 1964

'' For the further details o f the Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus see Pierre Oberling, The Road To Bellapais. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982

’ Christian Heinze, The Cyprus Conflict: The Western Peace System is Put to Test, ira n sla le d b y th e P u b lic In form ation O ffice o f the Turkish F e d e ra te d S ta te o f K ıb rıs -o rig in a l text w as p u b lis h e d in

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anything more than a minority.'’ For many Greek Cypriots Cypius was from earliest

days peopled by immigrants of Greek language and culture.’ According to them,

Cyprus is part, or ought to be part, of the Hellenic world."

The major enemy o f the Greek Cypriots is Turkey, and of course the Turk. It was

Turkey which, according to them, ‘invaded’ Cyprus in 1974, in response to a

successful coup against Makarios that promised e n o s is (union with Greece). In the

Greek Cypriot view, Turkey has invaded some 37% o f the Island and is responsible

for the flight o f some 150,000 Greek Cypriots from their homes. Turkey stands behind

Denkta§, President o f Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, in the Greek Cypriot

popular view.’ He has been only kept in power, many Greek Cypriots appear to

believe, by the votes o f the Turkish ‘settlers’ whom they often variously estimate to

be between 50 and 75% of the population, an estimate which a recent Turkish Cypriot

census has refuted.'®

G erm an in E u ro p a A r c h iv in 1964. Nicosia, 1977, and see the Akritas Plan which was first published in Patris, on 21 April 1966

The latest Greek Cypriot application on behalf of the whole island to the EU for full membership clearly shows that Greek Cypriots see the Turkish Cypriots no different than the Latins, Armenians and Maronites on the island. (See Heinz Kiamer, ‘The Cyprus Problem and European Security”, Survival, vol. 39, no. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 21-22

^ Polyviou, op.cit.. p. 1.

” See ‘Outline Proposal o f the Cypriot Government for the Establishment o f a Federal Republic and for the solution o f the Cyprus Problem’ in the Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy (ed.). Yearbook 1989 (Athens: ELIAMEP), pp. 291-304

^ A meeting was held in Athens on 4 May 1995 between the Greek government and the Greek Cypriot National Council headed by derides. Tlic then Greek Prime Minister Papandreu’s statement after the conclusion o f the Athens meeting, to the effect that: “...when we refer to the Turkish Cypriot side, we are in fact referring to Turkey” and derides statement to the effect that if the Greek Cypriot side were to engage in any process o f secret diplomacy it would do so “with Turkey, not Denkta§ because it is not Dcnkta§ who makes the decisions” arc clear manifestations o f the ti*ue intentions o f Greece and the Greek Cypriot Leadership, (see httpi/Avww.acccss.ch/tuerkci/GRUPF/intrans.htni)

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The Greek Cypriots’ suspicion and fear o f Turkey leads them to believe that the only

way to obtain a solution in their favor is to have pressure exerted on Turkey by

outside powers. But they often believe that the world in general, and the United States

in particular, is prone to support Turkey. They blame the former colonial power,

Britain, for having been eager to placate Turkey in 1960, hence preventing the

exercise o f self-determination'' by the Greek Cypriots. As the great majority on the

island they claim they had the right to self-determination for the whole island, and

would, in fact, at that time have declared union with Greece.'^ The 1960 treaties which

gave viitual equality to the Turkish Cypriot ‘minority’ are said to have been

‘imposed’ on Cypms.'^

The Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, believe that they have been let down by the

international community. They liad no real cause for complaint against the 1960

settlement, except that many would no doubt have preferred a division of the Island,

though that was not really feasible at that time. Their real frustration with the

international conmiunity stems from 1963-64.'“' After being intimidated by violence,

to the extent o f having to abandon their constitutional positions in the institutions o f

" Stephen Xydis, “Toward ‘Toil and Moil’ in Cyprus”, The Middle East Journal 20, no.l (Winter, 1966), p. 7

The Greek Cypriot House o f Representatives passed a resolution on 26 June 1967, on Enosis. This resolution has neither been annulled nor denied by the Greek Cypriot side until today. It is still in force, (sec Ertekiin, op.cit.. pp. 174-181)

” Sec S. Xydis, Cyprus Conflict and Conciliation 1954-1958 Ohio University Press, 1967, p. 53 and refer to the ‘Akritas Plan’.

See S/5950 o f 10 September 1964, articles 192, 203 and 205 o f the UN Secretary-General’s Reports evidencing the violations o f the human rights o f Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriot Administration.

