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BILKENT UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
UNITED STATES MEDIATION IN THE POST COLD-WAR ERA: THREE CASE STUDIES
BY TUBA KESİM
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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN PARTIAL FULLFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
NOVEMBER 1997 ANKARA
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quantity, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science in International Relations.
Asst.Prof.Nimet Beriker Atiyas Thesis Supervisor
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quantity, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science in International Relations.
Asst.Prof Nur Bilge Criss
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quantity, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science in International Relations.
Asst. Prof. Serdar Güner
Approved by the Institute of Economics and Social Science.
ABSTRACT
United States Mediation in the Post Cold-War Era: Three Case Studies By
Tuba Kesim
A thesis presented for the Degree of Master of International Relations Bilkent University, November 1997
This study aims to compare and contrast the United States’ mediation attempts in the Bosnian conflict, in Palestinian-Israeli and Haitian conflicts. For this purpose, the following components of the literature on mediation are utilised as the analytical tools of this thesis: The power of the mediator, stakes of the mediator, roles played by the mediator, entry and timing of the mediator. In addition, certain indicators are chosen; namely, the relative power of the parties, redistribution of resources, policy or position changes, duration of the conflict, establishment of ongoing mechanisms, the use of media in order to observe the changes realised during or as an outcome of the mediation attempts. According to the analyses of these three mediation attempts, this thesis reveals that “mediation” stands as an important foreign policy making tool of the United States in the Post Cold-War era. In addition, this study underscores the importance of mediator’s power in international mediation attempts.
Lastly, the study intends to make a contribution to the literature on mediation through defining a new concept called indirect mediation.
Key words: International Mediation - The United States Mediation Attempts -
ÖZET
Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Arabuluculuğu Girişimleri: Üç Vaka Çalışması
Tuba Kesim
Bilkent Üniversitesi, Kasım 1997
Bu tezin amacı, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin Bosna ihtilafı, Filistin-İsrail ihtilafı ve Haiti ihtilafı üzerine yürüttüğü arabuluculuk girişimlerini karşılaştırmaktır. Bu analizi yapmak için, arabuluculuk literatürünün aşağıda belirtilen önemli bileşenleri değerlendirilmiştir: Arabulucunun gücü, arabulucunun çıkarları, arabulucunun üstlendiği roller, arabulucunun ihtilafa giriş tarzı ve arabulucunun ihtilafa giriş zamanı. Buna ek olarak, tarafların birbirlerine göre değerlendirilen güçleri, kaynakların tekrar bölüşümü, politika ya da tutum. değişiklikleri, ihtilafın süresi, ihtilafın şiddetlenip şiddetlenmediği, süregelen mekanizmaların kurulması, medyanın kullanımı gibi göstergeler, arabuluculuk girişiminin getirdiği değişimleri incelemek amacıyla seçilmiştir. Bu üç arabuluculuk girişiminin analizi sonucunda, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin dış politika oluşturma araçları arasında arabuluculuğun önemli bir yeri olduğu gösterilmiştir. Ayrıca, bu çalışma, arabulucunun gücünün arabuluculuk girişimlerindeki öneminin altını çizmektedir. Son olarak, bu çalışma, “dolaylı arabuluculuk” adında yeni bir kavram tanımlayarak arabuluculuk literatürüne katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası Arabuluculuk - Amerika Birleşik Devletleri
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my appreciation to Bilkent University for giving me the opportunity to enroll the Masters program of the Department of International relations.
My sincere gratitude is dedicated to Dr.Nimet Beriker Atiyas for her precious guidance and encouragement throughout this thesis. It is my privilege to work with such a perse^ cring academician.
I would like to thank Dr.Nur Bilge Criss and Dr. Serdar Güner for kindly reviewing this study.
I am grateful to the staff of the Library of Grand National Assembly of Turkey for kindly providing the necessary materials, utilised in this thesis.
My deep thanks goes to all of my friends for their moral support. Special thanks to Serhat Süt and Aynur Genç for their technical help regarding to the computer, apart from their moral support.
The last but not the least, I wish to express my deep gratefulness to my family and my fiancee for their unconditional support. Without their help, I would not be able to work so efficiently.
TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT...Ill ÖZET...V ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...VI TABLE OF CONTENTS...VII LIST OF TABLES...IX CHAPTER 1... 1 INTRODUCTION...1 1.1 LITERATURE R EVIEW ... I 1.1.1 POWER OF THE MEDIATOR...4
1.1.2 STAKES OF THE MEDIATOR...5
1.1.3 ROLES/STRATEGIES OF THE MEDIATOR...6
1.1.4 ENTRY OF THE MEDIATOR... 9
1.1.5 TIMING OF THE MEDIATOR... 10
1.1.6 CFIANGES REALISED...11
1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE S T U D Y ... 13
CHAPTER II... 15
US MEDIATION IN THE BOSNIAN CONFLICT... 15
2.1 HISTORICAL B A C K G R O U N D ...15
2.2 A N A L Y S IS ...17
2.2.1 POWER OF THE MEDIATOR... 17
2.2.2 STAKES OF THE MEDIATOR... 17
2.2.3 ROLES PLAYED BY THE MEDIATOR... 19
2.2.4 TIMING OF THE MEDIATOR...24
2.2.5 ENTRY OF THE MEDIATOR... 25
2.2.6 CHANGES REALISED... 26
CHAPTER III...29
US M E D IA T IO N IN T H E P A L E S T IN IA N - ISR A E L I C O N F L IC T ... 29
3.1 HISTORICAL B A C K G R O U N D :...29
3.2 A N A L Y S IS ... 32
3.2.1 POWER OF THE MEDIATOR...32
3.2.2 STAKES OF THE MEDIATOR...32
3.2.3 ROLES PLAYED BY THE MEDIATOR... 34
3.2.4 TIMING OF THE MEDIATOR...42
3.2.5 EilNTRY OF THE MEDIATOR...43
3.2.6 CHANGES REALISED...44
CHAPTER IV... 49
U S M E D IA T IO N IN H A IT IA N C O N F L IC T ... 49
4.1 HISTORICAL B A C K G R O U N D ... 49
4.2 A N A L Y S IS ... 51
4.2.1 POWER OF THE MEDIATOR...51
4.2.2 STAKES OF THE MEDIATOR...53
4.2.3 ROLES PLAYED BY THE MEDIATOR... 54
4.2.4 TIMING OF THE MEDIATOR...57
4.2.5 ENTRY OF THE MEDIATOR... 58
4.2.6 CHANGES REALISED... 59
CHAPTER V ...64
F IN D IN G S ...64
5.1 POW ER OF THE M E D IA TO R ...64
5.2 STAKES OF THE M E D IA TO R ...65
5.3 ROLES PLA YED BY THE M E D IA T O R ... 65
5.4 TIM ING OF THE M E D IA T O R ...69
5.5 ENTRY OF THE M E D IA T O R ... 69
5.6 CH ANG ES R EA LISED ...70
CHAPTER VI... 80
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Summary of Findings... 76
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this study is to compare and contrast three international mediation attempts conducted by the United States (US) during the post cold war era. These cases, namely the US mediation attempts in the Bosnian conflict, the Palestinian- Israeli conflict and the Haitian conflict, are analysed in accordance with the framework borrowed from the literature on international mediation.
1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW
Conflict has been an integral part of human lives and likewise of international relations. There are several ways to deal with conflict peacefully. Negotiation, arbitration, preventive diplomacy and mediation are major mechanisms used for peaceful resolution of disputes. The focus of this study is the process and outcome of international mediation.
International mediation can be seen as a nonbinding process of
peacemaking, involving the intervention of a third party, aiming to resolve or at least de-escalate a conflict among parties.
International mediation, in practice, has a long history. However, the same can not be claimed for its systematic study. Only for the last thirty years, students of the field have been studying the dynamics of international mediation. Young,'
Burton and Stenelo's studies are the pioneers of the field.
In the literature, there are various definitions of international mediation, ranging from general to detailed. Doob’s definition can be shown as an example for a general one. He sees mediation as “the efforts of one or more persons to affect one or more other persons when ...the former, the latter or both perceive the problem requiring a solution.”"*
Like Doob's definition, there are definitions stressing the objectives of a mediation attempt, such as necessity of achieving a solution or an agreement in the end. For example, Dryzek and Hunter define mediation as “a process in which the parties to a dispute attempt to reach a mutually agreed solution under the aegis of a third party by reasoning through their differences”.^ Along the same line, Stenelo, while underlining the changeable character of mediation, defines it “as the process initiated by a third party in his attempts to facilitate the solution of other parties’ disagreements in order to ensure the achievement of a negotiated settlement”.^ On the other hand, there are scholars like Mitchell who widen the range of mediation objectives and, therefore stressing the fact that mediation is not static, but dynamic. He defines mediation as “any intermediary activity...undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of achieving some compromise settlement of the issues at stake between the parties, or at least ending disruptive conflict behaviour”.^ Touval
“Mediation is a form of third party intervention in conflict for the purpose of abating or resolving that conflict through negotiation.”*
In the literature, there are also definitions which focus on the characteristics of the third party- the mediator. For example, Bingham, sees mediation as the “assistance of a neutral party to a negotiation”^ and Moore, defines it as
the intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-making power to assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in
dispute.10
One of the broadest definitions in the literature is Bercovitch and Houston’s. Underscoring the dynamic nature of the international mediation, in which “a reciprocal relationship” '' between the mediator and the parties exists they define it as,
a reactive process of conflict management whereby parties seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group or organisation to change their behaviour, settle their conflict, or resolve their problem without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law.
