1
T.C.
DOKUZ EYLÜL ÜNİVERSİTESİ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI
İNGİLİZCE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER PROGRAMI YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ
EXPLAINING THE EVOLUTION OF EU MIGRATION
POLICIES FROM PAST TO PRESENT: TOWARDS AN
ECLECTIC APPROACH
Gönenç AKAR
Danışman
Doç. Dr. Gül M. Kurtoğlu ESKİŞAR
iii
YEMİN METNİ
Yüksek Lisans Tezi olarak sunduğum “Explaining the Evolution of EU
Migration Policies From Past to Present: Towards an Eclectic Approach” adlı
çalışmanın, tarafımdan, bilimsel ahlak ve geleneklere aykırı düşecek bir yardıma başvurmaksızın yazıldığını ve yararlandığım eserlerin bibliyografyada gösterilenlerden oluştuğunu, bunlara atıf yapılarak yararlanılmış olduğunu belirtir ve bunu onurumla doğrularım.
…../…./2011
iv
ÖZET Yüksek Lisans Tezi
Explaining the Evolution of EU Migration Policies From Past to Present: Towards an Eclectic Approach
Gönenç AKAR Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı
İngilizce Uluslararası İlişkiler Programı
Bu çalışma İkinci Dünya Savaşı’ndan günümüze kadar, AB’nin evrimleşen göç politikalarını ele almaktadır. AB ülkelerindeki göç politikalarını iki dönem olarak incelenmektedir. İlk dönem, ilk çabalardan Amsterdam Anlaşması’na kadar olan dönemi kapsamaktadır. Bu dönemdeki göç politikalarının gelişimini yapısal-işlevselcilik ve liberal hükümetlerarası kuramlar ile daha iyi değerlendirileceğini iddia etmektedir. İkinci dönem ile ilgili olarak, Amsterdam Anlaşmasıyla birlikte yetki ve karar verme mekanizmasında meydana gelen önemli değişiklikler ise rasyonel, sosyolojik ve tarihi kurumsalcı yaklaşımlar ile incelenmektedir. İlk dönemde, üye devletler göç politikaları konusundaki kendi otoritelerini topluluk yetkisine bırakmakta isteksizdi ve AB kurumları daha az rol oynamıştı. Bundan dolayı, AB göç politikaları Amsterdam Anlaşması’na kadar olan dönemde bağlayıcı olmayan bir şekilde gelişmişti. Fakat 1990’ların sonunda, üye devletler uluslararası arenadaki siyasal, ekonomik ve kültürel gelişmelerin ve AB’nin kendi içindeki gelişmelerin etkisiyle (örneğin süreç bağımlılığı, normatif değerler ve derinleşme süreci gibi) giderek göç konusundaki işbirliğinin gerekliliğini fark etmişlerdir. Göç politikaları hakkında işbirliği olmasına rağmen, ulusal çıkarlar hala daha önemini korumaktadır. Bu nedenden dolayı, devletler anlaşma yaparken kendilerine manevra alanları bırakarak işbirliğini daha kompleks hale getirmişlerdir. Kısaca, bu çalışma eklektik bir yaklaşım benimseyerek göç konusundaki tarihi gelişmeleri çeşitli AB Entegrasyon kuramları ile iki farklı dönemde incelemektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Göç, Göç Politikası, Avrupa Birliği, Maastricht
v
ABSTRACT Master Thesis
Explaining the Evolution of EU Migration Policies From Past to Present: Towards an Eclectic Approach
Gönenç AKAR Dokuz Eylül University Institute of Social Sciences Department of International Relations
International Relations Program
This study addresses the gradual evolution of the EU migration policies since the end of the Second World War until present. It analyzes migration policy of the EU member states in two periods. The first period starts from the initial attempts until the Amsterdam Treaty. It argues that neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism can better evaluate the evolution of the migration policies in this period. Regarding the second period, this study examines the significant changes beginning with the Treaty of Amsterdam in terms of the authority and the decision-making system through by rational, sociological and historical institutionalist approaches. In the former period, as the member states were reluctant to give their exclusive authority to the Community, the EU institutions played a little role. Thus, migration polices have evolved in a non-binding settlements until the Amsterdam Treaty. Beginning with the late-1990s, however, the member states have increasingly noticed the necessity of cooperation in migration related issues due to the political, economic and cultural developments in the international arena and in the EU itself (such as path-dependency, normative commitments and the deepening process). Although there is cooperation in migration issues, this study argues that national interests are still important; thus the member states keep manoeuvre areas which make the cooperation process more complex. Overall, this study adopts an eclectic approach in which the historical development of migration policy through several European integration theories in two time periods.
Key words: Migration, Migration Policy, European Union, Maastricht
vi
EXPLAINING THE EVOLUTION OF EU MIGRATION POLICIES FROM PAST TO PRESENT: TOWARDS AN ECLECTIC APPROACH
CONTENTS
TEZ ONAY SAYFASI ii
YEMİN METNİ iii
ÖZET iv ABSTRACT v CONTENTS vi ABBREVIATIONS viii INTRODUCTION 1 FIRST CHAPTER
AN OVERVIEW OF MIGRATION ISSUE
1.1.The Historical Development of Migration in Europe 9 1.2. Three Main Cycles of Migration in Europe 12
SECOND CHAPTER
THE EVOLUTION OF MIGRATION POLICIES UNTIL THE AMSTERDAM TREATY
2.1. Initial Steps in Migration Policy Formation 18 2.2. The Key Legal Issues 31
2.2.1. The Maastricht Treaty: Migration comes into the Institutional
Structure 31
2.2.2. Cooperation of Migration Policies under the Third Pillar of the
vii
THIRD CHAPTER
THE EVOLUTION OF MIGRATION POLICIES AFTER THE AMSTERDAM TREATY
3.1. Amsterdam Treaty: Shift to Community Pillar 40 3.2. Implementing Amsterdam Treaty: “Tampere Conclusions” 51 3.3. Enhancing Legal Framework through Summits: The Effect of 9/11
Attacks 56 3.4. Hague Program 2005-2010 59 3.5. Enlargement 62 CONCLUSION 68 REFERENCES 72
viii
ABBREVIATIONS
AHWGI Ad Hoc Working Group on Migration CEEC Central and East European Countries COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives EC European Council
ECJ European Court of Justice
EEC European Economic Community EP European Parliament
EU European Union
EURODAC EU automated fingerprint identification IOM International Organization for Migration JHA Justice and Home Affairs
1
INTRODUCTION
In the second half of the twentieth century, international migration emerged as a result of the integration of local communities and national economies into global economy and politics. Aside from being a pervasive and global phenomenon, migration has also become a major concern for the EU, due to the factors such as the increasing international migration mobility, the EU’s distinct geo-strategic role in the post-Cold War context and its enlargement process. Member states of the EU have developed diverse policies as an answer to these developments since the end of the Second World War. As migration is an evolving, increasing and significant fact in the enlarging EU, it remains at the center of focus of the EU scholars and international relations scholars in terms of policy changes and perceptions.
