r e l a t i o n s : f r o m e l ı g ı b ı l ı t y t o
c a n d ı d a c y a n d b e y o n d
ARMAĞAN KIRIŞMAN - ÇINAR ÖZEN
A B S T R A C T
This paper analyzes the changing patterns in the evolution of Turkey-EU relations. Turkey's long march to Europe has demonstrated three different patterns. 'Enduring association without accession', 'the reinforcing dynamics tovvards full-membership' and 'enduring association with an indefınite accession'. The fırst pattern includes the period from the establishment of association relations to the Helsinki Summit. Turkey was confırmed to be eligible for membership in this period. The second pattern starts with the period in Helsinki Summit, in vvhich Turkey gained a candidacy status. The third pattern, enduring association vvith an indefinite accession, seems to describe the situation started vvith the accession negotiations. The third pattern determines the road-map for Turkey on the way to the EU. This paper argues that the third pattern can lead Turkey-EU relations to a great ambiguity. After evaluating historically the validity of these patterns in Turkey-EU relations and their link vvith the internal dynamics of the European integration process, the manuscript investigates the implications and impacts of these patterns for future Turkey-EU relations. This paper gives a special attention to the discussion of a 'privileged partnership' betvveen Turkey and the EU.
K E Y W O R D S
Patterns in Turkey-EU relations, Turkey's accession to the EU, priviledged partnership, reforms in Turkey-EU relations.
This manuscript deals with question of future of Turkey in Europe. To facilitate the understanding of the necessary parameters of that big discussion, three patterns in recent Turkey-EU relations have been proposed: 'Enduring association without accession', 'the reinforcing dynamics tovvards full-membership' and 'enduring association with an indefinite accession'. After evaluating historically the validity of these patterns in Turkey-EU relations and their link with the internal dynamics of the European integration process, the manuscript investigates the implications and impacts of these patterns for future Turkey-EU relations. This paper gives a special attention to the discussion of a 'privileged partnership' betvveen Turkey and the EU.
Adopting the values, lifestyles, vvays of thinking and technological development of Europe vvas considered the only vvay to prevent the decline of the Ottoman Empire. That is vvhy the Ottoman Empire had already started its Europeanization process. The process of modernization and Europeanization did not come to an end vvhen the Turkish Republic vvas formed in 1923. On the contrary, the process vvas accelerated, and it has become one of the determining parameters of Turkish foreign policy.
After World War II, the process of gradual integration of Turkey into the European institutional system became much more visible. Turkey vvas among the first countries to join the Council of Europe and vvas one of the founding members of the organization that later became the OECD. During the early years of the Cold War, Turkey became a member of NATO. In addition, Turkey vvas considered to be a critical member of the Western defense system due to its pivotal position. Mutual benefits led Turkey to become closer to the US as vvell as to Europe.
Despite this continuing policy of rapprochement tovvards the European institutional system, Turkey faces difficulty finding a proper place for itself in Europe. Turkish aspiration to join the European Union (EU) is the last and most ambitious stage of this rapprochement. Hovvever, diffıculties embedded in this accession process reinforce Turkey's paradoxical situation in Europe.
The present study differentiates three patterns in Turkey-EU relations during Turkey's most recent integration with Europe. It is argued that these patterns are modes of relations, which define the aim and the level of the Turkey-EU integration. Using these patterns as a framevvork, this paper aims to clarify Turkey-EU relations, which remain difficult to interpret.
Historical Perspective in Turkey-EU Relations
Diplomatic relations betvveen Turkey and the EU have a long history, since Turkey has always been in close rapport with Europe as an economic and strategic partner. Turkey initiated its efforts to develop close bonds vvith the European Communities (EC) in 1959 vvith the request for Association Agreement. A formal relationship betvveen the EU and Turkey resulted from the 1963 Association Agreement vvith the European Economic Community (EEC). In July 1959, one and half years after the creation of the EEC, Turkey made its first application for association. The Community applauded Turkey's application for association, mainly for political reasons. Furthermore, it vvas a period vvhen politicians ali över the vvorld speculated on the EC's future. In addition, expansion to the Turkish market and its cheap labor pool vvere considered to be positive factors by the EEC since it vvould strengthen the influence of the EC in the economic arena and vvould reveal the fact that the EC vvas open to develop relations vvith nevv countries. Therefore, an association relation betvveen Turkey and the EEC served the interests of both sides; hovvever, vvhether the profıts gained from this relation vvere equally fair for both parties is open to debate. After four years of negotiations, the Ankara Agreement vvas signed on 12 September 1963 and came into force on 1 December 1964. It established an association, vvhich vvould endure until Turkey's economic, social and political circumstances permitted its accession1.