An indispensable factor in a mediation, is certainly the mediator who may be an individual, a state or an institution or organisation.'^ The students of mediation
analysed different aspects of the role of and the process of mediation. Issues such as the stakes of the mediator, role/strategies of the mediator, power/resources of the mediator, timing of the mediator and the entry of the mediator are important components of the literature on mediation.
1.1.1 POWER OF THE MEDIATOR
A mediator’s ability to make an impact on a dispute, which can be called leverage, is linked with its power thus its resources, such as, money, status, expertise, access and p re stig e .A s Carnevale and Pruitt put it, a mediator’s power sometimes stems from its reputation and authority and sometimes from the capacity to reward and punish the disputants.'^ The previous accomplishments of the mediator, its economic, military and political power in the international arena are important sources of power which may enable the mediator achieve its objectives.
Contrary to some scholars, such as Bercovitch , Touval and Zartman , who stress the importance of leverage for an effective mediation, there are some scholars who remind that the lack of political power of a mediator might facilitate success as her/his credibility and sincerity may be enhanced.'* In addition, ■S'/Zw'^ argues that the non-threatening stance of small states lead to their acceptability as mediators.
The scholars seem to have consensus over the idea that the overuse of leverage or exerting power frequently in a mediation attempt carries risks. For instance, Rubin^^ claims that a third party should not exert its full power in small scooped conflicts because a settlement achieved under strong pressure from the mediator may not endure. Likewise, the extreme use of carrots (like rewards.
incentives) and sticks (like punishments, ultimatums or withholding carrots) as the
conceptual components of leverage, may not produce any positive outcome.
Touval and Zartman stress that “a too strenuous use of sticks can cause a party to
withdraw its acceptanee of mediation, and leave the mediator without a role”.^^ Besides, an overuse of carrots may result in a situation in which the concessions are only achieved through these rewards.
1.1.2 STAKES OF THE MEDIATOR
In the literature, there are different views about stakes of the mediator. Some scholars, like Davis and Dungan^^, Moore^^ moving along the traditional line, do not consider the mediators’ having a stake in the outcome of the process. On the other hand, some scholars like, Touval and Zartman^\ Bailey^^, Kleiboer^^ do not regard the mediators’ that altruistic but interest-oriented as well. For example,
Touval and Zartman have labelled two kinds of motives a mediator may have at
stake: Defensive and expansionist motives. Defensive motives may arise when a dispute threatens the interests of the mediator and expansionist motives may emerge if the mediator has a desire to extend and increase its influence, resources and
power28
In a more detailed manner, Bercovitch lists five types of motives that a mediator may pursue. Like Touval and Zartman’s distinction, he mentions the motive stemming from a negatively affected interest due to a conflict and the motive arising from an aim to extend its influence over the parties. The other three may arise from a mandate, like the constitutions of the Organisation of American States;
from the demand o f one or both o f the parties and from a desire to keep a structure
to which they belong intact.29
1.1.3 ROLES/STRATEGIES OF THE MEDIATOR
In the literature, typologies of mediator roles/strategies by Kressel and Touval and
Zartman are well-known. Kressel developed three kinds of strategies ranging from
passive to active as follows; Reflective behaviour, nondirective behaviour and
directive behaviour. The reflective behaviour can be accepted as the preliminary
activities on which the mediator builds its later work. It involves discovering issues and facilitating better in teractio n s.T h e purpose is to reduce the degree of complexity and uncertainty inherent in any international conflict.^* Nondirective behaviour is a more active category and aims to produce a favourable climate for mediation with the contribution of the mediator. Directive behaviour, implies a mediator aiming to manipulate the parties toward a specific settlement.
By the same token, Touval and Zartman classified mediation behaviour
along a continuum ranging from low to high intervention, but with different
labels: Mediator as a facilitator within which communicator and formulator roles are present and mediator as a manipulator. The most passive role is facilitator which is usually acquired when communication between the parties is broken.
