Religion, polity and society in Turkey

trlufioro

er*id Dergisi, Say:2, Nitaa 1993

RELIGION, POLITY AND SOCIETY IN TURKEY

(I)

Arsey BEKTA$ (ph,D.) Asst

hof,

of political Science

MARMARA UNIVERSITY

Faculty of Communications

Thqc has be€ri much tdk in recent _{yeas both in} the Turkish press and in

popu-lar _Funals, about the apparent _{visibility of} Islam in social ana potticaf

lfe.

Ii

otfrer way, one feanne of Ihe Turkish sociay and polity of the

l9gft

that strikes any keeri ob_ s€rver is Ihe 'levival" of Islam. One of tlre most impofirnt cuxlent socio_poUtt f i"ro_ es in Turkey is secularism. The Islamic movemenihr"

_b"-m"

_ru"h

" rirsible pheno_

mena that in recent mo[ths valious agencies of tlre state have sttded to colleci infor_ malion and u/rite up official repore on the hcreasing threat of the clandestine

activiti-es of various _{groups seeking to rc-institute the} ,'Sheriat".

Tukey, being dre first Islamic country to lccomplish a profoutd cullwal re-volution, the core value of which was seculadzafion, and having experienced a long period of rnodernizatbn, might be expected ro have reached a level oi mod€nity, thal would have by rnw rendered the issue of secularism obsolete, However, the question of secularism, especially in the folm of state vqsus religion lingers on in rhe iurkish polity. Why after so long is the issue of secularism still a maner of heated debate m Tukey ard what might aocount for tlrc _{Turkish polity,s faiture to smnount the diffi_} culties surrounding this particular issuel

(l)

The

issr

of religion became politicized in Turkey following the secular dis-course of the one-party period _{(1923-1946) d€nied any legitimacy to Islam in public} life. As Toprak stated that "positivizm replaced faith as the dominant, indeed the offi_ cial, outlook. Islam was equated with reactionary and obscuantist political views which stood in the way of reform, development and pogress, Me$while, acc€pt$c€ or rejection of this equation came !o delineate position along the politicat

ipecr

rum.,(2)

In the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, such concems were shared by

ob-servers who talked about a relationship betrreen "revival of Islam" in Turkey and Re_

(*) The first venion of this article was presented at the conference on "The lra-nian Revolution an its Influence on Turkey and the Gulf-the Role of Fudamen-talism" University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA, December 4, 199O.

volution of Iran. we call say that tlFr€ were some inflUences of lranian Revolution on Iecent visibility of Islam in Turkey. Howwer, Islamic rcsugence in any lslamic co-untry, including Turkey, should be view in terms of the intemal and politicrl dyna-mics ot *re country itsetf. Erternal factols crn only have the effect of intensirying lhis potential.

Our 8im is to show some of dre characteristics ofttp Ouoman Empfue ard Tur-key together to explain the presence of thir potential in Tur&ey because Turkey is al-mo$t a unique case in ilself Itnong fte Islarnic countries.

Tbe Ottomatr BackgrouBd

ln ttrc Otroman polity one comes across a "Muslim State" whse tlte influerpe of tre religion was constsained by many frclors. In thar poliry, 0le concept of miilk i'e'

tenporal;wet,

had been suerched to

is

limits. Drawing upon their Orf-i SultstrL or

sovireign powers, tlrc Onoman Sultans could issue laws and regulations which vould do away with Islanic precedents. ftom tlle seventeenth c€ntwy on, even the Sultltl$ bst

thJf

charisma; chadsma was Sradually attsibut€d to the srab' The Sulta$ could now be deposed in the nsme of the rtate. As Heper stated lhat:

In other Muslim stales the c@EeP, of lhc slole 4s ott

ittstwehl ot

wordly salvation is a rather rece\t develo,rE tt.Thus, early in the garna lhe state in ttte Ouonan-Twkish

politt

vas bosed

la4elt

upoi "$tuctwal tegitinac!" or independent belief invaliditl

₄

the structures and norms. Although in developiLg lheir st4te slstem' the Otto

to

s

iaitiatlJ drcw upoLlhe lranian exanple' the two

syslems shov'ed marked differcrce in rh4r $age$. Begiming in the sineerrlh

centq

,hz Sda,id Stde itsev starled to lose irs relative autonomt vis-l-vis

th. Wuedial

Sht'a hierurctry. 14 stark

co"t'

rast, os earl! as the mid-sixAenrh centwy lhe Ouotnan begot lreely to _flout the law of IslonQ ) _.

