Other Conceived as the Aggressor and Expansionist Actor in

other require dichotomies, such as legitimate/illegitimate, powerful/powerless, and independent/dependent; that grow out of the nation-building process, wherein the first of each of these pairs associated with the self and the second with the other. By the same token, despite whatever the factual situation is, agents envisage, and in turn believe that the other should be condemned as being unfair at least in their ideational international realm, for normative structures, such as beliefs and ideas, are undeniable factors in creating public opinion. In other words, a web of othering accompanies the self-building practices, including various phases extending from domesticating the other to strengthening the differing line between the self and other⁴⁷⁷.

In the below excerpt of the PM Simitis, the differing line by posing contrasting positions of Greece and Turkey, and the domestication process of Turkey by broadcasting the unlawful Turkish acts and claims through media campaigns to activate the international fora to take action against her, are noticeable⁴⁷⁸:

[GR] “The current Turkish policy isn't dangerous only for Greece, but for all the balances and security in the Eastern Mediterranean. And it start[ed] to become understandable in most countries. What are our theses? The status in the Aegean is absolutely clear. The story of thousands of years defines it. International treaties accurately define it. The national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Country are neither [to] question nor [to] negotiat[e]. […] All means of our diplomacy and defence are directed at securing national integrity and at discouraging the Turkish reason with a strong deterrent force. The multi-faceted campaign we’ve undertaken over the last few months, across a wide range of forces that previously had a favourable neutral stance towards Turkey, has already [started to] create problems in Turkey, We’ll continue in the same way. We’ll firmly support the peace in the region, but we’ll

476 Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, 5.

477 Neumann, “Self and Other in International Relations.”

478 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, 9^th Term, 1^st Session, 4^th Sitting (10.10.1996): 24, http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/10_10_96.pdf [29.10.2017]. [Konstantinos Georgios Simitis, PASOK, the then Prime Minister of Greece].

implement a policy that combines the diplomatic vigilance with the deterrent ability, [and] the prudence with the determination, [and] the right arguments with a constant presence”.

Although international treaties are considered to be concrete and material instances they can be evaluated differently in accordance with perceptions and constructions based on the self and the other. Therefore, technical issues may become intriguingly political and historical. As PM Simitis noted in the previous excerpt, what can be at first sight depicted as a strategic analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean furthers with relation to history going back to thousands of years where Turks are actually evaluated as the other and disrupters of the balance in the region. The other is pictured as foreign elements that have come and conquered the area from the Greeks.

The historical aggressor is unified with the present-day lawbreaker in constructing the other, thereby it becomes a tangible entity which lies beyond the space and time.

In the Turkish Parliament, as voiced by MP Soysal, Turks, at any cost, had to defend their right of possession and keep laying their claim to the seas because “[t]here is a neighbour in the Aegean that intends to possess even a piece of rock which is 3,5 miles away, at the bottom of [Turkey’s] nose, considering that Turks do not understand the sea”⁴⁷⁹. According to this opinion, the motive behind the Greek encroachment stemmed from the perception that Turks do not make use of the sea –rather than concrete proof. This impression might have a long story, which traces back to the naval battles that inflicted a crippling defeat on the Ottoman State, respectively in 1770, 1827, and in 1853. Turks, supposedly, have not had a chance to recoup the losses and regain their ancestors' reputation for commanding the seas. In a similar vein, another reference to this unanchored relationship between Turks and water resources is traditionally made by a proverb that ‘water flows Turk stares’, which means even rivers just flow away without producing any benefit for the country, contrary to industrialized countries.

