TURKISH SECURITY IN TIIE SHIFfING BALKANS: REORIENTATION TO A REGIONAL FOCUS
I. The regionalization of world politics: impact on the Balkans and Turkey
One of the most important consequences of the phasing out of the Cold War has been the transformation of several re.gions of the world into highly autonomous subsystems in their own right. The immediate examples are the Balkans and the Transcaucasus. While these regions interact with the global system in numerous ways, they are primarily driven by forces from within. In contrast, the Cold War system of international relations had almost completely obliterated the political and historical personality of these regions.
It has become a truism to argue that the post-Cold War era has increasingly been characterized by local conflicts rooted in inter ethnic tensions largely over power-sharing. One major reason behind the systemwide significance of such conflicts is the nearly universal revival of the appeal of ethnicity as the criterion for establishing a political community.1 A related reason is their ultimate impact on the regional geopolitical balances. Many of the ethnic conflicts that are occurring today have the potential power to revise the old status. quo within their respective regions to sow the seeds of a new one in terms of cultural and political personality, orientation and agenda-setting.
In other words, not all ethnic conflicts have inherent systemwide significance. The scope of their impact on the regional geopolitics is what links them to the international system. The Yugoslav conflict has had systemic significance because of its ability to set in motion regional political and military reverberations on an extensive scale. The nationalist conflict in Northern Ireland, by contrast, was never able to generate an intraregional earthquake in the way of the Balkan
96 Common Security Regimes in the Balkans
conflict due to its unique circumstances, i.e. the insular position of the parties to the conflict, the unequal distribution of power between the center and the Sinn Fein-IRA nationalists.
The post-Cold War trend of what might properly be called the regionalization of world politics does not express itself solely in terms of conflict. At the other end of the continuum of possible behaviors at the regional level lies cooperation. The European Community is one region which has deepened and broadened its depth and radius of cooperation. The North American Free Trade Area (NAFfA), the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone (BSECZ) in Istanbul in 1992, and efforts to reinforce ASEAN by incorporating a security dimension are some cooperative manifestations of the increasing attention that regions have come to enjoy as a fundamental frame of reference in organizing interstate interaction.
Why is this trend towards a new regionalism, with new regions emerging as more or less autonomous subsystems, relevant to our study?
It is relevant because the Balkans, the subject of our concern, is where autonomous regional behaviour and interaction have been most visible and coercive. The volent disintegration of former Yugoslavia (FY) has been the catalytic event that has brought the regional dynamics back to life. Despite heavy diplomatic and humanitarian involvement by the international community, it is the interaction of the myriad local and regional elements which have determined the nature and the course of developments triggered by the Yugoslav conflict. By shaping new and redefining old questions, and by laying down several new or renewed politico-military patterns, relationships, and forms now, the regional forces have been in a position to put a large imprint on the future profile and agenda of the region. This regional autonomy is in marked contrast to the artificial world of the Cold War era when two ideologically opposed, incom municado military blocs and a socialist Yugoslavia could more or less successfully ignore most regional impulses.
This view does not overlook the interdependence and interaction between the region and external actors. It merely argues that for the
first time in many decades, major power policies and tools are not accepted automatically. They are subjected to the scrutiny of a plethora of conflicting regional interests and positions before being incorporated or rejected.
The system-wide significance of the transformation of the Balkans into a relatively self-defining and self-driving region is explained also by reference to the total anarchy within which it has occurred. No regional hegemony or institution existed capable of imposing order. In their absence, self-help has prevailed. A potential hegemony, Serbia, has resorted to the use of force to maximize its territorial and political gains as the old order in FY was subjected to change by internal and external forces. In the end Serbia has indeed maximized its values, establishing the political and territorial basis for a Greater Serbia. International institutions have remained involved, but ineffective, frustrating hopes placed in international institutions by .the neo-liberal analysis of international relations.2
A two-year long violent war in the heart of the Balkans in an environment of thorough regional anarchy would by definition alter the total security landscape. All actors would reappraise their respective national goals, needs and power bases in a geopolitical space being violently overhauled, in turn creating new and/or exacerbating old security issues.
-� Turkish security perceptions have undergone deep changes in response to the anarchical process of geopolitical change in the
Balkans. For nearly four decades, Turkey viewed its security interests in the Balkans almost exclusively through the prism of the Warsaw Pact and the Greek-Turkish conflict. The relapse of anarchy, and geopolitical change brought about by coercion, have urged completely new calculations and policies to serve Turkish security interests. The Yugoslav conflict has been especially detrimental to long-term Turkish, for that matter regional, security interests not simply because it has revamped the politico-military status quo but equally because it has unleashed the forces for a Christian versus Moslem polarization, thus reigniting in the Balkans the specter of a "clash of civilizations".3
98 Common Security Regimes in the Balkans
the regional struggle for power, thus greatly expanding its scope beyond the limited scope of the earlier era0 These points will be discussed in the text.
Turkish security concerns in the Balkans acquire greater urgency especially in view of the fact that the country's security environment has been altered on other fronts as well. While common borders with Russia have ceased to exist, the Transcaucasus has emerged as another war-ridden region adjacent to Turkey. The vicissitudes of the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Nagorno-Karabag touches on Turkish national interests in many direct and indirect ways. And, in the Middle East/Gulf region, too, Turkey faces another troublesome front. Though it has always been there as a source of concern, the post-Cold War sources of threat from the South are fundamentally more complicated.
Briefly, then, Turkish security considerations in the Balkans turn into deeper strategic concerns when viewed as part of the totally revamped security environment within which Turkey must be prepared to operate, and survive. Conflict, war and socio-economic instabilities abound in all the three regions around Turkey's borders without the benefit of positive countervailing factors.
Turkish perceptions of its security interests in the Balkans as they have evolved in the wake of the Yugoslav conflict will be treated in this paper under four headings. Section II will explain the nature of Turkey's national interests in the Balkans. Section III will trace the evolution of Turkish perceptions and policies towards the Yugoslav conflict. Section IV will describe the main thrust of Turkey's relations with Greece, Bulgaria, and the new democracies of Albania and Macedonia as the four important pillars of its Balkan policy in the turbulent post-Cold War environment. It will not deal with the regional dynamics raised by the interests and concerns of the outer ring of states such as Austria, Hungary, and Italy. Section V will discuss the trend towards regional polarization. Section VI-the least interesting because there is not much new in it-will restate Turkish concerns and positions about the issues in the Greek-Turkish conflict. Section VII will describe the military doctrine and force posture of the
Section VIII will look at the Turkish perceptions concerning the question of arms control and CSBM regimes in the Balkans. I shall conclude in Section IX by offering some thoughts on confidence-and security building between Greece and Turkey. The focus here will be exclusively bilateral for two simple reasons. First, the Greek-Turkish conflict is the central issue that defines their threat perceptions and corresponding security policies in the Balkans. Second, the Greek Turkish conflict is among the most powerful elements behind evolving
Balkan politics today-as it has often been in the past. Its resolution is a prerequisite for normalization and dialogue in the Balkans.
