Population changes in Ottoman Anatolia during the 16th and 17th centuries: The "demographic crisis" reconsidered

Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia during the 16th and 17th Centuries: The

"Demographic Crisis" Reconsidered

Author(s): Oktay Özel

Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2 (May, 2004), pp.

183-205

Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3880031

Accessed: 25-08-2017 13:06 UTC

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International Journal of Middle East Studies

Oktay Ozel

POPULATION CHANGES IN OTTOMAN

ANATOLIA DURING THE 16TH AND 17TH

CENTURIES: THE "DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS"

RECONSIDERED

The historiography of the past two decades of the demographic history of 16th- and

17th-century Ottoman Anatolia has seen diverse and often conflicting arguments among

historians. Whether the Ottoman Empire witnessed "population pressure" in the 16th

century, and whether this was followed in the 17th century by a serious "demographic

crisis," considered by some historians as a "catastrophe," have constituted the central

theme of the debate. The roots of these issues can be traced as far back as the early

works of Omer Liitfi Barkan in the 1940s and 1950s.1 It appears that the disagreements

not only arose as a result of the different models of historical demography developed by

diverse schools of thought, but that they also owed much to the highly disputed nature

of the sources that provide the bulk of quantitative data for the demographic history of

the Ottoman Empire.2

When looking at the sources, one immediately realizes that the central part of the

debate falls into the realm of what is known as "defterology,"3 a sub-field of Ottoman

historiography covering works based on the series of Ottoman tax registers, mainly of

the 15th and 16th centuries (tahrir defters). Barkan was the first historian to present

these sources to the world of Ottomanists, in the 1940s.4 In his seminal article "Tarihi

Demografi Aragtirmalari ve Osmanli Tarihi," he presented the preliminary results of the

painstaking work of his team in istanbul on a whole series of defters of the 16th century.

Also discussing some methodological aspects of Ottoman demographic history and its

sources, Barkan pointed in that article to the main trends of population movements in

the Ottoman Empire in that century.

However, Barkan's pioneering works on Ottoman demographic history were not

lowed until the late 1960s,5 when some historians turned to the same sources for their

works on local history. The new explosion in the use of tahrir registers came from the

1970s onward, soon leading to the development of a separate field-defterology-with

its sophisticated methods, distinct terminology, and, inevitably, growing debates among

the specialists. Thus, Ottoman historical demographic studies were largely developed as

part of local-history research and focused primarily on the period between the mid-15th

and late 16th centuries.6 During the past two decades, however, the research and debates

Oktay Ozel is Assistant Professor in the Department of History, Bilkent University, FEASS, Bilkent 06800, Ankara, Turkey; e-mail: oozel@bilkent.edu.tr.

have expanded to include the 17th century, basing themselves almost exclusively on

avartz and cizye registers, which until then had attracted little attention in demographic

studies.7

Barkan's article suggested substantial growth in the population of the Ottoman Empire

in the 16th century, and subsequent case studies of various districts of the empire have

generally confirmed his findings." The tahrir registers of the period clearly show doubling

(in some cases even more) in the recorded tax-paying population, in urban and rural

areas, during the century.9 In his meticulous work published in 1972, Michael Cook

developed the argument that, especially in the second half of the 16th century in some

parts of rural Anatolia, the population grew to the extent that it exceeded the amount

of arable land available for cultivation. To him, this was an indication of "population

pressure."'0 This argument concurred in a sense with the view of Mustafa Akdag, who

years earlier had referred, though implicitly, to the population growth of the same period,

which, according to him, resulted in the increase in the number of peasants without land

((iftbozan levends). To Akdag, this was an important factor in the eventual breakdown

of the inner balance of the village economy and society, as well in the emergence of

the ensuing Celali rebellions and widespread terror in the Ottoman countryside at the

turn of the 17th century.11 The correlation that Akdag established between demographic,

socio-economic factors and political developments was later discussed-and to some

degree, criticized-by Halil Inalcik and Huricihan Islamoglu-Inan.12 The main criticism

of Akdag's argument focused on the point that the early-17th-century phenomenon of

the large-scale abandonment of villages could not be explained simply by economic and

demographic factors. Akdag's critics drew attention instead to what are called "pull"

factors, such as various opportunities that they thought the cities would have offered to

peasants, as well as to the peasants' desire to enter the military class, which would at

least guarantee them a steady income.13

At this point comes the important question: what were the factors triggering the

peasant masses to leave their villages at the end of the sixteenth century, becoming

the main source of manpower for the great Celali rebellions and the widespread terror

that was to devastate the Anatolian countryside throughout the 17th century?'4 As an

explanation, scholars have often referred to the increasing tax burden and the oppressive

attitudes of local officials toward peasants, both of which appear to have been a general

phenomenon of this period.'" Not rejecting the role of these factors, Akdag developed the

argument that the expanding rural population could no longer be absorbed by the village

economy, forcing many peasants to search for a living elsewhere. Inalclk, however,

while accepting to a certain extent the role of demographic pressure, puts an emphasis

on the desperate need of the Ottoman government for more soldiers using firearms during

the long and difficult years of war at the end of the 16th century. According to him, this

need resulted in the formation of the sekban and sarica troops, which would soon turn into

Celali brigands. This coincided with the peasants' desire to enjoy the privileged position

of the military class of that same period, even though the socio-economic position of the

members of the military was also deteriorating.'6

The final point of debate relates to 17th-century developments. A central theme is

whether or not one can speak of a "demographic crisis." The main discussion revolves

around the effects of the Celali rebellions and focuses on what is termed "depopulation,"

the extent and nature of the radical decrease in the recorded tax-paying population was

further developed by Bruce McGowan to the point of a "demographic catastrophe."17

McGowan's method and his somewhat controversial findings and interpretations in his

works on the Balkan lands, which were based nearly exclusively on the quantitative

evidence provided in avartz and cizye registers, were later criticized by Maria Todorova.'8

While addressing once more the disputed nature of these sources, Todorova used the same

figures with different criteria and centered her criticism on the misunderstanding and

misinterpretation of the data offered by these registers; thus, she came to an opposite

and no less controversial conclusion. She claimed that one could hardly speak even of a

considerable decrease in Ottoman population in the 17th century, let alone a demographic

catastrophe.

In the following article, I will re-evaluate the main issues in this debate in the light of

recent research, arguing that all were part of a complex historical phenomenon that cannot

be explained by reductionist, single-factor approaches and unfounded interpretations. I

will also emphasize that, although there are many black holes in Ottoman demographic

history, one can still reasonably speak of a general demographic crisis during the late

16th and early 17th centuries.