Religious organization in the Ottoman Empire _{was PaIt} of the siate bueauc-Iacy, linked to tbe sdninistraiive structwe of the state though a network ofofrices

borh on the stae and prov""t"11*"1 (4).5erif Madin wouH argue thar ftis was padty

due to tlle fact that "religious heterogeneity of d€ Otlornan Empie was a constsrt

so-urce of concrrn for Orornuo St torn"n" (5)

"rrd that conbol of leligious matters was crucial to state affairs.

ln functional ard organization tetms, association betwe€n the socio-political

systems and religiorL was a disnrnguishing chuacteristic of uaditional Ocoman

Soci-ety. Combining the dual frrnctions of the spiritual leadar of the stongest Muslim stste

atd the iemlnlal ruler of the Ottoman Ernpire dre Sultan4aliph symbolized the Isla-mic ideal of a

politixl

cornmunity bas€d on leligious tegitirn6ry (6), The office of the Seyhu'l-Islam linked the institutionalized Eligious authority within the administrari-ve networt to the political decision making, mainly the Sultan. The Seyhu!-Islam was appoint€d by tlle Sultan while he in htrn was |e leader of the ubma corps. The Ulema (ulema rvas tlrc collective name given to the leamed men of rEligion who had impor-tant educational ard judicial, in addition to religious, posts in Otoman Turkey) beca-me a well organized and powerful group

within

the adninishative skucture of the Empire and even became s heriditsry class with immense wealth and power

0).

TlEy scted as frc imams (Feaches in mosques), were b&he$ in the me&ese (religious school), kadis (iudges) enEusted with the duly to administq law, or

multb

Cudsconsults) to see to it that new legal enacrnent or judicial cas€s confirmed to the Shariah. So the judical and educational instiurtions wele under the conEol of ulema, Tluough the institution ofrhe "fewa" tlre ulerna coqld even cond€mn the policy

decisi-ons of the Sultans, As Hepq pointed out that "in fac! the so-called Muslim institution in that polity was 8 _lrop for and subE€rvient to dle su!e, Unlike dreir shi'a brethren, tlle Ottoman ulema did not equate temporal power with injustice. Instead, they tlDught

that cooperafbn

wit[

and an official statrs in, the political realm was Ihe only wey of exercising art effective resFaining influ€nce on the temporal power"(8).

The Ottoman peftimonial bureaucnry carefully kep the instihrtions of

civil

sociefy utder ib contsol lhe npment these attempted to gah au6onomy ftom &e 6tate

(9).

One of Oe most irnportant furrtions ofreligbn in the Ofioman Empire was it be-hg a force of social integration. It also a.ted as an intemediary between tlrc individual

and the stlte. $erif Msrdin argues that while in the riy'est therc developed a netwotk of s€codary stuchres Ihaf gained authonomy

tom

trc state, the only source of collecti-ve identity in the abdence of secondaq/

st

rctures ftat gould _st8nd as channels of iden-tity fomation in the Otloman Empire( l0).

In Ottoman society, there was no founding organization, as in the We6! to de-fend particularistb class inierests ard protection of the indivilual came through mern-bership in the Islamic community. In [le political sphere, on the other hand, the most important function ofEligion was k, s€cue the legitimac, of trc Sultan and the

Empi-re. The Sultan was seer as dte rqresentative

ofcod

not lhe people ard political

obedi-ence was the duty of every Muslim subject since trc politicsl ord.r had divine sanction (11).

The need for rcform was already felt in the Otoman Empire duing the seven-teenth century but tlEs€ remain€d as "indigenous attemp{s whictl in general, centered around stsengthening the authority of the central

go.,orra"nf

(12). In th" ,rio"t""nth cen[rry the t€chnicd sup€riority of lhe Wes! e'speciaUy in its military, became a

lity ard this made W€starnizatbn seem to be the _{Feconditbn ofreform} in the Empire. By the ninet€edh cenbry Westernization efforts were ertended into Ihe educafional, legal ant

politid

institrtions as well. It has been argued dut the focus on Westerniza-tion prevent€d atternpb of irdigernus reforms of lhe exirthg socio-politicd structue of the Empire (13).

ConsEiction of the aeas that us€d to be covered under religious

laq

allowed secularization in drc legal system. The Sults[s used morc ald more of their authority

to enact a series ofkanuns (non religious laws) and the ulema did rct show opposition

to tlte secular law makinS. Separate mazalim courts were set up to l@k

it

o civil or cri-minal cases that involved admidstative officials, In 1950, a comnrercial code was ac-ccpted which brought commercial cases outside the religious codes(14). As

topt"f

stated thst "s€culadzation attempts of the ulema and of Islam in tlrc socio-political life of the Empire, particularly at the level of the Westemizpa elte csdres" (15). A consis-tent policy of Westemizalion was followed thoughout th€ nilpt€enth

ad

the la6t two de.cades of the Ottoman Empire in the twentieth oenu[y. A more complele

eliminati-on of the pover of the ulerna was to come wilh th€ establi*n€nt of lhe Tukish R€pub-lic in 1923.

Cultursl

nevolution in lhe Republic

Similar to th€ nircteenth cenhtry reform€f,s, the Kemalisb lhat led lhe change

to republican life in Tudcey also viewed dre poblem of modemization with reference

to Islam. The s€culadzation process of tlp Turkish Repnblic stengthenod $tate autho-rity and contsol over the major aimes of the Islamicr0uoman, and in so doing, Kema-lisn tied to bresk down bod ttle institutional shenglh of Ishm and the symbolic

sruc-ture of society. Thar which ne€d€d to b€ charged was <leftred by tie rcligiow system

because it was believed that it had been Ole Islamic character of th€ Ottoman Empire

that led to its colapde in face of the West-" This iasistence on changing Islamic in$itu-tion$ and stnrchres prevented th€ mod€mizing elite of tlle Kemalist €ra frrom urning thet attention to b,road€r defirations of systemic change" (16).