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the state‘^, they then had to suffer the recognition by the UN'®, and all states but

Turkey, o f the rump Greek Cypriot administration as the legitimate govermnent of the

Republic o f Cyprus established in 1960. In 1965, when the Turkish Cypriot members

o f the House o f Representatives tried to return through the UN, they were prevented

from doing so unless they agreed to constitutional amendments, including changes to

the electoral law, that would have turned them virtually into a minority.” At this

juncture Britain, one of the three Guarantor Powers of the 1960 treaties, refused a

Turkish request for a meeting of Turkey, Greece and Britain to discuss inteiwention,

as provided for in the treaties, with a view to restoring the state of affairs established

in the Constitution.'" Makarios had maintained that the Constitution was

unworkable.'’ d e rid e s has since disagreed. The outcome of this history was that the

Turkish Cypriots felt cheated of their rights, mainly because Britain looked to its own

and NATO interests, which were centered on the retention and smooth operation o f

the two sovereign bases, and other facilities in the South, regarded as important during

the time o f the Cold War.^’ These concerns clearly took preference over standing

behind the treaties it had signed. Since the 1960s British claims to mediation have not

been much welcomed by the Turkish Cypriots, conscious that their role as Britain’s

allies in the struggle against EOKA before 1960^' brought them no political return. In

fact, after 1964 Britain, with American support, soon began to entertain e n o s is and.

” See S/7350 o f June 1966, articles 152, 153 and 154 o f the UN Sccretary-Generars Reports evidencing the violations o f the human rights o f Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriot Administration.

UN Security Council Resolution 186 (S/ 5575 of 4 March 1964) ” Sonyel, op.cit.. pp. 142-143

Sonyel, Ibid., p. 144

” Richard A. Patrick, Political Gcoaranhv and (he Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971, pp. 115-116 Sonyel, op.cit.. pp. 118-160

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with it, Greek rule or influence in Cyprus, as a better solution to the Cyprus problem

than a Cyprus under the control o f Makarios.^^

Consequently Turkish Cypriots believe that only Turkey will stand up for them,

though Turkish support has not always in the past been given totally without

reservation. In fact, Turkish governments in the late 1960s and early 1970s held back

from full support, hoping that the Cyprus problem could be contained in a way that

would not upset Turkey’s relations with Europe.^^

2.2. NEGOTIATIONS

It should be clear from the above that both sides have entered into negotiations with

sets o f attitudes and emotions hardly conducive to agreement between them. The

Turkish side has a distinct grievance against the Greek Cypriots. The Greek side has a

distinct grievance against Turkey. Both are suspicious of the motive of the outside

powers. The Turkish Cypriots deeply resent the recognition by the UN and other

international organisations of the government o f the South as the legitimate

government o f the island. In fact, curiously, it has been the UN who has introduced

pre-conditions in attempts to obtain a solution. The Turkish Cypriots have confidence

only in Turkey and even Turkey, in order to maintain other international contacts, is

sometimes put in the position o f having to discriminate against the TRNC. For

Sonycl, OD.cit.. pp. 99-117

See the report on Tuikisli altitudes at the lime in Sulia Boliikba?!, Turkisli-Anicricaii Relations and Cyprus. New York and London: University Press o f America, 1988, p. 174

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example, if Turkey recognises TRNC thoroughly, why don’t Turkish football teams

play matches with Turkish Cypriot teams in TRNC?

The consistent Greek Cypriot and Greek policy has been firstly trying to persuade the

international community to exert pressure on Turkey in order to make the Turkish

Cypriots more conciliatoiy. Secondly, they take every opportunity to internationalise

the issue and, in particular, to have it discussed in international meetings where the

Turkish Cypriots do not have the right to participate.^'' Thirdly, both Greece and the

South have in recent years made pronounced efforts to rearm^^ against Turkey,

making a rapprochment really difficult.^*

Against this background the UN has tried as an intennediary to obtain agreement on a

bi-zonal, bi-coimnunal system of government for the Island. There was a good starting

point in 1977 when Makarios and Denlcta? met to agree on a number of points

establishing a bi-coinmunal federation.^’ Later it became tacitly accepted by the Greek

Cypriot side that a federation would also be a bi-zonal, but accepting the zone as a

territorial entity. The four guidelines constantly reappear in the course o f

negotiations.’* They noted agreement on the following points:

About the Greek Cypriot attempts through the United Nations see, Suha Bölükbaşı, “The Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations; Peaceful Non-Settlement Between 1954 and 1996”, Int. J. Middle East Stud. 30 (1998), pp. 411 -412

Heinz Kramer, “The Cyprus Problem and European Security”, Survival, vol.39, no.3. Autumn 1997, p. 18

The presence o f some 30,000 Turkish troops in Northern Cyprus has encouraged this policy, even though since 1974 there has been no notable increase in the numbers o f these troops, too many though may be, and they have shown no aggressive intent.

Sec the guidelines agreed between Denktaş an Makarios on 12 February 1977 (Ertekiin, on.cit.. p.278)

Despite attempts by the new Greek Cypriot leadership under Mr. Spyros Kyprianou to avoid them or to whittle down their real intention and spirit resorting to expediences o f interpretation, the Greek

Turkey-EU relations and the Cyprus question

НС

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3τΊΗΖ

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate,

in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree on Master o f International

Relations

Assistant Professor Hasan Ünal

Thesis Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate,

in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree on Masteylof International

Relations

A ssistai

i

Professor Hakan Kırımlı

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate,

in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree on Master o f International

Relations

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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