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5. TURKISH AND GREEK PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON THE

5.1. Rule-Based Approaches

5.1.2. Standpoint and Accountability of the International

new concept of NATO, and international treaties, as well595.MP Köse, with the same fashion, referring to Article 13 of NATO’s Alliance Strategic Concept adopted on 7-8 November 1991 in Rome596 and to Article 4 of the Washington Treaty,597maintained that Turkey’s request on the delivery of Öcalan was also in accord with NATO’s several resolutions, and underscored the double standard Turkey faced with regard to the European concepts; supposedly, Europe was in no position to lecture Turkey on human rights anymore598:

[TR] “Distinguished members of the parliament, the greatest jurisprudence tragedy of the century has been staged in Italy, which is claiming to be the cradle of modern law. Those who host the bloody murderer of 30 thousand people, in a sea-facing villa, before the eyes of the whole world, should never mention ‘law’ and ‘human rights’. If the rule of law, which is considered to be the greatest value of the contemporary world, is put aside persecutors will continue to be preferred to victims”.

Italy's resistance to extraditing Öcalan to Turkey caused peremptory indignation in the Turkish leadership. PM Yılmaz asserted that if Italy was to insist on assessing PKK not as a terrorist but as a political organization, this wrong and criminal conduct of Italy would not be left without retribution.

5.1.2. Standpoint and Accountability of the International Organizations and

that ironically “the Kurds who had been existed since ancient times as ancient Kurds”601 were described as ‘terrorists’. It was discussed in general that why could not the Kurdish people have a chance to experience the same fate as the Kosovans, whose liberation army had also been condemned as a ‘terrorist organization’602 before their case was politicized and they were transformed into freedom fighters. In the excerpt below, MP Konstantopoulos made the point clearly by placing Turkey and Serbia on one side, and PKK and Kosovar Army on the other603:

[GR] “While […] the Serbian leadership sits at the negotiating table with the Kosovo Liberation Army, under the NATO pressure and under the threat of military intervention to change the border, the Kurdish movement, representing a forty million people, is characterized as a terrorist organization and its leader as a terrorist who is not entitled to seek asylum”.

The Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, which was signed in 1997 and entered into force in 1999, was formed the legal basis of the Greek argument on Öcalan’s asylum process. As part of the communitarisation of asylum policy – which meant providing the minimum standards and temporary protection to displaced people from third countries who cannot return to their country of origin and who need international protection– the Greek government decided to speed up the implementation of paragraph 73A of the Treaty of Amsterdam604. According to MP Kouvelis, in addition to the EU’s there were other accords to be considered or applied such as the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which was also known as the 1951 Refugee Convention. As it was a multilateral treaty of the UN wherein Turkey was a member, Kouvelis suggested that Greece had to have recourse to the UN for Öcalan: “What was Greece refraining from, regarding the presence of Ocalan here, to apply the 1951 International Treaty in the light of the day”605. Moreover, Greece allegedly had another chance to benefit from the resolution of “the Foreign Ministers

601 ibid. [Tsovolas, DIKKI, the then MP].

602 As avowed in the press conference by the Ambassador Gelbard, “we also condemn the attacks against the police and others by the group that calls itself the UCK [Kosovo Liberation Army]. As I have said before, I consider these to be terrorists actions, and it is the strong and firm policy of the United States to fully oppose all terrorists actions and all terrorists organizations”. See, Robert S. Gelbard, “Press Conference, Pristina, Serbia, and Montenegro”, U.S. Department of State Archive, 22 February 1998, https://1997-2001.state.gov/policy_remarks/1998/980222_gelbard_pristina.html. [21.11.2018].

603 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (16.02.1999): 4463. [Konstantopoulos, SYN, the then MP].

604 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, 9th Term, 3rd Session, 78th Sitting, (11.02.1999): 4313, https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/ES0211.pdf.