THE 16TH CENTURY: FROM POPULATION "PRESSURE"

TO CELALi REBELLIONS

In her study on the dynamics of agricultural production, population growth, and urban

development in 16th century north-central Anatolia, islamoglu-inan, referring to the case

of the Tokat and 4orum districts, argues that population growth in the Ottoman Empire

never reached the point of "pressure" that was described by Michael Cook.19

Inan's view appears to have found a certain degree of support, becoming an argument

often referred to by other Ottomanists.20 In elaborating her argument, islamoglu-inan

suggests that the fragmentation of reaya Ciftliks, which is clearly revealed by the tahrir

registers, did not necessarily mean that the peasants became landless. She further argues

that the peasants in question reacted to the worsening conditions in terms of the imbalance

between population growth and the insufficient amount of arable land by (1) intensifying

cultivation; (2) reclaiming unused and forested lands to cultivation; and (3) changing crop

patterns, or rationalizing agriculture, and altering consumption habits.2' She then claims

that the population growth did not reach the extent of eventually forcing the peasants

to leave their lands. The great increase in population in this respect is explained by

the possibility of internal or westward migration and the sedentarization of pastoralist

nomads.22 The increase in the number of recorded caba (landless married men) and

miicerred (landless unmarried men) similarly is accounted for by the possibility of an

increased demand for wage labor in the face of intense cultivation.23

As seen in this argument, islamoglu-Inan suggests, first, that the peasant movements

in Anatolia in the second half of the 16th century were of a migratory nature; and second,

that the migration to cities during this period was in fact the result of the "preference" of

peasants, especially younger ones, who, under the "drudgery of work" in the Anatolian

countryside, chose to enter into the service of provincial administrators as irregular

soldiers or join medreses (theology schools) as students.24 The migration of peasants

therefore should not necessarily be seen as evidence of a subsistence crisis or of the

inability on the part of the village economy to absorb an increasing population.25 In other

words, according to Islamoglu-Inan, we cannot speak here of demographic pressure. In

saying this, however, she fails to note that the phenomenon of intensifying cultivation

and shifting crop patterns, which was seen during the second half of the 16th century in

many other parts of Anatolia, can also be linked to economic and demographic pressure,

as well as to developing markets and monetary changes.26 However, the main argument

of her work is not the analysis of certain historical phenomena that she had previously

accepted. Instead of dwelling on the subsistence crisis, the apparent drop in per-capita

production vis-ai-vis a considerable rise in prices, the fragmentation of peasant farms,

and the increasing number of landless peasants,27 she focuses on how population growth

affected the peasant economy and relationships in the Ottoman countryside.28 While

analyzing the reasons behind the migration from rural to urban areas in Anatolia, she tries

to minimize the extent of demographic factors behind this movement, thus rejecting the

thesis of population pressure. In doing this, she seems to overemphasize the possibilities

mentioned earlier instead of attempting a closer analysis of the evidence provided by the

sources she is using.29

The findings of recent studies of the neighboring north-central Anatolian districts of

Canik and Amasya, as well as Islamoglu-Inan's own sources on the regions of Corum

and Tokat, appear to support the argument for considerable demographic pressure, as

suggested by Cook particularly for north-central Anatolia during the second half of the

16th century.30 In that region, for example, the fragmentation of peasant farms reached

high levels, and the ever-shrinking plots of land recorded in the name of certain

ant households (hane) began increasingly to be cultivated by more adult peasants or

households.3' In addition, the number of landless peasant households (caba [-bennak])

increased, for example in the Amasya district to nearly 40 percent of the total recorded

households; moreover, this figure does not include unmarried adult men, who constitute

nearly half of the recorded male population.32

Another point further clarifies the picture. In her study, Islamoglu-Inan wrongly

terprets the term "caba" in the tahrir registers as "landless unmarried man," whereas it

clearly refers to "landless married man."33 As a consequence, the proportion of unmarried

men in the total adult male population-for example, in the region of Tokat between

1554 and 1576-appears to reach 70 percent,34 while in other parts of Anatolia in the

same period it varies between 20 percent and 40 percent.35 This high percentage, which

is difficult to explain, drops to about 45 percent when the term caba is taken in its

correct meaning as clearly defined in the law codes (kanunname) of the province in

question.36 This still significant rise in the number of unmarried men is paralleled by a

similar level of decrease in the number of landless married men in the very same district

during the same period. In other words, the proportion of married men in the total adult

male population in the Tokat countryside in 1574 shows a decrease of nearly 30 percent

compared with the situation twenty years earlier, while the number of unmarried men

increased even more in the same period.37 How can this be interpreted? One possible

explanation could be that, during this period, young adult men found it increasingly hard

to get married under the worsening economic conditions, thus expanding the unmarried

adult male population.

The remarkable increase in the proportion of both landless and unmarried adult men

in the central lands of the province of Rum in Anatolia during the second half of the

16th century is also observable in the Amasya and Canik districts.38 According to the

tahrir registers for these districts, the proportion of miicerreds to the total adult male

population in 1576 was 45.8 percent in Canik and 44.8 percent in Amasya. Similarly,

the proportion of the landless married men (caba) to the same total again in 1576 was

35 percent in Canik and 31.7 percent in Amasya. In other words, the combined proportion

of unmarried and landless married men among the total adult male population at the turn

of the last quarter of the 16th century was around 80 percent in the Canik region and

around 76 percent in Amasya.39 Given the assumption that the proportion of young

people (younger than fifteen years) among the population as a whole was from one-third

to one-half in pre-industrial societies,40 these proportions of unmarried men in

central Anatolia may be seen as not significantly abnormal. But when taken together

with the number of landless married man, this obviously points to a serious imbalance

between the population and the economy. This in turn also lends support to the notion,

first suggested by Mustafa Akdag and later cautiously mentioned as a possibility by

Cook along with Leyla Erder and Suraiya Faroqhi, of serious difficulties in marriage

conditions (late marriage or non-marriage) in the Anatolian countryside.41

Having said this, one observes in some cases a different picture of the changing

proportions of different sectors of rural society in 16th-century Anatolia. In the western

Anatolian district of Lazlkiyye (Denizli) between the 1520s and the 1570s, for example,

we see an extraordinary increase (159.59%) in the number of households holding the

minimum amount of land (a bennak, or less than half a farmstead), while the proportion of

those holding a full farmstead or half a farmstead decreased significantly (to 51.10% and

30.05%, respectively). Interestingly, this was accompanied by a drastic fall in the number

of unmarried adult men (75.77%).42 In this case, it seems that the observed population

growth followed a different path. While the young unmarried men increasingly left their

villages for brigandage or to fill the medreses as "students" (suhte) by mid-century43

(which meant that they went unrecorded in their villages), the increasing number of

peasant households who stayed in their villages found less and less land to cultivate. Such

fluctuations in the composition of the rural population of Anatolia in the second half of

the 16th century indicate a situation that cannot be seen as "normal." Behind all these

developments, one clearly observes demographic pressure, although its consequences

varied from region to region.

