BEHAVIORISM AND INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY
John K. Burton
Virginia Tech
David M. (Mike) Moore
Virginia Tech
Susan G. Magliaro
Since the first publication of this chapter in the previous edition of the Handbook, some changes have occurred in the theoret- ical landscape. Cognitive psychology has moved further away from its roots in information processing toward a stance that emphasizes individual and group construction of knowledge.
The notion of the mind as a computer has fallen into disfavor largely due to the mechanistic representation of a human en- deavor and the emphasis on the mind–body separation. Actu- ally, these events have made B. F. Skinner’s (1974) comments prophetic. Much like Skinner’s discussion of use of a machine as a metaphor for human behavior by the logical positivists who believed that “a robot, which behaved precisely like a person, responding in the same way to stimuli, changing its behavior as a result of the same operations, would be indistinguishable from a real person, even though,” as Skinner goes on to say,
“it would not have feelings, sensations, or ideas.” If such a robot could be built, Skinner believed that “it would prove that none of the supposed manifestations of mental life demanded a men- talistic explanation” (p. 16). Indeed, unlike cognitive scientists who explicitly insisted on the centrality of the computer to the understanding of human thought (see, for example, Gardner, 1985), Skinner clearly rejected any characterizations of humans as machines.
In addition, we have seen more of what Skinner (1974) called
“the current practice of avoiding” (the mind/body) “dualism by substituting ‘brain’ for ‘mind.” Thus, the brain is said to “use
data, make hypotheses, make choices, and so on as the mind was once said to have done” (p. 86). In other words, we have seen a retreat from the use of the term “mind” in cognitive psychology. It is no longer fashionable then to posit, as Gardner (1985) did, that “first of all, there is the belief that, in talking about human cognitive activities, it is necessary to speak about mental representations and to posit a level of analysis wholly separate from the biological or neurological on one hand, and the sociological or cultural on the other” (p. 6). This notion of mind, which is separate from nature or nurture, is critical to many aspects of cognitive explanation. By using “brain” instead of “mind,” we get the appearance of avoiding the conflict. It is, in fact, an admission of the problem with mind as an explanatory construct, but in no way does it resolve the role that mind was meant to fill.
Yet another hopeful sign is the abandonment of generali- ties of learning and expertise in favor of an increased role for the stimuli available during learning as well as the feedback that follows (i.e., behavior and consequences). Thus we see more about “situated cognition,” “situated learning,” “situated knowledge,” “cognitive apprenticeships,” “authentic materials,”
etc. (see, for example, Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Lave, 1988; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Resnick, 1988; Rogoff & Lave, 1984;
Suchman, 1987) that evidence an explicit acknowledgment that while behavior “is not ‘stimulus bound’. . . nevertheless the en- vironmental history is still in control; the genetic endowment of
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the species plus the contingencies to which the individual has been exposed still determine what he will perceive” (Skinner, 1974, p. 82).
Perhaps most importantly, and in a less theoretical vein, has been the rise of distance learning; particularly for those on the bleeding edge of “any time, any place,” asynchronous learning.
In this arena, issues of scalability, cost effectiveness, maximiza- tion of the learner’s time, value added, etc. has brought to the forefront behavioral paradigms that had fallen from favor in many circles. A reemergence of technologies such as person- alized system instruction (Keller & Sherman, 1974) is clear in the literature. In our last chapter we addressed these models and hinted at their possible use in distance situations. We expand those notions in this current version.
1.1 INTRODUCTION
In 1913, John Watson’s Psychology as the Behaviorist Views it put forth the notion that psychology did not have to use terms such as consciousness, mind, or images. In a real sense, Wat- son’s work became the opening “round” in a battle that the behaviorists dominated for nearly 60 years. During that period, behavioral psychology (and education) taught little about cog- nitive concerns, paradigms, etc. For a brief moment, as cogni- tive psychology eclipsed behavioral theory, the commonalties between the two orientations were evident (see, e.g., Neisser, 1967, 1976). To the victors, however, go the spoils and the rise of cognitive psychology has meant the omission, or in some cases misrepresentation, of behavioral precepts from current curricula. With that in mind, this chapter has three main goals.
First, it is necessary to revisit some of the underlying assump- tions of the two orientations and review some basic behavioral concepts. Second, we examine the research on instructional technology to illustrate the impact of behavioral psychology on the tools of our field. Finally, we conclude the chapter with an epilogue.
1.2 THE MIND/BODY PROBLEM
The western mind is European, the European mind is Greek; the Greek mind came to maturity in the city of Athens. (Needham, 1978, p. 98)
The intellectual separation between mind and nature is trace- able back to 650 B.C. and the very origins of philosophy itself.
It certainly was a centerpiece of Platonic thought by the fourth century B.C. Plato’s student Aristotle, ultimately, separated mind from body (Needham, 1978). In modern times, it was Ren´e Descartes who reasserted the duality of mind and body and connected them at the pineal gland. The body was made of physical matter that occupied space; the mind was composed of “animal spirits” and its job was to think and control the body.
The connection at the pineal gland made your body yours. While it would not be accurate to characterize current cognitivists as Cartesian dualists, it would be appropriate to characterize them as believers of what Churchland (1990) has called “popular
dualism” (p. 91); that the “person” or mind is a “ghost in the machine.” Current notions often place the “ghost” in a social group. It is this “ghost” (in whatever manifestation) that Wat- son objected to so strenuously. He saw thinking and hoping as things we do (Malone, 1990). He believed that when stimuli, bi- ology, and responses are removed, the residual is not mind, it is nothing. As William James (1904) wrote, “. . . but breath, which was ever the original ‘spirit,’ breath moving outwards, between the glottis and the nostrils, is, I am persuaded, the essence out of which philosophers have constructed the entity known to them as consciousness” (p. 478).
The view of mental activities as actions (e.g., “thinking is talk- ing to ourself,” Watson, 1919), as opposed to their being consid- ered indications of the presence of a consciousness or mind as a separate entity, are central differences between the behavioral and cognitive orientations. According to Malone (1990), the goal of psychology from the behavioral perspective has been clear since Watson:
We want to predict with reasonable certainty what people will do in specific situations. Given a stimulus, defined as an object of inner or outer experience, what response may be expected? A stimulus could be a blow to the knee or an architect’s education; a response could be a knee jerk or the building of a bridge. Similarly, we want to know, given a response, what situation produced it. . . . In all such situations the discovery of the stimuli that call out one or another behavior should allow us to influence the occurrence of behaviors; prediction, which comes from such discoveries, allows control. What does the analysis of conscious experience give us? (p. 97)
Such notions caused Bertrand Russell to claim that Watson made “the greatest contribution to scientific psychology since Aristotle” (as cited in Malone, 1990, p. 96) and others to call him the “. . . simpleton or archfiend . . . who denied the very ex- istence of mind and consciousness (and) reduced us to the status of robots” (p. 96). Related to the issue of mind/body dualism are the emphases on structure versus function and/or evolution and/or selection.
