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Ekonomik krizler ve ABD 2007 krizi sonrası ülkelerin borsa performansları üzerine bir araştırma

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(1)T.C. '2.8=(</h/h1ø9(56ø7(6ø 626<$/%ø/ø0/(5(167ø7h6h øùLETME $1$%ø/ø0'$/, FøNANSMAN PROGRAMI YÜ.6(./ø6$167(=ø. EKONOMøK KRøZLER VE ABD 2007 KRøZø SONRASI ÜLKELERøN BORSA PERFORMANSLARI ÜZERøNE BøR ARAùTIRMA. øEUDKLP.$<$'(/(1. 'DQÕúPDQ Prof. Dr. Öcal USTA. ø=0øR - 2012.

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(4) ÖZET Yüksek Lisans Tezi Ekonomik Krizler ve ABD 2007 Krizi SonrasÕ Ülkelerin Borsa PerformanslarÕ Üzerine BiU$UDúWÕUPD øEUDKLP.$<$'(/(1 Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü øúletme Anabilim DalÕ Finansman ProgramÕ. (NRQRPLNNUL]OHUJHUoHNOHúWL÷LONHGHE\NKDVDUPH\GDQDJHWirmekle ELUOLNWH \D\ÕOÕFÕ HWNLOHULQGHQ GROD\Õ GL÷HU ONHOHUH GH VÕoUD\DELOPHNWHGLU %X DUDúWÕUPDQÕQ DPDFÕ NUHVHOOHúPHQLQ XOXVODU DUDVÕ WHN ELU ERUVD VH\UL \DUDWPDVÕQÕQ \DQÕQGD ONHOHULQ D\ÕUWHGLFL HNRQRPLN VL\DVL YH LGDUL ELU WDNÕP özelliklerinin borsa SHUIRUPDQVODUÕQD QH \|QGH HWNL HWWLNOHULQLQ DUDúWÕUÕOPDVÕ  0RUWJDJH NUL]L VRQUDVÕQGD ONHOHULQ ERUVD SHUIRUPDQVODUÕQGD D\UÕúPD\D QHGHQ ROXS ROPDGÕNODUÕQÕQ LQFHOHQPHVLGLU %XQXQ LoLQ GRNX] D\UÕ ONHQLQ borsa endekslerinde 2007 Eylül sonu ile 2011 AralÕND\ÕVRQXDUDVÕQGDNLERUVD SHUIRUPDQVODUÕ oHU D\OÕN G|QHPOHU KDOLQGH LQFHOHQPLúWLU  0RUWJDJH NUL]LQLQ HWNLOHULQL LQFHOH\HELOPHN LoLQ NUL]L GHULQGHQ \DúD\DQ <XQDQLVWDQ øUODQGD 3RUWHNL] YH øVSDQ\D JLEL ONHOHULQ \DQÕQGD $%' ($PHULND %LUOHúLN Devletleri) $OPDQ\D øQJLOWHUH øVYLoUH JLEL JoO HNRQRPLOHULQ ERUVD HQGHNVOHUL GH VHoLOPLúWLU 6RQ RODUDN ø0.% (øVWDQEXO 0HQNXO .Õ\PHWOHU. %RUVDVÕ

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(7) ABSTRACT 0DVWHU¶V7KHVLV Economic Crises and A Research on Stock Exchange Performances of Countries After The 2007 U.S. Economic Crisis øEUDKLP.$<$'(/(1 Dokuz Eylül University Graduate School of Social Sciences Department of Business Administration Finance Program. Even though economic crises have huge impact on the country that they are found in, they might affect other economies. This thesis is dedicated to research the impact of the 2007 mortgage crisis on stock exchange performances and observe the characteristics which differenciate the stock exchange performances of countries after the crisis. To be able to find out that indices of nine different countires have been observed within every three months performances beetween the end of September 2007 and 2011 year end. While selecting the markets for research, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain were chosen to represent the Euro crisis; US, Germany, UK and Switzerland were chosen to see the differentiation of powerful economies and finally Turkey was included to understand how Turkey has been performing in recent global economic crisis after the 2001 economic crisis. The returns of indices were calculated by normal cumulative return method. Euro based index was calculated to eliminate the impact of currency rates. All currency rates were taken from interbank market as closing prices. As a result, ISE 100 index has the best performance with %15 return, while ASE index has %86 loss. In Euro based evaluation, Switzerland SMI index jumped into first place because of strong CHF. This research shows that the 2007 mortgage crisis has negative impact on all indices observed in this document. In addition, econonmic overviews of countries, strength of effective reaction can be created against economic crisis, psychological factors of financial decision vi.

