Perspectives on NATO-EU Comparison

The PASOK government was criticized particularly for hastening to confirm and use identification tagged by the USA and the EU. Reportedly, it was implementing the decisions of the others without discussing or raising an objection, and the Ocalan case was an end result of the meek compliance of the PASOK politicians. As stated by the MP Polidoras the Greek government “ha[d] become more royal than the king⁷⁵⁴ in Europe”⁷⁵⁵. It was condemned for advocating the policies of the USA, NATO,⁷⁵⁶ and some other countries of the EU that “sign[ed] various treaties, which on the one hand favour[ed] all those who cause[d] massacre in the Balkans, those who favour[ed]

separatist movements in the Balkans”⁷⁵⁷ but did not accept the Kurdish struggle after so many years of suffering because of the methods they chose to claim their rights on the other. The MP Tsovolas pointed out that the first was the USA that considered Öcalan a terrorist, and was followed by Germany of the EU, and finally the Greek government had “to play the policy of a good child in the United Europe, and in order to integrate Greece into the euro zone,⁷⁵⁸ in terms of political criteria it g[ave]

everything to achieve this supremacy”⁷⁵⁹.

from the process of naming the liberation movements and their leaders across the world⁷⁶¹:

[GR] “After the fall of Berlin, it proceeded with Belfast on the Ireland, with [Gerry] Adams, who went there, but the leaders of the Irish illegal army weren’t considered terrorists. Then we moved to Yasser Arafat, who at first was a terrorist and then became an interlocutor. We arrived at Ocalan, who was not useful on the international stage and his arrest was ordered. We arrived at the Basque Head of the ETA, where [sic] he was arrested because he was not useful on the world stage, and then we arrived in Kosovo, where the liberation army of a terrorist was considered an interlocutor and Milosevic was considered a terrorist. This name diversification made by America, which has the responsibility for the monitoring of all those, who for the sake of politics were called [either] terrorists [or] interlocutors”.

As was iterated by several Greek MPs, the international organizations and fora which were designated to protect human rights and values did not maintain the equality principle⁷⁶² while drawing conclusions on political processes. In the Greek parliament, the full responsibility was apportioned between NATO and the EU whereas in the Turkish parliament NATO was portrayed as far more responsible than the others.

Turkish politicians, in general, were vexed with the odd relationship between Turkey and NATO, whose members were taking steps against Turkey. Italy, for example, let the ‘so-called Kurdish parliament in exile’ to hold a session under the roof of the Italian parliament; France, for example, took a parliamentary decision on the ‘so-called Armenian genocide’; and Greece made agreements with Syria and Armenia against Turkey⁷⁶³. Moreover, Greece was in an effort to impede Turkey’s progress both in financial and military issues in respect that she was chronically vetoing Turkey on the MEDA funding of the EU, which was approximately 450 million USD, and supporting PKK⁷⁶⁴. In the excerpt below, MP Yülek quoted NATO’s apathy toward PKK⁷⁶⁵:

[TR] “For example, when a friend of mine said ‘while the PKK is being trained in a camp of Greece, which is a NATO state, how come NATO supports this movement against its [another]

state’ it was stated that ‘we don’t know anything like that’. Then Mr. Bedük said, as a former Director General of Security ‘I give you the address; it’s the Lavrio Camp, go and see there’; but the people in NATO, in the south never mentioned this”.

According to Yülek, Turkey’s role as NATO’s outpost during the Cold War period, or in his words “bear[ing] all of NATO's burden through a 40-year guardianship”⁷⁶⁶ ended up without any political gain. Turkey was still neither an EU member nor a

761 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (12.03.1999): 5309. [Tsafoulias, DIKKI, the then MP].

762 ibid, 5306. [Kouroumblis, PASOK, the then MP].

763 Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 20^th Term, 10^th Session, v. 64, (21.10.1998): 152, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c064/tbmm20064010.pdf. [18.09.2018].

[Ertan Yülek, FP, the then MP].

764 ibid, 162. [Yülek, FP, the then MP].

765 ibid. [Yülek, FP, the then MP].

766 ibid, 152. [Yülek, FP, the then MP].