There is further evidence that points to such pressure. Leaving aside the general

population growth that is evident particularly from the second quarter of the century

onward, one observes signs of dense settlement particulary in the lowlands and on

high plateaus suitable for cultivation. Some plots of land hitherto uninhabited or

used, the mezraas, were either reactivated as supplementary arable land for peasants of

nearby villages or were increasingly turned into permanent settlements during the 16th

century.44 One can add to this the increasing cases of lands newly opened to cultivation

either from marginal lands or through the clearance of woodland.45 Parallel to this, there

were instances of semi-nomadic Turkoman groups establishing permanent settlements

(etrakiye villages) in the mountain fringes, where they appear to have engaged in

scale agriculture and animal husbandry.46 Despite the silence of the registers as to the

cause of such cases, this clearly shows that arable land was expanding, probably at the

expense of pasture land, which was essential to the pastoral life and economy. It seems

16th century was never to be reached again, even by the turn of the 20th century.47 In

addition, the urban population of this period witnessed a considerable increase. There

are signs that big cities as regional centers, such as Tokat, received migrants of rural

origin, most of whom are likely to have been the landless and unmarried peasants from

the countryside mentioned earlier. It is highly probable that such cities continued to

attract these people throughout the second half of the 16th century,48 despite the efforts

of the central government to prevent such population movements with strict rules and

regulations developed to maintain the "pre-determined boundaries" of the social and

economic order in both rural and urban areas.49 I think all this points to the fact that

Anatolia-at least, in the north-central parts-was under pressure from rapid population

growth in the second half of the 16th century. It also indicates an apparent subsistence

crisis in the Anatolian countryside. The demographic pressure therefore appears to be a

historical reality in 16th-century Anatolia; it cannot simply be ruled out as a hypothetical

claim. It seems to have been a phenomenon that had diverse effects throughout society,

including on urban dwellers and nomads, at least in some parts of Anatolia in the second

half of the 16th century.50

In this context, it is not unreasonable to view these demographic changes as a

cant factor in the spread of the great Celali rebellions, and especially in the continuous

terror in the Ottoman countryside that began in the late 16th century and escalated in the

early 17th century. It also seems more than a coincidence that the human source of this

general devastation was largely generated by the changing conditions in the Ottoman

countryside in the late 16th century. Population pressure in this respect should seriously

be considered. This important subject of discussion deserves a separate study. However,

it should be pointed out here that the "pull" factors suggested by Islamoglu-Inan and

Inalcik, such as the opportunities offered by cities to the villagers in difficulty, the urgent

need of the Ottoman government for more soldiers using firearms, and the employment

of already rootless peasants to this end, no doubt possess a certain degree of validity.

It is evident that the government's crucial decision to resort to this destabilized human

element as a short-term solution to its military needs led to the dangerous mobilization

of this "floating mass" in the Anatolian countryside at the turn of the 17th century.

However, at this point it is perhaps more important to emphasize the very presence of

such a peasant mass in itself. Many of these peasants-landless, unmarried, and living

at the limits of survival while searching for a better life elsewhere-were open, despite

restrictions, to the attractiveness of outside factors.5"

Finally, it is also evident that this mass of peasants, the "surplus population,"52 who

had already begun to leave their villages in large numbers more visibly from the 1580s

onward, were not only attracted by such "pull" factors; they also resorted to "other" ways

of life, including illegal activities such as brigandage.53 A cursory look at the increasing

records of such cases in miihimme registers of the period bears witness to this. It is

highly likely that the "tiifenkendaz" groups (those who used firearms) that the Ottoman

government employed were these levends of peasant origin, whose numbers appear to

have been constantly increasing in the Anatolian countryside in the last quarter of the

century, or even earlier, rather than being peasants who, despite all difficulties, stayed in

their villages to continue their modest life. We do not yet know, however, the real extent

of the crucial phenomenon of what can be termed "levendization" in rural Anatolia,

which seems to have developed more toward independent brigandage or employment as

sekban and sarica in the retinues of provincial administrators,54 rather than intermittent

employment as mercenaries by the government. It is therefore highly unlikely that the

peasants' leaving their villages (giftbozanhk), which had intensified prior to the great

Celali devastation, can be fully explained by the "pull" factors without knowing the

real extent of this levendization and without knowing how many of these groups were

employed by the government as mercenary troops and how often.55 It is also important

in this context to keep in mind the critical difference between the peasants' hopes and

search for a better life in cities and the despair that hopelessly scattered them in search

of other options such as brigandage. It can even be suggested that, compared with other

opportunities in cities, brigandage per se was a more attractive option for them.

THE 17TH CENTURY: A "DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS"?

While the rapid population growth of the 16th century seems well established, research

on various parts of the empire, including Anatolia, the Balkans, and Syria, points to

an opposite phenomenon from the turn of the 17th century onward: a serious fall in

population.56 Signs of the change in this direction are observed from the late 16th century

onward, becoming marked in the 17th century.57 The main argument among scholars

dealing with the subject has focussed primarily on the extent of the decrease in population.

Historians working on this period refer again to the disputed nature of the sources, on the

one hand, and the problem of interpretation, on the other. How reliable are the sources of

the 17th century-namely, the avariz and cizye registers, which provide only quantitative

data for demographic developments? How can the picture revealed by these sources be

interpreted? Some go further to ask whether there was any real decrease in population,

while others present the decrease as an obvious historical fact, speaking of a serious

"crisis" or even a "catastrophe."

As mentioned earlier, McGowan developed the thesis of "demographic catastrophe"

on the basis of his examination of these registers58 belonging to the Balkan provinces. He

starts by observing a dramatic drop in the taxable population recorded in these registers

and concludes that this was a manifestation of a serious demographic crisis that in some

cases reached catastrophic levels. According to McGowan, this was mainly the result

of (1) the long wars and chaotic events of the. period; and (2) the dispossession of the

peasantry under an increasing tax burden and exploitation. However, he does not rule

out the possible effects of other factors that may well have contributed to this result,

such as famine, typhus or plague epidemics, or the climatic change in Europe which

is generally called the "Little Ice Age." Some historians claim that this climate change

manifested itself in the Ottoman Empire as increasing rainfall and unseasonable freezing

and occurrence of heavy snow.59

Criticizing the approaches that tend to analyze the issue within the disputed context

of the "17th century crisis," Todorova, maintains that the changes that took place in

the demographic structure of the Ottoman Empire during the 17th century cannot be

understood in such a framework.60 She argues that demographic phenomena have their

own distinct rules and chronology of development and that they should not be evaluated

in terms of conjunctural economic and political developments.61 Therefore, it would

be erroneous to link the population growth of the 16th century necessarily to social

progress, and adverse development to the so-called crisis. Referring to McGowan's

argument, Todorova raises a question: leaving aside the methodological problem of

whether the population decrease can be considered a sign of demographic crisis, did

such a population fall in fact occur in the Ottoman Empire in the 17th century? She

then goes on to question the extent to which the drop in population that is observed