II. Turkish Interests and Policies in the Balkans
Turkey has been an active observer of the evolution of Balkan politics since the dismantling of the FY began formally with the secession of Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991. Why? What might be, if any, the burning security issues for Turkey in the Balkans in the short term as the Yugoslav crisis unfolds, and later in the post-crisis period when the region will have acquired a political map likely to be substantially different from what it has been since the end of the First World War?
According to Turkish officials, three considerations define the nature and scope of Turkey's interests in the region: Turkey is a Balkan country geographically, historically and culturally. Second, the Balkans is a strategic link between Turkey and Western Europe, an entity which occupies a central position in the whole gamut of political, economic, security and cultural bonds Turkey has built with the outside world over the years. Two and a half miltion Turkish citizens live in Western Europe and more than half of Turkish ·foreign trade is with Western Europe. Hence, Turkey cannot afford to be cut off from all these interests and relationships. Third, there is a powerful sense of affinity between Turks of Turkey and some peoples through out the Balkans, i.e. ethnic Turkish minorities, Bosnian-Muslims, Albanians and Macedonians, who form part of the legacy of Turkish rule in the region under the Ottoman Empire roughly between the
100 Common Security Regimes in the Balkans
fourteenth and early twentieth centuries.4 On the basis of these interests, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel maintained that, "Stability, peace and cooperation in the Balkans are of vital importance to Turkey."5
If the Balkans hold such vital strategic importance for long-term Turkish interests in Europe, it follows then that Turkey would be sensitive to any major changes in the political and military status quo in the region that might threaten to jeopardize these interests. The Yugoslav conflict has evolved to threaten those interests by paving the way to the realization of a Greater Serbia and to a Greek-Serbian coalition, possibly exclusively on the basis of an anti-Moslem and anti-Turkish philosophy.
The human dimension of Turkey's national interests in the Balkans has been an equally power�l ,SX>nsideration. According to Turkish Deputy Prime Minister
fi'mel ·
Inonu, people of Turkish ethnicity in the Balkans number two million and Muslims number seven million.6 Their kin and friends in Turkey, most of whose ancestors migrated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as Ottoman power retrenched from the Balkans, form a significant constituency in Turkish state and society. Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin has stated that at least two million Turkish citizens come from Bosnian stock.7 Former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's estimate putsthe figure at four million.8
Turks feel a particular sense of responsibility for non-Turkish Muslims, like the Albanians and Bosnians, who converted to Islam during the Ottoman rule, the latter to escape further persecution by their intolerant Christian co-religionists. (They were persecuted because as Bogomils they were seen to be heretical to the basic tenets of Orthodox Christianity.9 This sense of historical responsibility has
been argued for by several Balkan leaders as they have approached Turkey for support in their struggle for survival for their Moslem politico-religious identity.10
Until the eruption of the Yugoslav crisis, the potential political role of non-Turkish Moslem peoples and minorities in the Balkans in Turkish perceptions was ambiguous. They enjoyed Turkish sympathies
largely on the sentimental level. In contrast, ethnic Turkish-Moslem minorities in Greece and Bulgaria and the Greek minority in Turkey have traditionally occupied a distinct place of importance in the region's political calculations. The Yugoslav conflict has expanded the role of non-Turkish Moslem peoples in Turkish perceptions to incorporate a political dimension. A more or less romantic relationship has since become politicized. Political cooperation and dialogue between Turkey and these peoples have become one of the new features in Balkan geopolitics.
Given this analytical framework, how would one interpret Turkish security interests in operational terms? What are, or have been, the practical policy implications?
The Turkish strategy was initially a highly conservative one. It counted on the continuation of the main contours of the status quo in the Balkans, hoping that the simmering conflict in Yugoslavia would be negotiated internally. The war in Croatia and later in Bosnia, conducted alongside a policy of "ethnic cleansing" of the Moslems, altered Turkish threat perceptions of Serbia. A Greater Serbia, bolstered by a Greek-Serbian entente, loomed like a formidable wall capable of cutting Turkey off from Western Europe. The simultaneous campaign of attrition on Bosnia-Herzegovina at the same time as the vulnerable states of Albania and Macedonia were being harassed by Greece threatened to wipe out the new potential bridges Turkey could cross to reach Western Europe. They would simultaneously be helpful in sustaining Turkish influence in the Balkans.
The Balkan policies of Turkey developed on the basis of these perceptions of threat and strategic calculations have focused on four pillars, namely former Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria and Alba nia/Macedonia. Sections II and III will elaborate them.
III. Turkish policy towards the crisis in former Yugoslavia � Turkish positions and policies towards the crisis in the FY
,, followed two stages. Originally Turkey supported the continuation of the status quo, a reformed one if the republics so desired. Once
dis-102 Common Security Regimes in the Balkans
integration ensued and the Bosnian-Moslem government of Bosnia Herzegovina became a victim of Serbian aggression, the Turkish position changed.
The new policies were designed to serve three immediate and interrelated objectives: to bring an end to the bloodshed in Bosnia Herzegovina; to preserve its independence and territorial integrity, and to prevent the escalation of the war into a broader regional way by engulfing Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, the Sandjak, and Vojvodina, thereby dragging along other powers with interests in the unfolding regional political-military balance. The fear of a Balkan war has loomed large in Turkish perceptions. 11
Premised on these objectives, Turkish policies have attempted essentially to pursue a strategy of containment. Through the combined use of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, it has sought to influence the course of local and international developments that it believed would best serve the objectives outlined above.