Besides, the timing of the incident was stressed in the Turkish parliament, in relation to the developments in Greece, where national issues were allegedly being replaced by international ones. In this respect, Greece intends to mitigate the impact of her domestic defects of either political or economic issues by stirring up the Turkish hatred and thrusting Turkey into the limelight. Reportedly, as the “Turkish hostility scores points in Greece”, the Greek Prime Minister thought that “he would earn reputation

479 Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, (30.01.1996): 86. [Mümtaz Soysal, DSP, the then MP].

by [pursuing] such a policy”,which roots in “the antagonism towards Turkey and Turkishness” that was instilled in the education policy and domestic policy of Greece⁴⁸⁰. For MP İnan, while the political situation was becoming more volatile, regarding Turkey as easy prey seemed like a solution for the Foreign Minister of Greece –Theodoros Pangalos⁴⁸¹– who was an ungrateful ‘Turcophobic’ agitator, to deflect the attention away from the internal disputes towards an external crisis:

[TR] “The [new] government which has taken power, after Mr. Papandreou’s approximately ten years of [authority], feels very weak. Therefore, they need a foreign crisis to get acceptance among the Greek nation and to get its support. The easiest address is Turkey. Unfortunately, in the current government, the person appointed to the Foreign Ministry is Pangalos, whom I know from the European Council and we have been struggling with for years. In the period of the Greek Military Junta, he [took] refuge in Turkey; although he was shown very nice hospitality for two months [by the Turks], he is a Turcophobe, with all his cells”⁴⁸².

[TR] “Greece should best know that this type of [political] escalation, creating these types of de facto situations, will eventually cost much more to Greece. In that respect, taking the current government gap in Turkey as an opportunity, if Greece is in such an endeavour, she has to tidy herself up once more. By remembering the previous events, remembering Cyprus, remembering what happened to them when they landed in Anatolia, Greeks need to come to their senses”⁴⁸³.

Although the conditions in Kardak/Imia and Cyprus were significantly different; in that, the first one consisted of non-residential islets without any civilians whereas the second was inhabited by Turks and Greeks who were under direct threat to life because of the protracted armed conflicts, these two events were likened to each other as an extending part of the mainland soil.

In MP İnan’s words, “in the massacre of December 21, 1963, they slaughtered our 256 cognates. They proceeded, step by step, until July 20th of the year 1974. By creating de facto situation and by locking our people within 5 percent of the island, they were subjected to persecution of our people”⁴⁸⁴. In this context, both incidents were broadly considered to be the Greek attempts of establishing de facto situations to achieve the annexation of the island and the islets by Greece. In the excerpt from MP Gül, Greece was threatened to experience what she had encountered in Anatolia during the Turkish

480 ibid, 87. [Namık Kemal Zeybek, DYP, the then MP].

481 Some of his recent declarations are as follows: “The only good Turk is a dead Turk. I believe it because I haven’t met a good Turk. They lack basic notions. The Turk doesn’t have a sense of justice.”

See, “Πρωτοφανής δήλωση Πάγκαλου: «Ο µόνος καλός Τούρκος είναι ένας νεκρός Τούρκος»,”

Kathimerini Newspaper, February 13, 2018,

http://www.kathimerini.gr/948415/article/epikairothta/politikh/prwtofanhs-dhlwsh-pagkaloy-o-monos-kalos-toyrkos-einai-enas-nekros-toyrkos [14.05.2018]; “Turks worked, we were lazy.” See, Sefa Kaplan, “Türkler Çalıştı Biz Tembellik Yaptık”, Hürriyet, 18 April 2011, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/turkler-calisti-biz-tembellik-yaptik-17573526 [23.05.2018].

482 Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, (30.01.1996): 80. [İnan, ANAP, the then MP].

483 ibid, 83. [Gül, RP, the then MP].

484 ibid, 80. [İnan, ANAP, the then MP].