The Ankara Agreement envisaged the progressive establishment of a Customs Union, vvhich vvould bring the parties closer together in economic and trade issues. In the meantime, the
'The article 28 of the Ankara Agreement stipulating the conditions of Turkey's accession to the EC.
EEC would offer financial assistance to Turkey. The 1963 Agreement, held out the possibility of later accession to the EC and provided for three stages of development in the association relationship. The fırst stage was the preparatory stage during which Turkey should, with financial assistance from the EEC, strengthen its economy so as to enable her to fulfıll the obligations that would develop during the next two stages. The preparatory stage came to an end in 1973 when the Additional Protocol vvas brought into effect. In compliance vvith the provisions of the Ankara Agreement and the Provisional Protocol attached to the Agreement, the transitional stage of Association started in 1973. The Additional Protocol vvas the basic text that determined the conditions and procedures to be observed by both Turkey and the EEC during the transitional stage, as vvell as during the progressive establishment of the Customs Union in trade of industrial goods.
The late 1980s represented a period of transformation for both Turkey and the European Community. Turkey's heavily protected and closed economy of the 1960s and 1970s vvas steadily changed into a far more open economy in the 1980s and 1990s vvith the liberal economic policies of the Özal government. On the political front, military control betvveen 1980 and 1983 vvas replaced by a step-by-step return to democracy. Therefore, Turkey started to adopt a more positive approach tovvards the Community. As a result of ali these encouraging developments, in 1987, Turkey applied for full membership to the EC in spite of the fact that the country received discouraging signals from the European countries. The Council forvvarded Turkey's application to the Commission for the preparation of an Opinion. The Commission's Opinion vvas completed on 18 December 1989 and endorsed by the Council on 5 February 1990.
There vvere various reasons vvhy the Turkish application vvas not supported by the Community. First of ali, the Avis stated that "it vvould be inappropriate for the Community, vvhich is itself undergoing majör changes vvhile the vvhole of Europe is in a state of flux, to become involved in nevv accession negotiations at this stage. "2 This
2Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community,
meant that Turkey's accession vvas prevented by the changing political conditions in Europe and the EC's ovvn situation since the completion of the Single Market hindered the consideration of further enlargement. The Commission's opinion noted that majör gaps persisted in the level of economic and social development, especially in areas of agriculture and industry, that deficiencies existed in democracy and human rights, and that the situation in Cyprus could not be ignored. The Opinion vvent on to emphasize the need for a detailed cooperation program aimed at facilitating the integration of the tvvo sides, and added that the Customs Union should be completed in 1995 as foreseen by the Ankara Agreement. Turkey's eligibility for membership, hovvever, vvas confırmed and the Community's interest in closer ties vvith Turkey vvas underlined. From then on, the Community prioritized the completion of the Customs Union betvveen Turkey and the EEC as foreseen by the Additional Protocol.
The Customs Union entered its final phase on 1 January 1996 follovving the 6 March 1995 Decision 1/95 of the Turkey-EC Association Council, after long debates in European countries. The Customs Union, as an economic integration model, foresees the elimination of customs duties, taxes having an equivalent effect and quantity restrictions, and ali of the measures having equivalent effect present in trade among the parties, in addition to the application of a customs tariff tovvards third countries that remain outside the Union. The fundamental principle of the Customs Union is the free circulation of those goods, that fail vvithin the scope of the Customs Union, vvithout being subject to any kind of restrictions.3 This means a Customs Union means that goods can move freely, as vvithin one customs territory, and each party applies the same external tariff for imports from third countries, and the same commercial policy. The Customs Union covers trade in industrial goods and processed agricultural products.
3Muzaffer Dartan, Turkey-EU Relations With Particular Reference to the
Customs Union', in M. Dartan, M. and Çiğdem Nas, eds., The European
Union Enlargement Process and Turkey, (İstanbul: A Publication of
Pattern 1: Enduring Association VVithout Accession
During 1990s, the EC/EU to a great extent pursued a strategy favoring a strategic relationship with Turkey rather than full-membership. The Community preferred to use miscellaneous concepts such as 'strategic partnership' and 'special relations' rather than 'full membership' vvhen defining Turkey-EC/EU relations during this period.4 Thus, it is possible to describe the period until the Helsinki decisions, as a pattern enduring association vvithout accession.
