Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. XXII, No. 3, Spring 1999
Turkey's New Vocation
Meltem Mufti.Her
{I)
Introduction
The extraordinary revolution and turmoil in global politics since 1989 have left few countries untouched. In 1989, the regime transformations in Eastern Europe and the dismantling of the Soviet Union signaled the end of one era and the beginning of another. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union have created a security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe that the West cannot simply ignore.1
Turkey has been among those states most immediately affected by the changing European security environment. This article focuses on the reformulation and diversification of Turkish foreign policy in response to the uncertainties in the external environment. In the post-Cold War period, the Turks proudly sense a new international prominence for themselves; they enjoy their position as a regional power in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. 2 In this uncertain period, the international system benefits from a nation whose stability and track record for international prudence are typically impressive . .J
Dr. Meltem Muftuler taught at Temple University between 1989-1992. She is currently at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey where she teaches courses on political development. Her current work aims at tackling Turkey's recent endeavors in the Middle East and Europe, and the implications of the customs union with the EU.
1 Edward Mortimer, European Security After the Cold War (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Adelphi Papers No. 271, Summer 1992), p. 5.
2 Morton Abramowitz, "Dateline Ankara: Turkey After Ozal", Foreign Policy, No. 91, Summer 1993, p. 164.
The author proposes that Turkey's new ties with the Middle East and Central Asia are in the interests of the western Alliance. However, it should be noted that Turkey's new orientation is not at the expense of its already existing ties with the United States or Europe, rather it is complementary and supportive of these pre-existing ties. Turkey's Western orientation is intact and remains undisputed.
Turkey has been one of the winners of the post-Cold War period; now its in the "eye of the storm." 4 For the first time in the last five centuries, Turkey does not share a border with the Soviet Union, thus the pervasive "Fear of the Bear," that has overshadowed Turkish foreign policy, has been removed.5 Turkey is now
surrounded by new areas of conflict; in the Balkans, there is chaos reminiscent of the 'L'Question D'Orient' of the 1900s; in the northwest, there is conflict in the Caucasus and in the sou~heast, there are violent clashes between the states in the area. In addition, a new challenge has appeared with the emergence of the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union in Central Asia that view Turkey as a model. Thus, in the post-Cold War period, Turkey is faced with the task of developing a multi-faceted foreign policy that addresses all these issues. Geographically, it is well placed to serve as a base from which a new order could radiate.6
(II) Turkey during the Cold War
The realist school proposes that a country's geography deter-mines its perceived power and its interactions with other players to a great extent. It also sets the policy choices and available alternatives while imposing natural restrictions and limitations to possible courses of action.
Turkey's geography is the key to its international relations, subjecting it to influences from all sides which it cannot escape.7
4 Philip Robins, "Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey's Policy Toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States", Middle East Journal, Vol. 47, No. 4, Autumn 1993, p. 657.
5 Paul B. Henze, "Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century'', Turkey's New
Geopolitics; From the Balkans to Western China (Boulder: Westview Press, Rand Study, 1993), p. 2.
6 Andrew Mango, Turkey: Tbe Challenge of a New Role, Washington Papers
No. 163, Praeger Publishers, 1994, p. 110. 7 Henze, op.cit., 1993, p. 28.
Turkey straddles Europe and Asia; the notion of Turkey as a bridge between East and West is a pervasive theme among the political and economic elite in Turkey and sympathetic observers else-where.8 This strategic location gives Turkey a prominent place in European security.
In the post-World War II order, the Western alliance and Turkey had the common aim of stopping Soviet expansionism. Turkey became a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 and an associate member of the European Community (EC) in 1963. These organizations had incorporated Turkey into their ranks for one specific purpose: to deter Soviet expansionism. For forty years, Turkey's role in the Western alliance was defined in terms of its strategic position vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. In the first years after World War II, as the only Islamic country with a secular democratic government, Turkey was viewed as a bulwark against Soviet designs in the Middle East.9 Turkey, on the other hand, strove to gain recognition as a European power in its own right by joining all the right clubs, and needed a powerful friend to deter the Soviets from·demanding concessions.rn
The Turkish-American relationship during the Cold War era can be best described as a reciprocal commitment. Turkey would act as a reliable American ally against the Soviets and the United States would protect Turkey against potential Soviet attacks or threats. These mutual commitments were guided by the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA), the framework that guided this bilateral strategic relationship.