From a Status Quo to a Pro-Bosnia-Herzegovina Stance
Turkey had its own combination of political, ethnic and commercial reasons in not wishing to see the dismemberment of FY. It feared the regional instability and turmoil that was almost certain to follow the hypothetical breakup. In Turkish eyes the FY had been a moderating power in the Balkan balance in general. Belgrade had been a benign ruler over its relatively small Turkish and large Muslim populations. And, Yugoslavia provided the land transit route for the bulk of Turkish trade with Western Europe. Viewed through the lenses of the state-as-rational-actor, therefore, the possible fragmentation of the FY could be seen to serve neither regional nor specific Turkish interests. Accordingly, Turkey stressed the importance of maintaining interethnic harmony in Yugoslavia, arguing, however, that the political modalities of this harmony was for the Yugoslavs to determine; it was genuinely concerned not to precipitate the crisis by acts that could be construed as interfering in former Yugoslavia's domestic affairs.12
Turkey desisted from an anti-Serbian attitude for some time even after full-scale armed hostilities broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and
Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic visited Turkey in January 1992 to persuade Ankara not to extend recognition to the separatist republics, when they were reportedly informed by Turkish officials that Turkish policy would not be anti-Serbia but would be pro Bosnia-Herzegovina.13 During his visit to Ankara in August, Serbian Prime Minister Milan Panic pledged, among other things, Belgrade's intention to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina and requested an active Turkish role in the exchange of prisoners of war.14
Turkey extended diplomatic recognition to Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina on February 6, 1992, in the belief that their integration with the international community was a pre requisite for the success of efforts aiming at the reestablishment of peace and stability in the region.
Turkish positions hardened as Bosnian-Moslems, outgunned, were subjected to intense suffering and large losses of territory by the Serbs. Developments through April, 1992 were weighed as convincing evidence about the long-term objectives of Serbian actions and plans. The strategic objective was the establishment of a Greater Serbia through the integrated use of force and ethnic cleansing. Given the intention and the capability, Serbians would implement their plans with impunity unless they were deterred by international diplomacy backed up by force, or, if coercive diplomacy failed, they were com pelled to stop by a selective use of force.
On May 4, 1992, Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin submitted Turkey's first appeal to the United Nations Secretary General, in which he asked the international body to help bring an end to aggression and destruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
On August 7, 1992, Turkey elaborated the details of an Action Plan to be implemented by the United Nations Security Council. In the face of continuing Serbian aggression and continuing ineffectiveness of the United Nations arms embargo in order to allow the Bosnian Muslims to procure weapons and equipment for their self-defense, and, for resort to a limited military engagement by the international community in order to enforce the United Nations sanctions.15
104 Common Security Regimes in the Balkans Multilateralism, Not Unilateralism
On the other hand, Mr. Demirel's government consistently shunned the option of a unilateral use of force-despite pressures by the domestic opposition to the contrary .16 Speculation outside Turkey that it intended to exploit the conflict in Bosnia through a show or use of force apparently has failed to weigh the total situation. For, even if Turkey had the intention, it lacked the capability for sustained power projection in Bosnia, a country far removed from Turkish borders. Government leaders and the military subtly reminded the public of the physical and logistical constraints that would rule out a unilateral military action. 17
The Turkish Government has persistently declared that peace making in Bosnia-Herzegovina fell within the sphere of competence and responsibility of the United Nations Security Council and that Turkey would make a military contribution to any enforcement action only as part of a duly mandated international effort to overcome the ineffectiveness of the diplomatic pressures and sanctions. 18 In this
spirit Turkey joined the NATO operation in April 1993 mandated by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 816 for the enforce ment of the seven-month old no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to United Nations sources, approximately 500 violations of the no-fly-zone, imposed by the Security Council on October 9, 1992, had been registered.19 Eventually a squadron of 18 F-16's joined the operation.20 Greece objected to Turkish participation and forbade the
use of Greek airspace to the Turkish force to use to reach the NA TO base in ltaly.21
A highly visible bilateral and multilateral diplomatic track was decidedly the preferred route that Turkey followed in its attempt to mobilize the international community into a more resolute stand to contain Serbia.
As part of its multilateral efforts, Turkey called on the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to meet in extraordinary session in Istanbul on June 17-18, 1993. It coordinated the efforts to create a contact group of the OIC states at the United Nations.22 In November 1992, it invited the Balkan countries to meet
in Istanbul in order to generate regional consensus on the need to prevent a slide into a regional war. Greece and Yugoslavia declined the invitation.
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone (BSECZ), founded in Istanbul in June 1992, offered another pqtential forum for crisis management by the Balkan powers themselves as all Balkan countries, except the former Yugoslavia, plus Russia were among its eleven founding members. However, it was only beginning to take off and was constrained from the beginning by the challenge of a series of didactic rivalries and suspicions within its own ranks. Hence it lacked the capacity to act as a venue of crisis management.
IV. IMPACT ON RELATIONS WITH BALKAN COUNTRIES Greek-Turkish Relations are Recast to the Balkans Theater
Under the dynamic impact of the positions, relationships and interlinkages that Greece and Turkey have established around the Yugoslav conflict, the Greek-Turkish bilateral conflict is now being played out on the regional level, possibly with the result that its resolution has become ever more elusive.
The unfolding crisis in FY has almost automatically upgraded the preeminence of Greece in Turkey's security environment in the larger region of the Balkans because of the pivotal potential role that Greece acquired in the emerging regional configuration on the ashes of FY.
This role emanated from its geographical location within and yet outside the theater of action in the Balkans where the status quo was being reconstructed by use of force, and second, from its unique strengths as the only member of the West simultaneously enjoying European Community membership.23 Greece has indeed exploited
these strengths and advantages with skill in order to put its stamp on the nature and direction of the developments in the Balkans. The Greek moves need to be seen from a larger perspective, however. Greek foreign policy since the early 1980s has viewed the isolation of Turkey from Europe by preventing its integration with the European
106 Common Security Regimes in the Balkans
Community as the priority objective while its own roots within the Community became stronger.24 The Yugoslav conflict has given Greece an opportunity both to assert itself as a regional leader on the basis of its credentials especially as a Community member and its defence adjunct, the Western European Union (WEU), and to press for the isolation of Turkey.
Against the larger set of respective and more or less mutually exclusive national objectives of Greece and Turkey, therefore, the element that contains the seeds of the deepest potential damage to the long- term prospects of Turkish as well as regional security is the fact that the two countries have sided with opposite parties in the Bosnian conflict. This division of loyalties is likely to have longlasting repercussions on the future political-military trends in the region and by extension in Europe. Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin implicitly draws attention to the risks of Greek-Turkish cleavages in their Balkan policies when he argues that their relations occupy a special place not only in Turkish foreign policy but for the Balkans and Europe in general. Therefore, he insists, "The absence of good relations cannot be accepted as normal. "25
The lack of a dialogue in Greek-Turkish relations has pre vented the development of a coordinated approach to help shape the post-Cold War Balkans. The Turkish Foreign Ministry maintains that "Turkey enjoys satisfactory relations with all her neighbors save Greece in the Balkan region. "26 However, Greece demands the reso
lution of the Cyprus conflict as a precondition for a dialogue.