(8) takers, currency, political and executive conditions of countries strongly influence on the differentiation of stock exchange performances. Moreover, 'time' has also impact on index performances after crisis. This study underlines the 'time' impact on markets, considering that the second best performing country were United States, where the mortgage crisis had begun first. In. high. level. interaction. economical. environment,. considering. economical relations and stock exchange performances, it has been getting more and more important to adapt multiple equilibrium systems. If financial authorities keep an eye on these balances, it might be possible to limit the losses in stock exchanges during economic crisis because of having stonger adaption of economies. Keywords: Economic crisis, Economic crises history, Mortgage, Stock exchange performance, Currency Wars. vii.

(9) (.2120ø..5ø=/(59($%'.5ø=ø6215$6,h/.(/(5ø1%256$ 3(5)250$16/$5,h=(5ø1(%ø5$5$ù7,50$. ødø1'(.ø/(5 TEZ ONAY SAYFASI................................................................................................ ii Y(0ø10(71ø ....................................................................................................... xii. ÖZET .................................................................................................................... xiv ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................... xvi ødø1'(.ø/(5 ....................................................................................................... xviii KISALTMALAR ....................................................................................................... xii TABLOLAR LøSTESø.............................................................................................. xiv ù(.ø//(5 LøSTESø ................................................................................................ xv EKLER LøSTESø .................................................................................................. xxvii. *ø5øù .......................................................................................................................1. %ø5ø1&ø%g/h0 .5ø=.$95$0,9( EKONOMøK .5ø=02'(//(5ø .5ø=7$1,0,9((.2120ø..5ø=.$95$0, ...................................................... 4 .UL]LQ7DQÕPÕ ............................................................................................. 4 (NRQRPLN.UL]dHúLWOHUL .............................................................................. 6 1.1.2.1. Reel Ekonomik Krizler .................................................................. 6 1.1.2.2. Finansal Krizler............................................................................. 7 'Õú%RUo.UL]L .................................................................. 7 1.1.2.2.2. Döviz (Para) Krizi ............................................................ 8 %DQNDFÕOÕN± Finans Krizi............................................... 11 (.2120ø..5ø=(1EDEN OLAN FAKTÖRLER ................................................ 13 1.2.1. Sürdürülemeyen Ekonomik Dengeler ...................................................... 14 viii.

(10) =D\ÕI)RUPGD%LU)LQDQVDO<DSÕ ............................................................... 14 1.2.3. Psikolojik Nedenler .................................................................................. 14 $KODNL5LVN.D\QDNOÕ.UL]OHU ..................................................................... 15 1.2.5. Çoklu DenJHYH%XODúÕFÕ.UL]OHU .............................................................. 16 6L\DVLøVWLNUDUVÕ]OÕN ................................................................................... 17 1.2.7. Kur SavaúlarÕ (Currency Wars)................................................................ 18 )LQDQVDO2WRULWHOHUYH=DPDQODPD+DWDVÕ ............................................... 20 .5ø=ø1$ù$0$/$5,9(5ø6.<g1(7ø0ø ........................................................... 21 1..UL]LQ$úDPDODUÕ ...................................................................................... 21 2OXúXP$úDPDVÕ ........................................................................ 22 2UWD\DdÕNPD$úDPDVÕ .............................................................. 23 %HOLUJLQOHúPH$úDPDVÕ ............................................................... 23 .UL]LQd|]OPHVLYHg÷UHQPH$úDPDVÕ .................................... 24 5LVN.DYUDPÕYH5Lsk ± .UL]øOLúNLVL ......................................................... 24 1.3.3. Risk Yönetimi ........................................................................................... 26 .UL]H.DUúÕ'XUXP$QDOL]OHUL ...................................................... 26 (NRQRPLN<DSÕQÕQ6WUDWHMLN2ODUDN.RQXPODQGÕUÕOPDVÕ ............. 28 .5ø=02'(//(5ø ................................................................................................ 29 1.4.1. Birinci Nesil Modeller ............................................................................... 29 øNLQFL1HVLO0RGHOOHU ................................................................................. 30 1.4.3. Üçüncü Nesil Modeller ............................................................................. 31 (.2120ø..5ø=ø1(7.ø/(5ø ............................................................................. 32. ø.ø1&ø%g/h0 'h1<$'$9(7h5.ø<(¶'((.2120ø..5ø=/(5. 'h1<$'$(.2120ø..5ø=/(57$5ø+ø ............................................................ 34 2.1.1. 1929 Öncesi Ekonomik Krizleri................................................................ 34 (NRQRPLN%XKUDQÕ .......................................................................... 35 2.1.3. 1933 ± 1980 Dönemi Ekonomik Krizleri .................................................. 38 2.1.3.1. 1966 Amerika Kredi Krizi ............................................................ 39 ix.

