Atıksu Numunelerinin Antibiyotik Kalıntıları Açısından Karakterizasyonu

We will now look at the current situation of the Western Sahara issue. The United Nations General Assembly first adopted Resolution 2072 on Western Sahara in 1965, which directs the Spanish government “to take immediately all necessary measures of the liberation of the Territories.”⁴⁶ Since this resolution, the United Nations has supported the right of

46 The UN Webpage (03/03/2013):

http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/218/35/IMG/NR021835.pdf?OpenElement

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self-determination of Sahrawi. Firstly, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) focused on the issue. Soon, the divisions in the organization between those African countries favoring the Polisario and those taking the Moroccan side became clear and it even led to the delay or cancellation of the summit meetings in 1982 and 1983 due to the latter‟s boycott. As a result, Morocco resigned from the OAU, while SADR was recognized as a member of the organization (Zoubir & Pazzanita, 1995: 615).

After the failure of the OAU, the United Nations began to take a larger role for the resolution of the conflict. When Morocco and the Polisario officially reached a ceasefire with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 690, it also suggested establishing a United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to set a transitional period of the territory and conduct a referendum to decide its future status –independence or integrated into Morocco.⁴⁷ However, the long-waited referendum has never taken place to this date. The main reason is that MINURSO faced a difficulty with identifying the eligible voters –Morocco demands 130,000 additional voters on the list for the referendum (Darbouche & Zoubir, 2008: 93). Moreover, not only has Morocco refused to renounce its military and administrative presence, but also they have disturbed MINURSO‟s mandate by surrounding its headquarters in Laayoune with their police or by interfering with its officers‟

contact with the local people (Zoubir & Pazzanita, 1995: 616). Although there have been proposals to abandon the United Nations endeavor in the Western Sahara by its Secretary-General, MINURSO‟s mandate has been recently renewed.⁴⁸

In order to break the deadlock over MINURSO‟s mandate, Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed former US Secretary of State James Baker as his special envoy in March 1997. Even though the Huston Agreements could show a certain result that Morocco and the Polisario agreed on voter identification,⁴⁹ Morocco did not stay on the agreement, and disagreement over the eligible voters –165,000 “Sahrawi” considered eligible voters by Morocco but not by the Polisario– prevented the referendum from taking place (Ohaegbulam, 2002: 95). Baker‟s next approach, a “Settlement Plan” in 2000, excluded the possibility of independence for Western Sahara and called for negotiations on limited self-rule of the disputed territory. Following this plan, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1945 in 2003, which endorsed the final version of Baker‟s plan.⁵⁰ This so called

47 The UNHCR Webpage (03/03/2013): http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f16818.html

48 The United Nations Security-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for example, proposed to abandon the UN endeavor in the Western Sahara entirely in 1994; however the Security Council decided to continue the UN effort for the solution (Zoubir & Pazzanita, 1995: 624).

49 Morocco and the Polisario had been unable to agree on the criteria for the eligibility of voters in the referendum. While Morocco had insisted on the inclusion of 170,000 additional voters, the Polisario insisted on limiting the list of voters to the 1974 Spanish census as the basis for eligibility, as the two sides had originally agreed to. As a result of the Huston Agreement, James Bakers estimated that the number of voters should revolve around 80,000 (Zoubir & Volman, 1997: 14-20).

50 The UN Security Council Webpage (03/03/2013):

http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/447/80/PDF/N0344780.pdf?OpenElement

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“Baker Plan II” is based on a modified version of the “third way” (autonomy under Moroccan authority) with the notable addition of a referendum after a five-year transition period (Zoubir

& Benabdellah-Gambier, 2006: 195). Surprisingly, the Polisario accepted this new plan, while Morocco rejected it due to the peace and security in the Maghreb region. The Sahrawi representative in Europe stated that “the Polisario made the decision as a logical and generous act to assure peace and reconciliation with the Moroccan neighbor and the peoples of the Maghreb (Zoubir & Benabdellah-Gambier, 2006: 195)”. Although the Polisario made a compromise, the Moroccan side did not accept it. On the contrary, Morocco presented a project for the “Autonomous Region of Sahara”,⁵¹ which is the first project of autonomy that Morocco has officially presented and with the support of the King Mohamed VI in 2003.

Despite the United Nation‟s and James Baker‟s efforts, the Western Sahara problem has not shown any progress for its resolution.

In addition, not only the United States and France particularly support Morocco in the Security Council, but also the European Union concluded a Fisheries Partnership Agreement with Morocco in 2006 –including the waters of Western Sahara (Chapaux, 2006:

217). Those facts gave deep disappointment and frustration to the Polisario‟s side, which could lead young people to return to armed conflict. As a matter of fact, the Gdeim Izik attack (one of the biggest clashes between Moroccan security forces and local population) in Western Sahara in 2011 clearly shows the local population‟s anger and frustration. At the same time, some scholars point out the link between some Sahrawi groups and Al-Qaida for Jihad in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which has been recently increasing their power in the North Africa.⁵² It seems like we may be faced with huge instability –which all of the powers were trying to avoid– in the region, because international organizations, including the United Nations, wanted to “forget” the issue and have not really tried to solve the question.

Above all, since the United Nations adopted Resolution 2072 to liberate the Western Sahara territory in 1965, the right of self-determination of the Sahrawi has never used.

Although the international organizations, including the AU and UN, have tried to solve the issue, no actors have really put pressure on the Moroccan authorities to find the solution.

Hence, the Polisario side has been disappointed by the status-quo situation and looked for the alternative solution, such as continuing the armed struggle. Because regional and international groups have not seriously faced the problem, the regional stability –which all actors are eager

51 The project does not respect “Baker Plan II”. Particularly, it would only conclude a decolonization process in which Saharawi freely decides to be integrated into Morocco, not with self-determination. It opposes the demands of international law. Group de Estudios Estrantégicos (14/01/2013):

http://www.gees.org/

52 Anouar Boukhars and Ali O. Amar pointed out the al-Qaida-style executions in the city of Laayoune on November 8, 2010, when the riots clashed with security officers (Boukhars & Amar, 2011: 220). Peter Pham mentioned that the Polisario has become one of the principal pools of recruitment for AQIM (Pham, 2010: 20).

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to maintain– has been threatened.