There are numerous indications that Greece and Turkey have set their respective policies towards the Yugoslav conflict to a large extent with the other in mind. The special position of Turkey was reaffirmed by Prime Minister Konstantides Mitsotakis in an address to the New Democracy Party Central Committee meeting on April 19, 1992, when, referring to his government's foreign policy, he reaffirmed that Turkey was at the �nter of that policy.27
On the other hand, at least some of the differences and cleavages can be explained not as products of deliberate policy planning but as spontaneous outcomes of historical and cultural
leanings and proclivities. For example, at the dawn of a new Balkans, Turkey was more or less predestined to veer towards the Moslem countries of Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina for purely sentimental reasons-with or without the Greek factor. Even in the case of Macedonia, Turkish policy probably contained strong elements of sentimentalism alongside geopolitical considerations. In contrast, Greece was held back because it had its own agenda and peculiar bilateral concerns. As Greeks saw it, the new regional context threatened the encirclement of Greece by an Islamic ring made up of Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina and by an expansionist Macedonia intent on cultural and territorial usurpation of values that were specifically Greek.
On the other hand, there is a strand of international opinion which argues that the real intention behind Greek opposition to an independent Slav Republic of Macedonia is to help provoke a crisis that could lead to a redrawing of Balkan frontiers, with parts of Macedonia and especially southern Albania going to Greece.28
In the new atmosphere of change and uncertainty, the Greek psyche has assigned Turkey the task of organizing this so-called Islamic ring. The inter-changeable images of the Turk and the Moslem as a source of threat to Greece run so deep that Turkey's invisible hand appears to have been perceived behind all developments that were found to be disagreeable to Greek interests. While some Greek statements have carried veiled charges against Turkey on this point, Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Viryinia Tsouderou chose several times to be more direct, ass for example when she accused Turkey of being "unrepentant, following an anachronistic policy, and, encouraged by self-deceit, trying to use the Moslem population in the Balkans to promote its infiltration of the area. "29 Prime Minister Mitsotakis has implied that one reason why Greece has been "so careful" with Serbia was the fear of Islamic encirclement.30
The emotional tone of the domestic debate in Turkey about a special responsibility towards these peoples has provided sufficient ammunition to outside observers for such arguments. Pronouncements by President Turgut Oza! who argued that his country had an
108 Common Security Regimes in the Balkans
obligation towards these peoples had an obligation to assist the Muslims in the Balkans who looked to Turkey for help31 were emulated by several leading politicians, intellectuals, and editorials in the Turkish press. However, Turkish Foreign Ministry officials categorically reject charges of involvement and manipulation.32
In short, emotions and prejudices were allowed to run their course on both sides in response to developments in former Yugo slavia, further reinforcing mutual suspicions and complicating the bilateral nature of the Greek-Turkish conflict.
In the meantime, the appearance of dialogue has been created by mutual agreement between Prime Minister Konstandinos Mitsotakis and Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel since their initial meeting in Davos· on February 1, 1992. Even if confined mostly to style, it has restored a tone of civility to exchanges at the top level while helping to limit the damage the Yugoslav conflict has inflicted on bilateral relations by reigniting nationalist passions and mutual suspicions.
The role of public opinion has become critical in determining the fre.edom of movement of both Greek and Turkish governments. It is fair to say that Prime Minister Mitsotakis has been U1nder greater nationalistic pressure. Reversing the Papandreau style radically, he downplayed the Turkish threat upon his return from the Davos meeting in February 1992 where he and Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel had agreed to mutually refrain from damaging public rhetoric.33 In May, he expressed satisfaction with the existing climate in bilateral relations, describing it as one of rapprochement and avoidance of statements and activities that could have repercussions.34
Greek opposition and public opinion demanded an explanation for the signs of detente displayed mutually at the top levels of gov ernment in both countries.35 The Greek State Minister Andreas Andrianopoulos was almost apologetic about the amicable atmosphere within which Greek-Turkish talks were held between the two prime ministers during then Prime Minister Mitsotakis' visit to Turkey to attend the funeral ceremonies for the late-President Turgut Ozal on April 21, 1993. He explained that according to t he Greek government, as the clouds darkened over the Balkans, Greece should have better
relations with its neighbors and that the maintenance of communica tion and dialogue with Turkey was a deterrent to the escalating tension in the Balkans. 36 Greek Government spokesman Vasilis Mangin2s added a qualifier: "Just because we have talks does not mean we agree. But we get rid of mutual distrust. "37
Clearly, then, Turkey and Greece have pursued totally divergent positions and policies concerning the key elements of the critical question of how to manage the Yugoslav crisis so as to prevent a larger, regional war. The joint statement issued at the end of official talks in Ankara between Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin and Greek Foreign Minister Mikhail Papakonstandinou on April 19020, 1993, acknowledges this vast chasm with the following words: "It has been announced that Turkey and Greece agree on the establishment of peace and stability in the Balkans as soon as possible, but differ on the means and methods for a solution. "38
Bulgaria: The Need to Safeguard a Delicate Deteote
Bulgaria is the other important pillar on which Turkey's strategic thinking about its security environment in the Balkans has been focused. Bulgaria is important for Turkish security not only on its own merits as a neighbor but also because it enjoys a potential balancing role in Greek-Turkish relations. As long as the Greek-Turkish conflict continues, neither country would be comfortable with the idea or Bulgaria entering into a close alliance with the other.
In contrast to the standstill on substantive issues in Greek Turkish relations, Turkish security thinking on th� Balkans has been able to build on the window of opportunity offered especially by the change of regime in Bulgaria upon the fall of Mr. Zhivkov, with t he result that Bulgaria is not generally perceived as a source of threat.39
A series of Turkish-Bulgarian accords of political and military significance comprise the concrete foundation of the new spirit of mutual confidence. The Sofia Document of December 20, 1991 on
Mutually Complementary Confidence and Security Building Measures and Military Contacts, the Edirne Document of November 12, 1992 that broadens the scope of the military transparency provided by the
110 Common Security Regimes in the Balkans
former document, and the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, Cooperation and Security concluded on May 6, 1992, have altogether dramatically altered mutual threat perceptions. In July 1992, Turkey redeployed one battalion of ground forces and one tank battalion to the area of Luleburgaz and Istanbul respectivel�40
Benevolent domestic policies in support o11he rights and free doms of the Turkish-Moslem minority 41 and the political will to steer
a policy of communication on issues of mutual security concerns instead of posturing nd confrontation on the part of Bulgaria's Post Zhivkov leaderships have contributed greatly to the new Turkish Bulgarian detente. The quality of the dialogue and military transparen cy achieved in the wake of the Yugoslav conflict may need to be safeguarded, however, against the turbulences let loose throughout the region by the ripple effects of the conflict. There are important diver gences on their respective approaches to the Yugoslav conflict.42 The
delicate question of ethnic relations in Bulgarian society could also as well revert to t he old pattern under the influence of a gathering anti Moslem wave in Greece and Serbia.