War of Independence, and in Cyprus. Greece was supposed to draw lessons from history and to relinquish her obstructive and demanding policies on islands and islets⁴⁸⁵. Greater stress was laid by MP İnan on the past, following his expression:

“Greeks, God’s skirt-wearing who were slapped by Anatolia and by Turks at each of their rebellions- come, under my nose, and with 9 soldiers, they challenge me”⁴⁸⁶. In the excerpt two sorts of remarks can be accessible: The first is a derogatory one which lies in the phrase skirt-wearing, implying traditional Greek kilt, namely fustanella that is worn by evzones. And the second is a laudatory one which is resided in the utterance Turks’ slap –reminding that of Ottoman slap which used to be a trained-fight-technique used in close combat for killing the enemy– that aggrandizes Turks, for even their bare-hands are weapons.

In the Greek Parliament, contrary to the idea that Greece was heading for a replacement of serious domestic setbacks with foreign ones, PM Simitis purported that it was Turkey which made strategic formulation of its foreign policy to compensate for its internal challenges; and likened the islets to Cyprus with the aspect that Turkey had been demonstrating the same aggressive tendencies. Bending on the legacy of the Ottoman State, Turkey was causing instability in the regions which were formerly under the rule of Ottomans, to promote her political clout and to exert her influence to become a regional power⁴⁸⁷:

[GR] “[Greece] is concurrently facing the Turkish aggression in the Aegean and Cyprus.

Turkey has changed in the biggest factor of destabilization in the Aegean Sea, [in] the Balkans, [in] Eastern Mediterranean, [in] the Caucasus and [in] the Middle East. The revival of the Ottoman Empire vision, which is ignorant of history, is the invention of the Turkish establishment to alleviate the acute internal problems and to gain an increased role in the region”.

Clinching PM Simitis’s argument, the Minister for National Defence Tsochatzopoulos and MP Papathemelis reiterated that Greece was the guarantor of stability in the region, balancing a healthy relationship while Turkey was constantly refusing to cooperate and challenging the Greek sovereignty. Since they were the heir of an invading power, the Turks were hereditarily obsessed with expanding their borders.

They did not have a sense of respect for territorial integrity of others and especially of the Greeks in that they aim at ‘shrinking Hellenism’, and in turn, the Greek nation.

485 ibid, 84. [Gül, RP, the then MP].

486 ibid, 81. [İnan, ANAP, the then MP].

487 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (10.10.1996): 23-4. [Simitis, PASOK, the then PM].

“The revival of the Ottoman Empire vision” or more precisely Neo-Ottomanism⁴⁸⁸ as mentioned in the previous excerpt by PM Simitis dates back to the 1974’s landing troops of Turkey in Cyprus and to Turgut Özal’s new perception and approach to the Turkish foreign policy throughout the 80s. Neo-Ottomanism was being voiced by several circles particularly within the period of Ahmet Davutoğlu’s ministry of foreign affairs and premiership in relation to his political vision cleared in his book called

‘Strategic Depth’⁴⁸⁹, which was scrutinized by scholars specialized in the Greek-Turkish relations⁴⁹⁰.

[GR] “Greece is not a revisionist power in the region and considers the political and legal status quo in the Aegean as the foundation of peaceful coexistence between Greece and Turkey. Greece rejects the escalation of tensions and the threat of violence used by Turkey in order to enforce [her] expansionist claims in the Aegean. And Greece calls on the international community to discourage this Turkish tactic, which inevitably leads to destabilization of peace in the region”⁴⁹¹. [GR] “The enemy is known; it’s the eastern neighbour. It’s a strategic opponent in official terminology. It’s a simple Hellenist enemy because […] its main goal [is] shrinking Hellenism.

And this shrinkage of Hellenism seeks it as a Turkish expansionism with a constant series of acts, with escalating actions”⁴⁹².

Expansionism was exemplarized with Neo-Ottomanism in the Greek Parliament whereas with Enosis –political union of Cyprus and Greece– in the Turkish Parliament.

When the Greek community of Cyprus called for Enosis, it aroused the reactions of Turkey, probably of evoking the enosis of Crete from where Turks had been expelled following the unification. Contrary to enosis, taksim (partition) became an alternative solution to the Cyprus issue espoused by the Turkish residents of the island⁴⁹³.

