IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IN THE EURASIA REGION
Kenji Murakami
Division of Operations C Department of Safeguards, IAEA, Vienna, Austria
ABSTRACT
Developing and implementing safeguards against misuse of nuclear material and facilities has always been the Agency's main activities. Like the nuclear non-proliferation regime itself, the development of the safeguards system has been an evolutionary process. The first safeguards inspection was carried out in 1962 (in Norway). In the sixties, the basic concepts behind safeguards were developed (INFCIRC/26, adopted in 1961, for some of you it might still have a familiar ring) and the number of inspections and types of facilities inspected grew slowly. With the advent of INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2, a more complete, albeit limited, system of safeguards covering nuclear material, equipment and facilities emerged. But the quantum leap came, of course, wit the entry into force of the NPT.
Today, the IAEA has 224 safeguards agreements in force with 140 States. Nearly all of these States are NPT States.
In the Eurasia Region, particularly the Newly Independent States (NIS) significant achievements have been made in the Safeguards Implementation. States with nuclear activities have the SG Agreement in force. Some states are already signing the Additional Protocol and it is in force in two of these States in the NIS region. Much progress has been made in the area of nuclear material and accountancy through the IAEA Coordinated Technical Support Programme (CTSP). The programme was organized to co-ordinate the donor states activities and has been successful for the last seven years in providing assistance in the area of nuclear legislation establishment of the State System of Accountancy of nuclear material (SSAC) and other related areas. Improvement is still foreseen in these areas, particularly as more states in the region will be signing and implementing the Additional Protocols.
INTRODUCTION
Developing and implementing safeguards against misuse of nuclear material and facilities has always been the Agency's main activities. Like the nuclear non-proliferation regime itself, the development of the safeguards system has been an evolutionary process. The first safeguards inspection was carried out in 1962 (in Norway). In the sixties, the basic concepts behind safeguards were developed (INFCIRC/26, adopted in 1961, for some of you it might still have a familiar ring) and the number of inspections and types of facilities inspected grew slowly. With the advent of INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2, a more complete, albeit limited, system of safeguards
covering nuclear material, equipment and facilities emerged. But the quantum leap came, of course, with the entry into force of the NPT.
Today, the IAEA has 224 safeguards agreements in force with 140 States. Nearly all of these States are NPT States.
In the 1995 Declaration of Principles and Objectives at the NPT Review Conference, States recognized the International Atomic Energy Agency as the competent authority to verify and assure, in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its Safeguards Agreements with States. They noted that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in this regard.
States party to the NPT rely on the IAEA safeguards for assurance of compliance by other States with their non-proliferation undertakings, as well as to demonstrate their own compliance. Provision of such assurance promotes further confidence amongst States and, being a fundamental element of the NPT, the IAEA safeguards help to strengthen collective security. During the past 30 years, the Agency has been able to provide a high level of assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material that has been placed under safeguards, and to identify cases where safeguards obligations are not being met. Effective safeguards have been maintained, particularly with regard to weapons-usable nuclear material-separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium.
Nevertheless, not all the news is good news; North Korea (DPRK) remains in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, and concerns still exist about the DPRK's declaration of its nuclear material subject to safeguards.
Inspection activities in Iraq came to an end in December 1998 and efforts by the Security Council to restart with a new commission has just started but it is still too early to predict any success. In the meantime, the Agency is confronted with the question of carrying out its inspection activities under Iraq's existing NPT safeguards agreement apart from the UN resolution.
Other unique events involved activities in South Africa where the Agency's experience has extended to verifying the elimination of South Africa's former weapons programme, and in the former Soviet Union (NIS) where a sudden emergence of many States, formally part of NWS, created a big challenge to IAEA for verification of initial declarations.
The Agency is also encountering increasingly severe resource constraints resulting from successive zero-real-growth budgets for the Agency stretching back into the last decade. These constraints have occurred at a time of significant real growth in the Agency's workload.
I referred earlier to the increase in the number of States party to the NPT since 1995. Unfortunately, this has not been accompanied by an equally strong commitment by NPT parties to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The Treaty embodies the
legal requirement that such safeguards agreements should be concluded and enter into force no later than 18 months after a country's accession to the NPT. While 26 new Safeguards Agreements have come into force since the 1995 NPT Review Conference, for more than 50 NPT signatories their NPT Safeguards Agreement is not in force. States should sign and bring into force comprehensive Safeguards Agreements pursuant to their commitments under the NPT without delay.
In 1995, States supported the further strengthening of the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system. Here, there are notable successes to report. Throughout the 1990s, extensive efforts have been directed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, building upon past experience. Early improvements to safeguards measures and procedures in the post-Iraq period include a reaffirmation of special inspection rights, early provision of design information and a voluntary reporting scheme by which the leading nuclear exporters agreed to provide the Agency with information on their exports of nuclear material, specialized nuclear equipment and non-nuclear material.