Special Friends: Albania and Macedonia
Turkey has embraced Albania and Macedonia as two friendly countries and peoples who have recently converted to a democratic form of government. In addition to sentimental factors referred to previously, both countries share with Turkey the uncomfortable position of being the targets of policies of isolation and alienation by Qreece and Serbia. The sense of vulnerability to Greek and Serbian pjlicies of intimidation and exclusion has created a common bond between Albania, Macedonia and Turkey, itself threatened by a Greece determined to do everything in its power to keep Turkey out of Europe. In other words, Turkey has an important stake in friendship with Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and any other country which is receptive, primarily because such positive inter action would help sustain the European orientation of the country.
There have been high level contracts between Turkish officials and Albanian and Macedonian officials. Prime Minister Suleyman
Demirel paid a visit to Tirana on May 31, 1992 when an Agreement of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation was signed. On July 29, 1992, a Turkish-Albanian Defence Cooperation Agreement was ·concluded, apparently with the prior consent of NAT0.43 Turkey has extended considerable humanitarian and economic assistance to both countries.44
The late-President Turgut Ozal of Turkey paid a visit to Sofia, Skopje, Zagreb and Has in February 1993, proposing megaprojects like new regional highway systems and ports in order to boost regional tourism and trade.
V. POLARIZATION IN THE BALKANS
In light of what has been said above, it is not difficult to detect that the Balkans have been heading towards a new stage of polariza tion among the countries of the region. The continuation of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the decision by Greece and Turkey to give support to the opposing sides in the Bosnian conflict have encouraged powerful divisive pressures and counterpressures to take shape in the region. The pressures have insidiously been laying the groundwork for the creation of two politico-military coalitions, the first around a Greek-Serbian axis and the second around Turkey, with Has as a possible ally.
Where Bulgaria would position itself within this apparently evolving divide would probably depend on how the question of Macedonia would evolve. Like Turkey, Bulgaria apparently finds the trend towards polarization around different power axes uncomfortable and dangerous.45
These scenarios should not be seen as too far-fetched. For, President Milosevic already proposed in June 1992 to form a Serbian Greek confederation.46 This offer was interpreted as a move highly indicative of his intentions to convert the conflict into a Balkan war; earlier, he was reported to have suggested to Greece to partition Macedonia between the two. 47
Moreover, Russian support for the Serbian cause has increased in several visible ways throughout 1993. Aside from an outpouring of
112 Common Security Regimes in the Balkans
sympathies for the Serbs, Russian nationalists are moved by a desire to weigh the Russian policy towards the Yugoslav conflict as a test case for the reaffirmation of Russia as a great power.48
Eventually, resurgent Panslavism and the image of Russia as the historical protector and liberator of Christian Balkans from the Ottoman regime might urge the Russian leadership into a closer alliance with the Greek- Serbian entente. President Yeltsin's official visit to Athens at the end of June 1993, when a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was concluded, may be the most powerful evidence so far of the first steps of a new Greek-Serbian-Russian politico military configuration in the Balkans. 49
These trends pose serious potential threats to regional security in general and Turkish security in particular if they evolve, as intimated above, into an anti-Moslem alliance among three major Christian-Orthodox countries and possibly others. There is already a general perception in the international community that at the basis of the Serbian-Greek cooperation throughout the crisis has stood a common understanding to neutralize the islands of Moslem ( often implying ethnic Turks as well) presence.
The revival of a new spirit of crusades in the Balkans would certainly be dangerous for obvious reasons. Turkey, for its part, has desisted from defining the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a war between two religions, refraining from statements and positions that could mobilize or radicalize anti-Western and anti-Christian move ments in the Moslem world.50
As a secular Moslem country, such developments would have serious domestic implications as well. The revival of the idea of the crusades would bring into question the legitimacy of the political regime in Turkey by strengthening the hand of Islamic militants. Hence, Turkey has had to tread the course of solidarity with Balkan Moslems with great caution, trying to avoid accusations from two opposing quarters: from Christian Balkan countries which imply Turkish complicity. in inciting the Balkan Moslems on the basis of religion, and, from Moslem fundamentalists in Turkey and outside
who charge it with having failed to go to the rescue of Bosnian Moslems slaughtered at the hands of the Christians.
VI. Turkish Views of the Greek Threat in Cyprus and the Aegean
The discussion in the previous pages should draw attention to the immensely complicated and tense new regional context within which old-time Greek-Turkish disagreements and suspicions are being thought through. This section will try to describe the Turkish views on the specific issues that divide the two countries.
Turkey and Greece have serious disagreements on two sets of issues: Cyprus and the Aegean.51 In terms of formal positions they may or may not be linked-for obvious diplomatic reasons. In reality, however, they are closely interactive.
Cyprus
In March 19870, Greece and Turkey stood at the brink of a shooting war over a crisis between their respective maritime forces in the Aegean. Awed by this experience, they decided at the Davos Summit on January 1, 1988, to refrain forthwith, as a war-prevention measure, from the policy of confrontation.
The spirit of Davos quickly evaporated but mutual posturing has been replaced by subtle diplomacy recently. Yet, as discussed previously, no movement on substantive issues has been achieved. Greece continues to insist on the resolution of the Cyprus question before it will agree to move to take up bilateral relations. Turkey rejects the concept of linkage between the two issues. Prime Minister Mitsotakis, who has infuriated the domestic opposition by his non
confrontational style towards Turkey in general, restates the Greek position firmly: no treaty of friendship with Turkey, as desired by the latter as a confidence-building prelude, prior to the resolution of the Cyprus question.52 At the core of the Greek demand lies the with
drawal of the Turkish troops from northern Cyprus.