The characteristic of this pattern is to keep integration on the level of association. This pattern bears great similarity to the model proposed by Angela Merkel, the leader of the German Christian Democrats, under the formulation of "privileged partnership"5. The association can be enlarged and enhanced with special arrangements to provide access to specific EU programs and policies, but will not reach full-membership. This pattern is quite flexible for ali kinds of specific participation and decision-making arrangements by the institutional framework such as Association Council and ali related association committees. The financial aspect of the integration could be a separate subject of bargaining in the associational framevvork as well.
This pattern describes relations betvveen Turkey and EU from 1963 to 1999. In the first phase of this period, 1963-1987, Turkey vvas not really motivated for full-membership. Thus there vvas no possibility for testing integration on the delicate question of Turkish accession. Hovvever in the second phase, 1987-1999, the Turkish application changed the nature of the relation. Turkey could not get a clear ansvver to its application until the December 1997 Luxembourg Summit. The ansvver given at the Luxembourg Summit reflected the pattern of enduring association vvithout accession.
The collapse of communism in both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union betvveen 1989 and 1991, and the attendant dissolution
4Çınar Özen, Tiirkiye-Avrupa Topluluğu Gümrük Birliği ve Tam Üyelik Süreci Üzerine Etkileri(İzmu: Ceylan Kitabevi, 2002), p. 123
of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, ended the bipolar security harness in Europe. Those newly born, newly independent and nevvly sovereign states of Central and Eastern Europe generated global and continental problems for Europe itself and also for the rest of the world, and it was the vvestern states that would come up with a solution to those problems. integration of those countries into the new global order, or the new enlargement project, vvas the only vvay to maintain and reinforce stability and security in Europe.
Beginning in 1991, the Central and Eastern European countries signed Europe Agreements vvith the EU that vvere based on trade, political dialogue, industry, environment, customs regulation, ete. The ultimate goal vvas the expansion of European integration tovvards Eastern Europe. The Copenhagen Summit in June 1993 clearly underlined that the membership of Central and Eastern European countries, but not Turkey, vvas a majör objeetive of the EU policy.6 It also set out specific economic and political criteria for membership. The political criteria ineluded a requirement that a candidate country has to achieve a stable democracy, maintain the rule of lavv, respect human rights, and protect the rights of minorities. The Copenhagen criteria, therefore, complicated Turkey's quest for EU membership. This nevv set of political criteria accentuated the differences betvveen Turkey and the other aspirants and highlighted Turkey's "distinetiveness".7
In the 1990s, vvhat affected Turkey's relations vvith Europe vvas not only the period of fundamental transformation in Europe but also the challenges that Turkey faced domestically and externally. At home, Turkey vvas exposed to severe Kurdish separatism and political islam, both of vvhich posed serious threats to the territorial integrity and the secular nature of the Turkish Republic. The campaign against the separatist organization, PKK, forced Turkey to focus on its internal affairs instead of paying great attention to the integration process. In addition, the rise of the Islamic political parties inereased uncertainties in Turkish domestic politics. Being intensively occupied vvith the domestic issues, Turkey felt itself in the periphery of Europe.
6I.O. Lesser and S. F. Larrabee, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertaintyi RAND, 2003), p.50.
External factors complicated Turkey's relations with Europe as vvell during this period. Greece as a member of the Union pointed to the Aegean disputes, and the Cyprus issue kept its dominant position during this period. Furthermore, the outbreak of the Rock of Kardak-Imia crisis only one month after the completion of the Customs Union generated a nevv hardening in the Greek stance tovvards Turkey.
The unvvillingness of the EC/EU to recognize Turkey as a candidate did not mean that it vvas totally ignoring Turkey. For the EC/EU in the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey, rather than being a 'natural insider', vvas an 'important outsider' vvith vvhom relations ought to be developed on an arm's length basis barring full integration.8 In that context the EC/EU implicitly put its relations vvith Turkey into a context of privileged partnership.