(11) 2.1.3.2. 1973 Petrol Krizi ......................................................................... 40 6RQUDVÕ(NRQRPLN.UL]OHU ............................................................... 42 2.1.4.1. Latin Amerika Krizi ..................................................................... 42 2.1.4.2. 1994 Tekila Krizi ± Meksika ....................................................... 43 2.1.4.3. 1997 Asya Krizi .......................................................................... 42 2.1.4.4. 1998 Rusya Krizi ........................................................................ 48 2.1.4.5. 1998 Brezilya Krizi...................................................................... 50 2.1.4.6. 2001 Arjantin Krizi ...................................................................... 52 $%'0RUWJDJH.UL]LYH6RQUDVÕ ...................................................... 55 .UHVHO.UL]LQ$YUXSDhONHOHULQH<D\ÕOPDVÕ ............................... 59 2.1.5.1.1. Yunanistan Krizi ............................................................ 60 øUODQGD.UL]L ................................................................... 61 2.1.5.1.3. Portekiz Krizi ................................................................. 62 2.1.øWDO\DYHøVSDQ\D QÕQ'XUXPX ....................................... 63 7h5.ø<((.2120ø..5ø=/(57$5ø+ø ............................................................. 64 2VPDQOÕ'|QHPL ...................................................................................... 64 %XKUDQÕQÕQ7UNL\H \H(WNLVL ........................................................... 65 2.2.3. Görece Daha Büyük Etkili Ekonomik Krizler ........................................... 67 2.2.3.1. 1958 ± 1961 Krizi ....................................................................... 67 2.2.3.2. 1978 ± 1983 Krizi ....................................................................... 69 2.2.3.3. 1994 Krizi ................................................................................... 71 2.2.3.4. 2000 ± 2001 Krizi ....................................................................... 72 2.2.4. Görece Daha Az Etkili Ekonomik Krizler ................................................. 77 2.2.4.1. 1948 Krizi ................................................................................... 78 2.2.4.2. 1954 Krizi ................................................................................... 78 2.2.4.3. 1974 Krizi ................................................................................... 78 2.2.4.4. 1988 ± 1989 Krizi ....................................................................... 79 2.2.4.5. 1991 Krizi ................................................................................... 79 2.2.5. 2007 Global Ekonomik Krizi'nin Türkiye'ye Etkileri.................................. 79. x.