Regarding the gradual change and the development in migration policies of the European Union member states, this study analyzes the dynamics behind these policy changes in history by overviewing the significant milestones in their migration policies by applying a theoretical framework. The main research question guiding this thesis is “why current theoretical studies are unable to explain the gradual increase in cooperation on migration policies in the EU”.
This study argues that it is convenient to evaluate the gradual development of migration policies in the EU with an eclectic view for the prior and posterior period of the Amsterdam Treaty. The content and the process of cooperation alter according to how states perceive it. However, though state-centric theories give attention to interest-based policy options, they sometimes fail to explain the context of the cooperation. Thus, this thesis aims to combine the strengths and weaknesses of European Integration theories to examine this process by focusing on milestones in history since the post- Second World War until present.
Considering its significance in high politics, state-centric theories regard migration as a security matter, such as illegal migration and asylum. Thus, it predicts that states are expected to act unilaterally and unwilling to cooperate due to security
2 dilemma. However, in a contradicting manner, the EU members have also taken decisive steps to increase cooperation in migration in recent years. As this study discusses in Chapter three, Trevi Group (1976) and Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration (1986) were particularly interested in illegal migration problems. Schengen Treaty (1985) and Single European Act (1986) both sought to remove all border controls and to strengthen common external frontier. Palma Program (1988) aimed to provide cooperation between the free movement measures and the internal security involvement and Dublin Convention (1990) deals with asylum applications. These were the initial attempts in which there were minimal immigration policy involvement and informal intergovernmentalism. As the primary example of establishing international cooperation, the Maastricht Treaty (1993) placed migration under the third (intergovernmental) pillar. Later, as the study examines in Chapter four, Amsterdam Treaty (1999) introduced supranational attempts and as a milestone, it transformed the policies under the third pillar, including immigration and asylum, the rights of third country nationals, control of external borders, visas and administrative cooperation in these matters into the first pillar (EC jurisdiction). The Hague Program (2005) was also an action plan requiring EU action on freedom, justice and the security.
Therefore, the leading factors behind this increasing level of cooperation bears scrutiny. Accordingly, the main argument of this study is that state-centric theories are insufficient to explain the gradual cooperation in migration in the EU on its own, because it has an inadequate point of view due to their linkage with state sovereignty. Therefore, different approaches of the various theories, particularly the European integration theories including neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, rational-choice, sociological and historical institutionalism are both required to elucidate the gradual movement from informal intergovernmental cooperation to a more communitarized integration in immigration policy inside the EU. This study combines these theories since; migration policy and cooperation have also two main aspects; namely member states and institutions. On the one hand, migration is a part of the European integration and interests are still important in this sensitive subject, thus they have to be considered by theories such as
neo-3 functionalism and liberal-intergovernmentalism. On the other hand, the European institutions are effective on member states regarding cooperation which are covered by institutionalist approaches.
In general, neo-functionalism argues that interstate cooperation in one area will lead to cooperation in other related area. (spill-over) Furthermore, when the cooperation among states expands and the cross national networks become dense, states are likely to find common solutions to their problems.1 Contrarily, liberal intergovernmentalism argues that rational actions of the states are affected by domestic pressures or external pressures. In this context, member states make cooperation with the aim of reducing their negative externalities and transactions costs.2
New institutionalism tries to understand that “why and under what conditions” member-states may delegate power to supranational agents. In general, they emphasize the significance of political institutions as mediating systems in the process of policy making both “with regard to power to constrain and to enable policy formulation”.3 Evaluating the social context, international world order and the interactions among the actors, they argue that institutions evolve and develop a significant degree of autonomy on actors by constraining or structuring politics through ideas and meanings. Insititutionalist approaches seem to explain the ‘mediating variable’ character of institutions that provide a strategic context and a historical path-dependency for the member states.
This study further argues that, although the state-centric theories fail to explain the gradual cooperation in migration-related studies in the EU, it successfully asserts that member states did not completely give up their interests or national
1Anthony Messina, The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 150.
2 Andreas Ette and Thomas Faist “The Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration: Research, Questions and Concepts”, The Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration: Between Autonomy and the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, p. 8.
3 Alexandra Formanek, “Managing Asylum: A Critical Examination of Emerging Trends in European Refugee and Migration Policy, McGill University, Quebec, 2004, p. 15
4 sovereignty. Instead, in some part of the migration-related issues where member states are tense and not open to cooperation, they protect themselves with a room to manoeuvre by prerogatives, opt-out mechanism and controlling the free movement of persons, ensuring law and order and safeguarding internal security which prevents us from eliminating the state-based theories from the argument. Indeed, institutionalist approaches are criticized for ignoring the content and reasons of state interests. They often do not mention the reason of flexibility of the institutions towards state interests.
During the 1990s, there were some critical developments in the international arena such as the dissolution of Yugoslavia leading to asylum applications and illegal migration, the establishment of the common market, and increasing economic, political and the cultural effect of the globalization which cause the rise of immigration. As a result of these developments, member states became aware of the fact that intergovernmental cooperation would not effectively overcome their problems. As internal and external developments induce cooperation; supranational elements became more effective regarding migration policy in the EU. As one scholar argues, “immigration-related issues have transcended their historical status as ‘low’ questions of domestic public policy to become ‘high’ issues of national and increasingly supranational policy and politics”.4
Migration is a developing significant issue in the international arena for various reasons. First, the number of the international migrants has rapidly increased, and is predicted to increase further in the near future.5 Second, this subject is not the problem of only a few countries in the world, but to some extent affects all countries. Third, significant global issues like development, poverty and human rights are all linked with migration. Fourth, migrants are “dynamic members of
4 Messina, p. 138.
5 Migration has continued to increase since mid-1980s both in Europe and in the US. In 2000, 40% of the total migrants in the world lived in Western industrialized states, covering nearly 19 million in the EU.