488 “[T]he word was coined by the Greeks after Turkey landed troops in Cyprus in 1974”. It reminds the hearer of Ottomanism, seems as if a modern version of it, in fact different it is. See, Kemal H. Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History (Leiden - Boston - Köln: BRILL, 2002), 524.

489 Some lines in the book were related to Neo-Ottomanism, and sparked a heated debate in Greece.

Such are as follows: “It is obvious that Turkey has to maintain a defence structure which considers the crucial factors that distinguish herself from the other countries. Historical factors of this defence structure subject Turkey to develop a defence strategy which [extends] beyond the conjectural impact of her current international borders. Having been born into the geopolitical background and history of the Ottoman State, and being [heir] of that heritage, it is impossible for Turkey to consider and plan her defence within her present day borders. This historical legacy can create de facto situations in which she has to interfere at any moment beyond her own borders”. See, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001), 41.

490 Hercules Millas, “Neo-Ottomanism, a Book and Bilateral Perceptions”, Rethinking Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1999, ed. Gökçe Bayındır Goularas, Hakan Sezgin Erkan (Lanham - Boulder - New York - London: Lexington Books, 2017): 1–13; Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy”, Hellenic Foundation For European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), April 2010,

http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟ-ΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΣ-8_2010_IoGrigoriadis1.pdf. [16.05.2018].

491 Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, (12.10.1996): 121. [Apostolos-Athanasios Tsochatzopoulos, PASOK, the then Minister for National Defence].

492 ibid, 96. [Papathemelis, PASOK, the then MP].

493 Hasgüler posed a simple question about what would be the reasons for not protecting the rights already given to Turkish Cypriots following Geneva negotiations and instead upholding new illegal

[TR] “Our country is in a strategic position. Our nation has a glorious history. Since our nation has an identity that does not accept to be brought under the subjugation of others and that struggles with a superhuman effort for the country, honor, and faith and that for whose sake epics were written and that gained such fame, all these conditions cause to form some enemies; there are such enemies. Our country faces problems and hostility all-round from outside. We face such hostilities, from time to time, […] especially from Greece and from many others”⁴⁹⁴.

Reportedly, Turkey was almost entirely surrounded by hostile neighbours that harbour secret feelings and sentiments, and they were in an attempt for daring ventures such as dreaming of Anatolia, or of controlling water resources and borax deposits in Turkey, or harnessing the potential of Caucasus, or longing for historical desires, etc. These were the things assumed to be an existential threat to Turkish national unity and sovereignty⁴⁹⁵. Being encircled by aggressors during the dissolution of the Ottoman State, which ended up with signing the Treaty of Sevres, although the attacks were repulsed and the Treaty of Lausanne signed by the successor nation state –Turkey–

there is a common belief that bad intentions of the aggressors are still alive. This belief is remained as Sevres syndrome that cements the inherited suspiciousness and distrustfulness of others and results in another common belief that ‘Turks do not have friends other than Turks’.

Another important theme lies in the next excerpts, where the traditional belief embodied in a popular patriarchal statement that the larger the population gets the stronger the country becomes. The phrase seems like a future projection remote from reality containing wishful thinking of the rise of Turkey (that’s the rapid growth and development of the country) and an overt intention for the fall of Greece. Actually, linking the state-power with the size of the population is a tendency dating back to the Late-Ottoman period. During the regression period of the Ottoman State, it is estimated that approximately 25 million subjects were living in an area about 3 million square kilometers, which supposedly made it hard for the state to flourish successfully in economic and military conditions⁴⁹⁶. The mentioned phrases in this aspect of the two members from the Motherland Party of Turkey are as follows:

claims: “Why did not Cypriot Turks save the rights that were acquired jointly by Cypriot Rums and Turks; that were guaranteed especially by TC [Turkish Republic], Greece and England? [...] Although Cypriot Turks and Rums were mentioned alike in all the international agreements, why do Turkish executives insist on demands with no legal basis rather than these rights?” See, Mehmet Hasgüler, Kıbrıs’ta Enosis ve Taksim Politikalarının Sonu, 5th ed. (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2007), 316.