The Luxembourg Summit that took place on 12-13 December 1997 vvas a turning point for the future of Europe and for Turkey's European aspirations as vvell. At the Luxembourg Summit, the European Council envisaged the inclusion of Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria in tvvo vvaves of enlargement. The European Council preferred to open a different chapter for Turkey called "A European Strategy for Turkey" vvhich did not provide Turkey vvith a clear path tovvards full-membership9. The European strategy for Turkey adopted in Luxembourg vvas not recognizing Turkey as a candidate state, but insisting on the completion of the customs union and assuring Turkey the possibility to participate in several Communitarian programs vvithout membership.
The EU's Luxembourg Summit in 1997 essentially confirmed the process of distinguishing Turkey from the other aspiring candidates. Turkey vvas not accepted as a candidate country, but in order to enhance its candidacy for membership, a pre-accession strategy vvas suggested for Turkey. The European approach tovvards
8Ziya Öniş and Şahnur Yılmaz 'Turkey-EU-US Triangle in
Perspective:Transformation or Continuity', available at http:// home.ku.edu.tr.
9ConcIusions of the Presidency of the European Council, Luxembourg, December 1997, Bulletirı of the European Communities, 12-1997, OOP,
Turkey in the Luxembourg Summit was neither one of inclusion nor exclusion, maintaining Turkey inside a pattern of privileged partnership.
2. Pattern 2: The Reinforcing Dynamics tovvards Full-Membership
The second pattern is set on a model developing fully tovvards Turkish accession to the EU. According to this pattern, the granting of candidacy status to Turkey should be interpreted as a genuine and sincere step in Turkey's process of accession. In brief, the parties are decided that the ultimate goal of integration is full-membership for Turkey. Thus ali procedures and stages proposed by the EU and pursued by Turkey during candidacy are oriented tovvards to the successful realization of this goal.
Turkey's actions follovving the Helsinki Summit 1999 vvere consisted vvith this second pattern. This period vvas characterized by Turkey's concentration on the requirements needed to reach the ultimate goal. The question is vvhether or not the EU actually took the same vievv of its relation vvith Turkey even after the Helsinki Summit. In Helsinki, the EU provided a framevvork of candidacy to Turkey and thus created a momentum tovvards membership. For both parties, Helsinki marked a nevv beginning and a process of cooperation and mutual understanding. After the approval of the Accession Partnership by the Council and the adoption of the Framevvork Regulation, the Turkish Government announced its ovvn National Program for the Adoption of the EU acquis on 19 March 2001. Progress tovvards accession continued along the path set by the National Program. Attaining the membership goal obviously required the fulfillment of the Copenhagen political criteria plus obtaining settlement in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus disputes. Turkey's membership vvould largely depend on the success of constant efforts tovvards this end.
Immediately follovving the offıcial approval of the National Program, the Turkish Government initiated a process of implementation, vvhich involved the translation of the proposals embodied in the document into concrete action. Indeed a record
number of thirty-four Constitutional Amendments vvere passed in October 2001.10 The package of constitutional amendments covers a vvide range of issues, such as improving human rights, strengthening the rule of lavv and some restructuring of democratic institutions.11 In February 2002, after heated debates, the Turkish Grand National Assembly passed a mini-reform package containing reforms to Articles 159 and 312 of the Turkish Penal Code and paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Lavv that relaxed constraints on freedom of expression.12 These reform packages vvere follovved by "Harmonization Lavvs" designed to translate the Constitutional Amendments concerned into concrete action as part of the process of bringing Turkish lavv in line vvith the European Acquis. So, the period from the beginning of 2000 onvvards may be described as a period of profound and momentous change in Turkish political history.
During this time the coalition government faced great opposition from the ultranationalist Nationalist Action Party
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP). Indeed, the MHP vvas a key actor in the coalition government and played a majör role in blocking some of the political reforms needed to meet the EU's democratic norms in the post-Helsinki era. The MHP vvas an obstacle for the coalition government vvhich vvanted to accelerate the necessary reform process. In the end, hovvever, the other members of the coalition government managed to persuade the MHP and passed the majör reform package in the Parliament. Although the euphoria after the legislative package vvas short lived due to the frustration in the Copenhagen Summit, the Harmonization Lavvs removed years-old state restrictions in key areas. The removal of these restrictions allovved Turkey to become a more democratic and pluralistic state in line vvith the requirements of the Post-Cold War period.