Fiona B. Adamson, “Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security”, International Security, Vol. 31, No1, 2006, pp. 169-170. technological and cultural changes occurred, then cross-border process with transnational dimensions outspreaded and gained importance.5 As a result, people from different countries were moving across various countries mostly for economic and/or political.
5 society” in terms of economy.6 These migrants affect economic structure of the receiving states as skilled or unskilled workers. Finally, migration has a connection with both high politics including sovereignty and security, and low politics such as economics and demographic issues. Therefore, it has a sensitive place in terms of state policies. Moreover, migration is particularly important in that it directly and simultaneously affects both international politics and at the same time domestic politics.
It is possible to assess migration from a variety of theoretical approaches, including push-pull theory, neoclassical economic theory, liberal theory, labor-market theory or world systems theory. Ernest Ravenstein argues that push-pull process directs the migration and many scholars concur with this argument. Sjaastad (1962) and Todaro (1969) point out neoclassical economic theory relates international migration to the global supply and demand for labor. Furthermore, labor- market theory was developed by Piore in 1979 who argues that “immigrants are recruited to fill these jobs that are necessary for the overall economy to function but are avoided by the native-born population because of the poor working conditions associated with the secondary labor market”.7 World-systems theory similarly regards migration as a product of global capitalism. Thus, migration occurs from periphery to center emanating from their structural economic problems (push factors) as the result of industrialized world.8 In all of these theories, the cause of migration is often based on the needs in different periods of time and various regions in the world.
This thesis concerns two main audiences, including the European migration studies and IR theories. Most of the existing studies on migration include partial or complete descriptive/ historical analysis without a theoretical base. (Elsen: 2007, Boswell: 2003, Stalker: 2002, Moraes: 2003) While this study does not explore a
6 Khalid Koser, International Migration- A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p. 1.
7
“Migration- Theories of Migration”, http://family.jrank.org/pages/1170/Migration-Theories-Migration.html, 08,06,2010
8 “Migration- Theories of Migration”,
6 brand new subject, it aims to contribute to the existing literature with a different point of view for the literature that is with an eclectic approach the issue. This thesis is based on a deductive approach which means that it derives its conclusions from the EU integration process and structural, legal and institutional developments, which regard migration issue through a combination of theoretical approaches. Therefore, starting from the first chapter, the study attempts to harmonize the developments regarding migration with theory, rather than writing a separate theory chapter. By this way, it aims to evaluate the subject by trying to fill out the theoretical gaps in the literature. This thesis makes an analysis of various theories including liberal intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism, rational-choice, historical and sociological (constructivist) institutionalism which are necessary for evaluating the subject from different point of views.
The first chapter introduces the historical development of migration and migration policy-making in three main cycles to the continent following the Second World War. Initial flow of migration started with a labor recruitment by European member states to supply their labor needs for the market. Family reunification comprised the second flow in the 1970s and illegal migration following the dissolution of Yugoslavia emerged as the third flow. During the period of these three flows, within realist attitudes, member states of the European Community recruited labor from outside of the Europe to fulfill their needs and assumed that migrants would return in the future. Thus, member states intended to supply their short-term needs. However, as the process of European integration was continuing, they have taken informal steps related with the never-ending migration to the continent, including the illegal migration flow of the 1990s. Depending on the integrationist policies inside the Community, as member states in the EU get closer in terms of economic and monetary affairs, political ties and common foreign and security policies, formerly unrelated issues like immigration become a part of the gradually rising interstate cooperation. However, in this cooperation, there was the autonomy of national leaders in which the nation-state has the power to frame the international migration and control its national territory by itself.
7 The second chapter briefly outlines the initial framework of migration policy-making including the Schengen Agreement, Single European Act, Trevi Group, Palma Program, Dublin Convention and the Maastricht Treaty. The study clarifies that regarding the developments until the Maastricht Treaty, as a part of an informal intergovernmentalism, member states participated in these attempts to protect their interests and find mutual solutions to their common problems in migration-related issues without delegating their authority. The most important step in this part is the Maastricht Treaty which introduced the three-pillar structure of the Community framework and put migration related issues under the third pillar. In this context, the Commission and the member states share the ‘right of initiative’ in the third pillar for decisions regarding immigration. Significantly, the Maastricht Treaty formally emphasized the need for a serious common migration policy. However, the period of Maastricht Treaty was only a formal intergovernmental cooperation as the member states were still reluctant to restrict their national sovereignty. Therefore, many decisions were made in a non-binding nature and institutions had limited effect on member states in the third pillar.
Third chapter discusses the Amsterdam Treaty as a legal framework which put most of the migration related issues under community (first) pillar and brought legal amendments in the structure of the decision-making system. In fact, as the chapter underlines, the cooperation of member states contradicts the arguments of the state-centric theories which claims that since nation states are the primary actor and is prone to act unilaterally, it would avoid cooperation with each other. However, the same chapter also points out that the state-centric theories fail to explain the degree and the depth communitarization of immigration policy after the Amsterdam Treaty (1999). Moreover, they fail to explain how coordination and harmonization can be possible in a subject so closely related to the state sovereignty.
Within the Amsterdam Treaty, particularly to prepare themselves and the union for further enlargements, EU member states delegated their authority to the Community. However, the member-states started to cooperate in security issues that were related to the immigration flows. Their security concerns particularly symbolize
8 the “lowest common denominator” for the member states towards a supranational cooperation. Accordingly, regarding the rational choice institutionalism, the institutions such as the EU are strategic contexts in which member states provide incentives or information. As a result, with the effect of the internal and external factors in the international arena above, the Amsterdam Treaty was a significant benchmark for further community framework through rules, routines and norms in the context of (historical) institutionalist and sociological perspective.
Furthermore, the third chapter also analyzes the Tampere Conclusions which laid down the policy principles of the Amsterdam Treaty until 2005. While the Amsterdam Treaty contributes to the process by providing a supranational authority for the implementation of migration-related issues, it has also shortcomings due to its fragmented communitarisation, implementation problems and opt-out mechanism. However, the cooperation process continued with Summits which provided the possibility of arguing the treatment of the system. Later, the Hague Program has a similar content with the Amsterdam Treaty and represents the road map for a period 2005 to 2010. Based on these points, this chapter therefore argues that, sociological institutionalist approaches help pointing out the effect of the EU on member states as an institutional actor by its rules, norms and routines including the legal framework.