in the available sources represented a real loss. To Todorova, this drop can well be

accounted for by certain historical developments of the period, such as migration and

re-nomadization, large-scale abandonment of villages by peasants, or their evasion of

registration. Similarly, the apparent fall she refers to in the non-Muslim population of

the Balkans in this context may be seen to be a false decrease.62

The first point to be emphasized in this part of the debate is that the problem of

interpretation of the relevant data, contained in the sources used by both McGowan

and Todorova, is valid for other similar material, including the tahrir registers. There

is no doubt that every single piece of research requires the utmost attention in this

respect. It should be remembered, however, that the collections of sources employed

in this discussion belong to two periods-the 1530s and the 1700s-neither of which

includes any part of the 17th century. The degree to which the nearly 170-year-gap

between these dates allows us to analyze the long-term demographic developments is

highly questionable. Furthermore, this line of argument clearly says nothing about the

short-term fluctuations that took place in the Ottoman Empire in the late 16th and first

half of the 17th century. To develop a more meaningful and sound argument, therefore,

one should make use of the same kind of sources for these periods or search for other

sources available in the Ottoman archives.

Recent research has revealed the importance of a new series of archival sources. The

most significant perhaps are the detailed avariz registers, which appear to have been

compiled for the first time for various parts of the empire in the first quarter of the

17th century and continued during the rest of the century. These are different from the

summary-type avariz-hane registers used by McGowan. Prepared in the same way as

the tahrir registers of the previous century, the detailed avariz registers enumerate the

entire tax-paying population as "nefer" (adult men, married and unmarried) in various

categories, as well as the members of the ruling class (askeri) who in one way or another

held possessions liable to avariz taxes or extraordinary levies, which were turned into

regular annual payments sometime around the turn of the 17th century.63

The few studies undertaken on these sources in comparison with the tahrir registers of

the late 16th century point to a radical decrease of around 80 percent in the recorded

paying population of the north-central Anatolian districts of Amasya, Canik, and Bozok

in the first half of the 17th century, with a corresponding figure of around 70 percent in

the district of Tokat (See Table 1).64 In the case of Amasya, 30-40 percent of the villages

that existed in the 1570s appear by the 1640s to have been abandoned or ruined. A

similar pattern, though less dramatic, is observable in the neighboring districts of Canik,

Bozok, and Tokat (See Table 2)."6 A significant portion of the villages in the district

of Amasya, some of which seem to have disappeared, were those that emerged in the

period of the 16th-century expansion with relatively small numbers of inhabitants either

on fertile plains or high plateaus.66 This was accompanied by the disappearance of the

etrakiye villages of the mountain fringes. Similarly, there is evidence that the Turkomans

of the Bozok region of central Anatolia, who had gradually adopted a sedentary lifestyle

during the 16th century, had largely returned to nomadic life by the mid-17th century.67

TABLE 1 Changes in tax-paying population between the 1560s and the

1640s (in nefer)a

1560-70s 1640s % Urban Tokat 3,868 (1,258) 3,858 +0.3 Amasya 2,835 (1,069) 1,736 -38.8 Merzifon 1,783 (770) 957 (33) -46.3

Gtimtii 1,176 (524) 317 (30) -73.1

Lddik 833 (248) 260 -68.8 Samsun 520 (229) 134 (58) -74.2

Gedegrab 97 (42) 739 +66.1

Harput 1,965 (403) 348 -82.3

Rural

Amasya (kaza) 28,449 (12,923) 6,068 (833) -78.7

Samsun (sancak)c 39,609 (18,063) 6,617 (1,181) -83.3 Bozok (sancak) 41,484 (22,780) 4,621 (252) -88.9

Harput (kaza) 15,379 (4,147) 1,476 (615) -90.4

aFigures in parentheses indicate the numbers of unmarried adult men already included in the totals. To make the comparison meaningful, I have excluded a number of askeris recorded in the 1642 register. Therefore, the figures in both dates present tax-paying reaya

only.

bThe exceptional increase in the population of the town of Gedegra is apparently due to its top-hill location. With its natural protection, it must have served as a perfect refuge for the displaced populace from nearby settlements on the low plains.

CThe kazas of Unye and Terme, which do not appear in the 1640s registers, are not included in these totals. Also note that the kaza of Arim in the 1640s corresponds to roughly half of its area in 1570. The other parts of the kaza were divided in the 1640s into new kazas, which do not appear in the registers. This is also the case for the figures given in Table 2.

It should not be forgotten that this was a period with a number of extraordinary

historical developments, mainly connected with the Celali depredations. It is the period

in which the sources increasingly speak of frequent "Celali invasions" and of members

of the provincial military-administrative class (ehl-i irf) roaming the countryside with

their retinues of hundreds of horsemen under the pretext of inspection. At the mercy

of the Celali bands and these brigand officials, the peasants dispersed ("perakende ve

TABLE 2 Decrease in the number of villages between the 1570s

and the 1640sa

District 1570s 1640s %

Amasya (kaza) 372 228 -38.70

Canik (sancak) 509 452 -11.19 Bozok (sancak) 629 548 -12.87

aNote that the numbers for the 1640s include the "new" villages appearing only in the survey of this date, although some of them may have been the old settlements with new

perigan olub"), leaving their villages en masse ("celdy-i vatan idiib"). City dwellers

were not immune to such attacks, either. Contemporary sources unanimously refer to

the famines frequently witnessed in the countryside and to the enormous damage they

caused to the state treasury ( "memlekete kitlik, devlet hazinesine kiilli zarar gelmegle ").68

Furthermore, the combined effects of these events on rural structure and village life in

the Anatolian countryside are likely to have had an adverse effect on the birthrate, the

real extent of which may never be known because of the shortcomings of the available

sources. To this should be added the increase in the death rate under conditions of

stant and widespread Celali terror and wars, which would have affected not only adult

men, but also women, children, and elderly people-that is, those who were most

nerable to human and natural calamities.69 All of these taken together with the possibility

of the phenomenon of late marriage turning into one of temporary non-marriage point

to extraordinary historical circumstances. Compared with the general conditions of the

16th century that allowed, mainly through military expansion, the growing population to

integrate into an expanding system, the 17th century was a period of shrinking military

and economic resources that created the conditions for a general crisis and depredation.

Contrary to Todorova's argument, therefore, it is not mere speculation to speak of a

general demographic crisis-at least, for Ottoman Anatolia in the first half of the 17th

century.