But the major effort was launched in 1993, two years before the NPT Extension Conference, hence the name "Programme 93+2", aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguards.
The term "effectiveness" reflects the extent to which IAEA verification achieves non proliferation objectives. The "efficiency" reflects the productivity of IAEA safeguards - that is, how well available resources are used to fulfil the stated objectives.
The main objectives of the Agency in its pursuit of the goals of effectiveness and efficiency have been:
a) increasing the assurance of non-diversion provided by safeguards;
b) improving the capabilities of the Agency to detect undeclared nuclear activities; and
c) optimizing the cost of implementing safeguards while maintaining or improving safeguards effectiveness.
Work to strengthen the safeguards system falls into two areas:
(1) implementation of strengthening measures within the Agency's existing legal authority under current comprehensive Safeguards Agreements; and (2) work towards the implementation of the measures for which further legal
authority was required, and which are enshrined in the Model Additional protocol adopted by the Board of Governors in May 1997.
While some of the new measures under existing legal authority are of great importance (like the authority to take environmental samples at certain points in nuclear installations), the conclusion of the Model Additional Protocol was the major result of Programme 93+2. The
Additional Protocol requires States to provide substantially more nuclear fuel cycle related information to the Agency, and gives Agency inspectors complementary access rights.
As a result, the Agency will have more information on States' nuclear programmes than ever before. This information comprises that which is received from States, that gathered by the Agency's own verification activities, and that collected from other sources. Access to a wide range of information should allow regular evaluations of the information, review by senior Agency officials, and recommendations for follow-up action. Through this process of information review and evaluation, the IAEA Secretariat will be better able to judge the completeness and correctness of States' declarations. This will go hand in hand with new action taken for handling and maintaining of confidential information by the Agency. Simplified designation and visa procedures for Agency inspectors are also being pursued with Member States to improve physical access rights and thus enable more effective safeguards implementation and more efficient use of Agency resources. Modification and expansion of the training curriculum for inspectors is under way to give inspectors the new skills and abilities required to fully implement all aspects of the newly strengthened safeguards system. New technology, such as environmental sampling, unattended monitoring and remote data- transmission systems, is being introduced in an effort to improve safeguards effectiveness while reducing costs. Most of these new measures are beginning to produce substantive results.
All in all, these measures strengthen the safeguards system considerably. I should add however that the additional rights for the Agency are balanced at the same time by obligations and limitations that were carefully negotiated to protect States' interests. Complementary access provisions will not be applied in a mechanistic or systematic fashion. For sensitive facilities and locations, managed access will be provided for upon request and consultation with the States. The Agency will provide the State with reports on the complementary access activities performed and conclusions drawn as a result. Provision has been made for the protection of proprietary and commercially sensitive information.
Since the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol, the Agency's Board of Governors have approved 49 Additional Protocols which subsequently were signed by the States; 43 with Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNSW) party to the NPT, 5 with NWS and, in November 1999, one with Cuba, the first with an INFCIRC/66 State not party to the NPT. Among these 49 States, 9 such additional protocols have entered into force, and one is being implemented provisionally pending formal entry into force. In two States (Australia and Uzbekistan), the implementation of the Additional Protocols has included complementary access to confirm the exclusively peaceful use of all nuclear material in these States.
The most important area of current and future work on the Strengthened Safeguards System is to integrate the traditional nuclear material verification activities with the new strengthening measures. Accordingly, this is being given the highest priority in the Department of
Safeguards. The aim is to optimise the combination of all safeguards measures available to the IAEA in order to meet the IAEA's safeguards objectives with maximum effectiveness and efficiency within available resources.
The objective of integrated safeguards is to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in each State with a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol. The optimum combination of activities will be determined, inter alia, by considering features of a State’s nuclear fuel cycle and the results of information analysis, in what is termed the “State-level” approach.
The Newly Independent States
An area that has posed quite a challenge to the IAEA has been the emergence of a number of new states, known as the Newly Independent States (NIS), many with substantial nuclear programmes, resulting from the disintegration of the former Soviet Union.
With most Newly Independent States becoming parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non nuclear weapon states, there has been an acute need in these States for considerable assistance for the establishment of the necessary structure and resources to ensure that their commitments to non-proliferation are implemented in full in a timely manner.
In the Eurasia Region, particularly the Newly Independent States (NIS), significant achievements have been made in the Safeguards Implementation. States with nuclear activities have the Safeguards Agreement in force. Some states are already signing the Additional Protocol and it is in force in two of these States in the NIS region. Much progress has been made in the area of nuclear material and accountancy through the IAEA Coordinated Technical Support Programme (CTSP). The programme was organized to co-ordinate the donor states activities and has been successful for the last seven years in providing assistance in the area of nuclear legislation, establishment of the State System of Accountancy of nuclear material (SSAC) and other related areas. Improvement is still foreseen in these areas, particularly as more states in the region will be signing and implementing the Additional Protocols.