[23.05.2018]. [Alexandros Chrysanthakopoulos, PASOK, the then MP].

605 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (12.03.1999): 5278. [Fotis Kouvelis, SYN, the then MP].

of the Member States of the European Union on the political provision of 1995 or even this Schengen Convention, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 29 to 31”606. Additionally, MP Vlahopoulos, expressing his sincere sympathy for Öcalan, emphasized the need for a Common Foreign Policy that had been absent in the Kurdish question as clearly seen. For him, “the European Union [was] neither a hell nor a paradise”607. It was not an endpoint but an ongoing process which aimed at objectives of Economic and Monetary Union with the Maastricht, and was on its way to reach a political union and impose the supranationally agreed norms and standards with the Amsterdam Treaty608:

[GR] “It is worth emphasizing that if the European Union had accelerated the implementation of paragraph 73 K2 A of the Amsterdam Treaty for communitarisation of asylum policy, then there would have been a common understanding of the European Union countries and there of Ocalan issue and also of the Kurdish question, and the European countries’ hypocrisy, which shows sensitivity to Kosovo's autonomy but turns its back to the twenty million Kurdish people exterminated in the Kurdistan mountains, would have disappeared”.

Conversely, in the view of Turkish leadership, PKK was listed and identified as a

‘terrorist organization’ by several states and organizations, including the USA, the UK, France, Germany, the OSCE, and NATO. Italy, however, refused to extradite Öcalan to Turkey, and instead welcomed him as a special guest. Supposedly, he had the chance to meet other PKK participants in Europe and “more importantly he had many advocates and proponents in the Italian Parliament some of whom were members of the ruling party”609. For the MP Kiriş, Italy’s rejection of Turkey’s warrant for the extradition of Öcalan meant denying all the agreements, legal documents, declarations, and evidence.

Moreover, Turkish parliamentarians argued about the probable outcomes of a press campaigned that would be launched in Europe by Greece for granting political asylum to Öcalan. Such developments considered as re-positioning of PKK and Öcalan, which had both already been associated with terrorism by several international organizations.

Kiriş pointed out that those were the Italian attempts to politicize the Kurdish issue610.

606 ibid. [Kouvelis, SYN, the then MP].

607 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (16.02.1999): 4487. [Ilias Vlahopoulos, PASOK, the then MP].

608 ibid. [Vlahopoulos, PASOK, the then MP].

609 Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, (18.11.1998): 474. [Altan Öymen, CHP, the then MP].

610 ibid, 477. [Recep Kiriş, BBP, the then MP].

In this regard, according to MP Akarcalı, the situation Turkey faced was “not a war of law but a war of public opinion, a political war or struggle”611.

Both parliaments believed that public opinion was a precious asset, and being backed by public opinion was the first step to achieve success in world politics. In the Greek parliament, for example, MP Kalafatis underlined the importance of raising public attention towards Öcalan’s capture and trial process. In his opinion, Greece should have brought the Kurdish efforts into the limelight, in his words: “[I]nternational public opinion must stand by the Kurdish leader and the struggle that he and his people have served, [by] forcing Turkey to respect human rights”612.

There was a strong consensus among the ruling PASOK party and the main opposition New Democracy party that engaging in the issue by giving political asylum to Öcalan would lead to ‘Greekizing’ the Kurdish problem and transform this ‘international problem’ into one of the Greek-Turkish disputes, which would then be inevitably disadvantageous both for the Kurds and the Greeks613. The excerpts below, of the Greek PM and FM revealed the root of this political attitude:

[GR] “[A]lmost everyone in this Chamber agrees that Greece could not give asylum to Ocalan.

This would serve neither the struggle of the Kurds nor Greece nor Ocalan himself. It would be an act of stupidity and would only serve [the interests of] Turkey. And Greece did not have to play the game of Turkey. […] [S]uch an act would turn the Kurdish question into a Greek-Turkish dispute, it would curb our foreign policy, while on the other hand it [would be a] risk to Greekize the Kurdish question”614.