1.2.1 Structuralism, Functionalism, and Evolution
The battle cry of the cognitive revolution is “mind is back!” A great new science of mind is born. Behaviorism nearly destroyed our concern for it but behaviorism has been overthrown, and we can take up again where the philosophers and early psychologists left off (Skinner, 1989, p. 22)
Structuralism also can be traced through the development of philosophy at least to Democritus’ “heated psychic atoms”
(Needham, 1978). Plato divided the soul/mind into three distinct components in three different locations: the impul- sive/instinctive component in the abdomen and loins, the emotional/spiritual component in the heart, and the intellec- tual/reasoning component in the brain. In modern times, Wundt at Leipzig and Titchener (his student) at Cornell espoused structuralism as a way of investigating consciousness. Wundt proposed ideas, affect, and impulse and Titchener proposed sensations, images, and affect as the primary elements of con- sciousness. Titchener eventually identified over 50,000 mental
elements (Malone, 1990). Both relied heavily on the method of introspection (to be discussed later) for data. Cognitive notions such as schema, knowledge structures, duplex mem- ory, etc. are structural explanations. There are no behavioral equivalents to structuralism because it is an aspect of mind/
consciousness.
Functionalism, however, is a philosophy shared by both cog- nitive and behavioral theories. Functionalism is associated with John Dewey and William James who stressed the adaptive nature of activity (mental or behavioral) as opposed to structuralism’s attempts to separate consciousness into elements. In fact, func- tionalism allows for an infinite number of physical and mind structures to serve the same functions. Functionalism has its roots in Darwin’s Origin of the Species (1859), and Wittgen- stein’s Philosophical Investigations (Malcolm, 1954). The ques- tion of course is the focus of adaptation: mind or behavior.
The behavioral view is that evolutionary forces and adaptations are no different for humans than for the first one-celled organ- isms; that organisms since the beginning of time have been vul- nerable and, therefore, had to learn to discriminate and avoid those things which were harmful and discriminate and approach those things necessary to sustain themselves (Goodson, 1973).
This, of course, is the heart of the selectionist position long advocated by B. F. Skinner (1969, 1978, 1981, 1987a, 1987b, 1990).
The selectionist (Chiesa, 1992; Pennypacker, 1994; Vargas, 1993) approach “emphasizes investigating changes in behav- ioral repertoires over time” (Johnson & Layng, 1992, p. 1475).
Selectionism is related to evolutionary theory in that it views the complexity of behavior to be a function of selection con- tingencies found in nature (Donahoe, 1991; Donahoe & Palmer, 1989; Layng, 1991; Skinner, 1969, 1981, 1990). As Johnson and Layng (1992, p. 1475) point out, this “perspective is beginning to spread beyond the studies of behavior and evolution to the once structuralist-dominated field of computer science, as ev- idenced by the emergence of parallel distributed processing theory (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986; Rumelhart & McClel- land, 1986), and adaptive networks research (Donahoe, 1991;
Donahoe & Palmer, 1989)”.
The difficulty most people have in getting their heads around the selectionist position of behavior (or evolution) is that the cause of a behavior is the consequence of a behavior, not the stimulus, mental or otherwise, that precedes it. In evolution, giraffes did not grow longer necks in reaction to higher leaves;
rather, a genetic variation produced an individual with a longer neck and as a consequence that individual found a niche (higher leaves) that few others could occupy. As a result, that individual survived (was “selected”) to breed and the offspring produced survived to breed and in subsequent generations perhaps even- tually produced an individual with a longer neck that also sur- vived, and so forth. The radical behaviorist assumes that behav- ior is selected in exactly that way: by consequences. Of course we do not tend to see the world this way. “We tend to say, of- ten rashly, that if one thing follows another that it was probably caused by it—following the ancient principle of post hoc, ergo propter hoc(after this, therefore because of it)” (Skinner, 1974, p. 10). This is the most critical distinction between method- ological behaviorism and selectionist behaviorism. The former
attributes causality to the stimuli that are antecedent to the be- havior, the latter to the consequences that follow the behavior.
Methodological behaviorism is in this regard similar to cognitive orientations; the major difference being that the cognitive inter- pretation would place the stimulus (a thought or idea) inside the head.
1.2.2 Introspection and Constructivism
Constructivism, the notion that meaning (reality) is made, is currently touted as a new way of looking at the world. In fact, there is nothing in any form of behaviorism that requires real- ism, naive or otherwise. The constructive nature of perception has been accepted at least since von Helmholtz (1866) and his notion of “unconscious inference.” Basically, von Helmholtz be- lieved that much of our experience depends upon inferences drawn on the basis of a little stimulation and a lot of past expe- rience. Most, if not all, current theories of perception rely on von Helmholtz’s ideas as a base (Malone, 1990). The question is not whether perception is constructive, but what to make of these constructions and where do they come from? Cognitive psychology draws heavily on introspection to “see” the stuff of construction.
In modern times, introspection was a methodological cor- nerstone of Wundt, Titchener, and the Gestaltist, Kulpe (Ma- lone, 1990). Introspection generally assumes a notion espoused by John Mill (1829) that thoughts are linear; that ideas follow each other one after another. Although it can (and has) been argued that ideas do not flow in straight lines, a much more serious problem confronts introspection on its face. Introspec- tion relies on direct experience; that our “mind’s eye” or inner observation reveals things as they are. We know, however, that our other senses do not operate that way.
The red surface of an apple does not look like a matrix of molecules reflecting photons at a certain critical wavelength, but that is what it is.
The sound of a flute does not sound like a sinusoidal compression wave train in the atmosphere, but that is what it is. The warmth of the summer air does not feel like the mean kinetic energy of millions molecules, but that is what it is. If one’s pains and hopes and beliefs do not introspec- tivelyseem like electrochemical states in a neural network, that may be only because our faculty of introspection, like our other senses, is not sufficiently penetrating to reveal such hidden details. Which is just what we would expect anyway . . . unless we can somehow argue that the faculty of introspection is quite different from all other forms of observation. (Churchland, 1990, p. 15)
Obviously, the problems with introspection became more problematic in retrospective paradigms, that is, when the learner/performer is asked to work from a behavior to a thought.