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(21) TABLOLAR LøSTESø Tablo 1: Para Krizi YH%DQNDFÕOÕN± Finans Krizinin Milli Gelir Cinsinden Maliyeti . s.13 7DEOR7UNL\H QLQ3HWUROøWKDODWÕ(N<NgUQHN6HQDU\R$QDOL]L ...................... s.27 Tablo 3: Ekonomik Krizler Tarihi Kronolojisi 1637 -1929 ...................................... s.35 7DEOR(NRQRPLN%XKUDQÕ.DSVD\DQ'|QHPGH<ÕOOÕN%\PH2UDQODUÕ ............ s.37 7DEOR%XQDOÕPÕ6RQUDVÕQGD7HSH1RNWDVÕQD*|UH6DQD\LhUHWLPLQGHNL 'úúOHU .............................................................................................................. s.38 Tablo 6: Meksika Ekonomik Göstergeleri (1987 - 1998) ....................................... s.44 7DEOR0HNVLND QÕQ± '|QHPLQGH8\JXODGÕ÷Õ'|YL].XUX 3ROLWLNDODUÕ ............................................................................................................ s.45 Tablo 8: Arjantin'in 1960 ± '|QHPLQGH8\JXODGÕ÷Õ(NRQRPLN3URJUDPODU ... s.53 7DEORdHúLWOL hONHOHUGH%D]Õ)LQDQVDO.XUXOXúODUÕQøIODVODUÕ............................... s.58 7DEOR$%hONHOHULQGH%UW*HQHO.DPX%RUoODUÕQÕQ*6<ø+ \D2UDQÕ 2012) ................................................................................................................... s.61 7DEOR$YUXSD%|OJHVL2UWDN7DKYLOøKUDFÕ ....................................................... s.63 7DEORøQWHUEDQN*HFHOLN)DL]2UDQODUÕ ............................................................ s.77 Tablo 13: 2001 ve Global Finansal Kriz Dönemlerinde Sermaye Hareketleri ....... s.81 7DEOR7UNL\H GH%\N%DQNDODUÕQ3HUVRQHO6D\ÕODUÕQGD.UL] ....................... s.82 Tablo 15: Mortgage Krizi SonrasÕ Ülkelerin Kümülatif Borsa PerformanslarÕ ........ s.96 7DEOR0RUWJDJH.UL]L6RQUDVÕhONHOHULQ(XUR%D]ÕQGD.PODWLI%RUVD 3HUIRUPDQVODUÕ ..................................................................................................... s.99. xiv.

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(45) Reel ekonomik krizler konjonktürel hareketlerden ND\QDNODQDELOHFH÷LJLELLo WDOHS GDUDOPDVÕ \D GD DU] ID]ODVÕ VHEHEL\OH GH PH\GDQD JHOHELOLU 'R÷DO DIHWOHU WHNQRORMLN NRúXOODUÕQ GH÷LúLPL VL\DVL ROD\ODU UHHO NUL]OHUH VHEHS RODELOLU 5HHO NUL]OHU ILQDQVDO NUL]OHUH J|UH GDKD \DYDú JHUoHNOHúLU DQFDN LúVL]OLN YH LIODVODUÕQ J|UOPHVL UHWLPLQ D]DOPDVÕ YH\D GXUPDVÕ WDOHS GDUDOPDVÕ JLEL VHEHSOHUGHQ GROD\Õ \ÕNÕFÕ etkiye sahiptir. 1.1.2.2. Finansal Krizler )LQDQV VLVWHPLQLQ JHOLúPHVL\OH ELUOLNWH ILQDQVDO NUL]OHU GDKD \D\JÕQODúPD\D EDúODPÕúWÕU *HQHO DQODPÕ\OD ILQDQV NUL]OHUL ILQDQV VLVWHPLQGH RUWD\D oÕNDQ oRN DQL EHNOHQPHGLN JHOLúPHOHU úHNOLQGH WDQÕPODQDELOLU )LQDQV NUL]OHULQLQ ]DPDQ LoHULVLQGH reel sektöre de etkisi olur ve reel krizi tetikleyebilir. 7UOHULLWLEDUL\OHILQDQVDONUL]OHUSDUDEDQNDFÕOÕNYHGÕúERUoNUL]LROPDN]HUH oIDUNOÕúHNLOGHRUWD\DoÕNDU g]WUN