The third chapter further examines the accession of the new members by 2004 and 2007 enlargement, and touches on the relation between migration and enlargement concerning free movement, labor need and public policy. Enlargements of the European Union in 2004 and 2007 have affected the policy choices of member states concerning immigration. Member states are mostly reluctant to allow accession to new members due to fear of integration, job/market problems emanating from income differences or xenophobia; member states thus seek to balance their fear with their need of enlargement because of their aging population, global competitiveness and growth, and the sustainability of social security systems, and also make inter-state cooperation regarding migration.
9
FIRST CHAPTER
AN OVERVIEW OF MIGRATION ISSUE
There have been three main flows of migration to Europe and all had different structures. The driving force of the migration wave following the Second World War was to fulfill the exhausted and depleted labor source of the Europe with labors coming from outside. As the resurgence of the European economy depends on this issue, European countries supported migration flow in this period by maintaining it with their existing colonial ties or with bilateral country relations. Especially beginning from 1960s, globalization of markets increased the labor migration. As a result, within the logic of realism, western industrialized states have formed their immigration policy “to regulate labor markets through the use of foreigners”.9 The main view of the European states that the migration would be temporary. They thought that in time, these labors would return to their home countries when they earned enough money that may contribute to the development of their countries, however that did not come true. This situation, which is argued in detail below, will be one of the significant propelling reasons that have enforced the EU in taking a common stand regarding migration.
1.1.Historical Development of Migration in Europe
History is significant for this study because it tries to fulfill theoretical gaps through analyzing the changes from the beginning of migration in Europe to today. The history of migration to Europe can be evaluated in three main cycles to better understand how the member states’ national responses and also supranational actors’ attempts have shaped the course of migration policy.
In the 18th and 19th centuries, migration was free and did not require any documents. Until 1914, the main driving forces behind international migration were the “dynamics of colonization and the push and pull of economic and demographic
9 Alexander Caviedes, “The Open Method of Co-ordination in Immigration Policy: A Tool for Prying Open Fortress Europe?”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2004, p. 291.
10 forces”.10 At the beginning of 20th century, the main factors driving migration were colonies and economic and demographic relations among colonial countries. After the World War I, however imperialism ended, and decolonization process took over. Thus, economic migration was replaced by political migration referring to individuals who are seeking to cross borders to escape political persecution or violent conflict.11 Political migration included many displaced persons, refugees and asylum seekers that would cross the national borders in the 20th century. From that time onwards, open migration regimes of the 18th and 19th century turned to close migration regimes in which travel would be possible only with documentation.12
Second World War was a huge destruction for all its participants. Europe, which was the main battle field, entered into an economically troublesome period following its end. Millions of people had died in various European countries; industrial and agricultural production had many problems and the city infrastructures entirely collapsed. Further, pressing social problems arose including the mass movement of people following the war, along with persistent problems of sheltering. While the European continent was an exporter of population in earlier decades, following the Second World War, it became the “destination of substantial waves of immigration”.13 Due to these problems between 1945 and 1993, nearly thirty-one million migrants and refugees moved through the international borders of Western Europe.14 At the end of the war, there were dramatic population shifts reaching nearly 15 million people who were transferred from one country to another as returnees and expellees. Particularly, as a result of the border changes, especially between Germany, Poland, and the former Czechoslovakia, many people were forced to relocate. In 1950, 30% of the West Germany was composed of refugees.
10 James F. Hollifield, “The Emerging Migration State”, International Migration Review, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2004, p. 890.
11 Adamson, p. 173. 12
Ibid.
13 Ceri Peach, “Postwar Migration to Europe: Reflux, Influx, Refuge”, Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 2, 1997, p. 269.
11 Nevertheless, migration flow slowed down at the beginning of the mid-1950s and then continued at lower levels until the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961.15
Following the end of the Second World War, due to their interdependent economics European countries therefore had to cooperate for their economic reconstruction. The basic formal cooperation attempt among the EC member states was the free movement of the EC citizens.16 Accordingly, the Treaty of Rome (1957), which created an ‘intra-EU migration policy’, also provided free movement for workers along the free movement of services, goods and capital.17 It further guaranteed that “a citizen of one member country could travel to another country to work or seek work”.18 However, the free movement of workers here referred to the movement among member states. In this context, national regulation of the countries was responsible and authoritative for the much larger flows from outside the EEC. As a result, the EC members had distinct national responses for ‘the unplanned process of family reunion’ and ‘ethnic community formation’ in the following years.19 At that point, it was obvious that in fact, states preferred to have the control rather than delegating it to a supranational authority which shows a parallelism with the state-centric theories.
While national governments controlled immigration in Europe, these policies differed from one country to another as well as from one period to another. Thus, countries have shaped and direct their own national migration policies according to the needs and interests of the country itself. The existence of “frictions and strains” among the member states in particular has been effectual in the emerging differences in their subsequent policy developments regarding migration.20 The term of
15
Peter Stalker, “Migration Trends and Migration Policy in Europe”, International Migration, Vol. 40, No.5, 2002, p. 152.
16 Claude Moraes, “The Politics of European Union Migration Policy”, Political Quarterly, Vol.74, No.1, 2003, p. 117.
17 Andrew Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, Sage Publications, Great Britain, 2005, p. 129.
18 Stalker, p. 167.
19 Stephen Castles, “Why Migration Policies Fail?”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2004, p. 217.
20 Joanna Apap, Sergio Carrera, “Progress and Obstacles in the Area of Justice & Home Affairs in an Enlarging Europe”, CEPS Working Document, 2003, No: 194, http://aei.pitt.edu/1818/01/WD194.pdf
12 “ideologies of migration” can help to better understand the variety emanating from different “patterns of political and social thought”.21 It basically means that member states may have different determinants about the migration-related policies; thus disagreements can emerge among the countries in the EU. This pattern of ideologies on migration then shapes many other related subjects, such as “citizenship and belonging, rights and responsibilities of members, and obligations toward non-members”.22 As a result of these ideological, political and institutional factors, various discourses on inclusion and exclusion have emerged in different European states.23
1.2.Three Main Cycles of Migration to Europe
The first period of this migration flow was between 1950s and 1973-74 and migration in this period reached its peak in the 1960s.24 In this period, there was a significant flow of under-skilled labor from the southern countries to the north in Europe.25 Following the destruction of the war, European economies, which gradually recovered themselves, entered into an unprecedented economic boom. Consequently, there was a huge demand for workers especially by Germany, France, and the UK, which were falling short of labor.26 Accordingly, labor needs of the European countries conducted this first period of migration.