With the end of Cold War, the common enemy that brought Turkey and the United States together - the Soviet Union - has disappeared, but their security interests still converge. Since 1989, American foreign policy has been concerned about the emergence of a new equilibrium and because Turkey's security depends upon stability in the region, the American and Turkish interests once again converge around the same axis. The United States seeks to
8 Ian Lesser, Turkey: A Bridge or Barrier(Santa Cruz, CA: Rand Co., 1992), p. 3. 9 Bruce Koniholm, "Turkey and the West", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2, Spring 1991, p. 34.
IO Meltem Mi.iftuler, "Turkey and the European Community: An Uneasy
preserve the longstanding alliance because Turkey's strategic location and regional power may be essential to implementing future security plans.11
American observers believe that it is in the interests of the United States to support Turkey as a regional power by recognizing the constructive role that Turkey's multilateral initiatives can play in the 'new world order'. There are a number of reasons for that support, the most obvious being Turkey's role in the Middle East as demonstrated by the Gulf crisis.
The Gulf crisis of 1990/91 was a timely reminder of the importance of Turkey with respect to the Middle East. It underlined the critical geostrategic location of Turkey and the crisis itself underlined the similarity of perception towards
the Middle East which Turkey shares with the West.12
Another reason is Turkey's position with respect to the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union. The key issues of interest to the United States in the former Soviet Union are: (i) avoidance of major military build- up or armed conflict in the Caucasus, (ii) avoidance of the emergence of extremist trends such as fundamentalist Islam, (iii) Turkish ability to serve as an honest broker in the Caucasian and Central Asian political conflicts, (iv) concern for the likelihood of an Iranian-Turkish or a Russian-Turkish conflict over influence in the region.13
This is a time when Turkey's foreign policies can play a signifi-cant role in impacting the regional balances and the region's future stability. For example, the United States and the former Soviet Union had signed an agreement on reducing conventional forces in 1990; the Conventional Forces Reduction Agreement (CFRA) which was to be operative in 1995. However, in June 1993, the Russians declared that they may not fulfill the conditions of the agreement because of a potential danger from their south, namely Turkey.14
11 Andrew Borowiec, "U.S. continues backing Turkey as a strategic ally," 1be
Washington Times, July 20, 1994, p. Al 5.
12 Philip Robins, "Turkey and the Eastern Arab World," in Europe and the Middle East, Gerd Nonneman (ed.) (London, Federal Trust for Education and Research, 1993), p. 189.
13 Graham Fuller, Turkey Faces East: New Orientations Toward the Middle East
and the Old Soviet Union, Rand report, R-4232-AF/A, 1992, p. 58.
14 This request was made by the Russian Defense Minister General Pavel Gracev to the American Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin in a Berlin meeting. (Hurriyet, Turkish Daily, June 13, 1993).
The Russians perceive a threat from Turkey fearing that Turkey is becoming a power in the region and dislodging Russian influence. The formation of a new regional identity is still in its early stages, but there is a general consensus that the weakening of the Russian influence has created a potential vacuum for other regional powers to extend their political, economic, cultural influences.15 For
example, among the Central Asian republics, the trend is towards Turkey. Turkey became a center of activities in the 'devilish triangle' of the Balkan, Caucasus and Middle East regions.16 Thus, it
has been labeled the 'Turkish Ace' by the EC Commission because the Europeans view Turkey as an important stabilizing factor not only in the Middle East but also in the crisis ridden process of restructuring the Soviet heritage in Central Asia and the Caucasus.17
In line with these developments, Turkey has changed its foreign policy towards the Middle East, the Balkans and the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union. Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War period has become multi-faceted in response to the rapidly changing environment.