(46)  1.1.2.2.1. 'Õú%RUo.UL]L hONHHNRQRPLOHULQLQWDVDUUXIODUՁONHKDUFDPDODUÕQD\HWPHGL÷L]DPDQONHOHU GÕúERUoODQPD\ROXQDJLWPHNWHGLU'ÕúERUoODQPDQÕQHQ|QHPOLVHEHSOHUinden birisi \NVHN HPWLDIL\DWODUÕ LWKDODWÕQ LKUDFDWÕ NDUúÕOD\DPDPDVÕ YH\D GúN NDWPD GH÷HUOL ihracat ve JHUH÷LQGHQID]ODNDPXKDUFDPDODUÕVHEHEL\OHROXúDQEWoHDoÕNODUÕGÕU 'Q\DHNRQRPLVLQLQGÕúERUoNUL]L\OHWDQÕúPDVÕ OL\ÕOODUGDKÕ]OD\NVHOHn SHWURO IL\DWODUÕQÕQ SHWURO LWKDO HGHQ 0HNVLND %UH]LO\D ùLOL JLEL /DWLQ $PHULND ONHOHULQLQ FDUL DoÕNODUÕQÕ E\WPHVL YH EX ONHOHULQ GÕú ERUoODUÕQÕ |GHPHNWH ]RUODQPDVÕ\OD RUWD\D oÕNPÕúWÕU 2 ]DPDQODU LWKDO LNDPH VWUDWHMLVL L]OH\HQ 7UNL\H ekonomisinde GH 3HWURO .UL]L QLQDUGÕQGDQ ùHNLO ¶GH J|UOHFH÷LJLEL FDULDoÕN KÕ]OD E\Pú |]HOOLNOH  GD JHUoHNOHúHQ LNLQFL SHWURO NUL]L LOH NUL]LQ HWNLOHUL GHULQOHúPLú YH GÕú ERUoODQPD PLNWDUÕQGD J|]OH J|UOU ELU DUWÕú ROPXúWXU .UL]GHQ oÕNÕú \ROX RODUDN gerek Türkiye'de gerek Latin Amerika ülkelerinde finansal VHUEHVWOHúPH YH |]HOOHúWLUPH oDOÕúPDODUÕ EDúODWÕOPÕúWÕU 7UNL\H NUL]GHQ oÕNÕú \ROX oHUoHYHVLQGH,0)YH'Q\D%DQNDVÕJLELILQDQVDONXUXOXúODUODoHúLWOLILQDQVDOSODQODU \DSPÕúWÕU%XGXUXP\DúDQDQGÕúERUoNUL]LQLQDWODWÕOPDVÕQGDHWNLOLROXUNHQVRQUDGDQ DQODúÕODFD÷Õ ]HULQH ONH HNRQRPLVLQL NÕVD YDGHOL VHUPD\H DNÕPODUÕQÕQ HWNLVL ]HULQGHKDVVDVGXUXPDJHWLUPLúYHG|YL]NUL]LQLWHWLNOHPLúWLU 7.

(47) *HoPLúWHQ EX \DQD GÕú ERUo NUL]L \DúD\DQ ONHOHUL LQFHOHGL÷LPL]GH JOREDO HNRQRPLGH YH ONH HNRQRPLVLQGH GÕú ERUo NUL]LQL WHWLNOH\HQ HWNHQOHUL úX úHNLOGH VÕUDOD\DELOLUL] Ó hONH HNRQRPLOHULQLQ SHWURO EDúWD ROPDN ]HUH HQHUML LWKDO HGHQ ONHOHU NRQXPXQGDROPDVÕ Ó øWKDOJLUGLIL\DWODUÕQÕQDUWPDVÕQÕQLKUDFDWLPNDQÕQÕJLGHUHN]RUODúWÕUPDVÕ Ó )DL]RUDQODUÕQÕQ\NVHOPHVL\OHERUoODQPDPDOL\HWOHULQLQDUWPDVÕ Ó *HOLúPLú ONHOHULQ JHOLúPHNWH RODQ ONHOHUH NR\GXNODUÕ UHNDEHWH \|QHOLN kotalar Ó 9HULPVL]NDPXKDUFDPDODUÕQÕQEWoH\HROXPVX]HWNLVL Ó <NVHOHQ SHWURO IL\DWODUÕQÕQ HWNLVL\OH ILQDQV NXUXOXúODUÕQGD ELULNHQ \NVHN PLNWDUGD QDNGLQ JHOLúPLú ONHOHUH NÕVD VUHOL NROD\ NUHGL LPNDQÕ VD÷ODPDVÕ DQFDNEXNRúXOODUÕQVUHNOLROPDPDVÕYHVRQUDGDQER]XOPDVÕ Ó 6UGUOHELOLU %RUo 2UDQÕ  %RUo  *6<ø+ (*D\UL 6DIL <XUW øoL +DVÕOD

(48) ) NDYUDPÕ ile ülke ekonomilerinin büyüdükçe daha fazla borçlanmaya izin vermesi ùHNLO2: Türkiye'de 'Õú%RUo6WRNX± *60+2UDQÕ 