Why is Turkey being so difficult on the Cyprus question despite the very high cost to its broader foreign policy interests and objec tives? What is it about Cyprus that makes Turkey forego pr(?sumably
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enormous foreign policy gains, that might accrue, i.e. upgraded relations with the European Community, in the event it yielded to the Greek position, also compelling Turkish-Cypriots to yield to the Greek-Cypriot positions?
Reduced to its bare essentials, it is the fear that Cyprus would eventually become the exclusive easternmost bastion of Hellenism if and when the Turkish-Cypriot community, left unprotected, were effectively neutralized as a viable political and economic force. Turks strongly believe that Greeks continue to hold onto what appears to be a timeless dream: Megali Idea. In practical terms, it is a call for the redemption of old Greek lands. Between its first year of independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1829 through 1947, Hellenism reached the shores of Turkey on the Aegean in partial fulfillment of the
Megali Idea. Continuing to sit on parts of ancient Greek lands,
Turkey feels constantly on guard about the smallest signs that imply the reactivation of the Megali Idea. The openly pursued policy of
ENOSIS--union of Cyprus with Greece-for two decades by succes
sive governments in Greece and among Greek-Cypriot leaderships following the British decision to withdraw from the colony, has been perceived as the most recent manifestation of the Megali Idea, this time in the eastern Mediterranean. Given this mental and emotional map of the Greek- Turkish universe of interaction, Turkish-Cypriots stand as the only real barrier to the total Hellenization of Cyprus and the surrounding Mediterranean into Hellenic waters.
Post-independence developments in Cyprus in the Sixties and Seventies exposed the vulnerability of the Turkish Cypriot community to physical and economic pressures by a majority that seemed intent on reducing it to total ineffectiveness. The coup d'etat engineered by Athens in 1974 against President Makarios was the most dramatic confirmation of the validity of two overriding and interrelated con cerns of Turkey: the Greek intention to bring out ENOSIS when the hour of opportunity struck, and second, the physical vulnerability of the Turkish-Cypriot community. The Turkish intervention came as a response to the Greek action to absorb the island. Unless held back by
the Turkish forces, Greece would have absorbed the island and ethnically cleansed it.
One could argue about the judiciousness of the size of the land occupied by the Turkish Armed Forces to bring about a de facto division of the island. But, given the details of the records of the coup d'etat in Cyprus in July 1974, one cannot deny the Turkish side the right to be constantly prepared against a repeat performance. Turks cannot be sure that a similar fait accompli is not awaiting Cyprus at some opportune moment in the future. The lessons of what in effect was the seizure of Cyprus by Athens in 1974 are just too powerful, too traumatic to dispense with under the duress of international diplo matic and economic penalties imposed both on Turkey andl the Turkish Cypriots.
Even if ENOSIS seems to have disappeared since the summer of 1974 from the political debate in Greece and among Greek Cypriots, the fundamental lesson of the cathartic experience of 1974 has survived: that Megali Idea can confront the Turkish-Cypriot community again any time they are left vulnerable. A domestic political system on the island that will guarantee their physical, political and economic security and well-being is, therefore, the sine
qua non of a settlement of the Cyprus conflict.
The Turkish force on the island would have no mission if and when the Turkish-Cypriots could be convinced that life with Greek Cypriots would not be rising, once again, their security and freedom, the security they have enjoyed under Turkish protection against all odds in the form of economic and diplomatic sanctions mobilized by the West in particular. Several powerful and responsible circles in Turkey believe that Turkey's military muscle should not be used for expansionist adventures. However, even these pacifist circles fear the destruction of the Turkish-Cypriot community and the subsequent Hellenization of the eastern Mediterranean unless they were protected by credible constitutional and physical guarantees.
In the two decades since 1974, drawn-out negotiations under the good offices of the United Nations, numerous political develop ments, and heavy misinformation from all sides have blurred the
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essentials of h ow the conflict got tied around the knot generally packaged by its opponents as the "Turkish invasion force". Incredible myths have been created. And, the two communities and their respective leaderships have drawn further apart in sentiment and life style. The external world has changed dramatically as well. Federalism has collapsed in three countries in Europe: the Soviet Union, Yugosla via and Czechoslovakia.
Under these circumstances, how realistic is it to continue to insist on the withdrawal of the Turkish forces in particular and the settlement of the Cyprus question in general as a precondition for entering into negotiations on the substantive issues of Greek-Turkish relations? Is it not time to start with a new look by all the parties concerned?
The Aegean
It is in the Aegean where Greek and Turkish national interests are in conflict in a direct manner. Contrary to what many Greeks apparently believe, the conflict arises not because Turkey challenges Greek sovereignty over its islands in the eastern Aegean but because Greece takes advantage of these islands in order to claim sovereignty over the entire Aegean. If Greek positions. on several outstanding issues were to prevail, the Aegean would effectively be reduced into a Greek lake, condemning Turkey to the status of a dependent on Greek good-will for maritime activity in and through the Aegean.
Turkey feels that as one of only two riparians in the Aegean, it has legitimate rights and interests of a military, economic and political nature. The entire western coast of its mainland, the most developed part of the country, is washed by the Aegean. Its large population receives an overwhelming portion of its energy supplies through the Aegean. Of the 22 million metric tons of Turkey's oil needs in 1990, Turkey imported 19 million; 15 million was refined at the Aliaga Refinery in the vicinity of Izmir, to be shipped to the ports of Istanbul and others on the Black Sea for nationwide distribution. The defense of Istanbul requires sea control. For a country in Turkey's geographic, demographic and economic position, it would be extremely difficult to agree to be reduced to marginality and dependence on somebody
else's good-will even though trends in the law of the sea would favor·
Greece in a legal case in support of change.
The list of the issues in the Aegean include the territorial waters, the continental shelves of the islands, the 10-mile Greek air-space, authority mandated by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) over civilian flight information region (FIR) in the Aegean, and the re-militarization of the Greek islands in the eastern Aegean.
Territorial Waters: Turkey feels that an extension by Greece of its territorial waters from six to twelve miles would threaten vital Turkish interests in the Aegean. These interests are related to military security, economic security and political influence, all three of which derive from one simple fact: that Turkey is one of only two riparian states in the Aegean, as noted above.
In military security terms, no regime in the Aegean should be such as to permit a balance of power that could either physically threaten Turkey or prevent it from protecting and defending its presence and control in that semi-enclosed sea. In terms of economic security, Turkish interest can be defined as the continued ability to use the sea lanes and the seabed of the Aegean on the basis of the 6-mile limit for territorial waters. Political influence is what every ration.al actor wants and needs in order to have a minimum degree of bargain ing power within its larger environment. A country which does not enjoy military and economic security in the Aegean is not likely to enjoy political influence in its dealings with its neighbors and generally with the rest of the world.