This poses a problem on two counts: accuracy and causality. In terms of accuracy, James Angell stated his belief in his 1907 APA presidential address:
No matter how much we may talk of the preservation of psychical dis- positions, nor how many metaphors we may summon to characterize the storage of ideas in some hypothetical deposit chamber of mem- ory, the obstinate fact remains that when we are not experiencing a
sensation or an idea it is, strictly speaking, non-existent. . . . [W]e have no guarantee that our second edition is really a replica of the first, we have a good bit of presumptive evidence that from the content point of view the original never is and never can be literally duplicated. (Herrn- stein & Boring, 1965, p. 502)
The causality problem is perhaps more difficult to grasp at first but, in general, behaviorists have less trouble with “heated”
data (self reports of mental activities at the moment of behaving) that reflect “doing in the head” and “doing in the world” at the same time than with going from behavior to descriptions of mental thought, ideas, or structures and then saying that the mental activity caused the behavioral. In such cases, of course, it is arguably equally likely that the behavioral activities caused the mental activities.
A more current view of constructivism, social construc- tivism, focuses on the making of meaning through social in- teraction (e.g., John-Steiner & Mahn, 1996). In the words of Garrison (1994), meanings “are sociolinguistically constructed between two selves participating in a shared understanding”
(p. 11). This, in fact, is perfectly consistent with the position of behaviorists (see, for example, Skinner, 1974) as long as this does not also imply the substitution of a group mind of rather than an individual “mind.” Garrison, a Deweyan scholar, is, in fact, also a self-proclaimed behaviorist.
1.3 RADICAL BEHAVIORISM
Probably no psychologist in the modern era has been as mis- understood, misquoted, misjudged, and just plain maligned as B. F. Skinner and his Skinnerian, or radical, behaviorism. Much of this stems from the fact that many educational technology programs (or any educational programs, for that matter) do not teach, at least in any meaningful manner, behavioral theory and research. More recent notions such as cognitive psychology, constructivism, and social constructivism have become “fea- tured” orientations. Potentially worse, recent students of ed- ucational technology have not been exposed to course work that emphasized history and systems, or theory building and theory analysis. In terms of the former problem, we will devote our conclusion to a brief synopsis of what radical behaviorism is and what it isn’t. In terms of the latter, we will appeal to the simplest of the criteria for judging the adequacy and appropri- ateness of a theory: parsimony.
1.3.1 What Radical Behaviorism Does Not Believe It is important to begin this discussion with what radical behav- iorism rejects: structuralism (mind–body dualism), operational- ism, and logical positivism.
That radical behaviorism rejects structuralism has been dis- cussed earlier in the introduction of this article. Skinner (1938, 1945, 1953b, 1957, 1964, 1974) continually argued against the use of structures and mentalisms. His arguments are too nu- merous to deal with in this work, but let us consider what is arguably the most telling: copy theory. “The most important
consideration is that this view presupposes three things: (a) a stimulus object in the external world, (b) a sensory registering of that object via some modality, and (c) the internal representa- tion of that object as a sensation, perception or image, different from (b) above. The first two are physical and the third, pre- sumably something else” (Moore, 1980, p. 472–473).
In Skinner’s (1964) words:
The need for something beyond, and quite different from, copying is not widely understood. Suppose someone were to coat the occipital lobes of the brain with a special photographic emulsion which, when developed, yielded a reasonable copy of a current visual stimulus. In many quarters, this would be regarded as a triumph in the physiology of vision. Yet nothing could be more disastrous, for we should have to start all over again and ask how the organism sees a picture in its oc- cipital cortex, and we should now have much less of the brain available from which to seek an answer. It adds nothing to an explanation of how an organism reacts to a stimulus to trace the pattern of the stimulus into the body. It is most convenient, for both organism and psychophysiol- ogist, if the external world is never copied—if the world we know is simply the world around us. The same may be said of theories accord- ing to which the brain interprets signals sent to it and in some sense reconstructs external stimuli. If the real world is, indeed, scrambled in transmission but later reconstructed in the brain, we must then start all over again and explain how the organism sees the reconstruc- tion. (p. 87)
Quite simply, if we copy what we see, what do we “see” the copy with and what does this “mind’s eye” do with its input?
Create another copy? How do we, to borrow from our informa- tion processing colleagues, exit this recursive process?
The related problem of mentalisms generally, and their admis- sion with the dialog of psychology on largely historical grounds was also discussed often by Skinner. For example:
Psychology, alone among the biological and social sciences, passed through a revolution comparable in many respects with that which was taking place at the same time in physics. This was, of course, behav- iorism. The first step, like that in physics, was a reexamination of the observational bases of certain important concepts . . . Most of the early behaviorists, as well as those of us just coming along who claimed some systematic continuity, had begun to see that psychology did not require the redefinition of subjective concepts. The reinterpretation of an es- tablished set of explanatory fictions was not the way to secure the tools then needed for a scientific description of behavior. Historical prestige was beside the point. There was no more reason to make a permanent place for “consciousness,” “will,” “feeling,” and so on, than for “phlogis- ton” or “vis anima.” On the contrary, redefined concepts proved to be awkward and inappropriate, and Watsonianism was, in fact, practically wrecked in the attempt to make them work.
Thus it came about while the behaviorists might have applied Bridg- man’s principle to representative terms from a mentalistic psychology (and were most competent to do so), they had lost all interest in the matter. They might as well have spent their time in showing what an eighteenth century chemist was talking about when he said that the Metallic Substances consisted of a vitrifiable earth united with phlo- giston. There was no doubt that such a statement could be analyzed operationally or translated into modern terms, or that subjective terms could be operationally defined. But such matters were of historical in- terest only. What was wanted was a fresh set of concepts derived from a direct analysis of newly emphasized data . . . (p. 292)
Operationalism is a term often associated with Skinnerian be- haviorism and indeed in a sense this association is correct; not, however, in the historical sense of operationalism of Stevens (1939) or, in his attacks on behaviorism, by Spence (1948), or in the sense that it is assumed today: “how to deal scientifically with mental events” (Moore, 1980, p. 571). Stevens (1951) for example, states that “operationalism does not deny images, for example, but asks: What is the operational definition of the term
“image?” (p. 231). As Moore (1981) explains, this “conventional approach entails virtually every aspect of the dualistic position”
(p. 470). “In contrast, for the radical behaviorist, operational- ism involves the functional analysis of the term in question, that is, an assessment of the discriminative stimuli that occasions the use of the term and the consequences that maintain it”
(Moore, 1981, p. 59). In other words, radical behaviorism re- jects the operationalism of methodology behaviorists, but em- braces the operationalism implicit in the three-part contingency of antecedents, behaviors, and consequences and would, in fact, apply it to the social dialog of scientists themselves!
The final demon to deal with is the notion that radical behav- iorism somehow relies on logical positivism. This rejection of this premise will be dealt with more thoroughly in the section to follow that deals with social influences, particularly social influences in science. Suffice it for now that Skinner (1974) felt that methodological behaviorism and logical positivism “ignore consciousness, feelings, and states of mind” but that radical be- haviorism does not thus “behead the organism . . . it was not designed to ‘permit consciousness to atrophy’” (p. 219). Day (1983) further describes the effect of Skinner’s 1945 paper at the symposium on operationalism. “Skinner turns logical positivism upside down, while methodological behaviorism continues on its own, particular logical-positivist way” (p. 94).