As domestic labor could no longer cover the need, many countries in Europe thus sought out outside labor for their economic reconstruction.27 Accordingly, European countries such as the UK, France, Belgium and Netherlands with a long colonial past started to tap into their colonial ties to meet their labor need.28
21
Christina Boswell, European Migration in Flux: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Blackwell, 2003, p. 3.
22 Ibid. 23 Ibid.
24 Geddes, The Politics of Migration…, p. 17.
25 Channe Lindstrøm, “ European Union Policy on Asylum and Immigration. Addressing the Root Causes of Forced Migration: A Justice and Home Affairs Policy of Freedom, Security and Justice?”, Social Policy and Administration, Vol. 39, No.6, 2005, p. 589.
26
Stalker, p. 153.
27 Randall Hansen, “Migration to Europe since 1945: Its History and Its Lessons”, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 74, No. 1, 2003, p. 25
13 Meanwhile, those countries without substantial colonial ties, such as Germany, chose to recruit labor particularly from those countries that were close to Western Europe, including the former Yugoslavia and Turkey.29 European countries seeking foreign labor also signed bilateral agreements and undertook legal proceedings for resident permits in order to facilitate the entry of migrant workers.30 As a result of these efforts, during this period, the “net immigration for Western Europe reached around 10 million (compared with net outflows of 4 million for the period from 1914 to 1949)”.31
Between 1960s and mid-1970s, many of the Northwestern European states continued to receive a large number of mostly low or under skilled male workers from the Mediterranean countries.32 Worker migrants from Portugal, Spain, Italy, former Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia went to Europe for the labor markets in Germany, France, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands. Accordingly, destination for immigration was shaped through the relations among the sending and the receiving countries such as Germany with Turkey, France with the Maghreb and the Iberian Peninsula, Switzerland with Italy and Spain, Belgium with Italy and Morocco, and the Netherlands with Turkey and Morocco.33 In general, immigrants in Southern Europe preferred migrating into North European countries due to the income differences between these countries, the power of the labor market in the host country and the existence of strong ties in the country of destination.34 All these unskilled migrants usually came for a short-term or seasonal basis, and particularly worked in agriculture, construction, and manufacturing, as well as in the service sectors, such as hotels and catering.35
29 Maria I. Baganha et als., “International Migration and Its Regulation”, Dynamics of Migration and Settlement in Europe : A State of the Art, (eds.) Rinus Penninx, Maria Berger and Karen Kraal, Amsterdam, NLD: Amsterdam University Press, 2006, p. 20- 21.
30 Ibid.
31 Stalker p. 153.
32 Philip Muus, “International Migration and the European Union, Trends and Consequences”, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2001, p. 33.
33
Muus, p. 33.
34 Fabio Franchino, “Perspectives on European Immigration Policies”, European Union Politics, Vol.10, No. 3, 2009, p. 409.
14 As a whole, the logic behind the first period of immigration in Europe was to meet the labor needs of the countries. Subsequently, member states sought to fulfill their market demand as needed. The assumption of the European countries that received labor immigrants was that when immigrants finished their tasks most of them would return to their ‘home countries’. Provision of economic recovery in their country of origin would be another reason for the remaining part of the migrants to return to their countries. The remaining small residual part of the immigrants was therefore not expected to cause “serious social or cultural problems”.36 However, “the guests stayed” in much larger numbers than the host countries had expected.37
This unexpected outcome gradually became an important fact and carried immigration to a higher level of importance in the EU agenda. Furthermore, beginning from 1970s, migration issue also started to appear on the agenda of European political parties. They gradually understood that immigration not only affected their economies and labor markets, but it also concerned their “welfare, social services and social cohesion”.38 As more migrants preferred to stay in the European countries, problems concerning their political or social rights and integration into the host country escalated. In addition to the stay of these migrants, another flow of migration raised including their families.
The second migration flow (family migration) began in mid 1970s, and continued until the end of 1980s. The northern countries ended their labor recruitment due to a general economic slowdown and steeply rising oil prices due to Yom Kippur War in the Middle East.39 Then, by 1973-1974, family migration remained as the main form of migration with the aim of reuniting the families that had been unsettled in the earlier decades. Here, the term family reunion refers to the family members like spouses and children of settled migrants.40 During these years, most of the European governments avoided ‘punitive measures’ and allowed family
36 Baganha et al., p. 21.
37
Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, p. 15. 38 Boswell, European Migration in Flux…, p. 3.
39 Peach, p. 276.
15 members of the existing immigrants to join them.41 However, by late 1970s, European countries had already discovered that short-term migration turned into a long-term settlement.42
During this recession period, European countries again “expected guest workers to leave”.43 These unskilled and cheap labors had arrived in the European labor market during periods of ‘high growth and low employment’. Although the recession period affected the sectors of heavy industry and manufacturing negatively, in which they worked, the ‘return rates’ of the workers, especially from non-EU countries, were low.44 Meanwhile, labor migrants that came from the Southern European countries returned to their homeland depending on the economic and political developments in their own countries. Therefore, countries such as Spain, Italy and Greece in particular experienced higher ‘return rates’, due to “improvements in the economies, the return to the democracy (Spain, Greece, Portugal) and the existing or forthcoming membership of the European Community”.45
During this second period, initial attempts concerning migration-related issues started in the European Community. Member states discerned the need to consult each other and cooperate in migration-related issues to take effective steps, particularly on economic integration.46 As a whole, beginning from these years until 1986, there was a policy-making attempt in national immigration policies. During these years, immigration policies were under national control. Formal attempts for closer cooperation in the community method of decision-making were therefore rejected.47 However, important cooperative developments in migration policy in this period did occur, including the establishment of the TREVI Group48 in 1976 to deal
41 Stalker, p. 153.
42 Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, p.15. 43 Stalker, p. 153.