Nationalism was put in a Westem contex! in thar the exist€nc€ of the Turkish n*ion as a gror.qp of people sharing a cornrnon _Irast did not become the bssis of the mo. vement but radrcr, was r€pleed by tlle idea tllat the Tukish nation was a people

sha-ring a common future among the civilized nations of Ure W"st (17), If we rcoept Wes-temization as the ideolory of the Kemalist revolution, lhat it becmes apparent lhat seculaization efforts of the time were fighting against the altemative source of ideo-logy which was Islam. It followed dut tlle refoms led by the early republicans aimed al weakening the role of Islam in Turkish society. As Heper stat€d that:

TNs approrch plrces Tut

kq

in a unique position. The Kemdists

attenpted to adopt ,eritorial, and,laer, tinguistic ratler tlan reli_ gious rutiorclisn...The situ4tion i4 nost othet Muslim cou4tries is somewhat diferen . As a consequcroe

₆

their

eulier

colonization by the Europeahs there seents to fu dificulty in rcsponding positi_ vel, to a West seen to be at, att.tcker qnd the abde

q

ir{idels. This leads to a continued emphosis on Islon. At the local level of the in_

dividual, too, what was aaempted was unlikc the situation in the Arab comtries.

IaTurkq

tfu aimu)as reforn atbn rcthcr

tlw

a re_

wissau:e of

Ishm(l8).

Ralher than making religion a matter of pdvate life, tlre lGmalist regime kied

to supervise and control religious activity by maintaining organizational links betwe_ en religious institutions and the state bureaucr*y (19). R"ligion

*""

put under politi-cal control. Refo(ms aimed at secularization went atong with the new administrative stsuctule. Some of these were aimed at changing the role of lslam withh society,

o!

hers involved chances in the polirical and legal in.tiurtion.(20). It

"hould be noted that

state contsol over religion and the westemizing rcforms did meet with resistance du_

ring the early periods of the republic (21).

_

_

Particularly significant in setting rhe in$titutional basis of religion in Turkey

and tlErefore significant in the political role of religion is thc organizatbn ofreligious affain within the political system since

lq3.

Orrhodox Islam is ua&r the jurisdbtion

o{ the hesidency of Religious

Affain

_@RA - Dyanet lgleri BaSkanhgt whos€ _{Fesi_} dent is appointed by the Council of Mini6te$ upon dre nomination of tlle prine Mn is_ ter. The PRA has regional offices called the

mnftiiliik

in provinces (il) and subpovin_

c€s (il9€) and dlese control Ihe admiristration of tlle religious institutions under tlreir jurisdiction and supervise all rcligious services. As civil servants 52.000 personnel of

the PRA fiurction under stutr cont ol (22).

Ite

graduares of religious schools staff the PRA, atld the terch€rs, textbook and curdcula of these schools are under the supervisi-on of the Dircctorate-Ceneral _{of Religious Edrcation @in Elitim Genel MiidiirliiEii)} vhich is a separate ofEce within the Ministry of Education (23).

As _{$erif Mardin} argues, the secularist reforms from above and the instinrtio-nalization of secularism at lhe level of the polity was in plac€ by 1946, when fte Tur-kish Republic changed ftom a shgle-paty period to a multi-party system, and rhe

aut-ho

tarianism of the single-party years was crucial in establishing this

(U).

Consequendy, the question of Westemization was settled with the

esrablish-ment of the Refublic in 1923. The &rminant paradigm

of

te n€w rebuplican elite was

Westemization, For the republican cadres, the lerm civilization was cultEe-bouod.

h

was not somethiflg to be s€en in relative tedns vis-& vis tlle cultrre of different p€ople.

It w8s a concept lhat made senre only wilhin the conlext of the WesL A civilized nation meant a nation which b€longed to the Westem world AlthouSh

ftir

new republican etlns was challenged by grorps rcting in th€ name of Islarn' sorne of which rase up in a series of bloody reb€llions in the 1920s and 193G, the republican elite had rapidly consolidated their power ard wete able to €ff€ctively supFess or silenc€ the religious oppo"ition(25) _'

As Toprak staled that "the comeNtone of 0|e qtltwal tansformation of Tur-key into a Wesiernized nation-state process was the concept of secularization and

is

tsanslation into state policies. State policies came to incltde th€ strict contsol of reliSi-ous functionaies, sects, group6 and movements. Religionr functionaries in mosques became civil servants. The tsrikat network

w*

outl"*.d"(26). No _-mpatision can

be msde between th€se oders ard, for instance, the Muslim Brohefiood in Egypt Ihat fully emerged in place of the declining SuIi orders by World War II. In lran, a more elaborate, though of course

diff€re

, tyPe of religious organization

""i"ad

(27).