1.3.2 What Radical Behaviorism Does Believe
Two issues which Skinnerian behaviorism is clear on, but not apparently well understood but by critics, are the roles of pri- vate events and social/cultural influences. The first problem, radical behaviorism’s treatment of private events, relates to the confusion on the role of operationalism: “The position that psychology must be restricted to publicly observable, inter- subjectively, verifiable data bases more appropriately charac- terizes what Skinner calls methodological behaviorism, an in- tellectual position regarding the admissibility of psychological data that is conspicuously linked to logical positivism and oper- ationalism” (Moore, 1980, p. 459). Radical behaviorism holds as a central tenet that to rule out stimuli because they are not ac- cessible to others not only represents inappropriate vestiges of operationalism and positivism, it compromises the explanatory integrity of behaviorism itself (Skinner, 1953a, 1974). In fact, radical behaviorism does not only value private events, it says they are the same as public events, and herein lies the problem, perhaps. Radical behaviorism does not believe it is necessary to suppose that private events have any special properties sim- ply because they are private (Skinner, 1953b). They are distin- guished only by their limited accessibility, but are assumed to be equally lawful as public events (Moore, 1980). In other words,
the same analyses should be applied to private events as public ones. Obviously, some private, or covert, behavior involves the same musculature as the public or overt behavior as in talking to oneself or “mental practice” of a motor event (Moore, 1980).
Generally, we assume private behavior began as a public event and then, for several reasons, became covert. Moore gives three examples of such reasons. The first is convenience: We learn to read publicly, but private behavior is faster. Another case is that we can engage in a behavior privately and if the consequences are not suitable, reject it as a public behavior. A second reason is to avoid aversive consequences. We may sing a song over and over covertly but not sing it aloud because we fear social disap- proval. Many of us, alone in our shower or in our car, with the negative consequences safely absent, however, may sing loudly indeed. A third reason is that the stimuli that ordinarily elicit an overt behavior are weak and deficient. Thus we become “un- sure” of our response. We may think we see something, but be unclear enough to either not say anything or make a weak, low statement.
What the radical behaviorist does not believe is that private behaviors cause public behavior. Both are assumed to be at- tributable to common variables. The private event may have some discrimination stimulus control, but this is not the cause of the subsequent behavior. The cause is the contingencies of re- inforcement that control both public and private behavior (Day, 1976). It is important, particularly in terms of current contro- versy, to point out that private events are in no way superior to public events and in at least one respect important to our last argument, very much inferior: the verbal (social) community has trouble responding to these (Moore, 1980). This is because the reinforcing consequence “in most cases is social attention”
(Moore, 1980, p. 461).
The influence of the social group, of culture, runs through all of Skinner’s work (see, e.g., Skinner, 1945, 1953b, 1957, 1964, 1974). For this reason, much of this work focuses on language.
As a first step (and to segu´e from private events), consider an example from Moore (1980). The example deals with pain, but feel free to substitute any private perception. Pain is clearly a case where the stimulus is only available to the individual who perceives it (as opposed to most events which have some ex- ternal correlate). How do we learn to use the verbal response to pain appropriately? One way is for the individual to report pain after some observable public event such as falling down, being struck, etc. The verbal community would support a state- ment of pain and perhaps suggest that sharp objects cause sharp pain, dull objects, dull pain. The second case would involve a collateral, public response such as holding the area in pain. The final case would involve using the word pain in connection with some overt state of affairs such as a bent back, or a stiff neck. It is important to note that if the individual reports pain too often withoutsuch overt signs, he or she runs the risk of being called a hypochondriac or malingerer (Moore, 1980). “Verbal behavior, is a social phenomenon, and so in a sense all verbal behavior, in- cluding scientific verbal behavior is a product of social–cultural influences” (Moore, 1984, p. 75). To examine the key role of social cultural influences it is useful to use an example we are familiar with, science. As Moore (1984) points out, “Scientists typically live the first 25 years of their lives, and 12 to 16 hours
per day thereafter, in the lay community” (p. 61). Through the process of social and cultural reinforcers, they become accul- turated and as a result are exposed to popular preconceptions.
Once the individual becomes a scientist, operations and contact with data cue behaviors which lead to prediction and control.
The two systems cannot operate separately. In fact, the behavior of the scientist may be understood as a product of the conjoint action of scientific and lay discriminative stimuli and scientific and lay reinforcer (Moore, 1984). Thus, from Moore:
Operations and contacts with data
Outcomes leading to prediction and control
Behavior
Social and cultural stimuli
Outcomes leading to social and cultural reinforcers
Although it is dangerous to focus too hard on the “data”
alone, Skinner (1974) also cautions against depending exclu- sively on the social/cultural stimuli and reinforcers for explana- tions, as is often the case with current approaches.
Until fairly late in the nineteenth century, very little was known about the bodily processes in health or disease from which good medical practice could be derived, yet a person who was ill should have found it worthwhile to call in a physician. Physicians saw many ill people and were in the best possible position to acquire useful, if unanalyzed, skills in treating them. Some of them no doubt did so, but the history of medicine reveals a very different picture. Medical practices have var- ied from epoch to epoch, but they have often consisted of barbaric measures—blood lettings, leechings, cuppings, poultices, emetics, and purgations—which more often than not must have been harmful. Such practices were not based on the skill and wisdom acquired from contact with illness; they were based on theories of what was going on inside the body of a person who was ill. . . .
Medicine suffered, and in part just because the physician who talked about theories seemed to have a more profound knowledge of illness than one who merely displayed the common sense acquired from per- sonal experience. The practices derived form theories no doubt also obscured many symptoms which might have led to more effective skills.
Theories flourished at the expense both of the patient and of progress toward the more scientific knowledge which was to emerge in modern medicine. (Skinner, 1974, pp. x–xi)
1.4 THE BASICS OF BEHAVIORISM
Behaviorism in the United States may be traced to the work of E. B. Twitmeyer (1902), a graduate student at the Univer- sity of Pennsylvania, and E. L. Thorndike (1898). Twitmeyer’s
doctoral dissertation research on the knee-jerk (patellar) reflex involved alerting his subjects with a bell that a hammer was about to strike their patellar tendon. As has been the case so many times in the history of the development of behavioral the- ory (see, for example, Skinner, 1956), something went wrong.
Twitmeyer sounded the bell but the hammer did not trip. The subject, however, made a knee-jerk response in anticipation of the hammer drop. Twitmeyer redesigned his experiment to study this phenomenon and presented his findings at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association in 1904. His paper, however, was greeted with runaway apathy and it fell to Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936) to become the “Father of Classical Conditioning.” Interestingly enough, Pavlov also be- gan his line of research based on a casual or accidental obser- vation. A Nobel Prize winner for his work in digestion, Pavlov noted that his subjects (dogs) seemed to begin salivating to the sights and sounds of feeding. He, too, altered the thrust of his research to investigate his serendipitous observations more thoroughly.