Although much has been achieved in the NIS, several problems have been encountered: the provisions of the Safeguards Agreements are not always supported by internal regulations; SSACs, in many cases, lack infrastructure with regard to authority and resources and further improvements are required in the area of nuclear material accountancy.
The verification of the correctness of the Initial Inventory Verification has also proven to be a big challenge for the IAEA; nuclear material is not always accessible for verification and systems for nuclear material accountancy are inadequate. However, verification of IIVs has been accomplished with the exception of four RBMK facilities, the BN-350 reactor in Kazakhstan and the spent fuel store at Ignalina NPP, Lithuania.
The Additional Protocol is now being implemented in two NIS, namely Uzbekistan and Lithuania, and this has provided the IAEA with very valuable experience. It has shown that there is a need to strengthen and upgrade the role of the SSACs which, owing to the difficult economic situation in some States, lack technical and financial resources. Seminars on general issues of implementation are required and training of SSAC staff on technical issues of the Additional Protocol implementation is needed.
Other Non-Proliferation Undertakings
Implementing strengthened safeguards is not the only Agency activity to promote nuclear non proliferation. One area that has posed quite a challenge to the IAEA has been the emergence of a number of new States, known as the Newly Independent States (NIS), many with substantial nuclear programmes, resulting from the disintegration of the former Soviet Union.
There has been an acute need in these States for considerable assistance for the establishment of the necessary structure and resources to ensure their commitments to non-proliferation. The IAEA, Department of Safeguards, has played for the past 7 years, a co-ordinating role in the preparation of the Co-ordinated Technical Support Programme (CTSP), by helping individual NIS countries.
This has been, and continues to be, a challenge to the IAEA in supporting these Newly Independent States, which is additional to the normal Agency role of safeguards implementation.
Within its Mandate and Statute, the Agency has also provided assistance to States in the negotiation and implementation of nuclear weapon free zones. Since 1995, one more NWFZ (Bangkok) has entered into force, another (Pelindaba) has been concluded, and another (Central Asia) is under negotiation. The Agency's role here is to ensure that these treaties contain adequate verification provisions which are compatible with and, if possible, enhance the States NPT commitments. The Agency has also been active in promoting international norms for the physical protection and in the development of new measures against illicit trafficking of nuclear material and radioactive sources.
In addition to the Agency's role in contributing to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, there are new verification challenges associated with nuclear disarmament initiatives that have, or could have, implications for the Agency. For example, over the past three years, the Agency has been involved in discussions with the Russian Federation and the United States regarding the possible verification of nuclear material transferred by Russia and the USA from their nuclear weapon programmes to the civilian sector. Further, the United Kingdom announced last year that, following its Strategic Defence Review, substantial amounts of fissile material surplus to the needs of its defence programme will be made available for international safeguards. Additionally, the Agency could become involved in the verification of a future treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes known as FMT, and is currently studying possible verification options that the negotiators in Geneva may propose. The future verification of other nuclear materials of potential proliferation
significance requires study. In all of these cases, the Agency is prepared to contribute its verification and safeguards expertise and experience to the full realization of these initiatives. CONCLUSION
As we entered the new millennium there is a widespread recognition of the Agency's essential functions under the NPT - namely, to implement international safeguards and to further the development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. From a technical point of view, Agency safeguards have never been more effective and will be even more so with the improvements associated with the universal adoption by States of the provisions of the Model Additional Protocol.
The Agency safeguards system, underpinning the non-proliferation Treaty, has allowed the civil nuclear power industry to bring the benefits of nuclear energy to mankind. Today, nuclear energy accounts for almost 17% of the world's electricity consumption. With the public perception of effective international safeguards, nuclear energy will continue to meet these needs and in so doing, help States honour their commitments made in Kyoto in 1997 to reduce future emissions of greenhouse gases.
Nevertheless, further progress is needed to reduce nuclear arsenals and, as nuclear weapons are dismantled, to dispose of fissile materials made excess to defence purposes. There needs to be more forceful actions by States to physically protect their nuclear material against theft and other illegal actions of individuals and to ensure that there will be no safe haven for those who might illegally acquire such materials.
Most of all, progress is needed to extend the legal nuclear non-proliferation framework to include all States - a system capable of providing credible assurance that declared nuclear material has not been diverted, that specified facilities and other safeguarded items are not being misused for any military purposes or purposes unknown and that there are no undeclared nuclear material and activities present in States that have comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with Additional Protocols in force with the Agency.
This is the promise underlying the steps taken for the newly strengthened safeguards system that can address nuclear proliferation under any guise. Ultimately, this promise can only be fulfilled where States comply with their obligations under Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols and where the international community demonstrates that it has the will to take meaningful action against a State that does not comply with its non-proliferation commitment.