Whether such a crisis was a general phenomenon in the entire empire in this

and, if it was, whether there was any degree of recovery during and after the time

of Kiprtillis in the later part of the century-can be shown only through further case

studies.70 The question of the extent of the Celali terror that appears to have continued

throughout the 17th century in different parts of the empire should be kept in mind

when examining the problem. Particularly important in this respect is the extent of the

terror's destructive effects on rural structure," given the facts that the rural economy, both

agricultural and pastoral, was the main source of wealth for the imperial treasury and

that the complex relationships of revenue distribution, which constituted the backbone

of the whole military and administrative structure of the empire, were based mainly on

the stability of both rural life and the economy. Also crucial is the frequency of natural

disasters such as famine, epidemics, drought, earthquakes, floods, and heavy snow in the

Ottoman Empire during the 17th century.72

It should immediately be pointed out, however, that the apparent decrease in the

recorded tax-paying population in the early- 17th-century registers employed in this

study does not necessarily imply that 70-80 percent of the rural population simply

died as a result of wars or natural or human-made disasters. A significant proportion

of this "loss" in population may well be accounted for by many peasants' forming the

human source of the hundreds of Celali bands that were still active in the Anatolian

countryside at the time of the surveys in the 1640s. Alternatively, some peasants may

simply have evaded registration, thus going unrecorded in the registers. One can only

speculate about this point. Nevertheless, the early-17th-century loss of population as

reflected in the contemporary survey registers and interpreted in this study is too high to

be explained only by such possibilities. Even if these are taken into account, it is more

than likely that the picture presented by these registers still remains the most significant

evidence for a serious demographic fluctuation in Ottoman Anatolia at the turn of the 17th

century.73

THE OTTOMON CASE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Let us turn at this point to the larger context of the nature of these demographic

opments. Inalclk considers the case of late-16th-century overpopulation in

or, as Cook puts it, the apparent imbalance between economic resources and the

creasing population-to be an overall "population crisis" with social and economic

complications.74 Considering Carlo Cipolla's assertion that, in pre-industrial agrarian

societies, fluctuations such as sudden and drastic falls in population could be expected

when population growth exceeded certain limits,7 it seems quite reasonable to approach

the extraordinary demographic movements, whether rapid growth or drastic fall, as two

phases of a general crisis.76 Approached from this perspective, the population pressure

that Cook suggests for the second half of the 16th century can also be seen as an indication

of such a crisis in Ottoman Anatolia. In the light of the findings of recent research,

the period from the mid-16th to mid-17th century, with its up-and-down swings, may

therefore be considered a period of general crisis in the demographic history of the

Ottoman Empire-a crisis whose first stage manifested itself in the form of "pressure"

(or overpopulation), and the second stage in the form of "implosion" (or depopulation).

If true, does this take us back to the neo-Malthusian "population cycle," which has long

constituted the central theme of scholarly debates in demographic studies?77

The scope of the present study is limited to the re-interpretation of old evidence in

the light of new evidence concerning the 16th- and 17th-century population changes

in Ottoman Anatolia in the hope that it will contribute to the revival of the debate

among specialists. Although taking the present examination beyond this point deserves

a separate study, it is not totally without benefit to make some brief remarks on these

questions to place the Ottoman case in the wider theoretical context of the worldwide

population movements in the early modern period.

The role of population changes in history has been a subject for both demographers and

historians since the publication of the classic works of T. R. Malthus and David Ricardo.78

Based on their arguments about the nature of population movements in history and the

relationships between population and the economy, which have often been regarded as

too mechanical to comprehend the complex nature of historical development and explain

its diversity, there emerged in the 20th century many revisionist attempts to modify or

refine the Malthusian and Ricardian demographic "laws" or to refute them categorically.

The resultant debates among scholars have thus evolved around what is termed the

"neo-Malthusian" approach, among whose principal defenders were historians such as

Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie and M. M. Postan.79 It was mainly on their works concerning

late medieval and early modern France and England that Robert Brenner launched in

the late-1970s a counter-argument rejecting the primary role of demographic changes

in the rise of European capitalism in general and in income distribution in particular.

However, he never categorically denied the importance of what he referred to as

"demo-economic" trends in long-term historical developments.80 What he sharply

criticized was the mechanistic application to history of demographic models, which

have almost been exclusively associated with Malthus via Le Roy Ladurie in particular.

With the participation of other specialists, the "Brenner debate" led to a productive

discussion among historians that was to have a strong influence on later historiography.

demographic-economic processes as the main factors in historical change toward a

greater focus on the political-distributional level, resulting finally in bringing the "state"

back into historical analysis in the 1980s and 1990s.81

Concurrently-or, perhaps, as a reaction to this tendency-some scholars, the most

prominent of whom was Jack Goldstone, returned to the primary role of

ecological changes in the development of history.82 According to Goldstone, population

in principle moved independently for reasons exogenous even to the economy and played

a central role particularly in the political crises of early modern societies.83 Goldstone's

"post-Malthusian" approach once more brought attention to the role of demographic

factors in history on the widest scale across time and space, covering areas stretching

from Europe to China and in the period from the late medieval ages to the 20th century.

All of these debates have found echoes in Ottoman historiography. Islamoglu-Inan,

who wrote in the 1980s mainly about the agrarian economy of Anatolia, also touched

on population changes in Anatolia. She closely followed the current discussions

ing around Wallerstein's "capitalist world system" approach along with the Brenner

debate, with certain reservations toward both based to some extent on the works of Ester

Boserup.84 I have already discussed islamoglu-Inan's argument, which places heavy

emphasis on the determining power of the state and its role in socio-political and

butional processes in the Ottoman Empire.

Although I agree with her in rejecting any deterministic mechanical and reductionist

single-factor approach in history, her somewhat eclectic theoretical approach

estimates the precarious balance between population and resources that were in fact

closely connected in late medieval and early modem agrarian societies. I also agree with

her that the roots of population changes are not necessarily internal to the agricultural

economy. But this does not mean that demographic changes-rises or falls-have no

negative effects or do not put strain on the economy in general and state finance in

particular. Indeed, Goldstone's entire work convincingly shows how population changes

that occurred often syncronously across the world during the 16th and 17th centuries

led to eventual state breakdowns, following strikingly similar patterns, albeit in different

forms.

Goldstone himself included the Ottoman Empire in his comprehensive study of "state

breakdowns" in the early modern period. His post-Malthusian demographic approach,

which in the main argues that "revolutions are the result of multiple problems, arising

from long-term shifts in the balance of population and resources,"85 deserves closer

attention because of its direct relevance to the central argument of the present study.

Goldstone develops the argument that the more or less simultaneous state breakdowns

during the late 16th and 17th centuries in Europe, the Ottoman Empire, and China

were the best examples of the recurrent waves of similar events in history. All of these

originated mainly from a periodic, cyclic imbalance between population growth and

inflexible economic and political systems.86 In this respect, Goldstone's treatment of

the Ottoman case places the price increases of the late 16th century, the crisis in state

finance, and the widespread Celali rebellions into this worldwide context. In doing this,

he refers to old evidence concerning the socio-economic and political manifestations of

this period of crisis, such as the increase in the number and overall proportion of young

unmarried men in the population, the fragmentation of peasant farms, and the increase

livelihood outside their villages. All of this eventually contributed directly to the Celali

uprisings.