44 Hollifield, p. 895, Muus, p. 33. 45 Muus, p. 33.
46 Bill Jordan, Bo Strath and Anna Triandafyllidou, “Contextualising Immigration Policy Implementation in Europe”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2003, p.208. 47 Ette and Faist, p. 5.
48 “The Trevi group was set up in 1976 by the 12 EC states to counter terrorism and to coordinate policing in the EC. The group's work is based on intergovernmental cooperation between the 12 states,
16 with internal security measures, and Schengen Agreement in 1985 to ensure “cooperation on mutual abolishment of internal border controls and the development of compensating internal security measures”.49
The third period of migration flow began around the end of Cold War in 1989-1990. After the Cold War ended, as a result of the collapse of the USSR and the associated collapse of socialist systems in Western Europe, there was a substantial growth in the number of asylum seekers moving into the Western Europe from the East.50 In this new form of migration, people from troubled areas around the world, but particularly Eastern Europeans fled from the conflict and sought asylum in Western Europe.51 In this new migration flow, in Western Europe, Germany has remained the favorite country for asylum seekers.52 Other important destination countries in the EU have included France and the UK and smaller countries like the Netherlands and Sweden.53 In this period, aside from war or conflicts, dissatisfaction about the political conditions in the country of origin also influenced people to migrate. Particularly, in the existence of a repressive regime in which people could not benefit from their voting rights effectively, such political and social instability caused people to move to more democratic states with better conditions.54
These developments have resulted with the diversification of the country of origins of international migrants throughout the Europe.55 In terms of numbers, from 1989 to 1998, “more than 4 million people applied for asylum in Europe, 43 percent of whom came from elsewhere in Europe, 35 per cent from Asia, and 19 per cent from Africa”.56 However, due to the growing pressure about the amount and the structure of migration, Western European governments have started to tighten up on a process which excludes the main EC institutions - the European Commission and the European Parliament.”
Tony Bunyan, “Trevi, Europol and the European State”, http://www.statewatch.org/news/handbook-trevi.pdf, 08,06,2010.
49 Ette and Faist, pp. 5-6.
50 Peach, p. 277, Hollifield, p. 898. 51 Stalker, p. 153, Muus, p.34. 52 Muus, p. 34.
53 Ibid, p.34. 54
Margıt Kraus, Robert Schwager, “EU Enlargement and Immigration”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 42, No.1, 2003, pp. 167-168.
55 Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, p.17. 56 Stalker, p. 153.
17 asylum applications. Consequently, an increasing number of people have sought to enter these countries illegally by traveling on their own initiative or through the help of smugglers.57 Compared to previous periods, more European countries faced the effects of international migration in this period.58
In this period, member states’ immigration policy had different and sometimes even contradictory goals. As Bendel argues migration policies may include “the restriction and control of immigration, the protection of refugees, the prevention of refugee movements, the integration of migrants or the attraction of special groups of immigrants”, such as those that are highly skilled.59 Although powerful domestic actors in states often tend to ‘welcome’ the flow of capital and commodities, they can also regard immigration and cultural differences as ‘potential threats’ to national sovereignty and identity.60 This is because migration easily removes the transnational boundaries between languages, cultures, ethnic groups and nation-states. Therefore, it can also create problems for “cultural traditions, national identity and political institutions” and reduce the autonomy of nation-states.61 Nation-states regard migration as a potential economic or political threat is due to its dual effect while it can contribute to development and play an important role in improved social and economic conditions, it can also cause economic stagnation and social inequality. As a result, many governments and political movements tend to restrict, rather than promote the flow of international migration.62
In the following chapter, non-binding formal and informal initial attempts regarding migration policies in the EU will be analyzed. To name all, the Schengen Treaty, Single European Act, Dublin Convention, Palma Program and particularly the Maastricht Treaty will be examined with the help of old integrationist theories; neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism.
57 Stalker, p. 153.
58 Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, p.17.
59 Petra Bendel, “Immigration Policy in the European Union: Still bringing up the walls for fortress Europe?”, Migration Letters, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2005, p. 23.
60 Castles, “Why Migration Policies Fail?”, p. 211, Stephen Castles, “International Migration at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Global Trends and Issues”, International Social Science Journal, Vol. 52, No. 165, 2000, p. 271.
61 Castles, “International Migration at the Beginning…”, p. 269. 62 Ibid.
18
SECOND CHAPTER
THE EVOLUTION OF MIGRATION POLICIES UNTIL THE AMSTERDAM TREATY
2.1.Initial Steps in Migration Policy Formation
This part of the thesis examines the initial intergovernmental attempts including the Trevi Group (1976), Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration (1986), Schengen Treaty (1985), Single European Act (1986), Palma Program (1988), Dublin Convention (1990) and the Maastricht Treaty (1993). It argues that state-centric theories, and liberal intergovernmentalist and neo-functionalist theories emerged as the leading theories for the period until the Amsterdam Treaty. Accordingly, this part evaluates formal and informal intergovernmental developments about EU migration policy from the end of the Second World War until the Amsterdam Treaty.
The factors which led to migration since the end of 1980s differ from those during the post-colonial period and the subsequent guest worker immigration waves of the 1950s, 60s and 70s due to the changes in the international context. After the Cold War, new migration- related questions arose, including the rapidly increasing number of migrants, their increasing ability to travel from one place to another, the rapidly increasing facilities for international communication and the rising numbers of Diaspora.63 Resulting from the change in the international context, structure and interactions, perceptions have changed.
As a result of the increasing levels of migration in all around the world since the end of 1980s, migration gradually entered the agenda of all European countries, particularly since the end of the Cold War. The process of the European integration during 1980s and 90s changed the member-state based approach in migration related matters towards cooperation. First of all, Kicinger and Saczuk point out ‘outside challenges’, such as increase in illegal immigration, human trafficking, asylum crisis
63 Adrian Favell, “Europeanisation of immigration politics”, European integration online papers, Vol. 2, No.10, 1998, p. 2.