However, one should note that Turkey's post-Cold War power in the region is going to be increasingly determined by its domestic stability. In an analysis of Turkey's potential power, the elements that would decrease or challenge this power should be mentioned. According to Henri Barkey, Turkish foreign and domestic policies are increasingly determined by the domestic ethnic conflict between Turkey's Kurdish population and the Turkish army.18 Thus, even though the end of the Cold War has opened up new horizons for Turkey, such issues as Kurdish nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism came to the forefront, thereby challenging the newly defined role for Turkey as a regional power. Whether Turkey will succeed in its bid towards regional power will be determined by Turrtey's capacity to solve its own internal conflicts, but this is a subject to be explored on another occasion.
15 The Strategic Sumey, 1991-1992, p. 150.
16 Bahri Yilmaz, "Turkey's New Role in International Politics," Aussenpolitik, Vol. 45, No. 1, January 1994, 19. 93.
17 Heinz Kramer, "Turkey between the EC and Central Asia", Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ehenhausen, June 1993, p. 7.
18 Henri Barkey, "Turkey's Kurdish Dilemma", Sumiual, Vol. 35, No. 4, Winter 1993, p. 51.
(III) Turkey in Post-Cold War Conflicts
Turkey's new policy initiatives can be broadly categorized under two headings; conflict and cooperation. The first post-Cold War conflict in which Turkey took an active role was the 1990-91 Gulf crisis. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 introduced a new regional dimension to the balance of power in the Middle East and constituted the most serious threat to vital Western oil interests in the Persian Gulf since the Iranian revolution.19 The Gulf crisis of 1990-91
demonstrated that, even if the superpower conflict has ended, the Middle East is still a prime source of instability.20 The future of the U.S.-Turkish relations and Turkey's search for a new regional role were the decisive factors in shaping the Turkish policy in the Gulf crisis.21
The Gulf crisis marked the beginning of a new period in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. By deciding to actively side with the Allied Forces against Iraq, the late Turkish president, Turgut Ozal, made a conscious choice in changing seven decades of Turkish policy of noninvolvement towards the Middle East.22
In the first week of the crisis, on August 8, 1990, Turkey announced that the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline for the transport of Iraqi oil would be closed and that all commercial links between Iraq would be suspended in line with the UN embargo.23 When the
air war against Iraq began on January 18, 1991, the Turkish govern-ment allowed the use of Incirlik and other bases by the multilateral forces to force Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.
1be U.S. policies toward Iraq, the effectiveness of sanctions and the ability to coerce Iraq's compliance with international will hinge on Turkey's cooperation in enforcing them. Likewise, the professed U.S. foreign policy of containment as directed against
Iraq may at times require Turkey's deference.24
19 Koniholm, "Turkey and the West," p. 36.
20 William Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis," International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 4, 1992, p. 679.
•
21 Sabri Sayari, "Turkey: The Changing European .Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis," 7be Middle East journal, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1992, p. 14.
22 For further information, see Meltem Mi.ifti.iler, Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe, Manchester University Press, forthcoming.
23 For further information see Philip Robbins, Turkey and the Middle East
(London: Pinter, RIIA, 1991), pp. 67-71.
24 Carol Mig<aalovitz, "Turkey: Ally in a Troubled Region," Congress Report, September 1993, p. 14.
Ozal had foreseen Turkey's role in the Gulf in March 1991 when he announced that Turkey would have a definite role in any security system for the Middle East with U.S. support and the closely-linked U.S.-Turkish interests in the region.25 The crisis led to
a recognition that for European security, Turkey is a safety pillar in an area ridden with constant turbulence.