(49). .D\QDN7&0%.UHVHOOHúPHQLQ7UNL\H(NRQRPLVLQH(WNLOHUL6. 1.1.2.2.2. Döviz (Para) Krizi 6DELWNXUVLVWHPLQGHGHYDODV\RQHWNLVL\OHGDOJDOÕNXUVLVWHPLQGHLVHSL\DVD aktöUOHULQLQ HOOHULQGHNL SDUD\Õ XOXVDO SDUDGDQ \DEDQFÕ SDUD\D DQLGHQ oHYLUPHVL VRQXFX NXUGD ROXúDQ EDVNÕQÕQ SVLNRORMLN HWNLOHUOH \D GD VSHNODWLI DWDNODUOD QRUPDO GDOJDODQPDQÕQ |WHVLQGH oRN VHUW GH÷LúLPOHUH VHEHS RODUDN 0HUNH] %DQNDVÕQÕQ finansal müdahaleler LOH |QOH\HPH\HFH÷L ER\XWODUGD RUWD\D oÕNDQ NUL]OHUGLU %XUDGD 8.

(50) SL\DVD DNW|UOHULQLQ SR]LV\RQODUÕ ONH SDUDVÕQD GX\XODQ JYHQ KDONÕQ \DWÕUÕP JHOHQH÷L SDQLN GXUXPX YH PHUNH] EDQNDVÕQÕQ JF G|YL] NUL]OHUL DoÕVÕQGDQ |QHP WHúNLO HWPHNWHGLU hONHGHNL NÕVD YDGHOL \DEDQFÕ \DWÕUÕPODUÕQ PLNWDUÕ GD ELU NUL] ihtimalini güçlendirecek niteliktedir. 3L\DVD DNW|UOHULQLQ \DEDQFÕ SDUD OHKLQH \DWÕUÕP EHNOHQWLOHUL ONHQLQ SDUD SL\DVDVÕQÕQ \HWHULQFH JHOLúPHPLú YH GHULQOHúPHPLú ROPDVÕ SDUD NUL]L RODVÕOÕ÷ÕQÕ DUWWÕUPDNWDGÕU  7UNL\H NUL]L EX NRQX\D J]HO ELU |UQHN WHúNLO HGHELOLU )LQDQV VHNW|UQGH \DEDQFÕ \DWÕUÕPÕQ ID]ODOÕ÷Õ GD RODVÕ NUL] ]DPDQODUÕQGD \DEDQFÕ SDUD SR]LV\RQODUÕQÕ DUWWÕUPDODUÕQGDQ GROD\Õ NUL]L N|UNOHPHNWHGLU ùHNLO  GH J|UOHFH÷L üzere kamu ve özel seNW|U EDQNDODUÕQÕQ JHQHO ILQDQVDO SR]LV\RQ \DSÕODUÕ IDUNOÕ ILQDQVDO VWUDWHMLOHUL ROGX÷XQXQ ELU J|VWHUJHVL NDEXO HGLOHELOLU Özel sektörün Eylül LWLEDUL\OHHOLQGHG|YL]EXOXQGXUPDVÕNXUGD\XNDUÕ\|QOELUEHNOHQWLROGX÷XQXQ J|VWHUJHVLRODUDNDOJÕODQDEilir. '|YL] NUL]L ELU VSHNODWLI HWNL VRQXFXQGD ONH SDUDVÕQÕQ GHYDOH HGLOHUHN GH÷HU ND\EHWPHVL\OH VRQXoODQDQ \D GD VSHNODWLI VDOGÕUÕODU VRQXFXQGD SDUD RWRULWHVLQLQ XOXVODUDUDVÕ UH]HUYOHUL KDUFD\DUDN YH IDL] RUDQODUÕQÕ \NVHOWHUHN ONH SDUDVÕQÕ VDYXQPD\D ]RUODPDVÕ\OD ROXúXU (Küçükaksoy 2006: 112). Ülkenin merkez EDQNDVÕQÕQ \DEDQFÕ SDUD UH]HUY GXUXPX YH HOLQGHNL GL÷HU ILQDQVDO PGDKDOH DUDoODUÕ\OD ONH SDUDVÕ OHKLQH KDUHNHWH JHoHU YH EX GXUXPX NUL]H G|QúPHGHQ HQJHOOHPH\HoDOÕúÕU ùHNLO3: %DQND*UXSODUÕøWLEDUL\OH1HW*HQHO'|YL]3Rzisyonu (Eylül 2011). Kaynak: BDDK, Türk BanNDFÕOÕN6HNW|U.XU5LVNL'H÷HUOHQGLUPH5DSRUX(\OOV. 9.