WEU member and, furthermore, in case of any war against the members of these organizations in accordance with the latest agreement signed with NATO, Turkey “had to give all her materials, equipment, military ammunition, and forces to the command of Western European Union”⁷⁶⁷. He suggested that Turkey should have negotiated it thoroughly, instead of accepting it unconditionally, and made use of her bargaining power “for her European Union dream”, or in other words, “for her platonic love”⁷⁶⁸. There was a general consensus among the Turkish MPs that NATO did not explicitly assert its opinion on the PKK issue⁷⁶⁹, and did not force its members to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of each other, let alone supporting a terrorist organization nested in a member country. As professed by the MPs Demirkol of the RP and Köse of the DYP, Turkey’s moderate foreign policy particularly had been underestimating PKK for a long time, which caused Turkey’s loss of capacity in obstructing terrorist actions on the one way and eased PKK’s acquisition of political identity in Europe on the other:

[TR] “Indeed, we see that our applied foreign policy is passive, submissive on some issues, and accepting everything. The striking example of this is the foreign policy that we implement to our neighbors. As how we accept the fact that Greece has been arming the islands for years, and has put pressure on our tribes living in Western Thrace; today, we accepted the PKK camps opened by the Greek Cypriot side, especially by Greece, and didn’t react. […] A week ago, a private television channel [shared] the scenes and news that broadcast by a television channel located in the Greek Cypriot part, and showed the PKK’s camp here and the Greek authorities interest and support in these camps; the PKK members was being trained by the Greek officers in these camps”⁷⁷⁰.

[TR] “Greece is in NATO alliance, Italy is in NATO alliance; [but] both states, unfortunately host Apo. The foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey should be little more active, little more aggressive. So, considering that when we approach to it mildly, try to explain it with its human dimensions, [and] tell those states about our problems perhaps they will settle the issue over time [is wrong], time will be against us because until today it has been already explained. Our people in that region have no identity problems, neither language problems nor land issues”⁷⁷¹.

In the second excerpt above, NATO’s position against terrorist attacks in Turkey was deemed as a matter of indifference and obliviousness. The MP Emmioğlu argued that in order to get maximum political leverage in negotiations, Turkey should have made a bargain with NATO about whether to veto its enlargement policy, and in return, she could have received the WEU membership⁷⁷². Moreover, the MP Bedük remarked that

767 ibid, 151. [Yülek, FP, the then MP].

768 ibid, 152. [Yülek, FP, the then MP].

769 Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, (18.11.1998): 475. [Öymen, CHP, the then MP].

770 Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, (20.03.1996): 352. [Demirkol, RP, the then MP].

771 Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, (09.02.1999): 69. [İsmail Köse, DYP, the then MP].

772 Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, (21.10.1998): 163. [Kahraman Emmioğlu, FP, the then MP].

there was “a decision of a secret principle between NATO and the EU [about following] an enlargement process parallel to each other”⁷⁷³. Accordingly, after getting acceptance to NATO, countries who applied also for the EU membership were admitted to the Union. The only exception was Turkey, which was included in NATO but excluded from the EU. Lately, in the Luxembourg Summit, Turkey was not even declared eligible to join the EU,⁷⁷⁴ and this was considered to be stemmed from Turkey’s lack of pursuing consistent foreign policy, for that Turkey was not used to utilizing her rights and entitlements originated from her memberships in international organizations. The readmission process of Greece in NATO’s military wing which took place during Turkey’s 1980 military coup was placed as an example for the insufficiency of Turkey in bargaining leverage. On the other hand, Greece was considered capable of exploting international instruments such as her veto power on decisions in the EU. Turkey’s EU track was obstructed several times by Greece, which interpreted as “Turkey was sentenced to Greece’s [approval]”⁷⁷⁵ due to her ignorance in foreign politics. In this respect, any development through the way of the EU membership would have been supervised by the intention of Greece⁷⁷⁶.

Contrary to what was argued by the Turkish MPs, the Greek PM Simitis argued that the only required condition was “respect for legalities”⁷⁷⁷. In his view, Turkey’s European process “d[id] not concern Turkey’s relationship with Greece”, but

“Turkey's relationship with the European Union as a whole, Turkey's relationship with the Council of Europe, with the entire international community”⁷⁷⁸. It was allegedly not a reciprocal issue between two countries, there were no loopholes or vagueness of the European plans that Turkey would have fair trial, and uphold the rule of law and human rights. In his words: “In a Turkey which follows these rules of conduct, we have no reason, like any other country, to oppose”⁷⁷⁹. In a similar vein, the FM Papandreou asserted that Greece, which had long been striving for parity and equality, for all minorities in the Balkans, and for the Greek Muslims of Thrace⁷⁸⁰, would help

773 ibid, 148. [Saffet Arıkan Bedük, DYP, the then MP].

774 ibid, 149. [Bedük, DYP, the then MP].

775 ibid, 150. [Yülek, FP, the then MP].

776 ibid, 164. [Emmioğlu, FP, the then MP].