[GR] “[T]he real question […] is whether or not Greece should grant political asylum to Abdullah Ocalan. We answer: No, she should not have done so. And she should not have done because it would be a loss for the struggle of the Kurdish people, it would be a detriment to peace, stability and the struggle for democracy in our region, in general. And it would have been a tragic responsibility for the nation, to turn the Kurdish issue into a Greek-Turkish dispute [probably] in the first Greek-Turkish crisis. [And] [i]t would have become the number one Greek-Turkish issue”615.

The Turkish Minister of State, Seçkiner, pointed out that in addition to explicit efforts of Turkey for demonstrating the truth about PKK, indirect occasions also played an important role in strengthening Turkey’s argument that PKK was a terrorist organization. The USA and the UK, for example, witnessed PKK’s ‘terrorist acts and drug trafficking’ during the Operation Northern Watch, which was aiming at enforcing

611 ibid, 473. [Bülent Akarcalı, ANAP, the then MP].

612 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (16.02.1999): 4479. [Alexandros Kalafatis, PASOK, the then MP].

613 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (16.02.1999): 4461 [Konstantinos Karamanlis, ND, the then MP]; Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (17.02.1999): 4512 [Mitsotakis, ND, the then MP]; Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (17.02.1999): 4523 [Papazoi, PASOK, the then Minister of Aegean].

614 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (05.03.1999): 5026. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

615 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (16.02.1999): 4460. [Pangalos, PASOK, the then FM].

no-fly zone above the 36th parallel in Iraq. As a result, the USA ‘listed PKK within the 30 terrorist organizations’ which would be issued in accordance with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996616 and “supported Turkey’s request on the delivery of Öcalan, and ran a sort of campaign on PKK that it is a terrorist organization, by sending delegates with a special mission to those European countries which had a tendency to recognize PKK as a political organization”617. The Turkish MP Hacaloğlu, additionally, speaking about the letter of Human Rights Watch which was written to the Italian Premier on 21 November 1998, expressed that

“Öcalan –the head of PKK terrorist organization– was responsible for the murder of hundreds of innocent people”, and notified that “cutting a sorry figure” or

“disapproving terrorism would not protect him from prosecution”, and if Italy did not try him she should have sent him to another country that would try him618.

It was asked by several MPs in the Turkish Parliament that why did Italy neither surrender him to Turkey nor grant him political asylum, which meant turning both sides against itself. After leaving Syria which was his base for almost 18 years, in general, the West and Russia left him on the run from one country to another for months. It was the last straw when Italy refused to extradite Öcalan to Turkey, which sparked anti-Italian street riots across Turkey. Italy rejected him sanctuary and political asylum and instead expelled him from the county to a destination unknown619. While the transparent conduct of Italy caused diplomatic pressure of Turkey and the USA, as well as, a public outrage among Turkish origins around the world, and a boycott of Italian products by Turkish businesses; in the Greek parliament the then government of PASOK was criticized by several MPs of different political positions for concealing the facts about the situation of Öcalan and “consciously deceiv[ing] the Greek people, the Parliament, party leaders, parties, even the ruling party, even the

616 Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 20th Term, 37th Session, v. 68, (24.12.1998): 316, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c068/tbmm20068037.pdf. [18.09.2018].

[Yücel Seçkiner, ANAP, the then Minister of State].

617 ibid, 316-17. [Seçkiner, ANAP, the then Minister of State].

618 Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, (24.11.1998): 236. [Algan Hacaloğlu, CHP, the then MP].

619 It was also stated by the Greek FM Pangalos that after leaving Italy, Ocalan remained at large and no one knew exactly where he was. In his words: “I’ll also tell you that Ocalan stayed in the place we had set him for twelve days. For ten days, no one in the world knew where he was. [...] For ten days there has been the most absolute and the most widespread confusion. No one knew where he was and what was happening around him. When he began to communicate with his various associates and friends, of course, he slowly became known where he is and what he intends to do.” See, Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (16.02.1999): 4467.