(51) <DEDQFÕODU WDUDIÕQGDQ VDWÕQ DOÕQDQ KLVVH VHQHWOHUL YH WDKYLO \DWÕUÕPODUÕ X]XQ G|QHP SRUWI|\ \DWÕUÕPODUÕ RODUDN J|UOPHNOH ELUOLNWH \NVHN OLNLGLWH\H VDKLS ROGXNODUÕQGDQ GROD\Õ ONHGHQ oÕNÕúODUÕ ùHNLO ¶GHQ DoÕkça J|UOHFH÷L JLEL oRN KÕ]OÕ olabilmektedir. gUQH÷LQ 7UNL\H GH  NUL]L\OH ELUOLNWH  PLO\DU GRODUOÕN QHJDWLI seUPD\H KDUHNHWL JHUoHNOHúPLúWLU *HQHOOLNOH \HUOL SDUD LOH DOÕQDQ EX SR]LV\RQODUÕQ NDSDWÕODUDN \DEDQFÕ SDUD\D JHoPHVL GH SDUD NUL]LQL KÕ]ODQGÕUÕFÕ \|QGH HWNL etmektedir.. ùHNLO4: *HOLúPHNWH2ODQhONHOHUH6HUPD\H+DUHNHWOHUL PLO\DUGRODU

(52). .D\QDN 7%%  <ÕOÕQGD 7UNL\H %DQNDODU %LUOL÷L YH 7UNL\H GH %DQNDFÕOÕN 6LWHPL 2007' , 2008, s. 33. hONHKDONÕQÕQHNRQRPLNGHQH\LPL\DWÕUÕPJHOHQHNOHULYH\DWÕUÕPSVLNRORMLVLGH döviz kri]OHULQL WHWLNOH\HELOLU 7UNL\H JLEL JHoPLúWH ELUoRN GHID GHYDODV\RQ \DSPÕú ELU ONHQLQ KDONÕ \HWHULQFH ELOJLOHQGLULOHPHGL÷LQGH SDQLN KDOL\OH KÕ]OD \DEDQFÕ SDUD SR]LV\RQXDODUDNONHSDUDVÕQÕQGH÷HUND\EHWPHVLQHQHGHQRODELOPHNWHGLU%LOLQoVL] medya orgaQODUÕ GD KDEHUOHUGH YDWDQGDúÕQ SDQLN ROPDVÕQD VHEHS RODUDN ELOLQoVL] \DWÕUÕPFÕODUÕQILQDQVDONDUDUODUÕQÕNROD\OÕNODHWNLOH\HELOPHNWHGLU %LUONHGHNLXOXVODUDUDVÕúLUNHWOHULQDoÕNG|YL]SR]LV\RQODUÕPLNWDUÕGDGROD\OÕ olarak döviz krizine sebep olabilir '|YL] NXUODUÕQGD RODELOHFHN VHUW KDUHNHWOHUL GúQHQXOXVODUDUDVÕILUPDODUQHJDWLIQHWG|YL]SR]LV\RQODUÕQÕNDSDWPDNLoLQ\NVHN PLNWDUGDDNWLIOHULQL\DEDQFÕSDUD\DoHYLULU%XGD\DEDQFÕSDUDWDOHELQLNÕVDYDGHGH DUWWÕUGÕ÷ÕQGDQNXUODUGD\XNDUÕ\|QOELUEDVNÕROXúXU (BDDK, 2011: 20-22). 7UHYSL\DVDODUÕQJHOLúPHVLYH|]HOOLNOHEXSL\DVDODUGD\DWÕUÕPFÕODUDVXQXODQ NDOGÕUDoOÕLúOHPLPNDQÕ -400'e kadar) panik halindeki finansal karar sahiplerinin çok 10.