777 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (05.03.1999): 5024. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

778 ibid. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

779 ibid. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

780 Although the Muslim citizens in Thrace identified as minority because of their religion and named as the Muslim Minority of Thrace in general, there is a common misunderstanding of the term whether to attach those subjects of the country with Greece (meant that they are minority because of their

Turkey to make progress by exposing her to the Greek struggle for democracy and human rights, for the respect of international law and legal order⁷⁸¹. Accordingly, Greece supported Turkey’s European process as a device for solving bilateral disputes⁷⁸²:

[GR] “We, Greece, want Turkey's European course, we promote cooperation in the Balkans together with Turkey, we open the prospect to the Turkish Cypriots for the European Union, which closes Turkey's occupation in Cyprus, we show particular sensitivity to human rights, to refugees in the world and to minorities, we are ready, if these conditions are actually fulfilled by Turkey -and I want to respond to what Mr Tsovolas said- to remove the veto, because it is not an end in itself. The veto is related to specific conditions”.

In addition to the impartial feature of Greek vetoes within the EU, another emphasis was placed on Turkey’s bargaining power within NATO. Turkey was deemed to be a hard-bitten bargainer in the international arena that somehow had achieved success for a long period of time. The Greek MP Papariga, for example, asserted that “NATO consider[ed] Turkey to be legitimate in her policy in the Aegean since October 1980, when Greece was reintegrated into the military arm of NATO”, and the EU had never vindicated Greece on the issue of her borders, although those very borders were designated as the EU’s Eastern external borders⁷⁸³. Papariga revealed that Greece, Italy, and “Turkey –namely the country which [was] projected as the Eastern threat–

form[ed] a common military force” as a new structure of NATO “with the aim of intervening in so-called crises, in other words, this force w[ould] preserve borders and the peace” in the region⁷⁸⁴. Papariga furthered by posing a series of counterfactual questions on the Greek conception of Turkish threat, one of which was: “Are there verbal or real risks from Turkey?” Accordingly, ‘if the Turkish threat is real’ then why has Greece been defended by Turkey under the NATO umbrella. Another MP who was questioning the dimensions and efficiency of Turkish threat was Giorgos Rokkos

religion) or with Turkey (meant that they are minority because of their origin). The discussion between the MPs Andreas Karagounis of the New Democracy and Orestis Kolozof of the KKE might be given as an example for this situation. Two MPs could not understand each other while the one was speaking about the Muslim population in Germany the other thought that he was speaking about the Muslim population in Greece, as for both situations, the joint point of reference is Turkey. See, Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (11.02.1999): 4314.

781 Actually, it was a response from Papandreou to his Turkish counterpart. In his words: “I would like to reply to my colleague, Ismail Cem, the Turkish Foreign Minister. Ironically, a few days ago, he said that he believed Turkey helped Greece in 1974 in Cyprus, and today with Ocalan [...] I respond to him that Greece will reward Turkey for this help [...] together with our partners in the European Union, in every step, until the autocracy and the anachronism that keep the Turkish citizens –the oppressed Kurds and the excluded Turkish Cypriots– bounded today, are overturned”. See, Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (05.03.1999): 5054.

782 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (05.03.1999): 5054. [Papandreou, PASOK, the then FM].

783 ibid, 5037. [Papariga, KKE, the then MP].

784 ibid. [Papariga, KKE, the then MP].

of DIKKI. Below are the two excerpts from Rokkos and Papariga respectively, wherein they unite under the same misgivings about the implausible claim and assumption of the Greek government on Turkey:

[GR] “Turkey of the threat, of the terrorism is not as strong as you want to inspire the Greek people with your own tactics. She has her own internal problems that are too big. She has her own surroundings, with the Kurdish, with the Armenians, with the Azeris, who do not give her the pleasure of bullying. You, however, terrorize the Greek people with dilemmas: compromise or war, compromise or EMU”⁷⁸⁵.

[GR] “Is Turkey so strong, and the others -the USA, Germany- are weak? Why doesn't NATO pull Turkey's ‘ear’⁷⁸⁶ once it is found violating the international treaties and international law?

And we mean politically to pull its ‘ear’ and nothing else. They don't, because they are in favor of these Greco-Turkish frictions”⁷⁸⁷.

Papariga assumed that since NATO was the main decisive power over its member states’ foreign policies the problem was neither about Greece nor Turkey. In her opinion, none of its members were able to exercise a policy without its affirmation⁷⁸⁸. On the contrary, the Turkish parliamentarians did not mention any NATO endeavour like interfering the foreign policies of others or establishing a new world order as notified by the Greek MPs.