The

Multi-Parly

Period: 1945s to Prcs€nt

Retgion in Turkey, especially during the eady republican' single-party peri-04 has been an irnponant force with the potential of dernanding a change of the

politi-cal systam. The Republican People s Pady (RPP- Cumhuriyet l{alk PadisD, in the

fo-otsteps of lhe Kemalists, (28) had a quite raaical utderstandirg of t€cularism ttuoug-hout the early period. Reactionary movenrents at the time did cfeata a gap between lhe elile and the mass cul$te because mgdemizing mernt Weslernizdion ard oot

I

pro-motion of folk culbre and tradition'

As a resul! with the multi-party systam, religion $as puled back into politics in the pladorms of some of ft€ portb6 as a

pa

ofcompetition for votes. The Democrat Party _{@P-Demohat Parti), which} ruled between 1950 and 1960' was in continuous conllict with ttrc RPP ovei int€rpretation of s€cularism and the role leligion could play in political affairs(29). As Togsk pointed out thst :

Throughoul the 1950s, the Derlocrats wete ^ccused

bf

tlv

opPosi-tionfo

their polbies alleged to rudermine the seculo prbriples

of

tle Republic in @

_fiort

a gain vaes.Tle mintx revisiotts

_$

policy thot theJ inpledented, srch as the

lifing

of the bat @ the rccital

of

the ezon (call to pruler) ia Arobic, the brudcasting

₆

Korun reo' ding over the stare rudio, tle

esfulislvttot

of religious schuls and the expotLtior. oJ

tlv

PRA's budga, were heavily oiticized by bah tle seculqr press ond

tte

RPP leaders

a

naior sleps,o

od

tla

es-nblishmen of a wn-seculs stotJ30).

This contsovergr over 0re politicization of Islam continued after the 196O mi-litary intsrvention with the establishment of the Justice party in

l96t

which rlow rep_

loced 0l€ DP a8 the target of secularist attack duing the firsr half of the 1960s. The 196l ConEtitution had allowed genuine associational _{freedom which rcsultad in the} mushrooming of organizations throughout the decade, including religious ones. As Topak added that :

Religious _forces wete

_fina

_!

aAe

b

estabtish a political

_{Wry of}

thei an'n in 1970 under thc ,arrv, the _{Nalionat Ordel panJ WOp_}

Milli Nizam Panisi)which, hantever. was outlowed ia Ig72 by thc Constitutional Coutt. The NOP leadership quickly reasseibted ard _foanded the Natioral Sdvalion

pa

y (Nsp-Milli Seknat

par-tisi) u'hich, as it tut lcd ont , would play a crucia! rote in the political

oeru

tluring the

I

970J3 I ) _.

The party sctivities ofthe NSP during tlle l9?0s is againsr the secularist

as-pects of Kemalism. The rise of the NSp coincided with a period in Turkish hisrory when, for the fus! time, institutions of civil society were beginning to develop consi-derable autonomy in the liberal abnosphere of the 1970s, the NSp was able io make considerable iruoads into party competition. The NSp was a neo-Islamic pslty whos€ major conoem was the partid retaditionalization ofTurkish

culue

along Islamic pre_ oepts, Its ideology was called the "National Oudook',(Mi[i G6dir)- lt becam€ an in-dispensible

paros

in duee coalition govemments bar*een l9?3- 1978. It polled I

l.g

and 8.6 per cent of dle lotal votas in the 1973 and

l9Z

ebctions respectively. Tlre NSp

also built a consi&rable pafronage network through placing the NSp synpathisec in various ministerial and other govemmental positions. Following the military inter-vention of 1980 dre NSP, along with all the other political parties, w""

outl"*"d

(32).

As 0E Turkish eleclorare rcaligrrd itself utd€r the malrr parties, a rcw neo_ Islanic party, Welfare Party (WP-Refah Panisi) was foudod in 1983

b

fil

rhe gap

af-ter trc closing of the NSP. "The W? emerged oo the politicd scene to realign rhe ,Mus-lim vote'. It was unrble to acquire legal sbn$ before the 1983 national elections ard

w8s left out of competitbn. It was however, sble to particbab

h

the municipal

electi-ons of March 1984 and recieved 4.8 per cent of dle rotal vot€s. Reminisc€nr of tlle "Na-tional Outbok" of tlre NSB the WP calls

ir

ideology "National Consciousness',

(Milli

guur;"(33).

Consequently, there is little possibility for religion in Turkey to be a functio-nal altemative kr politics, which is not fte ssrne thing as political nrovernent takhS on a religious coloring. Turkey $eems io have

I

distinctly modem political system as

compared to other Muslim polities as a field of human activity makes sense in its own right and can

fuction

without religious props.