The new findings presented in this study once more confirm and consolidate this

ture. However, a more important point in Goldstone's argument is that population growth

has a non-linear or disproportionate effect particularly on marginal groups-in our case,

the unmarried men and the landless.87 Using Goldstone's own words, "[I]ncreases in total

population generally produce a much larger increase" in these marginal populations "...

than in the population as a whole.""88

Leaving aside Goldstone's other arguments, which obviously open new horizons for

future comparative studies in Ottoman history, this point alone is particularly important

for the argument of the present study. If his argument is correct, the figures presented in

this study become more significant because they show a substantial increase in the size

of the sectors of rural society that were gradually "marginalized" under the conditions

of population growth. If so, one might expect even further increases in these populations

in the last quarter of the 16th century-increases that cannot be observed because we

have no surveys available for this period. When the landless and unmarried young men

are taken together with the discontented timar holders, who had also lost much of their

income under the inflationary trend that went hand in hand with population growth, it is

not a coincidence that these were the very groups that formed the main source of Celali

bands and rebel armies in the 17th century. One can further assume that the large-scale

destruction caused in the Anatolian countryside by the Celali terror, coupled with wars,

resulted in what Brenner describes as the "disruption of production leading to further

demographic decline, rather than a return to equilibrium."89

This last point, which is perhaps Brenner's only contribution to the neo-Malthusian

debate, although he developed it as a counter-argument to the theory of Malthusian

adjustment, relates to the very point at which we started to evaluate the Ottoman case in

a wider historical context. Implicit in my line of argument throughout this study is that the

Malthusian approach still has merit in population studies and offers much, particularly in

terms of the nature of demographic changes in essentially agrarian societies. One should

also remember the remarks of another prominent historian, Guy Bois, that knowledge of

demographic changes is essential to understanding the development of societies in which

small-scale family production is the basic economic unit and in which "reproduction takes

place on that scale according to an economic/demographic process."90 As such a society,

the Ottoman peasantry was vulnerable to demographic changes, and the developments

in 16th- and 17th-century rural Anatolia can be re-interpreted in this context.91 Does this

take us to demographic and economic determinism? Certainly not. No reasonable mind

can suggest such a deterministic approach after the decades-long debates over the

plex nature of historical development. What this may mean instead is that demographic

analysis can be further developed and refined to widen our perspective, as impressively

exemplified by the works of scholars such as Cipolla, Goldstone, and many others.

CONCLUSION

Whatever the fruits of discussing the problem at such a theoretical level, in the case of

Anatolia it is perhaps more important to bear in mind the geographical dimension of

the population changes in the late-16th- and early-17th-century Ottoman Empire. The

crucial question is how representative the cases of demographic pressure in Anatolia

described here were as far as the whole empire was concerned.92 Furthermore, one

may ask the same question for Anatolia only, considering the fact that in some parts

of Anatolia the population seems to have remained within reasonable limits,93 although

substantial growth in the 16th century was a general phenomenon throughout the Empire.

It is therefore imperative to pay attention to voices that emphasize regional differences

in terms of demographic changes-differences that depended largely on the quality

and quantity of the land, climatic conditions, economic opportunities, and, as Karen

Barkey rightly suggests, the patron-client relations at the local level and in the empire

in general.94

It is also clear that population growth does not necessarily or automatically mean

"pressure." What this study shows in this respect is that one can speak of such pressure

in at least some parts of the empire-in this case, the north-central Anatolian province

of Rum. Whether the apparent rise in population resulted in similar pressure elsewhere

in Anatolia or throughout the empire toward the end of the century remains a question.

Nevertheless, this study has also pointed out that the Celali rebellions and widespread

terror in the Anatolian countryside were closely related to the demographic growth of

the 16th century.

At this point, it is important to return to the sources, the nature and interpretation of

which constitute an significant part of the debate. There is no doubt that the

sive series of imperial tahrir, avariz, and cizye registers of various kinds (separate evkaf

tahrir registers included), which offer the only quantitative data for demographic studies,

have been, and still are, the principle sources. But it has increasingly become apparent

that the qualitative information that these sources provide is equally important in terms,

for example, of settlement patterns, and abandoned or lost settlements. Miihimme and

sicil collections available for the period in question, as well as other archival materials

such as the account books of certain foundations (vakifs),95 often provide useful and

sometimes extremely important insights into the complex historical developments of the

time. Only through cross-examination can one make a reasonably convincing evaluation

of demographic changes in general, and of the degree of reliability of the figures given in

the sources in particular. Nevertheless, the varying roles of factors affecting the

death ratio remain an important issue that is unlikely, perhaps impossible, to clarify given

the shortcomings of the present sources.96 However discouraging repeated mention of

such methodological problems and the questioning of the reliability and shortcomings

of the source material may be, there seem to be no easy solutions to the problems of

Ottoman demographic history of the period in question.

NOTES

Author's note: The initial version of this article was presented at the Eighth International Congress of Economic and Social History of Turkey, Bursa, 18-22 June 1998. The author thanks Halil Inalcik, Rifa'at Ali Abou El-Haj, Paul Latimer, Mehmet Oz, Fikret Yilmaz, and anonymous IJMES reviewers, as well as its editors, for their valuable suggestions.

1See esp. 0. L. Barkan, "Ttirkiye'de Imparatorluk Devirlerinin Biiytik Ntifus ve Arazi Tahrirleri ve Hakana Mahsus Istatistik Defterleri," istanbul iniversitesi iktisat Fakiiltesi Mecmuasl 2, 1 (1940): 20-59: ibid., 2, 2 (1941): 214-47; idem, "Tarihi Demografi Aragtlrmalanr ve Osmanhl Tarihi," Tiirkiyat Mecmuast 10 (1951-53): 1-27; idem, "Essai sur les donnees statistiques des registres de recensement dans

l'Empire Ottoman aux XVe et XVIe siecles," Journal of the Social and Economic History of the Orient 1, 1 (1958): 9-36. See also his later works on the subject: "Research on the Ottoman Fiscal Surveys," in Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, ed. Michael A. Cook (London: Oxford University Press,

1970), 163-71; and "894 (1488/1489) Yili Cizyesinin Tahsilatlna Ait Muhasebe Bilangolari," Belgeler 1, 1 (1964): 1-117.

2For a detailed re-evaluation of the related literature within the larger framework of the Braudelian Mediterranean world, see Halil Inalcik, "The Impact of the Annales School on Ottoman Studies and New Findings," Review 1, 3-4 (1978): 69-96.