The Gulf crisis was a timely reminder of Turkey's importance to the West for stability in the Middle East; in that aspect it underlined Turkey's importance as a regional power. However, the flip side was that by reviving the Kurdish problem and attracting both domestic and international public opinion to the issue, the crisis ~orked in a counterdirection by pointing out to the potential weakness in Turkey, namely the ongoing Kurdish problem. Bringing the Kurdish problem into the limelight of international politics was an unintended consequence of the Gulf War, yet it revealed that "the persistence of a violent domestic conflict will undermine Turkey's role as a stabilizing influence in the regions in which its interests and those of its Western allies coincide."26
A second conflict in which Turkey is more-or-less involved is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Turkey's policy towards the conflict may be viewed as a metaphor for its uncertainties, ambivalences and contradictions towards the Middle East since World War II. 27 The peace process which began with the Madrid framework in .1991 brought a modification in Turkish foreign policy towards the issue. The perception in many Western minds is that if an Arab-Israeli peace treaty is signed, Turkey will be more effective in
""
the Middle East. 28
Turkey's position in the Middle East peace process is confined to its role in the Multilateral Track. The Madrid Framework, which constitutes the backbone of the peace process, consists of three elements; the Madrid conference of October 1991; the bilateral track, that is negotiations between Israel and its neighbors; and the multilateral track which began in Moscow in January 1992.
The multilateral track consists of negotiations on five forums; water issues, environment working group, arms control and
25 William D. Montalbawn, "Ozal seeks to translate role as Gulf War ally into Power for Turkey," Los Angeles Times, March 16, 1991.
26 Henri Barkey, "Turkey's Kurdish Dilemma", p. 66.
27 Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (London, Pinter Pre~s,' 1991), p. 74.
28 John Murray Brown, Financial Times, July 28, 1993.
regional security, the refugees problem and economic develop-ment. The assumption is that a lasting, viable peace is possible only through regional cooperation. Turkey's participation in these five forums is essential to achieving a viable peace plan. Turkey's new position towards the conflict can be observed by the official visits paid to Israel, first by the former Foreign Minister, Mr. Hikmet Cetin in November 1993 and then by the Prime Minister, Tansu (:iller, in November 1994, during which extensive cooperation agreements were signed by the two parties.
Another conflict worth mentioning is the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The importance of this crisis for European security is that it is taking place in Europe and it revealed that the Muslim factor in the Balkans during the 1990s is likely to be divisive of the region's future.29
Turkey is the only European country which has ethnic, cultural and historical ties with the Bosnian Muslims. European pro-crastination on broader security concerns has pushed Turkey and the United States closer on the issue of the bloody dispute in Bosnia-Herzogovina.30 The late Turkish President, Turgut Ozal, on
his last visit to the United States before his death in April 1993, tried to convince United States President Clinton to launch a military intervention based on the assumption that the United States was the only country with the power to stop the ongoing plight of the Bosnian people. In February 1994, the Turkish Prime Minister, Tansu (:iller, along with the Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, visited Bosnia. The visit was a symbolic demonstration of Turkish and Pakistani support behind the Bosnian Muslims.
In March 1994, the Turkish troops were included in the UN peacekeeping force to be stationed in Bosnia. These developments indicated that Turkey was very interested in the fate of the Balkans. During the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Turkish government
~
made it clear that it would not accept a solution disadvantageous to the Bosnian Muslims and that Turkey is a player in Balkan politics. Therefore, any settlement in the Balkans should involve Turkish participation.
The last tenet of the new Turkish foreign policy is the newly-independent republics of the former Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's dissolution had created Turkey's biggest and most
29 James Brown, "Back to the Balkans," Turkey's New Geopolitics, 1993, p. 150. 30 Briefing, March 15, 1993, Issue 931, p. 3.
immediate foreign policy headache: the Armenian and Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Both of these republics turned towards Turkey, neighbor to both. Each of these states was in search of some external ally. As Graham Fuller states: "Only Turkey and Iran were available to play this role. Only Turkey could serve as an overland lifeline to the West."31
Turkey shares cultural and ethnic ties with Azerbaijan. Turkey is involved in economic cooperation schemes with Azerbaijan; for example, the Azeri oil is to be transported through the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline pursuant to an agreement signed on March 9, 1993 and another agreement signed at the end of 1994 for transporting oil from Turkmenistan through a similar pipeline. In February 1994, the Turkish and the Azeri government signed a "Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement" and 15 other documents. In this agreement, the two countries pledged to "take all measures required in conformity with the UN Charter and international obligations" if either of the two countries faced aggression from a third party.32 This means that in addition to a comprehensive
net-work of economic, political, cultural cooperation schemes, Turkey and Azerbaijan committed themselves to a common defense.