(53) VHUWGH÷LúLPOHUHVHEHSROPDVÕQDLPNDQYHUPHNWHGLUYH PHUNH]EDQNDODUÕQÕoRN]RU GXUXPODUGD EÕUDNPDNWD VUHNOL YH \NVHN PLNWDUGD \DEDQFÕ SDUD UH]HUYL WXWPD\D itmektedir. 1.1.2.2.%DQNDFÕOÕN± Finans Krizi )RQDU]HGHQOHUYHIRQWDOHSHGHQOHUDUDVÕQGDN|SULúOHPLJ|UHQEDQNDFÕOÕN ve finans sistemi bir ülke ekonomisinde çok önemli yere sahiptir. Finans sektöründe IDDOL\HW J|VWHUHQ úLUNHWOHULQ oHúLWOL VHEHSOHUGHQ GROD\Õ VÕNÕQWÕ\D GúPHVL YH \NPOONOHULQL NDUúÕOD\DPD\DFDN GXUXPD JHOPHOHUL EDQNDFÕOÕN ± finans krizi ROXúXPXQDVHEHEL\HWYHULU Mevduat baQNDODUÕQÕQ OLNLGLWH NUL]LQH JLUPHOHUL YH KDONÕQ PHYGXDWODUÕQÕ oHNPHN LoLQ EDQNDODUD NRúPDVÕ \DWÕUÕP EDQNDODUÕQÕQ NDEXO HGLOHPH\HFHN ]DUDUODU J|UPHVL YH GL÷HU EDQNDODUÕQ GD \NVHN ]DUDUODU EHNOHPHVL ERUVDODUÕQ QHJDWLI J|UQPH JHoPHVL YH VDWÕúODUÕQ KÕ]ODQPDVÕ ILQDQV VLVWHPLQLQ JHQHOLQH \|QHOLN ROXPVX] EHNOHQWLOHU LoLQH JLULOPHVL ILQDQV NUL]L HWNLOHULQGHQGLU %DúND ELU GH\LúOH WDVDUUXIODUÕQ UHHO HNRQRPL\H ND]DQGÕUÕOPDVÕQGD DUDFÕ RODQ EDQNDFÕOÕN VLVWHPLQLQ \NPOONOHULQL \HULQH JHWLUHPHPHVL PHQNXO NÕ\PHW ERUVDODUÕQGD KLVVH VHQHGL IL\DWODUÕQÕQ oRN KÕ]OÕ GúPHVLQH 0HUNH] %DQNDODUÕ¶QÕQ PDOL SL\DVDODUÕ \|QOHQGLULFL IRQNVL\RQXQXQ HOLQGHNL SDUD SROLWLNDVÕ DUDoODUÕQÕQ \HWHUVL]OL÷L \D GD HWNLQVL]OL÷L VHEHEL\OH D]DOPDVÕQD VHEHS RODUDN ILQDQVDO ND\QDNOÕ ELU HNRQRmik kriz ortaya oÕNPDNWDGÕU (Küçükaksoy, 2006:113). 0DUN -LFNOLQJ H J|UH ILQDQV NUL]LQLQ NHVLQ ELU WDQÕPÕ ROPDPDVÕQD UD÷PHQ ILQDQVDOSL\DVDODUGDER]XOPDYHQDNLWDNÕúODUÕQGDD]DOPDúHNOLQGHNHQGLQLJ|VWHUHQ YH GDKD VRQUD HNRQRPLQLQ GL÷HU DODQODUÕQD GD \D\ÕODELOHQ ELU NUL]GLU (http://fpc.state.gov/documents/ organization/103688.pdf) (27.01.2012).  \ÕOÕ VRQUDVÕQGD ILQDQV NUL]OHULQLQ VD\ÕVÕ oRN \NVHOPLúWLU %XQXQ QHGHQL KHU QH NDGDU ILQDQVDO SL\DVDODUÕQ JHOLúLPL\OH RUDQWÕOÕ JLEL J|]NVH GH EDQNDFÕOÕN VHNW|UQQ \DSÕVDO GH÷LúLPOHULQLQ HWNLVL GH EXOXQPDNWDGÕU ùHNLO  GH J|UOHFH÷L ]HUH  \ÕOÕQGDQLWLEDUHQEDQNDFÕOÕNVHNW|UQQJHOLúLPLQGHILQDQVDOYDUOÕNODUGDQHOGHHGLOHQ JHWLUL EDQNDFÕOÕN VHNW|UQQ HVDV NXUXOXú DPDFÕ RODQ NUHGL YHUPH NROXQGDQ HOGH HWWL÷L JHWLUL\L JHoPH\H EDúODPÕúWÕU %LU QHYL ILQDQVDO SL\DVDODUGD \DWÕUÕPFÕ NRQXPXQGD RODQ ILQDQV NXUXOXúODUÕQÕQ DOGÕNODUÕ \NVHN ULVNOHU VRQ  \ÕOGDNL DUWDQ ILQDQVNUL]LQLDoÕNODUQLWHOLNWHGLU. 11.

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