1 0The vvhole schedule and vvork to be done in this respect is outlined in a
vvorksheet called as Follow-Up Instrument. The document is available at www.abgs.gov.tr
' 'L. Boulton, 'Turkey Approves Reforms to Ease Curbs on Human Rights',
Financial Times, 24 September 2001
l 2See "Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Toward Accession", Brussels,
Commission of the European Communities, SEC(2002), 1412, October 10, 2002, p. 45
The most debated reform in the reform package vvas the abolition of the death penalty, including for those convicted of terrorist activities. As a matter of fact, the death penalty had not been carried out in Turkey since 1984, but for the Nationalists it had to be imposed for the leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, vvho vvas captured in 1999. Lifting the death penalty vvas an extremely sensitive issue for Turkey. The second outstanding reform made in August 2002 vvas legalizing broadcasting and private tutoring in different languages and dialects. With the amendment of Article 4/1 of the Lavv, legal restrictions on broadcasting in different languages and dialects vvere lifted and the freedom to broadcast is ensured.13
Additional reforms included ending punishment for criticism of the armed forces and other pillars of the Turkish state establishment and outlavving the smuggling of organs and people.14 The package lifted certain restrictions on people's right to associate and form civic organizations, and imposed stricter penalties for human trafficking. It allovved non-Muslim minority communities such as Greeks, Armenians and Jevvs greater rights över religious property such as churches. The reforms tightened regulations governing the poliçe, vvho vvere frequently accused of human rights abuses. Interestingly enough, the Turkish Parliament adopted these key decisions vvith an overvvhelming majority despite opposition from the nationalists in the coalition and from the public.
In its Regular Report of 2002, the EU Commission also appreciated these positive developments. The Commission concluded that: "Overall, Turkey has made noticeable progress tovvards meeting the Copenhagen political criteria since the Commission issued its report in 1998, and in particular in the course of last year. The reforms adopted in August 2002 are particularly far-reaching. Taken together, these reforms provide much of the groundvvork for strengthening democracy and the protection of human rights in Turkey. They open the vvay for further changes, vvhich should enable Turkish citizens progressively to enjoy rights and freedoms
Official Gazette, 08 August 2002, available at www.basbakanlik.gov.tr
Analysis of the EU Harmonization Laws adopted by the TGNA on August 3, 2002 is available at www.euturkey.org.tr/abportal/uploads/files.
commensurate vvith those prevailing in the European Union. Nonetheless, Turkey does not fully meet the political criteria."15 Turkey's failure to meet the political criteria, according to the Regular Report of 2002, vvas a result of the significant limitations on the reforms and prospective problems in the implementation process by Turkey.
On the eve of the enlargement, and just before the Copenhagen summit (December 2002), from vvhich Turkey expected a date for the start of accession negotiations, the nevvly elected AKP government (under the premiership of Abdullah Gül vvith the strong backing of the USA) declared that they vvould pass the necessary reforms immediately and implement them to comply vvith the Copenhagen criteria. Challenging the suspicious opinions of the European leaders about this nevv, Islamic rooted government, Abdullah Gül, tried to assure the Europeans that Turkey's priority vvas its relations vvith Europe, not vvith the Islamic countries. Later, in accordance vvith their promises, Tayyip Erdoğan, the premier and the real leader of the AKP, began his tours to many European countries.
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French President Jacques Chirac met on 4 December 2004 in a tovvn near Berlin and spelled out their formula for Turkey: "At the Copenhagen Summit, 12-13 December 2004, vvith the agreement and recommendation of the Commission, it vvould be considered vvhether Turkey had completely respected the Copenhagen criteria. If this vvere the case then negotiations could begin from July 2005".16 The Franco-German deal fell rather short of Turkey's expectations, and the government did not vvait long to react to that 'date for date'. The EU' s attitude and the consequences of this deal started to be severely criticized among political circles.
After visits to almost ali the European capitals by Tayyip Erdoğan and after the USA lobbying on behalf of Turkey, Ankara
15"Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Tovvard Accession", Brussels,
Commission of the European Communities, SEC(2002), 1412, October 10, 2002, pp. 46-47.
was unable to get what it hoped for. The Copenhagen Summit fell close to the Franco-German proposal and stipulated "the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey vvill start after December 2004 vvithout delay on the condition that Turkey fulfills the so-called Copenhagen political criteria". This vvas not vvhat Ankara had hoped for. Nevertheless, the AKP government made its declarations cautiously, shovving great care not to deteriorate its relations vvith The EU and to keep the Turkish path tovvards Europe open.