Under such circumstances, the new Armenian leadership under President Levon Ter Petrosyan came to recognize that it really had little· alternative to normalizing its relations with Turkey.33 To a great
extent, the Armenians are dependent on Turkey for the transport of supplies. An illustration of that dependence was the crisis in January 1993, when Armenia's only source of energy and heat, the natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, became dysfunctional due to an explosion. As a result, Turkey became the center of inter-national attention and had to allow the transfer of supplies to Armenia. However, since the Azeris and the Armenians were at war, to block the su~plies would have given some superiority to the Az~ris.
Turkey's role in the conflict can be better analyzed in its demands to Armenia to abandon its expansionist policy before full diplomatic relations could be restored.34 Due to its location, Armenia
31 Graham Fuller, "Turkey's New Eastern Orientation," Turkey's New Geopolitics, 1993, p. 76.
32 _Briefing, February 14, 1994, Issue 977, p. 9. 33 Fuller, "Turkey's New Eastern Orientation", p. 77.
is dependent on Turkey giving Turkey considerable leverage over Armenia. Incidents such as Armenian President Petrosyan's request to the Armenian-American community to moderate its anti-Turkish lobbying in the U.S. Congress should be viewed as Armenia advancing from normalizing relations with Turkey.
Turkey seems to be the only Western mediator with open channels of communication with both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Turkey has worked in a multilateral setting to solve the conflict; it is a party to the nine nation "Minsk Group" created by the CSCE and also is a party to a trilateral group with the U.S. and Russia. Turkey also had the advantage of being on friendly terms with both states due to their common borders. The first place where the leaders of these two republics met unofficially was the funeral ceremony for the late Turkish President, Turgut Ozal, in April 1993.
In the three conflicts that have erupted since 1990, Turkey followed a consistent foreign policy and took a firm stand. This is a new approach for Turkey since traditional Turkish foreign policy favors neutrality in the disputes erupting in the neighboring countries. Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and Bosnia are important to Turkey because they are taking place in Turkey's geostrategic backyard; they are perceived as having security implications for the Turkish Republic.:i5 Turkish foreign policy has
been changing in response to the changing security environment. Turkey seems to adapt to the new security arrangements by strengthening its stance in the region and by abandoning its isolationalist policies. Thus, in the post-Cold War era, there is a reformulation of Turkish security interests which, in turn, leads to a reformulation of foreign policy.
(IV) Turkey in Cooperation Attempts
In international politics, there are two axes for nation-state behavior; one is conflict and the other is cooperation. The argu-ments above have shown Turkey's newly-defined role in the conflicts in its immediate neighborhood. The second aspect of Turkey's post-Cold War foreign policy revolves around the cooperation axis. In line with 'new policy initiatives', Turkey had suggested the establishment of a free trade zone among the Black
Sea region countries under the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Association (BSECA). The aim was to create a scheme in the Black Sea region to promote regional economic cooperation and conse-quently peace, stability, security and prosperity in the area.;" The members of the organization are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldava, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.
The importance of this organization is that Turkey hopes to play a strategic role in international politics through cooperation with surrounding countries.37 One of the crucial issues concerning the
future of the BSECA is whether Turkey will use the BSECA for its political ends in the region and in Central Asia_;s Turkey perceives and promotes itself as a middleman between former Soviet/Warsaw Pact nations and the West, with the BSECA being one vehicle for triangular cooperation.;9 Turkish attempts at becoming a regional power is institutionalized through the formation of the BSECA and if it succeeds, then it can elevate Turkey's position in the eyes of its Western allies.