Operant or instrumental conditioning is usually associated with B. F. Skinner. Yet, in 1898, E. L. Thorndike published a monograph on animal intelligence which made use of a “puz- zle box” (a forerunner of what is often called a “Skinner Box”) to investigate the effect of reward (e.g., food, escape) on the behavior of cats. Thorndike placed the cats in a box that could be opened by pressing a latch or pulling a string. Outside the box was a bowl of milk or fish. Not surprisingly, the cats tried anything and everything until they stumbled onto the correct response. Also, not surprisingly, the cats learned to get out of the box more and more rapidly. From these beginnings, the most thoroughly researched phenomenon in psychology evolves.
Behavioral theory is now celebrating nearly a century of con- tribution to theories of learning. The pioneering work of such investigators as Cason (1922a, 1922b), Liddell (1926), Mateer (1918), and Watson and Rayner (1920) in classical condition- ing, and Blodgett (1929), Hebb (1949), Hull (1943), and Skin- ner (1938) in operant conditioning, has led to the development of the most powerful technology known to behavioral science.
Behaviorism, however, is in a paradoxical place in American ed- ucation today. In a very real sense, behavioral theory is the basis for innovations such as teaching machines, computer-assisted in- struction, competency-based education (mastery learning), in- structional design, minimal competency testing, performance- based assessment, “educational accountability,” situated cog- nition, and even social constructivism, yet behaviorism is no longer a “popular” orientation in education or instructional de- sign. An exploration of behaviorism, its contributions to re- search and current practice in educational technology (despite its recent unpopularity), and its usefulness in the future are the concerns of this chapter.
1.4.1 Basic Assumptions
Behavioral psychology has provided instructional technology with several basic assumptions, concepts, and principles. These components of behavioral theory are outlined in this section
(albeit briefly) in order to ensure that the discussion of its ap- plications can be clearly linked back to the relevant behavioral theoretical underpinnings. While some or much of the follow- ing discussion may be elementary for many, we believed it was crucial to lay the groundwork that illustrates the major role be- havioral psychology has played and continues to play in the research and development of instructional technology applica- tions.
Three major assumptions of selectionist behaviorism are di- rectly relevant to instructional technology. These assumptions focus on the following: the role of the learner, the nature of learning, and the generality of the learning processes and in- structional procedures.
1.4.1.1 The Role of the Learner. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, one of the most misinterpreted and misrepresented assumptions of behavioral learning theory concerns the role of the learner. Quite often, the learner is characterized as a passive entity that merely reacts to environmental stimuli (cf., Ander- son’s receptive–accrual model, 1986). However, according to B. F. Skinner, knowledge is action (Schnaitter, 1987). Skinner (1968) stated that a learner “does not passively absorb knowl- edge from the world around him but must play an active role”
(p. 5). He goes on to explain how learners learn by doing, ex- periencing, and engaging in trial and error. All three of these components work together and must be studied together to for- mulate any given instance of learning. It is only when these three components are describable that we can identify what has been learned, under what conditions the learning has taken place, and the consequences that support and maintain the learned behav- ior. The emphasis is on the active responding of the learner—the learner must be engaged in the behavior in order to learn and to validate that learning has occurred.
1.4.1.2 The Nature of Learning. Learning is frequently de- fined as a change in behavior due to experience. It is a func- tion of building associations between the occasion upon which the behavior occurs (stimulus events), the behavior itself (re- sponse events) and the result (consequences). These associa- tions are centered in the experiences that produce learning, and differ to the extent to which they are contiguous and con- tingent (Chance, 1994). Contiguity refers to the close pairing of stimulus and response in time and/or space. Contingency refers to the dependency between the antecedent or behav- ioral event and either the response or consequence. Essential to the strengthening responses with these associations is the repeated continuous pairing of the stimulus with response and the pairing consequences (Skinner, 1968). It is the construc- tion of functional relationships, based on the contingencies of reinforcement, under which the learning takes place. It is this functionality that is the essence of selection. Stimulus control develops as a result of continuous pairing with consequences (functions). In order to truly understand what has been learned, the entire relationship must be identified (Vargas, 1977). All components of this three-part contingency (i.e., functional re- lationship) must be observable and measurable to ensure the scientific verification that learning (i.e., a change of behavior) has occurred (Cooper, Heron, & Heward, 1987).
Of particular importance to instructional technology is the need to focus on the individual in this learning process. Contin- gencies vary from person to person based on each individual’s genetic and reinforcement histories and events present at the time of learning (Gagn´e, 1985). This requires designers and de- velopers to ensure that instruction is aimed at aiding the learn- ing of the individual (e.g., Gagn´e, Briggs, & Wager, 1992). To accomplish this, a needs assessment (Burton & Merrill, 1991) or front-end analysis (Mager, 1984; Smith & Ragan, 1993) is con- ducted at the very beginning of the instructional design process.
The focus of this activity is to articulate, among other things, learner characteristics; that is, the needs and capabilities of indi- vidual learners are assessed to ensure that the instruction being developed is appropriate and meaningful. The goals are then written in terms of what the learner will accomplish via this instructional event.
The material to be learned must be identified in order to clearly understand the requisite nature of learning. There is a natural order inherent in many content areas. Much of the information within these content areas is characterized in se- quences; however, many others form a network or a tree of related information (Skinner, 1968). (Notice that in the behav- ioral views, such sequences or networks do not imply internal structures; rather, they suggest a line of attack for the designs).
Complex learning involves becoming competent in a given field by learning incremental behaviors which are ordered in these sequences, traditionally with very small steps, ranging from the most simple to more complex to the final goal. Two major con- siderations occur in complex learning. The first, as just men- tioned, is the gradual elaboration of extremely complex pat- terns of behavior. The second involves the maintenance of the behavior’s strength through the use of reinforcement contin- gent upon successful achievement at each stage. Implicit in this entire endeavor is the observable nature of actual learning pub- lic performance which is crucial for the acknowledgment, veri- fication (by self and/or others), and continued development of the present in similar behaviors.
1.4.1.3 The Generality of Learning Principles. According to behavioral theory, all animals—including humans—obey uni- versal laws of behavior (a.k.a., equipotentiality) (Davey, 1981).