3. Pattern 3: Enduring Association with an Indefinite Accession
This pattern emerges on one hand from the reluctance of the European political environment tovvard Turkish accession and on the other hand from Turkish insistence on full-membership. The EU found itself in a very diffıcult position vvith respect to Turkish accession. The grovving strategic and economic importance of Turkey, vvhich made Turkey an indispensable partner, contributed to the evolution of this third pattern in Turkey-EU relations. This pattern can be seen as a hypocritical formulation to gain time and to impede Turkish accession. During this time, on the one hand, Turkish membership vvould be stopped and, on the other hand, necessary pretexts vvould be produced. Finally, Turkey could be convinced to another option for its relations vvith EU apart from membership.
The last Commission report of October 2004, proposed a model for starting negotiations. 'Open-ended negotiations' vvere proposed by the Commission and adopted by the Brussels European Council in December 2004. Moreover, France envisaged a 'referendum for the ratifıcation' vvith an amendment to its Constitution, vvhich could possibly be pursued by some other member states. The third pattern seems to be influential behind the critical decisions of the period starting vvith the Brussels European Council. In that sense this nevv period of Turkey-EU relations is filled vvith vagueness vvith respect to the future of Turkey-EU relations.
In the post-Cold War era, Turkey has faced a change in its strategic environment. In the changing security conditions, Turkey has gained a nevv pivotal position in the Eurasian region. Balkan, Caucasian and Middle Eastern developments underline the potential
strategic role of Turkey. From the strategic perspective, the EU would prefer that Turkey not feel 'left out'. The crisis in Turkey-EU relations has the potential to disturb both Europe and the USA. Washington too expressed its unhappiness with the EU's treatment of this strategically important NATO member.17 The revitalization of Turkish hopes for full-membership can be explained partially by these nevv security conditions and strategic evaluations.
The shift in the EU's position vvas due to several factors, as Lesser and Larrabee put it: (1) a desire on the part of the EU to halt deterioration of Turkish-EU relations after Luxembourg, (2) a more accommodating position by the nevv SPD/Green coalition in Germany, (3) a change in Greek policy tovvard Turkey, (4) pressure from the United States.18 Europe vvas also vvell avvare of the fact that despite the demişe of a threat from the Eastern Block, Turkey vvas stili a pivotal country that could serve both the security and economic interests of the continent. If Turkey vvere allovved to drift tovvards isolation and authoritarianism, not only vvould Turkey find itself in a state of limbo, but also European interests vvould be jeopardized. Therefore, Europe tried to launch a more positive approach tovvard Turkey. Hovvever Turkey's inclusion might lead to serious problems on the continent. The fınancial, economic and cultural obstacles to Turkish accession, debated in European public opinion, and Turkey's integration through full-membership did not have a favorable reception.
The historic decision taken at the Helsinki Summit vvas applauded. No one asked if Turkey vvas "European". After Helsinki the focus vvas essentially on the Copenhagen political criteria, and Turkey's big political transformation dominated the agenda of Turkey-EU relations at that time. In this sense the Copenhagen Summit of December 2002 indicated a nevv stage.
The Copenhagen Summit vvas an historical event in tvvo significant respects. First, after the Helsinki Summit of 1999, in vvhich Turkey had been finally granted a candidate status, the
17WiIliam Park, 'Turkey's European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to
Helsinki-to Ankara?', available at http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/pab01/
Copenhagen Summit created a sense of 'certainty' in EU-Turkey relations by giving a specific date for the beginning of the accession negotiations.19 Even though the year 2004 was a conditional date, it was nevertheless an important move forward, insofar as it has provided Turkey vvith the prospect that full EU membership vvas a real possibility. Secondly, the Copenhagen Summit created a historical moment in Turkey, in that the AKP, even though it failed to obtain a definite date for the start of accession negotiations, understood that Turkey had to tighten its relations vvith the EU as long as it vvanted to become an economically and politically stable country.