Turkey is not a party to the new Law of the Sea Convention which recognizes the right of states to extend their territorial waters to twelve miles. Greece argues that this is its sovereign right and that it will not negotiate over it. It is precisely on this point, in addition to Cyprus, where the Davos understanding of 1988 became stalled. Greece is generally recognized as having a sound case from a technical-legal perspective. Turkey also concedes that as a sovereign state Greece is entitled to exercise its sovereign rights but only at Turkey's risk. The question, then, is to find a solution that would balance the needs and interests of both countries through bilateral
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negotiations on the basis of equity and equality, as Turkey proposes to do.
The Continental Shelves of the Islands: The 1958 Geneva
Convention and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea attribute continental shelves to the islands. If this legal prerogative were to be applied to two thousand and some Greek islands in the Aegean, some of them only a few nautical miles from the Turkish mainland, the Aegean would indeed be transformed into a Greek lake.
Turkey proposes to seek a political solution to the delimitation of the continental shelves on the basis of the principles of equity and equality while Greece prefers to take the question to the International Court of Justice, as it did in 1976. The Court declared itself incompe tent to pass a ruling on the substance of the Greek complaint.
The Impact of 12-Mile Territorial Waters on Continental
Shelves of the Islands: A twelve-mile limit in the Aegean would
solve the continental shelf question by proxy in favour of Greece, reducing the international navigable waters by more than half. Under the six-mile limit, Greek territorial waters cover approximately 43.68 per cent and Turkish waters 7.468 per cent of the Aegean. The remaining 48.885 per cent is the high seas. In the event of an extension to the twelve-mile limit, Greece's territorial waters would jump to approximately 71.53 per cent of the Aegean while Turkey's would trail behind to a mere 8.76 per cent.
The Greek islands would, of course, be responsible for the enormous surge in the Greek share. A twelve-mile territorial limit for the two thousand some Greek islands would simultaneously award the islands with continental shelves. The high seas would be reduced down to 19.71 per cent from the current 48.85 per cent.
Turkey pronounces such a situation to be totally unacceptable, stating that should Greece resort to even a partial extension of the territorial waters or to the declaration of other kinds of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Aegean, Turkey would take all necessary measures to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests in that sea.
Air Space: Greece maintains a ten-mile air space while continuing to adhere to the six-mile limit on its territorial waters.
Turkey argues that a state's air space cannot exceed the limits of its territorial waters. Hence, the repeated protests by Greece against the alleged violations of its airspace by Turkish aircraft.
The Greek goal of exerting full sovereignty over the Aegean air space has been manifested in its interpretation of the meaning and ex tent of the technical responsibility Greece enjoys under the rules and regulations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to control civilian air-traffic in the Aegean's Flight Information Region (FIR). In Turkish eyes Greece is trying to convert a technical respon sibility over the safety of civilian flights in the Aegean into a mandate for sovereignty. As an illustration, Turkey cites Greek demands for the submission of flight plans by military aircraft before they could be cleared to fly through the FIR.
Remilitarization of the Greek Islands: The remilitarization by Greece of the eastern Aegean islands is in violation of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, the London Agreement of 1913, on which the relevant provisions of the Lausanne Treaty rest, and the Paris Treaty of 1947. This unlawful remilitarization presents Turkey with the most direct military threat.
The Lausanne Treaty established a balance between the interests of the two riparians by constraining Greek sovereignty on the islands through the imposition of a non-militarized status. In this way, Greece would have the land and Turkey would have the security that would flow from the islands' demilitarized status. Thus neither would be able to obtain a position of military preponderance in the Aegean. The Dodecanese Islands were turned over to Greece after the Second World War, but the Paris Treaty continued to stipulate their demili tarization and defortification. Since 1974, Greece has remilitarized these islands, citing the Turkish intervention of 1974 as its rationale.
Why is the remilitarization of the islands so serious a matter for Turkey? Is it the principle of violation of international treaties or the nature of the weapons deployed that trouble Turkey? The answer is a combination of both. A fundamental principle of international law is
pacta sund servanta. This principle has been violated. A contractually
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between the two is unraveling, setting dangerous precedents for future developments.
The nature of the military threat posed by the remilitari zation of the islands is more subtle. The military infrastructure and the logistical preparations on the islands are designed to sustain reinforce ments. However, the islands' remilitarization threaten Turkey not primarily because of their capacity for force generation necessary to invade the Turkish mainland and inflict large-scale destruction on it. Fundamentally it is the sophisticated defensive systems on the islands that seem to be a source of great concern to Turkey. This capability would put at risk Turkey's ability to defend what it perceives as its rights and interests in the Aegean.
Greece has deployed early warning systems in the air and surface surveillance systems on naval ships docked at the islands. Early warning systems in thef air are complemented and enhanced by electronic warfare capability. Linked between the islands, these systems allow the surveillance, detection and identification of Turkish ships entering the Aegean from the Dardanelles. Turkish. ships, thus, turn into clear targets upon entry into the Aegean. The early warning capabilities in the air perform similar missions against Turkish air craft. These defensive systems ultimately constrain Turkey's ability to engage in military operations in the air and the sea, if need be, with
any chance of success. What are defensive systems, then, become in effect offensive systen:is.
Under what specific circumstances will "the need" arise? The answer probably lies in the future resolution of the 12-mile territorial waters issue, If and when the Aegean comes under effective control of Greece by a declaration of a 12-mile limit, Turkey will feel extremely threatened.
In summing up, one can say that the question of a 12-mile limit for territorial waters sits at the core of the Greek-Turkish disagree ments in the Aegean, in effect subsuming all other issues under its heading. Its implementation by Greece would establish Greek dominance over the Aegean and force Turkey to retrench militarily
and politically from a geopolitical space on which it sits as one of the only two riparians.
The Moslem/Turkish Minority: The treatment by Greece of the Moslem minority, made up overwhelmingly of ethnic Turks living mostly in western Thrace, provides a constant irritant to bilateral relations. Simply stated, Greece does not appear to have confidence in the loyalty of its ethnically non-Greek citizens. Therefore, its policies towards the Moslem/furkish minority are especially repressive.53 The
perception of Turkey as a national security threat to Greece is the prime reason behind the inbred hostility towards the Moslem{furkish minority.
