3. NATIONAL IDENTITY FORMATION IN GREECE AND
4.3. Policy-Based Approaches
4.3.3. Confidence Building Measures and Their Limits
Actually, in virtue of mutual communication, the year 1988 recorded further attempts for maintaining constructive and positive approaches to conflicts: Two agreements were signed to build confidence between Greece and Turkey; the first was on the 27th of May in Athens and the second was on the 8th of September in Istanbul. And PM Özal paid a state visit to Athens on the 13th of June in the same year, after a period of 36 years of no visit526. Since the Turkish-Greek relationship was intrinsically pregnant with peaks and troughs, any attempts might easily provoke reactions among the ones, especially those who were against reconsiderations and revisions. Such was the case with MP Spiliotopoulos527:
[GR] “I wanted to draw the attention of the Government to the issue of Turkish pursuits, in relation to the Confidence Building Measures that possibly lead Greece to conclude an agreement with Turkey and […] will prospectively be made [with] the corresponding Measures of 1988, for which special attention is needed. Despite the similar declarations at the time about the non-negotiability of our rights, the then Government gave consent to the unjustified restriction of those rights, and waived the lawful pursuit of those rights”.
Accordingly, the process was a big disappointment. The incumbents refrained from making comment on, let alone reference to violations of Greek rights. No mention was made of the aeronautical exercises carried out continually by Turkey in the Aegean, within the Athens FIR. As “Greece was liable and responsible for the control of Athens FIR towards the International Community” she was the one complied with international commitments and obligations, such as “to submit flight plans, but Turkey
525 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (12.10.1996): 100. [Kypouros, PASOK, the then MP].
526 “To the surprise of diplomats, the honor guard that greeted Ozal was made up of commandos in battle dress, not ceremonial uniforms. And there was no exchange of national anthems as is customary on such state visits.” See, Loren Jenkins, “TURKEY’S OZAL VISITS GREECE,” Washington Post, 14 June 1988, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/06/14/turkeys-ozal-visits-greece/e9ffb82a-548e-487e-ace0-3d10a597bb00/ [17.06.2018]. Despite a sort of backlash against PM Özal’s official visit both PMs played a decisive role in reducing the communication gap between two countries.
527 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (12.10.1996): 80. [Spilios Spiliotopoulos, ND, the then MP].
did not do, […] the abidance to the assigned exercise area, but Turkey did not respect”528.
Actually, the two countries had contrasting views about flight international regions:
Turkey was claiming that it was a technical issue involving information and alerting services for the regions of airspace, but for Greece, it was a political issue, “a matter of sovereignty to restrict Turkish aircraft and exercises over the Aegean”529.
MP Spiliotopoulos furthered with his opposing position on any actions and steps, and he was not alone in his opinion530 that in the name of confidence-building or normalization in relations between two countries, the alterations were made routinely in favour of Turkey531. MP Mitsotakis, for example, shared a similar view and declared a precondition for dialogue by stipulating that Turkey should have abandoned her claim of grey-zones that was obvious evidence of Turkey’s revisionist stance in the Aegean532. Allegedly, contrary to Turkey’s revisionist posture towards the Aegean issue, which was far beyond in reaching an amicable settlement, Greece remained a status-quo state, which struggled to maintain the existing conditions and strongly resisted the Turkish threat. Therefore, Greece had to beef up her militaries, but for promoting peace in the region, and the decisive stance of Athens to secure the Greek national air and maritime space was not only a fundamental right but also “a unique way to prevent an act of war”533. As expressed by the Minister for National Defence534:
528 ibid. [Spiliotopoulos, ND, the then MP].
529 Carol Migdalovitz, “Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues -- Background and Recent Developments”, CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress), 21 August 1997, http://www.congressionalresearch.com/97-799/document.php?study=Greece+and+Turkey+Aegean+
Issues+--+Background+and+Recent+Developments. [26.04.2018].
530 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (12.10.1996): 95-96. See, MP Papathemelis of the PASOK.
531 In fact, it was the Greek foreign policy vis-a-vis Turkey during the premiership of Andreas Papandreou that “negotiations were out of the question, as Greece was content with the existing status quo. In any negotiations between a status quo state and a revisionist state, the former is bound to lose, as the pressure is on the status quo party to make concessions so that agreement can be reached.” See, Heraclides, The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies, 117.
532 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (12.10.1996): 133. [Konstantinos Mitsotakis, ND, the then MP].
533 ibid, 121. [Tsochatzopoulos, PASOK, the then Minister for National Defence].
534 ibid. [Tsochatzopoulos, PASOK, the then Minister for National Defence].
[GR] “[W]e are interested in peace […] that is why we precisely deal with acts of aggression, infringements and violations of the Turkish side, with determination and responsibility. […]
Ladies and gentlemen, a great theorist of war had stressed that ‘the basic purpose of the Armed Forces is the peace and prosperity of the people.’ That is why their high combat and deterrent capacity is needed. For this reason, Armed Forces are needed to force their respect for friends and enemies”.
Reportedly, the basic obstacle to achieving peace was Turkish aggression, so the military solution was valued as a reliable remedy, by arguing that peace requires a strong military presence. Various ideas were exchanged between the MPs during the discussions about strengthening the Greek Armed Forces, one of which was far more remarkable than the others. The dissenting voice of MP Papariga pointed out that Greece would fail to attain any tangible achievement of securing the country and the region as well if she counted on the NATO defence umbrella535:
[GR] “Do you know under what conditions can Greece play a significant role, a role recognized by her allies? […] By establishing NATO’s multinational belligerent forces in the South-eastern Mediterranean, of course, you will get credit from both the Americans and the Germans. And these are the well-known multinational rapid action forces that you will establish together with Turkish and Italian troops and even under the command of Turkish chief-officer alternatively […] That’s well-known. And ultimately, we establish forces for peace in the region –[where] we say, [we] see war or [we] see military, political interventions- with the leadership of a country that challenges our borders!”
Contrary to this projection, in the Turkish parliament stated by MP İnan Greece was given an extraordinary amount of freedom by NATO to pursue a sort of containment policy in order to counter Turkey536:
[TR] “In the recent past, Greece's military cooperation agreement made with the Russian Federation; This is the first of its kind in between NATO countries. Some time ago, she made a similar military cooperation agreement with Syria and gained the right to have aircraft in Syria.
Consequently, Greece is in a sort of endeavour to pull Turkey into a multifaceted conflict. This is clearly seen”.
Greece was purportedly conducting two distinct phases of adapting to globalization.
The first was on the economic level that she was consolidating her membership in the EU by doing her utmost to join the EMU, and the second was on the political level that she was making a great effort to influence her alliances to take part in the disputes where she fell short by internationalizing her national issues.
535 ibid, 122. [Papariga, KKE, the then MP].
536 Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, (30.01.1996): 80. [İnan, ANAP, the then MP].