89

'(8€) _dsN e$ InI.t '(llu -S3 se _[e^\ sE sseumolElot s.q roJ u,norq SrnegJlasuq IszQ nBmJ. ul q?ue.qs aner -€plsuoc srq 'DII.a6a) teuqel{ fq papEaq

_'d

_I aql

qwra

_{enblt. dsN}

eql

(F.ruEd uEtB^Buv-dAD duBd puEF€qlow _{aqt Pne d/{[} el$ ue6^9aq uoddns dsN sno$ad aql lo Ilds eql _{sI 'rolsBJ} lu8uodun ,fipnbe

uy

'dnod crurelq ern uae,npq uoggeduroo aqt sl 'aroJareql 'drt\ er$ Jo goddns propele ,no1 aq roJ slun@@ l8ql

rol*J

auo

'U

_dQ

"t!,

W .f

a4t Pared&ts Qsn.,,ard {aqt so (d41) KrrDd qQd

arul

?4, ,nd.l,,s ot utt\otq

ao

'putll oqro aq, uo'sfl,mN

all'dn

aq, utqtr/ s&poal

fl?uuotd

^ulpnttut'(dn)

tttDd pto4aqton

parou

a.@'satmaP(lls'Dp -ro aIt

_{P tooqw}

uo qpzadsa 'stryaq*loN aq,

h

uod

'pqrotsl

u1 _ryualg ouap1.,g tlyaqg ryuaq*p\'1

aq

a41 _to

sa&o

ol

al

qtto o,

paulvor

qwdnddD st sryuaqt$pN aqt qtt,/.

uotpauo2

_dsN

attt

bllna

po

dl

aqt'D^a/w)H'dsv

dqt Jossa,apzrd stt plp so

'opto

ryuaqtfxoN aW qrlu sltoltxawloJ a

ul

ot paounJ s!

dAaql

:rBql _{Pelqs {8rdoJ} sV '(9€) luerualtcra aql 'sp'norc aqt 'euldrcqp aq fq pecsardun are,n ssa.6uoJ

ar

pedesqo

o$r

gsqeumol'scnlod tFPltrltr

anrv

u! alor

lne.lp3rs

I

dBId pFo,$ _di{\ e(I rct|l peparuuro dlsnountruun ssad qsrdmJ a$ .Sg6I .tmf u! pleq 3e,$ q.q,$ {u8d al?Jlart\ eql Jo ssaduoJ

lsld

arp

r4IV

srcFl

_lo

etuanuul _{aql ro}

qtaclc

.

G€faAat tsaq?fq avt

p

ua^t pap -ua _l/{1s u

aldantl

3urztun!3al o so uoFI

_lo

acnl aq1'ols1un1po DtraBlV 'rd{8a so qtns sauo pazlmltcas

(p^ltopr

?4,

?ulPnpl

saturs

qo|

ap

p

Fowlo

u

WV'a&oqo lo.tttlod

taq

{to

Euntaa -ald alqlA a\taqJ _lD6os ?tttos ptm

Jlwowta

snoltbua PaSo t'to2 -ua

w4

_lo

tlotls ?4t 'auoE a4 u1 t1ma st141od

hod-qnu

ot tolt1s -to,4o aPou

blmlafqt

(nuarrSal prflr"tuts anpoq au&at aqt 's?!t!muu

w

srmqJratu a\t'slDnr2a

aflt

aqt'ssol2 dlPplu ?lrDt -2ouap aq lo sab aq

q

'n4

u! qnls a4t o, tuauoAou uoltlsoddo aq, _lo

uoltzoqlrys

o

talt aou

rot p?wo22o .nMal s'"ot?trat Ptl, snEaauat aas

!

_PatD!2?,tdb

Dn4

aq

(nt

fzrlmJu! uolronrls

a\I

:lElo

po

pegrod radall sy

'(ff)

&1-I

u! .q

ppor'

1 araq,n ftru peeoans ppoo gaurdola'r' -rp _lccrtrtd cqsrcoulep tei( e qcese

I

t?r$ tno petqod uoeq seq q 'sa8u^Bolt

FrnlF'

usql leqlsl Fuolpuru uo _FsBq rlle|s,G dued ^!eu

s .ollpod ol pdl'Bls ercuuaqrql puB

.s.oroJ

lEtaqdnod

&

perermucp urals,G i(uud-nFru

I

Iq ureNfs ,{r.Dd-eFqs

5lglcm

.

Until lata 1985, rhe stsength of the NSp sympa0dzers wirhin the Mp le{d€rs_ hip was also evident in rh€L contsol of the Ministry of Education, youth

&d

Sports which has alwalas been consi&red a key minisay by Islarnic goup6. Sorne @ntsover_

sial policies and decisions of the govement reflect tlrc iofluence oi lhis faction an inf_

luence rooled ia the mass aptrral it enjoys. The former Minister, Vehb Dngerler, was

a centef, of atrention in the Turkish press for his unprecedented decision, (39).

Tho.

decisions prompted one Turkish writer to entitle a recent aiicle ,Turtey; Secular or Islamic?"