Another organization that Turkey may use as a new source of power for itself is the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), originally founded in 1977 under the name Regional Organization for Cooperation and Development (RCD) between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. When RCD was replaced by ECO in 1985, there were serious doubts concerning its effectiveness. In 1994, ECO has ten members; in addition to the original three, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan are the new members which constitutes a body of 300 million people. The first ECO meeting where all these ten members met took place on July
6,
1993 in Istanbul where the members decided upon projects of highways, railroads, oil and natural gas pipelines which would connect Central Asia with Turkey and Iran. In the most recent ECO meeting held in Pakistan in March 1995, Turkey signed a number of cooperation agreements.36 Sukru Elekdag, "Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project," Turkey Economy, May 1991, p. 30.
37 Omer Faruk Genckaya, "The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project: a
Regional Challenge to European Integration," International Social Science Journal, Vol. 138, November 1993, p. 556.
38 Id.
The political vacuum left by the dismantling of the Soviet Union opened a new road for Turkey. The first challenge now facing the states of Central Asia was to emerge from political obscurity and economic isolation.40 Turkey hopes to become Central Asia's
principal outlet to Europe as well as a conduit for Western aid and a middleman for investment.41
Turkey's relations with the Central Asian Republics to a great extent depend on the future of the cooperation schemes such as the oil pipeline and railroad construction. If Turkey can provide an infrastructure skeleton that connects it with these states, then Ankara will have succeeded in locking these entities into an intimate and long-term relationship. 42 Turkey perceives itself to be a
'newly emerging center' that works with the West for the necessary reforms to come to the Central Asian republics.43
In addition, Turkey presents a model of development for these new Central Asian republics; it is a secular, democratic country with a market economy. Turkey is the ideal as prescribed by the West for the development of Central Asian republics.44 The close ethnic,
cultural and language ties between the parties make Turkey a likely candidate for bringing these republics into close ties with the Western world. The regional organizations, therefore, are critical in assisting the newly independent republics in their process of development; their development, in turn, is critical in stabilizing the region. However, as Andrew Mango states: "relations with the newly independent Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union, which Turkey is certainly doing its best to foster, can yield benefits only in the context of Turkey's wider relationship with the advanced industrialized nations."45
Turkey warned the West that all of the former Soviet territories, particularly the Turkic states, are in need of urgent economic restructuring loans if they were to get on with free market
40 Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's Catapult to Independence," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3, Summer 1992, p. 109.
41 Morton Abramowitz, "Dateline Ankara", p. 168. 42 Robins, "Between Sentiment and Self-Interest," p. 608.
43 Stileyman Demirel, "Newly Emerging Center," Turkish Review, Vol. 6, No. 30, Winter 1992, p. 15.
44 Kramer~ "Turkey Between EC and Central Asia", p. 7.
45 Andrew Mango, "The Turkish Model," The Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, October 1993, p. 729.
economies and strengthen their democracies. 46 This means that for the emergence of a new equilibrium, the United States and the West European states should support the Turkish endeavors in the region for Turkey provides a valid model of development for newly independent countries in Asia.47
Turkey tried to expand its ties with the Central Asian and Caucasian republics by engaging in a network of economic, technical and political cooperation. By mid-1992, Turkey had made a bold bid for leadership and influence in the region.4H
A major issue confronting Turkey in this bid was the rivalry with Russia and Iran over influence in Central As_ia and the Caucasus. Ankara considers the establishment of pluralistic democratic administrations in the Turkic republics to be of vital importance, not least of all in view of the neo-expansionism of Russia and the danger of fundamentalist Islam from Iran.49 However, if Turkey follows an aggressive pan-Turkist policy in the region, it is going to face an aggressive Islamist policy from Iran; similarly, it would be faced by an aggressive Russian policy in the "nearabroad." In view of this competition for power and influence in the region between these three countries - Turkey, Iran and Russia - the Western interests would be better off viewing Turkey as the 'decisive foreign actor' that would determine the course of action that the Central Asian republics will take in order to avoid a resurgence of the Cold War structures or fundamentalist Islam.