Cops”620 for more than fifteen days621. The MP Konstantopoulos stated that “[t]hese actions [we]re suicidal, they [we]re acts of suicide for the country's foreign policy, they [we]re acts of criminal irresponsibility. The final result: Ocalan today [wa]s in Turkey and everybody [wa]s against Greece”622. In his view, the process was initiated in terms of secret services and not in terms of political responsibility, and Greece unfortunately without triggering the European procedures and institutions consented to deal with the issue on her own623:

[GR] “Ministers, what I have to say is that your government did exactly the opposite of what the Italian government did on the same matter. The public or the Italian government has assumed the responsibility and openly handled Italy's political system of the problem. Publicly received Ocalan, the Italian courts had publicly examined the issue, publicly granted him protection, and finally publicly asked him to leave the country when Italy could not bear the burden of pressure, the pressure you acceded to. And I want to say this because you, as the Greek Government, chose the exact opposite process. Transparency, secrecy”.

Following Öcalan’s capture while he was being transferred from the Greek Embassy in Kenya to Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, Turkey was strongly urged –or in a sense compelled– by the EU to abolish the death penalty, to give Öcalan a fair trial, and to let international observers attend his trial. Related to the first issue, no discussion was held whether or not to impose capital punishment, after all, nobody was executed in Turkey since 1984. The second and the third points, however, aroused feelings of resentment and anger in the Turkish Parliament. The FM İsmail Cem avowed openly that the Turkish judicial system cannot be intervened in by others, and that the independence of the judiciary was under the guarantee of the constitution. For Cem, it was inexplicable since “the number two of the terrorist organization had been on trial for nearly a year [and] nobody ever thought of such a thing, no one had any objections on neither judicial proceeding nor judicial process”624 in Turkey. Cem, accusing the EU of acting like ‘colonial governors’, added that Turkey would not tolerate and definitely not permit any observer or lawyer from international

620 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (16.02.1999): 4455. [Karamanlis, ND, the then MP].

621 Approximately the same point of view was shared by the MP Orestis Kolozof of the KKE: “From the publications it appears that Ocalan visited Greece several times. It should therefore be investigated what the government’s stance each time he came here and who handled this issue. […] It is our belief that since the arrival of Ocalan in the country, this had to be made public and all the maneuvers should have been made in full transparency.” See, Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (12.03.1999): 5286.

622 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (16.02.1999): 4463. [Konstantopoulos, SYN, the then MP].

623 ibid, 4461. [Konstantopoulos, SYN, the then MP].

624 Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 20th Term, 54th Session, v. 71, (13.03.1999): 51, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c071/tbmm20071054.pdf. [18.09.2018].

[İsmail Cem, DSP, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs].

organizations and foreign bars to attend the case, for both situations were not allowed by the Turkish law of procedure and the international treaties signed by Turkey625:

[TR] “Some think of themselves as the colonial governor who sent observers to the colonies of the 18th century, to inspect their colonies. Nobody should view Turkey from this point, we don’t let also someone do so. […] Well, a foreign attorney will come, a foreign attorney will come to [represent and] defend [him], will interview [him]… No, there’s no such thing […] This is the case also in the vast majority of Western Europe, only, the lawyer who is registered in [the respective state’s] bar comes and makes the defense”.

In the Turkish Parliament, in general, it was not understandable why did Europe, the European institutions, and the authorities who were defending the European democracy and human rights disregard PKK’s terrorist attacks for more than a decade, and instead vindicated and supported freedom of thought and expression before Turkey. Although “the right to life comes before freedom of thought”, as asserted by the MP Kozakçıoğlu, Europe “shielded and advocated terrorism which violated the right to life” before recognizing reluctantly that those actions in Turkey were terrorist acts626.