In this sense the Copenhagen Summit reassured the EU's engagement for Turkish accession. On the other hand the Copenhagen summit increased the indefinite conditionality of the Turkish accession. Pursuing the path opened by the Copenhagen Summit, the European Commission issued its regular report in October 2004. The 2004 report first praised ali the positive developments that had taken place recently in Turkey; it then underlined the problems, vvhich vvere seen to be as significant as the improvements in Turkey and capable of causing problems in the future. Among the majör causes of concern, the report highlighted the difference in the definition of 'minorities' betvveen Turkey and the EU. According to the report, there are other communities in Turkey that should be regarded as minorities, such as the Kurds.20 In this vvay, the Commission criticized the legal definition of minorities in Turkey. Furthermore, the report defined the Alevis as non-Sunni Müslim minority and stated that the fact that they vvere not officially recognized as a religious community posed a threat to civil and political rights in Turkey.21 The report also pointed out continuing problems related to freedom of religion for non-Muslim communities, and the restrictions on the exercise of cultural rights, including in the areas of
19Ziya Oniş and Fuat Keyman, 'Turkey at the Polis: A Nevv Path Emerges',
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 99.
2 02004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress tovvards accession, Commission
of the European Communities, SEC(2004) 1201, Brussels, 16.10.2004, p. 48
broadcasting and education.22 In brief, the Commission's approach to the definition of minorities and civil and cultural rights is totally different from that of Turkey, and this is likely to create serious problems in the negotiation process. As regards the role of the military in Turkish political life, the report tended to criticize the influence of the military on political issues.23
The Cyprus dispute stili constitutes the biggest determinant of the negotiation process. The officially recognized government of Cyprus is the Greek Cypriot Government and it novv has the veto right över the signature and the approval process of EU agreements, since becoming member of the EU in May 2004. Therefore, one should bear in mind that the evolution of relations vvith Cyprus vvill determine the fate of Turkey during negotiations.
The Brussels European Council meeting of December 17, 2004 vvas regarded as the opening of a nevv era in Turkey-EU relations. The Turkish government gained a date for the start of accession negotiations and interpreted this as a delayed victory for Turkey. Despite the fact that the decisions taken in the Brussels Summit seem to be quite positive and vvelcoming for Turkey, the EU did not actually offer vvhat Turkey vvanted. As a matter of fact, the 23rd paragraph of the 'Presidency Conclusions', vvhich outlines the framevvork for negotiations, does not include Turkey in the full-membership process as it did in the previous enlargements. This article states that negotiations vvith Turkey are 'open-ended process'. The last part of the same paragraph also points out "if the candidate state is not in a position to assume in full ali the obligations of membership it must be ensured that the candidate state concerned is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond". This article vvill only be applied to Turkey but not to Romania and Bulgaria, vvhich are in the process of negotiation or to Croatia, vvhich vvill start negotiations in April 2005. What is more, a member state vvill be able to stop or to bring permanent restrictions to any chapter if it endangers the country's ovvn interests. The last European Council meeting clearly points out that getting a date from the EU does not necessarily direct Turkey tovvards full membership,
22Ibid„ p. 18 23Ibid., p. 15
as it sets out strict restrictions that have not been spelled out for other candidate countries.
The former President of France and chairman of the European Convention, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, stated that "Europe lies to Turkey. The real tendency of the ones affırming the candidacy status of Turkey is actually based on the idea that Turkey can never become a full member".24 Whether Europe is serious about Turkish membership is open to discussion. As one scholar put it, it is "unclear whether the EU Council decision regarding Turkish candidacy in Helsinki was European decision-making at its best, or at its vvorst."25
Turkey took one step forvvard tovvards membership, but vvas that really a turning point in Turkey-EU relations? As a matter of fact, the granting of candidacy status vvas not an end or a victory for Turkey-EU relations, but just the beginning of the complexities of Turkey-EU relations.
4. Looking Ahead: Discussion and Conclusions
The third pattern, enduring association vvith an indefinite membership, seems to describe the situation today. After the Brussels Summit, Turkey had a date, 3 October 2005, to start negotiations. Hovvever, this date vvill launch an open-ended process that vvill not necessarily end up vvith an accession. Hovv should vve understand this formulation? If Turkey-EU negotiations terminate vvith success and the parties accomplish the goal of preparing a mutually acceptable accession agreement, the ratification vvill be guaranteed. Othervvise vvhy vvould the parties negotiate? In that context, vvhat vvould a French referendum26 on Turkish accession mean?