In methodological behaviorism, all habits are formed from con- ditioned reflexes (Watson, 1924). In selectionist behaviorism, all learning is a result of the experienced consequences of the or- ganisms’ behavior (Skinner, 1971). While Skinner (1969) does acknowledge species-specific behavior (e.g., adaptive mecha- nisms, differences in sensory equipment, effector systems, re- actions to different reinforcers), he stands by the fact that the basic processes that promote or inhibit learning are universal to all organisms. Specifically, he states that the research does show an
. . . extraordinary uniformity over a wide range of reinforcement, the pro- cesses of extinction, discrimination and generalization return remark- ably similar and consistent results across species. For example, fixed- interval reinforcement schedules yield a predictable scalloped perfor- mance effect (low rates of responding at the beginning of the interval following reinforcement, high rates of responding at the end of the
interval) whether the subjects are animals or humans. (Ferster &
Skinner, 1957, p. 7)
Most people of all persuasions will accept behaviorism as an account for much, even most, learning (e.g., animal learn- ing and perhaps learning up to the alphabet or shoe tying or learning to speak the language). For the behaviorist, the same principles that account for simple behaviors also account for complex ones.
1.4.2 Basic Concepts and Principles
Behavioral theory has contributed several important concepts and principles to the research and development of instructional technology. Three major types of behavior, respondent learning, operant learning, and observational learning, serve as the orga- nizer for this section. Each of these models relies on the building associations—the simplest unit that is learned—under the con- ditions of contiguity and repetition (Gagn´e, 1985). Each model also utilizes the processes of discrimination and generalization to describe the mechanisms humans use to adapt to situational and environmental stimuli (Chance, 1994). Discrimination is the act of responding differently to different stimuli, such as stop- ping at a red traffic light while driving through a green traffic light. Generalization is the act of responding in the same way to similar stimuli, specifically, to those stimuli not present at time of training. For example, students generate classroom behavior rules based on previous experiences and expectations in class- room settings. Or, when one is using a new word processing program, the individual attempts to apply what is already known about a word processing environment to the new program. In essence, discrimination and generalization are inversely related, crucial processes that facilitate adaptation and enable transfer to new environments.
1.4.2.1 Respondent Learning (Methodological Be- haviorism). Involuntary actions, called respondents, are entrained using the classical conditioning techniques of Ivan Pavlov. In classical conditioning, an organism learns to respond to a stimulus that once prompted no response. The process begins with identification and articulation of an unconditional stimulus (US) that automatically elicits an emotional or phys- iological unconditional response (UR). No prior learning or conditioning is required to establish this natural connection (e.g., US= food; UR = salivation). In classical conditioning, neutral stimulus is introduced, which initially prompts no response from the organism (e.g., a tone). The intent is to eventually have the tone (i.e., the conditioned stimulus or CS) elicit a response that very closely approximates the original UR (i.e., will become the conditional response or CR). The behavior is entrained using the principles of contiguity and repetition (i.e., practice). In repeated trials, the US and CS are introduced at the same time or in close temporal proximity.
Gradually the US is presented less frequently with the CS, being sure to retain the performance of the UR/CR. Ultimately, the CS elicits the CR without the aid of the US.
Classical conditioning is a very powerful tool for entraining basic physiological responses (e.g., increases in blood pressure, taste aversions, psychosomatic illness), and emotive responses (e.g., arousal, fear, anxiety, pleasure) since the learning is paired with reflexive, inborn associations. Classical conditioning is a major theoretical notion underlying advertising, propaganda, and related learning. Its importance in the formations of biases, stereotypes, etc. is of particular importance in the design of instructional materials and should always be considered in the design process.
The incidental learning of these responses is clearly a con- cern in instructional settings. Behaviors such as test anxiety and “school phobia” are maladaptive behaviors that are often entrained without intent. From a proactive stance in instruc- tional design, a context or environmental analysis is a key com- ponent of a needs assessment (Tessmer, 1990). Every feature of the physical (e.g., lighting, classroom arrangement) and support (e.g., administration) environment are examined to ascertain positive or problematic factors that might influence the learner’s attitude and level of participation in the instructional events.
Similarly, in designing software, video, audio, and so forth, care- ful attention is paid to the aesthetic features of the medium to ensure motivation and engagement. Respondent learning is a form of methodological behaviorism to be discussed later.
1.4.2.2 Operant Conditioning (Selectionist or Radical Behaviorism). Operant conditioning is based on a single, simple principle: There is a functional and interconnected relationship between the stimuli that preceded a response (an- tecedents), the stimuli that follow a response (consequences), and the response (operant) itself. Acquisition of behavior is viewed as resulting from these three-term or three-component contingent or functional relationships. While there are always contingencies in effect which are beyond the teacher’s (or designer’s) control, it is the role of the educator to control the environment so that the predominant contingent relationships are in line with the educational goal at hand.
Antecedent cues. Antecedents are those objects or events in the environment that serve as cues. Cues set the stage or serve as signals for specific behaviors to take place because such behaviors have been reinforced in the past in the pres- ence of such cues. Antecedent cues may include temporal cues (time), interpersonal cues (people), and covert or internal cues (inside the skin). Verbal and written directions, nonverbal hand signals and facial gestures, highlighting with colors and bold- faced print are all examples of cues used by learners to discrim- inate the conditions for behaving in a way that returns a desired consequence. The behavior ultimately comes under stimulus
“control” (i.e., made more probable by the discriminative stim- ulus or cue) though the contiguous pairing in repeated trials, hence serving in a key functional role in this contingent rela- tionship. Often the behavioral technologist seeks to increase or decrease antecedent (stimulus) control to increase or decrease the probability of a response. In order to do this, he or she must be cognizant of those cues to which generalized responding is desired or present and be aware that antecedent control will increase with consequence pairing.
Behavior.Unlike the involuntary actions entrained via clas- sical conditioning, most human behaviors are emitted or volun- tarily enacted. People deliberately “operate” on their environ- ment to produce desired consequences. Skinner termed these purposeful responses operants. Operants include both private (thoughts) and public (behavior) activities, but the basic mea- sure in behavioral theory remains the observable, measurable response. Operants range from simple to complex, verbal to nonverbal, fine to gross motor actions—the whole realm of what we as humans choose to do based on the consequences the be- havior elicits.
Consequences.While the first two components of operant conditioning (antecedents and operants) are relatively straight- forward, the nature of consequences and interactions between consequences and behaviors is fairly complex. First, conse- quences may be classified as contingent and noncontingent.
Contingent consequences are reliable and relatively consistent.
A clear association between the operant and the consequences can be established. Noncontingent consequences, however, of- ten produce accidental or superstitious conditioning. If, per- chance, a computer program has scant or no documentation and the desired program features cannot be accessed via a pre- dictable set of moves, the user would tend to press many keys, not really knowing what may finally cause a successful screen change. This reduces the rate of learning, if any learning occurs at all.
Another dimension focuses on whether or not the con- sequence is actually delivered. Consequences may be posi- tive (something is presented following a response) or negative (something is taken away following a response). Note that pos- itive and negative do not imply value (i.e., “good” or “bad”).