(4).

hde€4 tike in tl€ 1950s, there has been much talk ofa revival of Islarn in Tur-key in recent yeaN. The entsenchment of the Islamist within tlle Mp govenrnenl the existerre of an Islamic Party, the wea.lth of Islamic publications and periodic press

re-po-fts about several incidents involving Islamic groupc has once again put the question of religion on the agenda of the Twkish secularist intellecruals. As Toprak

sh;d

$at:

Seyerd repons about private

Kora

C<]l',rses (4 I ) which wae sup_

posed to

b

termiruled

_{tet

1980, indicated that ttvy \9ae stitt in operation under diferen! naties aad had becorne a4 arcna in the figl{ for contol futween the _{SllLyrrunctand Nutct} orders. Arlot_ hcr inrolved _fowteen Naktihcndit, itrcluding the pwaerful NokSi-bendi Shcikh Rajit Ercl, who were <rccused of cooperuring wirh a

fu

dorncntalist otganization

in

Saudi

Arcbia,

thc

Rabitat-ol-ALmal-Islal

in ordet ,o stort ot

anqd

uprising with the oim

_d

esrablishi^g a "theooalic state" inTurke! based oithe Shui,a .., The much publicized issuc offedale sudents who belieee in

t

sa-,r

(ldattic precept

_for

the cowring ofuronea's bodies ond hab)

u/ho refuse to

lif

rhei rcatfs during sch<nl hours, utas yet

arbtter

etanEle of Muslim nilitancJ

_fot

the secutarists,G2) .

As trc foregoiag illusEates, the case of Islam points to the p'recarious nature of

the relationship between the stare and civil socbty in Tu*ey. Above all, it points to Ii-mits of _{state FDwer even} in r state{entered polity. Despite hatf a centuy of asempts

b

put religion urder state control, the rcle oflslam in Turkish society arld politics rema-ins influential, Part of the reasons for this situation lie in the shaping of voter

align-rnents in Tu*ey. As in the cise in mort d€mocrrcbs tfie dpices of the vot€i have beert

historicauy crystalized. Ind€ed the trends in Turkish politics can be mapped through

cleavage clusten in Turkish society which shape not only 0re behavirr of tre voter but also the stucturalizalion ofpolitics itself.

Islam as a political force is an integal part of this pattem spectrum. However, the electoral fortun€s of Islamic parties in Turkey also demonstate thal Islam, by

if

self, is not a sufficient catalyst for mass mobilization. The Trrkish case seem io diffet significsndy &om other Muslim countries. Both the economic development of

Tur-key, and the implementation of strict secularist policies over a long period of time, ha-ve pushed the issue of religion to the background of electorsl politics.

Despite the fact that electoral behavior in Turkey does not seem to accept

ls-lam as an altemaiive political ideology by iaelf, all the attemp{ to put religion under

state contsol have not been able to stop the rcle of Islam in Turkistr society and politics' Actually, while during the early years of tle Republic, religion was confined to gtoups who were predominantly nral, uneducated and outside the ruting elite, recently it has become a counter culfire which h8s exterded itself to p,rominent sectors

of

urban soci-ety such as the civil service, free professions, political parties and the press.

Conclusion

Although the picture emerging ftom the above discussion superficially sug-gests an increasing significance of Islam in Tr.rkish politics, there is, in fact' litde io be

found to argue lhat the Islarnic forces could not have become a viable political altema-tive had tlre lranian revolution not influenced Turkey in 1980s. However, as has been

argued above, a mass political movernent based on religious appeals has litde chance

of success in modem Turkey. In tlte last anal,sis, socio-economic changes und€r8one by lhe country since 1983, coupled with state dominance over religious institutions

and forces, have pushed the significance of Islarn into the background, as economic

and social struc[rral factos gained importance bolh in oational politics and at the indi-vidual level. Islam, by its€lf, is no longer a sufficient force for mass mobilization. Isla-mic "revival" lherefore, should be understood within the Turkish context as lhe

outc!-me of an increasingly pluralisl society durhg lhe 1970s. From 0p mid-196G until the military intervention of 12 September 1980, the country widnessed an unprecenden-ted growth of ideological movements represented by various political panies, institu-tions and organizainstitu-tions. This period in Turkish history was probably the most liberal in term of allowing social forces the fteedom of expression, even the Military Inter-vention of 1971 and various declarations of martial law did not sucred in stopPing this rend toward pluralism. Islamic movementrs were only one, among several such

for-ces. And they were not the most militant in demanding regime change.

However, lhe influence of the Lanian Revoluation on the visibility of Islam in

the Turkish society should not be completely ignored. The gevalent issue of female

students who believ€ in t€s€ttur and who refuse to lift their scarfs duing school hours

intinsified. o'r the otlrcr han4 it was rumored that some agent provocateus have gon€

into Turkey from some coutries (not or y kan but also Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Lib-ya) for performing certain Islamic rituals or suFponing Islamic demonstrations and terrorist movements.

We should point out that sorne Islamic orden and orgarizations are supported financially by some Islamic countries. These orders and organizations which are also

as active are the "Islarni Cihad", the "Muslim Brotherhood,,, the "Humeydst,,, the 'Nakshibendf', the "SuleymancL' and the "Nurcu".

All

ofthese reLigious organizati-oos aim at reversing the Kemalist secularization anempts and re-installing political

sysbem based or Islamic principles. It is rumored lhat they are being hnancially sup-poned by above countsies.

Depending on the circumstances religion is seen as offering a charnel of

pno-tesl oi security or a force that could lead a revoluation towards lhe creation of a Mus-lim state. The role religion will play in Tukey will be determined on how it is manipu-lated and how the historic attempts of secularization are interpreted. On the other han4 as Sanbay stated that the "revival of Islam" seems to present Ttddsh &mocracy with a dilemma. If democracy means a representation of sll the people and participati-on of every segment of the poputation in the political process, then the traditionally-oriented segment of the population who find a great appeal in tlre Islamic movement must also be represented (43).