The barrier that Turkey faces in this region is coming from Russia. Russian influence and its desire to be the decisive actor, is a notable problem. Political events such as the ousting of President Ebulfez Elchibey, a democratically-elected leader, from power by Geidar Aliyev, a member of the former P,olitburo, in Azerbaijan indicates the extent to which Russia is still the dominant power in these newly independent republics. Azerbaijan's re-admittance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in October 1993 also indicated that Russia was a powerful magnet drawing the countries into its orbit once again. A very strong motive stimulating the Baku government for re-applying to CIS was to obtain even-handed treatment by Russia for the conflict with Armenia.
46 Briefing, June 21, 1993, Issue 943, p. 10.
47 Mme. Lalumiere's-Secretary General of the CouncH of Europe-declaration,
Mango, 1993, p. 726.
48 Fuller, ·'Turkey Faces East," p. 38. 49 Brif!:ftng, Feb. 14, 1994, Issue 977, p. 9.
Some Russians express concern that Ankara has become Washington's chosen instrument for influence in Central Asia and an attempt to dislodge or displace Russian influence.50 Therefore, in promoting Turkey as a model of secular development in the region, both U.S. and Turkish policy planners should pay attention to such concerns because it may bring a clash between Russia and Turkey. Since Russia is still the gate opener for Central Asia and Caucasus, it is not a risk to be taken lightly.
(V)
Policy Implications for the United States and Western Europe
The importance of Turkey's active involvement in regional politics through the establishment of such organizations as the BSECA and ECO for Turkey's allies in the West is that Turkey can act as a key bridge between these various organizations, ECO, BSECA, EC and the European Economic Space Area. Turkey has been an associate member of the European Community since 1963, and signed a customs union agreement with the EU on March
6,
1995. The opening up of the Turkish borders to the EU means that the EU members will also benefit from the goods coming from Black Sea region countries and the Central Asian republics under similar terms because Turkey has free trade agreements with them. The EU, Turkey and Central Asian triangular relationship can be formed for economic reasons where Turkey can be directly paid for its assistance to the Central Asian republics. 51
Turkey has the personnel, resources and entrepreneurial capac-ities to become an impressive mid-level power in the next decade.52 The end of the Cold War brought major changes in the area. Today, Turkey is trying to fill a power vacuum left with the dismantling of the Soviet Empire and the collapse of the bipolar system. In order to do so, Turkey is abandoning some of its former foreign policy strategies such as noninvolvement in the Middle East and acquiring new strategies that would lift Turkey to a regional power status. Therefore, its stance during the Gulf war, the conflict in the Caucasus, the Bosnian conflict, as well as its membership and
50 Fuller, "Turkey Faces East," p. 46.
51 Philip Robins, New Trends in EC-Turkish Cooperation (Brussels: Forum
Europe, 1993), p. 27.
leadership in various organizations such as the BSECA, ECO and the EC, should be evaluated in this new light.
The importance of the new Turkish policy initiatives for the United States is that there is a close convergence of American and Turkish interests in the post-Cold War era as was the case during the Cold War years. The Soviet threat was the common security interest which brought U.S. and Turkey together in a complex relationship web after World War II. The disappearance of that threat, however, did not lead to a divergence of interests. American and Turkish national interests still converge, but in the post-Cold War era, the issue is no longer to contain Soviet expansionism, but to ensure stability in former Soviet Union republics, the Balkans and the Middle East. Since Turkey seems to be the linchpin of stability in the region, it is in the interests of the United States and Western Europe to support Turkey's recent endeavors in this triangle.
These endeavors provide Turkey with fresh approaches to influence the West and additional options to offer to the West in international trade and regional policy. 53 Turkey's new policy
initiatives and new multilateral ties can be of critical importance to the United States in terms of having a mediator between the U.S., Europe, Middle East and the former Soviet Union territories. The geopolitical shifts combined with Turkey's new prominence in international events, will have a major impact on the way Turkey sees itself, deals with others and is perceived by others. 54
53 Migdalovitz, "Turkey: Ally," p. 27.
54 Graham Fuller, "Conclusions: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World," Turkey's New Geopolitics, G. Fuller, Ian Lesser, Paul Henze (eds.) (Boulder: Westview Press, RAND Study, 1993), p. 163.