19 and growing economic migration pressure.64 As an answer to these challenges, EEC/EU member states have sought common solutions. Thus, at first they have taken cohesive, joint actions and later delegated their competency in migration-related issues to the community level. In this context, delegation is a matter of institutional arrangement which provide a choice to “overcome problems of collective action” in which actors hope benefits from that long-term cooperation.65 Put differently, institutional choice here is functional that actors choose them due to their “intended effects”.66
Secondly, Geddes links the impetus for composing a common EU migration policy to the factors of economic interdependence and globalization.67 In the end of 20th century, globalization has also emerged as a significant and world-wide effective phenomenon influencing political, economic and also cultural aspects. Globalization mainly involves “the rapid increase in cross-border flows” including flows of capital, commodities, ideas and people.68 In today’s world system, globalization has also salient effects on the process of migration. For instance, “falling transportation costs, increasing economic integration, path-dependent migration linkages, structural demand for labor within host states and global demographics” are the leading elements that indicate the continuing increases in immigration flows into the developed world.69
To understand the increasing cooperation and integration efforts in politics of migration in the European Union since 1980s, two theories of European integration; intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism particularly stand out. The main factor differentiating these two theories is “the question of which political actors have
64 Anna Kicinger and Katarzyna Saczuk. “Migration Policy in the European Perspective- Development and Future Trends”, Central European Forum for Migration Research, 2004,
http://www.cefmr.pan.pl/docs/cefmr_wp_2004-01.pdf, 01, 12, 2009, p. 9.
65 Hussein Kassim and Anand Menon, The principal–agent approach and the study of the European Union: promise unfulfilled?”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 10, No.1, 2003, p. 123. 66 Kicinger, Saczuk, p. 9.
67 Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, p. 127. 68
Castles, “Why Migration Policies Fail?”, p. 211, Castles, “International Migration at the Beginning…”, p. 271.
69 Wayne A. Cornelius and Marc R. Rosenblum, “Immigration and Politics”, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 8, 2005, p.106.
20 decisive influence on the integration process”.70 While neo-functionalism emphasizes the “autonomy of supranational officials”, liberal intergovernmentalism emphasizes the “autonomy of national leaders”.71
First of all, neo-functionalism emerged from the ideas of Ernst Haas.72 It supports the view that based on the logic of spill-over, the interstate cooperation in one field leads to cooperation in other related areas.73 Neo-functionalist theory, rooted in theories of interdependence, analyzes that pressure arising from single market integration and also increasing global economic and political change in world politics lead states to seek for international solutions for their domestic problems.74 When internationalization of economy leads to economic interdependence and globalization, it also decreases state sovereignty.75 Then, following the decline of the transaction costs76 of international migration, national borders therefore become more permeable and ‘post national members’ like migrant workers and noncitizens acquire basic citizenship rights due to the effects of globalization. As a result, states’ power of regulating immigration gradually flows and seriously ‘erodes’.77 Put differently, “the self-preserving nature of immigration, the constraining impact of economic imperatives and international legal norms” were ‘eroding’ the territorial and functional foundations of the nation state and decreased the ability of states to control migration, they brought European states closer under the subject of the “fortress Europe”.78
Supranationalism within neo-functionalist theory approach emphasize that as interstate policy cooperation increases, states find common solutions to their mutual
70 Torsten J. Selck, Mark Rhinard, Frank M. Häge, “The Evolution of European Legal Integration”, European Journal of Law Economy, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2007, p. 189
71 Jensen, “Neo-functionalism”, pp. 94-95.
72 Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, Palgrave, England, 2000, p. 54
73Carsten Stroby Jensen, “Neo-functionalism”, European Union Politics, (ed.) Michelle Cini, Oxford University Press. 2003, p. 85.
74 Andrew Geddes, “ International Migration and State Sovereignty in an Integrating Europe”, International Migration, Vol. 39, No. 6, 2001, p. 28.
75 Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, p. 127. 76
It defines those risks and penalties that arise when actors engage in negotiation with one another. Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, p. 116.
77 Messina, p. 149.
21 problems.79 Put differently, as member states in the EU get closer in terms of economic and monetary affairs, political ties and common foreign and security policies, formerly unrelated issues like immigration become a part of the gradually rising interstate cooperation. In time, as the number of significant agreements between member states increase, they transfer “more of their traditional authority and responsibility” about immigration issues to intergovernmental and later supranational institutions.80 However, neo-functionalist theory falls short of explaining some factors of the integration process such as the diversity of expectations and interests among the member states.81
Liberal intergovernmentalism favors the role of nation-states in the process of European integration. It perceives integration as a “zero-sum game” in which integration is limited to policy areas that do not concern crucial issue of state sovereignty. In European integration, interests and actions of nation states drive the process.82 Nation-state has the power to manage migration and their rational choices of policies are constrained by external pressures and domestic political pressures. In this state-centric point of view, first of all, the external pressures resulting from increasing international migration and crime lead to the ‘convergence of national preferences’ and hence build a “precondition” for cooperation. 83 Put differently, member states cooperate under the framework of the EU to abstain from the “negative externalities and transaction costs” such as protection of the external borders or integration problems.84
As Moravcsik argues, while establishing cooperative regimes, states reach their gains by regarding their preferences.85 Liberal intergovernmentalism here
79
Messina, p. 150. 80 Ibid, pp. 156-157.
81 Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, p. 101
82 Cini, p. 94. In this context, intergovernmentalism has taken from realist and neo-realist theory regarding interstate bargaining. Particularly, neo-realists argue that “international institutions of all kinds are established to reduce the level of anarchy within the states system, and see the EU as just another of these institutions, albeit within a highly institutionalized setting”. Accordingly, this symbolizes the influence of neo-realism on intergovernmentalism. Cini, pp. 94-95
83
Ette, Faist, p. 8. 84 Ibid.
85 Andrew MacMullen, “Intergovernmental Functionalism? The Council of Europe in European Integration”, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2004, p. 408.
22 asserts “a liberal theory of national preference formation, a bargaining theory of international negotiations and a functional theory of institutional choice” in its concentrated framework.86 As liberal intergovernmentalism suggests, mainly “international interdependence, opportunities for international economic exchange, and the dominant economic interests in national society” modify the preferences of states in the European integration.87 Accordingly, in history, EU member states had acted together only in those cases when the costs of compromised sovereignty explicitly outweigh the advantages of collective action.88 (agreements on a lowest common denominator)
It further argues that, secondly, rather than exogenous ones, domestic political constraints motivate nation states to cooperate in immigration related matters.89 (domestic pluralism) Put differently, factors such as “public opinion, extreme right-wing parties, economic actors, ethnic groups and constitutional courts” cause reduction of control regarding the immigration issue.90 For instance, to reply the growing political criticism from xenophobic electorates and also by anti-immigrant groups, EU governments are increasingly cooperating on immigration-related issues to extend their “individual and collective capacity” to decrease non-EU immigration”.91 Moreover, as a more specific example of using the EU to fulfill domestic policy change was the 1993 reform of Article 16 of the German Constitution that initiated the principle of safe third countries and made it one of its main elements.92
Accordingly, member states develop a common EU immigration policy to avoid domestic legal and political constraints to attain their domestic policy
86 Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”, European Integration Theory, (eds.) Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 76-77.