Sanbay added trat 'Tlowever, Islam as a polirical ideology implies ttrc comp-rehensive contsol and arrangement ofthe social cultursl, economic ard political acti-vities of all members of the umma according

o

its own principles. It tlrus constitutes a

thrcat lo democracy by its exclusion on principle of the voice of secularly-oriented ci-tizens

h

Turkey"

(4).

Finally, even though secular circles in Turkish society express concem over the Islamic movements new visibility, thei! actions are not devoid ofcontsadictions either. The Turkish population is 99 per cent Muslim. Thus, Islam is a ctitical facor in determining lhe moral values of

Turk.

Many tlreat lslam as a standrrt by which the daily sets of fellow citiz€ns atd othe$ are to be judged. Islam is appeated to, on occasi-on, by those wishing

o

legitimize some hnovation. Islam serves also as an imponant ideological tool in the competition for votes, one not commonly utilized by political paflies bent on winning elections in Tr.nkey. Moreover, the gap betw€en the centei and the periphery of the Turkish sociery penist with Islam serving both the elites of the cenler and the masses of the periphery as a device to tnidge ttris gap.

In the last analysis :

(l)

no possitrilitiy of an ovedly religious party io be

elec-ted in the political power (2) due to the stucEe of he society, lhe posribility of a reli-gious levolution similar to drat in kan is minimal, if not nil, (3) the

thid

ahemative is

for th€ rcligious sectors to contirue growing in political po,rer if one of the parties which has overt religious tendencies is elected into political po\f,er thn'national elec-tions under the auspices of economic liberaLism.

NOTES

l.Ali

YaEar Sanbay, 'Religion in the Contemprorary Turkish Society and Polity",

Currcnt

Turkbh

Thougbt, 58 (SFing, 1986): 2-24.

2.Binnaz Toprak, "Islami$t lnlelle-ctual of the 198Os in

Tu*ey",

Current Turkisb Thoughq 62 (Spring, 1987\ : 2-19 .

3.Main Heper, 'Islam, Polity and Soci€ty in Tltrkeyi A Middle Eastern Perspective", The Middle

Esl

Journal, 3 (Summer, 1981) : 347-348.

4.Binnaz Topralq Islsm atrd Politicsl Dcvelopment itr Turkey (Leiden, The Neder-lards : EJ.

Bill, l98l),

p.26.

5.$erif Mardin, 'Religion and Seculadsm in

Tu*ey"

in

Atatirk:

Foutrdcr of s MG dern Stat€, eds.,

Ali

Kazancrgil and Ergun Ozbudun (London : C.Hurst,

l98l),

pp.l91-219.

6.Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Politicrl Developmenl in Turkey,p.26. 7.Ibid.

8.Metin Heper, "Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey, p.348.

9.Binnaz Toprak, '"The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey", in State, Democracy and the Military, eds.Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Belin: Walter de Gruy-ier, 1988), p.122.

l0.$erif Mardin, Din ve ldeoloji (Ankara : Seving Matbaas! 1969), pp.52-70. l l.Binnaz Toprak Islam and Political D€velopment in Turkey,p.28. l2.Ibid., pp,31-32

l3,Niyazi Berkes, Tank Zafer Tunaya ffrd Davidson, Tiirkiyenin Siyasi Hayatnda

Bat

alma Hareketi (lstanbul : YedigiiLn Matbaasr, 1960).

l4.For a more detailed analysis of the interaction between religious and secular law see Omer

Liifr

Barkan "TtiLrkiye'de Din ve Devlet nilkilerinin Tadhsel Geli-gimi", Cumburiyetin 50.

Y

ddriimii

Semineri (Ankara: TiiLrk Tarih

Kr.uu-mu Basrmevi, L9'15r, _W.49-6'l .

l5.Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics and Religion in Twkey",

p.l2l.

l6.Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Politic.al Development in Turkey, p33. and for parti-cular information on the same idea see _{$erif Mardin, "Ideology} and Religion in the Twkish Revolution" IDternatioml Journal of the Mkldle East Studi. es 2 (Spring,

l97l),

p.2@.

lT.Binnaz Toprak, Islam aDd Political Development in Turkey,p.39, l8.Metin Heper, "Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey, p.350-351. l9.Binnaz Toprak,IslaD atrd Politicrl Development in TurkeJi,p.l.

20.Some examples of these reforms would be :(1) accepting the latin alphabeth in 1928, (2) rubstituting new words with Turkish roots in place of Arabic and Persian derivatives end creating 0rc Turkish linguistic Society in 1932, (3) Eanslating the Koran inlo Turkish and bannhg its recital in Arabic, (4) drop-ping

Anbic

and Persion from the cirriculum of schools, (5) abolution of the Caliphate which had been part of the Ottoman Empire since

l5l7

(Selim I), (6) abolution of the Sultanate in 1922, (7) acc€pting westem hat and clothing (1925), the gregorian calendar (1925), sunday holidays instead of Fridays (1935), european numerals (1928), the metric system (1931), and family

the Shriah courts in 1q24, (10) cbsiry the medreses, (11) adapting the Swiss

kgal

Code, the Italian Criminal Code and tlrc German Commercial Code as the basis of secular law etc, For a $ummary of these reforms see Binnaz Top_ rak,Islam and Political DevelopmeDt in Turkey, pp.33_5g; also see her fo_

,

otnotes and bibliography for particular information on any of tlrese reforms. 2l.Ibid., pp.7l-90.