3The historian who first used the term "defterology" was Heath Lowry, himself being a prominent ogist. For his major monographical works, as well as his discussion of some methodological problems involved in the use of these defters, see his Trabzon ?ehrinin Islamlayma ve Tiirklegmesi, 1461-1583 (Istanbul: Bogaziqi Universitesi Yaylnlan, 198 1); idem, Studies in Defterology, Ottoman Society in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth turies (Istanbul: Isis Yaylnevi, 1992). For a critical evaluation of this field, see esp. Colin Heywood, "Between Historical Myth and Mythohistory: The Limits of Ottoman History," Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 12 (1988): 315-45; and for a more recent critique, see Fatma Acun, "Osmanh Tarihinin Genigleyen Sinirlan: Defteroloji," Tiirk Kiiltiirii incelemeleri Dergisi 1 (2000): 319-32. For another work that deals well with the major problems of defterological studies, see Mehmet Oz, XV-XVI. Yiizyillarda Canik Sancagi, (Ankara: TTK Basimevi, 1999). The number of monographical studies in local history for which these defters constitute the principal sources has increased substantially in the past two decades. These works have also contributed significantly to the development of complicated terminology and the problems of Ottoman demographic history. For the most important, see Michael A. Cook, Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia, 1450-1600 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972); Leyla Erder, "The Measurement of Pre-industrial Population Changes: The Ottoman Empire from the 15th to 17th Century," Middle Eastern Studies 11 (1979): 284-301; Leila Erder and Suraiya Faroqhi, "Population Rise and Fall in Anatolia, 1550-1620," Middle East Studies 15 (1979): 328-45; Bekir Kemal Ataman, "Ottoman Demographic History (14th-17th Centuries). Some Considerations," Journal ofEconomic and Social History of the Orient 35, 2 (1992): 187-98; Maria Todorova and Nikolai Todorov, "The Historical Demography of the Ottoman Empire: Problems and Tasks," in Scholar Patriot, Mentor: Historical Essays in Honor of Dimitrije Djordjevic, ed. Richard B. Spence and Linda L. Nelson (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1992), 151-72. For a bibliographical essay on population movements in the Ottoman Empire, see Daniel Panzac, "La Population de l'Empire Ottoman et de ses Marges du XVe au XIXe Siecle: Bibliographie (1941-80) et Bilan Provisoire," Revue de l'accident Musulman et de la MWditerrande 31 (198 1):

119-37.

4See Barkan, "Ttirkiye'de imparatorluk Devirlerinin."

5The only exception to this in Turkey was Halil Inalcik's publication of the earliest extant register in the Ottoman archive, relating to Albanian lands. See Halil Inalclk, Hicri 835 Tarihli Suret-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid (Ankara: TTK Basimevi, 1954).

6Nejat Gbytinq's XVI. Yiizyilda Mardin Tarihi (Istanbul: i. U. Edebiyat Faktiltesi Yayini, 1969; repr. Ankara: Tiurk Tarih Kurumu, 1991) deserves special mention here in that it was the first example of this kind of study in modern Turkey.

7Bruce McGowan, Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade, and Struggle for Land, 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Linda Darling, Revenue Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996); Oktay Ozel, "Changes in Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in Rural Anatolia: A Case Study of Amasya, 1576-1642" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1993); idem, "17. Yiizyll Osmanh Demografi ve Iskan Tarihi Igin Onemli bir Kaynak: 'Mufassal' Avariz Defterleri," XII. Tiirk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara, 12-16 Eylfil 1994, Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler (Ankara: TTK Yaylni, 1999), 3:735-44. Here Machiel

Kiel deserves special mention for his works, each of which are among the most significant contributions to the field particularly in terms of the discussion of the problematic nature and utility of these sources. See his "Remarks on the Administration of the Poll Tax (Cizye) in the Ottoman Balkans and the Value of Poll Tax Registers (Cizye Defterleri) for Demographic Research," Etudes Balkaniques 4 (1990): 70-104; Ayni Yazar, "Anatolia Transplanted? Patterns of Demographic, Religious and Ethnic Changes in the District of Tozluk (N. E. Bulgaria), 1479-1873," Anatolica 17 (1991): 1-27; idem, "Hrazgrad-Hezargrad-Razgrad: The tudes of a Turkish Town in Bulgaria," Turcica 21-23 (1991).

8While the main objective of this study is not to discuss well-known but still little appreciated aspects of defterological studies, because of the nature of the sources and the question of the reliability of the data

they contain, I believe that it is imperative to remind the reader of the fact that all the arguments developed and discussed here are based on the records of the tax-paying population only, both rural and urban, whose status was well defined by law and regularly and systematically recorded with the utmost care in the survey registers. Other sectors of the society at large, including marginal groups such as gypsies, generally went unrecorded. Similarly, a certain portion of the peasantry might have not been recorded because of their particular services to the government, although we know that in most cases they were also included in the registers with a mention of their special status even if they were tax-exempt. Furthermore, a large portion of urban society-members of the military class, for example-were not subject to systematic survey. Despite all this, a regularly and systematically recorded portion of Ottoman society constitutes in itself an important database for historical demographic inquiry, allowing us to clearly follow the main population trends as well as certain aspects of demographic change. What follows is an example of this kind, of study, and like other such studies, it should be read with these limitations in mind. For a discussion of the subject, see Mehmet Oz, "Tahrir Defterlerinin Osmanli Tarihi Ara\unhboxgtirmalarmnda Kullanllmasi Hakkinda Bazi Diiptinceler," Vakiflar Dergisi 22 (1991): 509-37; Fikret Yilmaz, "16. Yiizyllda Edremit Kazasl" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Ege University, Izmir, 1995), 192-205. On avariz and cizye registers, see Oktay Ozel, "Avariz ve Cizye Defterleri," in Osmanli Devleti'nde Bilgi ve Istatistik, ed. Halil inalclk and Sevket Pamuk (Ankara: DE, 2000),

33-50.

9Since it is unnecessary and practically impossible to give here a complete list of defterological studies that do not deal totally with population changes in the Ottoman Empire during the 16th century, I will refer only to those mentioned in n. 3. A relatively recent publication that discusses the relevant findings of these studies is Oz, Canik. See also Kemal (iqek, "Tahrir Defterlerinin Kullamminda Gtiriflen Bazi Problemler ve Metod Araylglarn," Tiirk Diinyast Arattirmalart 97 (1995): 93-111; inalclk, "Impact of the Annales School."

10Cook, Population Pressure.

"1Mustafa Akdag, Celali isyanlari, 1550-1603 (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Yaylm, 1963). (For a later, extended version, see Celali Isyanlart. Tiirk Halklnin Dirlik ve Diizenlik Kavgasi (Istanbul: Bilgi Yayinevi,

1975). Idem, Tiirkiye'nin Iktisadi ve 4&timai Tarihi, 2 vols. (Istanbul: Tekin Yayinevi, 1971).

12See Halil inalclk, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700," Archivum Ottomanicum 6 (1980): 283-337; idem, "Impact of the Annales School," 80-83; Huricihan islamoglu-Inan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire: Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia during the Sixteenth Century (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994).