87 Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union”, International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 1, 2001, p. 49. 88 Messina, p. 155.
89 Messina, p. 152, Domestic Pluralism, here confirms one-half of the liberal institutionalist model of Moravscik which argues that “state behavior reflects the rational actions of governments constrained… by domestic societal pressures”.
90 Ette, Faist, p. 8. 91
Messina, p. 152.
92 Eiko R. Thielemann, ““The ‘Soft’ Europeanisation of Migration Policy: European Integration and Domestic Policy Change”, 2001, ECSA Seventh Biennial International Connference,
23 objectives.93 Thus, independent from the intensity of the domestic political pressure changing from one country to another, EU governments are highly motivated to delegate responsibility for immigration policy to higher bureaucratic levels to remove this problematic policy area from their domestic political agendas.94 Member states seek to embody the interaction between domestic and the EU level. Accordingly, they may affect current policy models by installing “preferred policies” in order to minimize the costs of subsequent domestic adaptation.95 Thus, in such a case, cooperation on immigration strengthens state sovereignty rather than weakens it, as liberal intergovernmentalism suggests.96
In the period from 1957 to 1986, there was minimal immigration policy involvement in national migration policies. During the post-Second World War period, nation-states had the authority over the policies on immigration in general and the integration of ethnic minorities in particular. Immigrants who came into the continent as the former members of the colonies or as contractual guest workers therefore fell under the ‘exclusive responsibility’ of the host country. European governments at the time behaved carefully about “asserting control over the policing of borders, and the power to decide who is a member of the country and who is not (in citizenship and nationality laws)”.97 Thus, every state has an “exclusive competence to regulate all kinds of relations developed on its territory and to execute legal norms passed by proper authorities”.98
During the process, European countries managed migration policies with the understanding that they were a “prerogative” for themselves.99” They formed their government policies for immigration with an attempt to control its flows in their
93 Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, p. 127. 94 Messina, p. 152.
95 Andrew Geddes, “The Europeanisation of What? Migration, Asylum and the Politics of European Integration”, The Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration: Between Autonomy and the European Union, (eds.) Thomas Faist, Andreas Ette, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 57.
96
Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, p. 127. 97 Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, p. 127. 98 Kicinger, Saczuk, p. 4
24 national interest.100 Based on the sovereignty principle and following their national interests which they defined as being secure and having a stable economy, the European governments considered themselves as responsible for the conditions regarding the entry and residence of immigrants. Member states of the EU adopted and mainly pursued state-centric policies regarding migration related issues during the post-war period up as a reflection of the international economic and political conditions.101 However, there were also examples of minimal cooperation including the formation of Trevi Group (1976) and Schengen Agreement (1985). Trevi Group was formed by European Member States to cooperate on internal security measures.
The Schengen Agreement (signed in 1985) has been one of the earliest attempts about regulating national immigration policies within the European Community. It sought to find “multinational solutions” to member states’ migration problems. As a result of the declining transaction and transportation costs in the movement of people, many of the member states sought these multinational solutions to control migration flows.102 As a whole, the Schengen agreement aimed to remove all border controls and also tried to strengthen the common external frontier.103 It also included those issues that were related with the immigration and asylum policies and closely linked to security and public order.104
At the beginning, the Schengen Agreement (signed in 1985) was not a part of the European Community framework. However, it had a “communitarian vocation”, thus it was open to all member states.105 The agreement initially covered five member states which were France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.106 In this period, member states of Schengen Treaty then started to compose common policies on “asylum, immigration and visas, police cooperation
100 Ibid.
101 Caviedes, p. 291. 102 Ibid.
103 Stalker, p. 167. , Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, p. 130.
104 Umberto Melotti, “Migration Policies and Political Cultures in Europe: A Changing Trend”, Vol. 16, No. 2, International Review of Sociology, 2006, p. 200.
105 Ibid.
106 Besides France, Germany and the Benelux countries, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden are also signatories now.
25 and the exchange of information between national immigration and police authorities”.107 From 1990 to 1996, other member states also adopted the Schengen agreement, with the exception of the United Kingdom and Ireland.108 Beginning from this period, member states usually attain agreements on a lowest common denominator by apparently limiting the transfer of their sovereignty to supranational powers.109 Accordingly, flexibility option, a practice that opt-out choices have been offered to member states to allow their participation to prevent an unattractive or unacceptable agreements For instance, in Schengen Agreement, important concessions, including an “island exclusion” clause (without having to eliminate external borders), were offered to the UK, Ireland and Denmark to enable their participation, but they rejected. 110
Schengen cooperation thus only evolved among signatory countries outside the EU structure until the Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed in 1997 (and entered into force in 1999). From that time onwards, the Amsterdam Treaty integrated the provisions and decisions of Schengen and the ‘Schengen acquis' (that which has been acquired) became the acquis of the EU.111 As neo-functionalist theory argues, member states’ initial attempts about cooperation has accelerated more cooperation initiatives, accordingly their search for common goals had become “increasingly routinized and its fruits embedded in a series of EU treaties and institutions”.112
The changes in the nature of migration to the EU countries combined with the EU integration process which has propelled the search for a common policy on migration.113 Therefore, member states would get away from their “self-contained, bordered units” in which immigrants must integrate, and seek after a solution.114 The issue was not only about integrating migrants and minorities into “their more or less
107 Moraes, p. 117. 108 Melotti, p. 200.
109 Michelle Cini, “Intergovernmentalism”, European Union Politics, (ed.) Michelle Cini, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003, p. 103.
110 Messina, pp. 155-156.
111 Charles Elsen, “From Maastricht to The Hague: The Politics of Judicial and Police Cooperation”, ERA Forum, Vol. 8, No 1, 2007, p. 14.
112 Messina, p. 168. 113 Moraes, p. 117.