22.Binnaz Toprak, "The Stare, Politics and Religion in Turkey',, p.122. 23.tbid.

24.$erif Mardin, "Power, _Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empirc", Compa_ rative Studies in Sociology

ard

History,

ll

(1969), p.276.

25.See Binnaz ToFalq "Islarnist lntellectuals of the 1980s in Tu*ey",

Curent

Tur_ kish Thought, 62 (Spri

_ry,

1987\ 2-7 .

26.Ibid, pp.4-5.

27,On tlrc elaborate and caitical functions of the religions orders in Eglpt and Iran, sr:e,

Gilsenan, _{Saint and Suli in Modem Egypt,} pp. 2@-203 and James A. Bill, "lrun

_-6

the Crisis of78" Foreigr Aflairs, 57 (19781979):332. 28.The shift to republican life was led by the national leader Mustafa Kemal

Atatii*

and the implemenred changes (reforms) and the "ideology', behind these is of_

ten referred to as Kemalism or Kemalist Revoluiio..

29,The 1946-1960 period was characierized by the conflict over the interpretation of secularism between the RPP in power during the single_party years, and Ole

DP, which won the fust ftee elections in 1950. See more detail analysis Feroz Ahmad "Polirics and Islam in Modem Turkey", Middl€ Eastern Studies 1

(January 1991), pp.3-21, and Binnaz Topratq .The Religious Right', in

Tur-key in TraNitiotr, eds., Irvin C. Schick and Ertutsul A. Tonak (Oxford: Ox-ford University Press, 1987), pp.218-235.

30.Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics snd Religion in Turkey,', p.123. 3 l.Ibid., p. 124.

32.On tbe National Salvaiion Party see Jacob _{M. Landau, "The National Salvation} Party in Tukey", Asiau snd Aftairs Studies, l1(1976): I -57; Tikker Alkan, "The National Salvation Party in Turkey" in Islam and politics ilt the Mo-dern

Middle

East, eds., Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli (l,ondon and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984), pp.79-l@; Ali Y-a5ar Sanbay, Tiirkiye'de Mo" derrle$me

Dir

ve Parti Politikasr: iMSP

Orrek

Olayr" (lstanbul Alan Yayrncrftk, 1985).

33.Binnaz Toprak, 'The State, Politics and Religion in Tukey", p.128.

34.See Metin Heper,

"Isla4

Polity and Society in Turkey: A Mirldle Eastem Peqpec-tive", pp.245-265; Ergun Ozbudun, Social Charge and Politicsl participa-tion in Turkey (Princeton: Princeton UniveNity

he$q

1976) and Ersin Ka-laycrollu, "Why l,egislarure$ Persist in Developing Counaies: The Case of Turkey", Legislative Studies _Quarterly, 5(1980): 123-1,10.

35.Metin Heper, "Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastem Pe$pecti-ve", p.255. For an elaboration, see S0ha Eliiliikbaqr, "Turkey Copes with

Re-volutionary lran," Journsl of South Asisn 8Dd Mktdle E€stern Studi€s, l-2 (Falvwinter 1989): 94- 109 and R. Stephen Humphreys, "Islam and Political Values in Saudi Arabia, Eg1pt, and Syria,

'Thc

Middle East Journal, 33(1979): 1-19.

36.See Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, Terciiman, Giinaydrn,

Milll

Gazete, July

l,

1985. 37.Binnaz toprak "The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey", p.130.

38.See Teoman Ere[ in Milliyet, March 5, 1985 and June i9, 1985. On the other han4 Turgut Ozal was an NSP candidate in lhe 1977 elections, but lost.

39.Arnong the decisions are the following: the decision of the Minister of Education, Youth and Sporls to forbid girls from wesring "shors" in the Youth Day

Para-de, the law banning the airing of beer commercial on Turkish TV, the effort

o

build a mosque at the Grand Nadonal Ass€mbly complex, the drafting and sut'sequent adoption of a law punishing those who swear at monotheistic reli-gious. For details see Binnaz Toprak "The Stlte, Politics and Religion in Tur-key", pp.13l-133.

40.Sami Kohen, 'Turkey: Secular or Islamic?", Middle Easr Times, June 2-9, 1984. 4l.Binn^z Toprak stated ihat these are cowses frnancad by citizens or local

communi-ties where the recital of the Komn is hught to students. See h€r footnotes, 'The

State, Politics and Religion in Turkey", p.133. 42.Ibid.

43.Ati Yalar Sanbay, 'Religion in the Contemporary Turkish Sociery and Polity", p.20.

,t4.Ibid.