13inalclk, "Military and Fiscal Transformation"; islamoglu-inan, State and Peasant, 185. See also Suraiya Faroqhi, "Political Tension in the Anatolian Countryside around 1600: An Attempt at Interpretation," in Tiirkischhe Miszellen, Robert Anhegger Festschrift, Armagani, Melanges, ed. J. L. Bacque-Grammont et al. (Istanbul, 1987), 117-30.

14For the details of the first stage of the uprisings and the nature of the Celali rebellions in general, see William J. Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion, 1000-1020/1591-1611 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1983); Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994). 1 have already referred to M. Akdag's classic Celali isyanlart.

S5See, for example, McGowan, Economic Life in Ottoman Europe. See also Halil inalclk, "Adaletnameler," Belgeler 2, 3-4 (1965): 49-145; idem, "The Ottoman Decline and Its Effects upon the Reaya," in Aspects

of the Balkans, Continuity and Change: Contributions to the International Balkan Conference, University of California, Los Angeles 1969, ed. H. Birnbaum and S. Vryonis (The Hague: Mouton, 1972), 338-54. Suraiya Faroqhi, however, emphasizes the "political" nature of peasants' exodus from the villages under such conditions, thus expressing her doubt, apparently on the basis of the works of islamoglu-inan, about the role of a demographic pressure. See Suraiya Faroqhi, "Political Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers and the Problem of Sultanic Legitimation (1570-1650)," Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 35 (1992):

38-39.

16inalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation." 17McGowan, Economic Life in Ottoman Empire.

1SMaria Todorova, "Was There a Demographic Crisis in the Ottoman Empire in the Seventeenth Century?" Etudes Balkaniques 2 (1988): 55-63.

19islamoglu-inan, State and Peasant, esp. chap. 4.

2(See, for example, Faroqhi, "Political Activity"; idem, "Crisis and Change, 1590-1699," in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, ed. Halil Inalclk and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 433-38; idem, "Seeking Wisdom in China: An Attempt to Make Sense

of the Celali Rebellions," in Zafar Name: Memorial Volume of Felix Tauer, ed. Rudolf Veselly and Eduard Gombar (Prague: Enigma Corporation, 1996), esp. 104.

21islamoglu-inan, State and Peasant, 149-54, 156.

22Ibid., 143, 146-48. Frequent movements of pastoral nomads and peasants from the less secure ern provinces to the western parts of the empire during the course of Ottoman history seem to be a torical fact. See Halil Inalclk, "Introduction: Empire and Population," in Inalclk and Quataert, Economic and Social History, 31 ff. However, we have no clear evidence of any significant migration taking place in the region in question in the period concerned. Furthermore, recent research has revealed that the high level of growth in population was the case not only in the western cities but also across Anatolia, in both urban and rural areas. See, for example, Ismet Miroglu, XVI. Yiizyllda Bayburd Sancagt (Istanbul, 1975); idem, Kemah ve Erzincan Kazasi (1520-1566) (Ankara: TTK Basimevi, 1990); Mehmet Ali Unal, XVI. Yiizyllda Harput Sancagt (1518-1566) (Ankara: TTK Basimevi, 1989); Orhan Khliq, XVI. Ve XVII, Yiizytllarda Van (1548-1648) (Van: Van Belediye Balkanllgi Ktilttir ve Sosyal Iller Miidtirltigti Yaylnlarl, _1997).

23islamoglu-Inan, State and Peasant, 143, 154.

24Ibid., 156. There are many problems in this argument. First, it is highly questionable to assume that entering the askeri class was a matter of "preference" for Ottoman peasants, given the strict rules delimiting such movements. Second, it seems to be chronologically premature to speak of the existence of such retinues composed of irregular soldiers within the Ottoman provincial-military organization under the timar system during the first three quarters of the 16th century, although Ciftbozan levend groups existed in the Ottoman countryside well before that century. The present level of our knowledge of such retinues suggests that it was instead a phenomenon of the years prior to or during the Celali movements at the turn of the 17th century. Third, speaking about the "drudgery of work" as a factor behind Anatolian peasants' leaving the land while rejecting apparent economic and demographic constraints of the period is not convincing. I will touch on these issues later. Cf. Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats, 150 ff.

25 Islamoglu-inan, State and Peasant, 156.

26See, for example, Oz, "Osmanh Klasik Diineminde Tarim"; Yunus Kog, "XVI. Yiizylhn Ikinci Yarisinda Kiylerin Parqalanmasi Sorunu: Bursa Kazasi Ol6eginde Bir Araltirma," unpublished paper presented at the Eighth Turkish Congress of History, Ankara, 4-8 October 1999. I thank Dr. Koq for permitting me to use this

paper.

27See Huricihan islamoglu-Inan, "M. A. Cook's Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia, 1450-1600: A Critique of the Present Paradigm in Ottoman History," Review of Middle East Studies 3 (1978?): 120-35. Islamoglu-Inan deals with the price rise in another article: see Huricihan Islamoglu and Suraiya Faroqhi, "Crop Patterns and Agricultural Production Trends in Sixteenth-Century Anatolia," Review 2, 3 (1978). For the problem of price increases in connection with population growth, see also Mustafa Akdag, "Osmanh Imparatorlugu'nun Kurulu?u ve Inkigafi Devrinde Tiirkiye'nin Iktisadi Vaziyeti," Belleten 13 (1949): 571. See also Omer Liutfi Barkan, "Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East," International Journal of Middle East Studies 6, 1 (1975): 8-15. Cf. Inalcik, "Impact of the Annales School," 83 ff. The latest contribution to the discussion is from Sevket Pamuk, who re-evaluates the findings of Barkan and his interpretation of price movements in the Ottoman Empire: See Sevket Pamuk, "The Price Revolution in the Ottoman Empire Reconsidered," International Journal of Middle East Studies 33 (2001): 69-89.

28Islamoglu-Inan, State and Peasant, 149.

29As far as the later historiography is concerned, it was Karen Barkey who developed a systematic critique of Islamoglu-Inan's argument. Barkey argues that Islamoglu-Inan, along with inalclk, has overstated the role of "pull factors" in peasants' leaving their lands and emphasizes the impact of declining economic conditions and rapid growth in population-in the landless and unmarried population, in particular-in Anatolia during the 16th century: see Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats, 148 ff.

30See Oz, Canik; Ozel, "Changes."

31See Cook, Population Pressure, 25; Oz, "Tahrir Defterlerinin," 433, 436. Cf. Feridun Emecen, XVI. Asirda Manisa Kazast (Ankara: TTK Basimevi, 1989), 232-33.

32The proportion of landless peasant households to total households reached more than 50 percent in some nahiyes of the kaza of Amasya (Ozel, Changes, 75-76, 78). Note that these figures were reached via a detailed examination of the tax register of the region dated 1576 (TD 26, Kuyud-1 Kadime Archive, General Directorate of Deeds and Surveys, Ankara) and include neither those peasants recorded in the registers as "caba" (landless)