Consequences can also be reinforcing, that is, tend to main- tain or increase a behavior, or they may be punishing, that is, tend to decrease or suppress a behavior. Taken together, the possibilities then are positive reinforcement (presenting some- thing to maintain or increase a behavior); positive punishment (presenting something to decrease a behavior); negative rein- forcement (taking away something to increase a behavior); or negative punishment (taking away something to decrease a be- havior). Another possibility obviously is that of no consequence following a behavior, which results in the disappearance or ex- tinction of a previously reinforced behavior.
Examples of these types of consequences are readily found in the implementation of behavior modification. Behavior modifi- cation or applied behavior analysis is a widely used instructional technology that manipulates the use of these consequences to produce the desired behavior (Cooper et al., 1987). Positive re- inforcers ranging from praise, to desirable activities, to tangible rewards are delivered upon performance of a desired behav- ior. Positive punishments such as extra work, physical exertion, demerits are imposed upon performance of an undesirable be- havior. Negative reinforcement is used when aversive condi- tions such as a teacher’s hard gaze or yelling are taken away when the appropriate behavior is enacted (e.g., assignment completion). Negative punishment or response cost is used when a desirable stimulus such as free time privileges are taken away when an inappropriate behavior is performed. When no
consequence follows the behavior, such as ignoring an unde- sirable behavior, ensuring that no attention is given to the mis- deed, the undesirable behavior often abates. But this typically is preceded by an upsurge in the frequency of responding until the learner realizes that the behavior will no longer receive the desired consequence. All in all, the use of each consequence requires consideration of whether one wants to increase or de- crease a behavior, if it is to be done by taking away or giving some stimulus, and whether or not that stimulus is desirable or undesirable.
In addition to the type of consequence, the schedule for the delivery or timing of those consequences is a key di- mension to operant learning. Often a distinction is made be- tween simple and complex schedules of reinforcement. Sim- ple schedules include continuous consequation and partial or intermittent consequation. When using a continuous sched- ule, reinforcement is delivered after each correct response.
This procedure is important for the learning of new behav- iors because the functional relationship between antecedent–
response–consequence is clearly communicated to the learner through predictability of consequation.
When using intermittent schedules, the reinforcement is de- livered after some, but not all, responses. There are two basic types of intermittent schedules: ratio and interval. A ratio sched- ule is based on the numbers of responses required for consequa- tion (e.g., piece work, number of completed math problems).
An interval schedule is based on the amount of time that passes between consequation (e.g., payday, weekly quizzes). Ratio and interval schedules may be either fixed (predictable) or variable (unpredictable). These procedures are used once the functional relationship is established and with the intent is to encourage persistence of responses. The schedule is gradually changed from continuous, to fixed, to variable (i.e., until it becomes very
“lean”), in order for the learner to perform the behavior for an extended period of time without any reinforcement. A variation often imposed on these schedules is called limited hold, which refers to the consequence only being available for a certain pe- riod of time.
Complex schedules are composed of the various features of simple schedules. Shaping requires the learner to perform suc- cessive approximations of the target behavior by changing the criterion behavior for reinforcement to become more and more like the final performance. A good example of shaping is the writing process, wherein drafts are constantly revised toward the final product. Chaining requires that two or more learned behaviors must be performed in a specific sequence for conse- quation. Each behavior sets up cues for subsequent responses to be performed (e.g., long division). In multiple schedules, two or more simple schedules are in effect for the same be- havior with each associated with a particular stimulus. Two or more schedules are available in a concurrent schedule proce- dure; however, there are no specific cues as to which schedule is in effect. Schedules may also be conjunctive (two or more behaviors that all must be performed for consequation to oc- cur, but the behaviors may occur in any order), or tandem (two or more behaviors must be performed in a specific sequence without cues).
In all cases, the schedule or timing of the consequation is manipulated to fit the target response, using antecedents to sig- nal the response, and appropriate consequences for the learner and the situation.
1.4.2.3 Observational Learning. By using the basic con- cepts and principles of operant learning, and the basic defi- nition that learning is a change of behavior brought about by experience, organisms can be thought of as learning new be- haviors by observing the behavior of others (Chance, 1994).
This premise was originally tested by Thorndike (1898) with cats, chicks, and dogs, and later by Watson (1908) with mon- keys, without success. In all cases, animals were situated in positions to observe and learn elementary problem-solving procedures (e.g., puzzle boxes) by watching successful same- species models perform the desired task. However, Warden and colleagues (Warden, Field, & Koch, 1940; Warden, Jackson, 1935) found that when animals were put in settings (e.g., cages) that were identical to the modeling animals and the ob- servers watched the models perform the behavior and receive the reinforcement, the observers did learn the target behav- ior, often responding correctly on the first trial (Chance, 1994).
Attention focused seriously on observational learning re- search with the work of Bandura and colleagues in the 1960s.
In a series of studies with children and adults (with children as the observers and children and adults as the models), these re- searchers demonstrated that the reinforcement of a model’s be- havior was positively correlated with the observer’s judgments that the behavior was appropriate to imitate. These studies formed the empirical basis for Bandura’s (1977) Social Learn- ing Theory, which stated that people are not driven by either inner forces or environmental stimuli in isolation. His assertion was that behavior and complex learning must be “explained in terms of a continuous reciprocal interaction of personal and en- vironmental determinants . . . virtually all learning phenomenon resulting from direct experience occur on a vicarious basis by observing other people’s behavior and its consequences for them” (p. 11–12).
The basic observational or vicarious learning experience consists of watching a live or filmed performance or listening to a description of the performance (i.e., symbolic modeling) of a model and the positive and/or negative consequences of that model’s behavior. Four component processes govern obser- vational learning (Bandura, 1977). First, attentional processes determine what is selectively observed, and extracted valence, complexity, prevalence, and functional value influence the qual- ity of the attention. Observer characteristics such as sensory capacities, arousal level, perceptual set, and past reinforcement history mediate the stimuli. Second, the attended stimuli must be remembered or retained (i.e., retentional processes). Re- sponse patterns must be represented in memory in some or- ganized, symbolic form. Humans primarily use imaginal and verbal codes for observed performances. These patterns must be practiced through overt or covert rehearsal to ensure reten- tion. Third, the learner must engage in motor reproduction pro- cesseswhich require the organization of responses through their
initiation, monitoring, and refinement on the basis of feedback.
The behavior must be performed in order for cues to be learned and corrective adjustments made. The fourth component is motivation. Social learning theory recognizes that humans are more likely to adopt behavior that they value (functional) and re- ject behavior that they find punishing or unrewarding (not func- tional). Further, the evaluative judgments that humans make about the functionality of their own behavior mediate and regu- late which observationally learned responses they will actually perform. Ultimately, people will enact self-satisfying behaviors and avoid distasteful or disdainful ones. Consequently, external reinforcement, vicarious reinforcement, and self-reinforcement are all processes that promote the learning and performance of observed behavior.