Article 19 of the Greek citizenship code is a major tool in the hands of Greek governments to help diminish the numbers of an unwanted minority. Under this article, nonethnic Greek citizens may be stripped of their citizenship by a simple administrative decree if it is determined that they moved abroad with the apparent jntent not to return. There is no hearing or judicial review, and no effective right of appeal. No statistics on loss of citizenship are published. At least 122 Moslem Greek citizens lost their citizenship in 1988, and an additional 66 as of June 1990.54
The Moslem/furkish minority feels the heavy hand of the gov ernment in religious, cultural and educational affairs, as well. Greek law weakens the financial autonomy of the "wakfs"--community funds used for maintaining mosques and for charitable works- by placing the wakfs under the administration of muftis (Islamic judges and reli gious leaders) appointed by the State. In accordance with a 1990 presidential decree, the State appoints the three muftis in Greece, all resident in western Thrace-thus depriving the Moslems of their right to elect their own religious leaders. In February 1993, Greece expelled four Moslem clergymen visiting western Thrace upon the invitation of the Moslem/furkish minority on the occasion of the holy month of Ramadan.55
Disputes between Greece and Turkey on educational and cultural matters have caused serious problems in obtaining sufficient numbers and quality of. Turkish-language source mater.ial and
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instructors. Under a 1968 agreement, Greece and Turkey may annually exchange up to 35 teachers each to serve respectively, in Istanbul and Western Thrace. In 1992, Greece sent 16 teachers to Istanbul and admitted 16 of the 35 high school teachers whom Turkey nominated to teach in Thrace.56 Until 1992 Moslem/furks were also dispropor tionately required to sell arable land to the State for public projects.
On the other hand, it is not too difficult to understand the Greek sensitivities on the question of minorities. Greeks can be rightly proud that there is still a sizeable Moslem-Turkish minority in their midst, estimated by the Greek government to be roughly 120,000, while the sizeable Greek minority in the 1920s and 1930s have all but left Istanbul. 57 Every major political crisis over Cyprus since the mid-1950s, and finally the confrontation in 1974, witnessed the dramatic dwindling down of the wealthy Greek community in Istanbul to a mere 4,000 through emigration to Greece. Against this larger sad picture, Greece's mistreatment of the Moslem/furkish minority might even seem to be justified in Greek eyes. Nevertheless, the political fact is that the Turkish minority in Greece has turned into a hostage in Greece's over-all anti-Turkish campaign. Greece has its own list of complaints about the treatment of the Greek minority in Istanbul.
Passions and stereotypes unleashed in Balkan politics, in parti cular around the Yugoslav crisis, do not augur well for the future welfare of the Turkish or other Moslem minorities in Greece and the Balkans as a whole. As has been noted in previous sections, Greek suspicions of the Balkan Moslems have heightened to a point where they may be perceived as the enemies of Greece conspiring (with Turkey) to entrap Greece in a ring of hostile Islamic states.
VII. TURKISH MILITARY DOCTRINE, POSTURE AND ARMED FORCES
The most important policy statement by the Turkish General Staff in the wake of the phasing out of the Cold War concerning the future doctrine and organization of the Turkish Armed Forces was announc;ed at the Second Military Doctrines Seminar held in Vienna in October 1991, under the auspices of the CSCE.58 The
politi-cal/philosophical, organizational and technological thrust envisioned by the Ozal regime in power then for the Turkish Armed Forces was probably the expression of the lessons learned from milestone devel opments in the external world: the phasing out of the Cold War, the change in NATO strategy, and the lessons of the Gulf War in the winter of 1991.
Public sources suggest that the main concepts elaborated in that document continue to be the basis of tbe reform efforts undertaken by Turkey in the post-Cold War era.59 In a major press briefing on August 24, 1992, Prime Minister Suleyman Demire.l reiterated his government's commitment to the key ideas in the reform package: to enhance the mobility, c3 systems and the capacity of the forces to integrate high-tech weapons; to reduce manpower levels, and; to shift to a professional army. He also announced that according to the man power limits set within the framework of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFER), Turkey was required to reduce its forces to 530,000 within forty months after the agreement came into force.60
Turkish defense policy aims at maintaining sufficient armed forces capable of protecting the country's borders, territorial integrity and legitimate rights and interests. The protection of the Turkish homeland and Turkish national interests against external threats requires maintaining a deterrent force in peacetime, and forward defense beginning at the frontiers on land, on sea and in the air, the last two in places where the intention of attack is clearly identified. Hence Turkish military doctrine is based on deterrence, and on defense in the event that deterrence fails. Public statements by officials stress the importance attached to forward defense and full readiness at the borders.
Turkey will defend against possible enemy aggression alone, anticipating the arrival of allied reinforcements. Allied reinforcements will be necessary for a stable defense on all three fronts into which the country is divided. In order for allied reinforcements and logistical support to arrive at reception facilities in Turkey, it is of utmost importance that sea lanes of communication be safe and secure.
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Peace and stability have not been restored in the :Balkans and the Transcaucasus since October 1991 when Turkey announced the changes underway in its armed forces and military doctrine, possibly complicating the task of the proposed restructuring. Chief of the General Staff General Dogan Gures expressed his sense of unease about the new environment at an Air Force ceremony on July 6, 1992, saying, "Turkey has not been as important and in as risky a situation since World War II has it has been in recent years. The number of unknowns around us has increased. "61
Unlike Greece, Turkey cannot afford to be preoccupied exclusively by a single threat. As serious as it is, Greece is only one of Turkey's security concerns. The multiple sources of security concerns that inform the country's military doctrine find their reflection in Turkey's defense posture.
Def eose Posture
For strategic and tactical purposes Turkey is divided into three distinct and separate geographic areas, each with its own specific terrain and tactical and logistical considerations. They form three separate defense fronts or potential combat zones: the Turkish Thrace and the Straits; eastern Turkey; and, southeastern Turkey. Accordingly, the Turkish Armed Forces are organized into three armies, each responsible for the defense of one of the three geographic areas cited above.
The First Army's task is to defend the Turkish Thrace and the Straits region-the strategic prize in any military engagement. The Second Army's task is the defense of southeastern Turkey. The Third Army's task is the defense of eastern Turkey. Because each front exhibits different terrain features, their defense doctrines and tactics differ from each other's. In this paper we shall focus on the First Army only since it is responsible for defense of the Greek-Turkish and Bulgarian-Turkish borders.
The Turkish First Army consists of twelve division equivalents.
Its mission is forward defense.. Major withdrawal is not envisioned. Terrain characteristics almost inevitably impose a forward defense strategy. For, Turkish Thrace is an area of open rolling plains with