494 Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 20^th Term, 26^th Session, v. 2, (20.03.1996): 354, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d20/c002/tbmm20002026.pdf [26.02.2018].

[Mustafa Ünaldı, RP, the then MP].

495 ibid, 348-49. [Ahmet Alkan, ANAP, the then MP].

496 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 9.

[TR] “[I]f Greece still teaches her children that the Aegean and Istanbul are within her territories, points ENOSIS as a national objective in Cyprus, if a travel agent dares to distribute maps, showing the presence of another state on our lands, to the tourists whom it will send to our country, if Greece dares to enter our territorial waters and to plant a flag on our rock; […] there is an obligation to seriously think about […] these problems”⁴⁹⁷.

[TR] “Greece has a national policy that has been going on since the revolt of 1821 [in]

Peloponnesus against Turkey, she has megali idea, she has expansion [policy]. [Greece] was defeated in Anatolia [but] gained land in Lausanne. From her independence in 1821 till the present day, she has expanded her land four times against Turkey. She has repeatedly received the Western support and struggled with Turkey, and her nowadays big fear is the growth of Turkish nation – every six years [Turkey] adds to her population the equivalent of the whole Greece’s– by contrast with the decline in Greece's; May God give worse, their population is falling and a sort of phobia is started because of this”⁴⁹⁸.

The other is an unscrupulous neighbour that pursues irredentist nationalist policies against the self. Greece’s eternal irredentism allegedly originates in her aggressive nationalism that was constructed during early years of the Greek War of Independence.

As stated Greece sustains a political vision of expanding her borders to achieve Ioannis Kolettis’s⁴⁹⁹ concept of Great Idea (Megali Idea)⁵⁰⁰ which can be briefly interpreted as encompassing the lands associated with the Greek race and/or history, regardless of whether the Greek subjects constitute majority or minority of those regions. Greece, eventually, has expanded her borders against Turkey with the tacit approval of the West. From the viewpoint of Turkey, Greece is politically powerful in the international arena wherein the West is operative; and although Turkey herself is powerful in the legal realm she cannot seek her rights due to several reasons, one of which is her historical background. Although the below mentioned events are fairly old, the others display a resistance to assimilate them, and Turkey is constantly reminding Greece of the Fall of Constantinople and the West of the Siege of Vienna⁵⁰¹:

497 Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, (20.03.1996): 348-49. [Alkan, ANAP, the then MP].

498 Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, (30.01.1996): 81. [İnan, ANAP, the then MP].

499 PM Kolettis had been one of the most influencial figures of the independent Greek Kingdom, for the first two decades, and was the first to coin the term Megali Idea, and introduced it as the official ideology in a public speech he gave on 14 January 1844, during his second premiership between 1844 – 1847.

See, Millas, Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu, 211.

500 For a good review of the philological roots and discussion on the concept, See, Anastasia Stouraiti, Alexander Kazamias, “The Imaginary Topographies of the Megali Idea: National Territory as Utopia”, Spatial Conceptions of the Nation: Modernizing Geographies in Greece and Turkey, ed. P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, Thalia Dragonas, Çağlar Keyder (London and NewYork: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010): 11–35.

501 Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey, (30.01.1996): 82. [İnan, ANAP, the then MP].

[TR] “Greece hasn’t been able to digest the conquest of Istanbul yet. The Western world hasn’t been able to digest that we’re on the [city] gates of Vienna for two times yet. […] Turkey must leave the drowsiness caused by the forty-five years of Cold War’s condition. That period is over.

Turkey, as a regional power, as a giant has the power to stand up on her own, but Turkey fears her own shadow”.