24"Turkey Entry vvould Destroy EU", BBC Nevvs, World edition,
nevvs.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Europe/2420697.stm, 8 November 2002.
2 5S . Chubin and J. D Green, 'Turkish Society and Foreign Policy in Troubled
Times', Report of a Geneva Center for Security Policy/RAND Workshop, 2001, p. 7
Turkey's ossified internal dynamics, prevailing as a residue of a hard transition from a multi-ethnic empire to a secular nation-state, limit the way in which change can take place. In that context the role that the external dynamics can play to alter the existing structures and way of thinking gain importance. The supranational legal personality of the EU, in this sense, provides a valuable framevvork for Turkey in the way of freedom and wealth. In other vvords, the essential external dynamic to make this change permanent and sustainable is the integrationist philosophy of the EU, vvhich embodies various principles, criteria, standards and implementations.
Moreover, the EU, from historical, economic or strategic perspective, is the closest option to Turkey for integration. The full functioning of the customs union from the 1 January 1996 until today achieved the convergence of Turkish and the European economies. The customs union, as a highly advanced mode of economic integration demonstrates clearly the choice of Turkey and provides a solid foundation for political integration. Turkey's determination is quite clear, but the uncertainty prevails in the EU. Until the end of 2002, Turkey vvas unable to progress along the lines of the Copenhagen political criteria. Hovvever, the Commission Report of 2004 pointed out that "Turkey sufficiently fulfils the political criteria" and recommended "opening of accession negotiations".27 In this perspective given by the Commission, the EU members should be clear and precise. It is hard to observe that in the decisions of Brussels Summit.
Permanent non-membership vvill probably lead to significant consequences both in Turkey and in Europe. Although Turkey is considered to be an important partner both economically and strategically, the differences betvveen Turkey and the member states of the EU, vvhether of economy, culture, politics, foreign policy, democracy or religion, seem to be too great to minimize in the eyes of European leaders. The cultural debate has gained considerable importance in Turkey-EU relations, that not seen before.
27Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's Progress
tovvards Accession, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Par'.iament, Brussels, 6.10.2004, COM (2004) 656 final, p.9.
The third pattern, in the light of these hesitant evaluations, seems to have been chosen as a provisional solution, and could delay the issue until after 2015 and require the parties to reconsider the issue. It is argued as vvell that nobody can speculate about the future of Turkey-EU relation today, because the period may be quite long and the day of decision vvill be quite far off. During this long period Turkey may lose its motivation and vvillingness for EU membership, since indefiniteness can cause a change in Turkish public opinion. Maybe this is the desired end.
The Brussels summit provisions present Turkey a menu vvith a politically hilly mechanism for the negotiations, the special arrangements for agricultural and cohesion policies and permanent safeguards for free circulation of vvorkers. Hovvever, this menu does not provide an adequate financial framevvork or a clear process for achieveing the ultimate goal of the full-membership. This is a very discouraging fact vvhich gives the impression that Turkey is advancing tovvard a special status called 'privileged partnership". As a matter of fact, the EU vvill determine the reinforcing pattern of Turkey-EU relations, not Turkey. Thus, continuing evolution of European integration vvill also have significant influence.
As noted above, if the third pattern continues to determine Turkey-EU relations, this vvill lead to great ambiguity. Ambiguity can cause a step-by-step isolation of Turkey, from the European institutional architecture. An indefinite accession process vvill not benefit Europe or Turkey. What is needed is a clear-cut definition of the relationship betvveen the Union and Turkey vvhich eliminates ali ambiguity. Finally, the parties should start a sincere dialogue. Turkey-EU relations can go on outside a membership framevvork as vvas the case before the application of Turkey to the EU. Hovvever, the relations betvveen the two parties might deteriorate unless the EU clarifies the kind of relationship it vvants to have vvith Turkey. Turkey vvill definitely be reluctant to vvait at the door of the EU vvithout gaining something concrete in turn. The European Union should launch a stable and consistent policy tovvards Turkey, since Turkey vvill be discouraged and vvill lose ali motivation if it is kept vvaiting for the negotiations to come to an end. Some definite special partnership betvveen Turkey and the EU is a better vvay of integrating Turkey to Europe than an indefinite and endless accession process,
because Turkey probably won't accept that kind of a blurred association vvith the EU.