1.4.3 Complex Learning, Problem Solving, and Transfer
Behavioral theory addresses the key issues of complex learn- ing, problem solving, and transfer using the same concepts and principles found in the everyday human experience. Com- plex learning is developed through the learning of chained be- haviors (Gagn´e, 1985). Using the basic operant conditioning functional relationship, through practice and contiguity, the consequence takes on a dual role as the stimulus for the subse- quent operant. Smaller chainlike skills become connected with other chains. Through discrimination, the individual learns to apply the correct chains based on the antecedent cues. Com- plex and lengthy chains, called procedures, continually incorpo- rate smaller chains as the learner engages in more practice and receives feedback. Ultimately, the learner develops organized, and smooth performance characterized with precise timing and applications.
Problem solving represents the tactical readjustment to changes in the environment based on trial and error experi- ences (Rachlin, 1991). Through the discovery of a consistent pattern of cues and a history of reinforced actions, individuals develop strategies to deal with problems that assume a certain profile of characteristics (i.e., cues). Over time, responses occur more quickly, adjustments are made based on the consequences of the action, and rule-governed behavior develops (Malone, 1990).
Transfer involves the replication of identical behaviors from a task that one learns in an initial setting to a new task that has similar elements (Mayer & Wittrock, 1996). The notion of spe- cific transfer or “theory of identical elements” was proposed by Thorndike and his colleagues (e.g., Thorndike, 1924; Thorndike
& Woodworth, 1901). Of critical importance were the “gradi- ents of similarity along stimulus dimensions” (Greeno, Collins,
& Resnick, 1996). That is, the degree to which a response gener- alizes to stimuli other than the original association is dependent upon the similarity of other stimuli in terms of specific elements:
The more similar the new stimulus, the higher probability of transfer. Critical to this potential for transfer were the strength of the specific associations, similarity of antecedent cues, and drill and practice on the specific skills with feedback.
1.4.4 Motivation
From a behavioral perspective, willingness to engage in a task is based on extrinsic motivation (Greeno et al., 1996). The tendency of an individual to respond to a particular situa- tion is based on the reinforcers or punishers available in the context, and his or her needs and internal goals related to those consequences. That is, a reinforcer will only serve to in- crease a response if the individual wants the reinforcer; a pun- isher will only decrease a response if the individual wants to avoid being punished (Skinner, 1968). Essentially, an individ- ual’s decision to participate or engage in any activity is based on the anticipated outcomes of his/her performance (Skinner, 1987c).
At the core of the behavioral view of motivation are the bi- ological needs of the individual. Primary reinforcers (e.g, food, water, sleep, and sex) and primary punishers (i.e., anything that induces pain) are fundamental motives for action. Secondary re- inforcers and punishers develop over time based on associations made between antecedent cues, behaviors, and consequences.
More sophisticated motivations such as group affiliation, prefer- ences for career, hobbies, etc. are all developed based on associ- ations made in earlier and simpler experiences and the degree to which the individual’s biological needs were met. Skinner (1987c) characterizes the development of motivation for more complex activity as a kind of rule-governed behavior. Pleasant or aversive consequences are associated with specific behaviors.
Skinner considers rules, advice, etc. to be critical elements of any culture because “they enable the individual to profit from the experience of those who have experienced common contin- gencies and described this in useful ways” (p. 181). This position is not unlike current principles identified in what is referred to as the “social constructivist” perspective (e.g., Tharp & Gallimore, 1988; Vygotsky, 1978).
1.5 THE BEHAVIORAL ROOTS OF INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY
1.5.1 Methodological BehaviorismStimulus–response behaviorism, that is, behaviorism which em- phasizes the antecedent as the cause of the behavior, is gener- ally referred to as methodological behaviorism (see e.g., Day, 1983; Skinner, 1974). As such, it is in line with much of experi- mental psychology; antecedents are the independent variables and the behaviors are the dependent variables. This transfor- mational paradigm (Vargas, 1993) differs dramatically from the radical behaviorism of Skinner (e.g., 1945, 1974) which empha- sizes the role of reinforcement of behaviors in the presence of certain antecedents, in other words, the selectionist position.
Most of the earlier work in instructional technology followed the methodological behaviorist tradition. In fact, as we have said earlier, from a radical behaviorist position cognitive psy- chology is an extension of methodological behaviorism (Skin- ner, 1974). Although we have recast and reinterpreted where possible, the differences, particularly in the film and television
research, are apparent. Nevertheless, the research is part of the research record in instructional technology and is therefore nec- essary, and moreover, useful from an S-R perspective.
One of the distinctive aspects of the methodological behav- ioral approach is the demand for “experimental” data (manipu- lation) to justify any interpretation of behavior as causal. Natu- ral observation, personal experience and judgment fall short of the rules of evidence to support any psychological explanation (Kendler, 1971). This formula means that a learner must make the “correct response when the appropriate stimulus occurs”
and when the necessary conditions are present.
Usually there is no great problem in providing the appropriate stimulus, for audiovisual techniques have tremendous advantages over other edu- cational procedures in their ability to present to the learner the stimuli in the most effective manner possible. (Kendler, 1971, p. 36)
A problem arises as to when to develop techniques (in which appropriate responses to specific stimuli can be practiced and reinforced). The developer of an instructional medium must know exactly what response is desired from the students, oth- erwise it is impossible to design and evaluate instruction. Once the response is specified, the problem becomes getting the stu- dent to make this appropriate response. This response must be practiced and the learner must be reinforced to make the correct response to this stimulus (Skinner, 1953b). Under the S-R paradigm, much of the research on the instructional media was based upon the medium itself (i.e., the specific technol- ogy). The medium became the independent variable and media comparison studies became the norm until the middle 1970s (Smith & Smith, 1966). In terms of the methodological behav- ior model, much of the media (programmed instruction, film, television, etc.) functioned primarily upon the stimulus compo- nent. From this position, Carpenter (1962) reasoned that any medium (e.g., film, television) “imprints” some of its own char- acteristics on the message itself. Therefore, the content and medium have more impact than the medium itself. The “way”
the stimulus material (again film, television, etc.) interacts with the learner instigates motivated responses. Carpenter (1962) developed several hypotheses based upon his interpretations of the research on media and learning and include the following possibilities:
1. The most effective learning will take place when there is similarity between the stimulus material (presented via a medium) and the criterion or learned performance.
2. Repetition of stimulus materials and the learning response is a major condition for most kinds of learning.
3. Stimulus materials which are accurate, correct, and subject to validation can increase the opportunity for learning to take place.
4. An important condition is the relationship between a behav- ior and its consequences. Learning will occur when the be- havior is “reinforced” (Skinner, 1968). This reinforcement, by definition, should be immediately after the response.
5. Carefully sequenced combinations of knowledge and skills presented in logical and limited steps will be the most effec- tive for most types of learning.