Within the range of passive facilitator and active formulator, the mediator may serve as a channel of communication, carry proposals of concessions thus become a communicator as the parties can not contact each other directly. A more active role is formulator by which the mediator may “redefine the issues in conflict
or find a formula for the conflict’s resolution or managemenf’.^'* Therefore it may submit proposals in an effort to persuade the parties to conflict.^^ As Touval and
Zartman state, mediator along this role works on perceptions, doing nothing to
change the nature of the problem.36
Mediator as a formulator may also determine the mediation place, the
7
number and type of meetings with the disputants. Moreover, it may help in
providing a neutral environment, deciding on who will participate in the
q Q
negotiations and in controlling outside pressure.
The most active role is manipulator in which a mediator uses its leverage,
o 0
resources of power, influence and persuasion to move the parties into agreement. Mediator as a manipulator changes the structure of the conflict'*® by empowering the weaker side of the conflict through using carrots and sticks. In conflict cases where there is significant power asymmetries between the parties, the mediator may make a deliberate effort to enhance the power of the weaker party in order to decrease power discrepancies between the parties. In an effort to prevent the stronger party “to impose an unsatisfactory settlement on another” the mediator may assist the weaker party.'*' The idea here is to create a conducive environment for the resolution of the conflict.
In the mediation literature, there are other roles listed by other scholars as well. For example, Rubin lists a number of roles such as formal as opposed to informal roles, individual in contrast to representative role, invited to non-invited role, advisory to directive roles, content to process roles, permanent to temporary
roles and conflict resolution to conflict prevention roles. Moreover, Rubin numerates three functions for a mediator: Modification of physical and social structure within which the conflict is waged, modification of issue structure and increasing the motivation of the parties to reach agreement.'*^ Moore enumerates a number of roles and functions that a mediator may acquire, such as opener of communications channels, legitimiser, process facilitator, trainer, resource expander, problem explorer, agent of reality, scapegoat and leader."*^ Though in much the same vein, Stulberg’s list of mediator’s roles is a little narrower: Catalyst, educator, translator, resource expander, bearer of bad news, agent of reality and scapegoat.'*'’ The variety of roles, strategies and functions of a mediator show the diversity of international mediation and stress the importance of analysing each case within its uniqueness.
In the mediation literature, the concepts of impartiality and neutrality of a mediator have received significant attention by scholars of the field. The definitions on impartiality seem to stress the unbiased nature of a mediator.'*^ According to
Moore, impartiality refers to an unbiased opinion or lack of preference in favour of
one or more parties in conflict.'*^ Therefore a partial mediator can be regarded as closer to one side than the other, politically, economically, culturally.'*^
On the other hand, neutrality refers to pursuing no personal preferences that the dispute be resolved in one way or another.'** Carnevale and Arad regard the neutrality of a mediator as having no opinion about the conflict.'*^
Contrary to these views, Bercovitch rules out the possibility of a neutral mediator on the grounds that the mediators’ entry changes the structure and setting of the dispute by turning a dyad into a triad. Besides, he also shows mediators’ own interests to intervene as a reason to exclude the possibility of a neutral mediator. In addition, Bercovitch also stresses that “depending on their conduct and perceived qualities of outcome”, a mediator may be partial or impartial but can not be neutral.^®
In the literature of international mediation there is a heated dispute concerning whether or not the impartiality is a must for effective mediation. Some scholars following the traditional line consider mediator impartiality as a critical quality for successful mediation.^' On the other hand, some scholars like Faure,^^
Kressel and Pruitt^^ Smith^'^ Touval and Zartman^^ do not consider impartiality a
necessary condition for a mediator. Furthermore, some analysts view impartiality as an exception.^*^ Bercovitch and Houston stress the mediators’ ability to influence, protect, or extend the interests of each party in conflict as the reason for their acceptability, not their impartiality.^^ For example, the mediator might favour the weaker party, in other words empower the weaker party, in order to force the more
powerful disputant to come to the negotiation table.58
1.1.4 ENTRY OF THE MEDIATOR
Several motives may lead the disputing parties to become willing to seek or accept mediation. Some political interests of the parties like seeking a certain mediator so as to achieve a favourable agreement over the adversary, aiming to guarantee an eventual agreement with the inclusion of a third party, trying to improve its relations
with the mediator or accepting a mediator as a face-saving device to protect their
domestic and international reputation can be cited among these motives.
The entry of a mediator can be realised in two ways. The mediator might be either invited by the disputants, or imposed by its own initiative. It will obviously be for the benefit of the resolution of the conflict if the mediator is invited by the disputants since this invitation can be regarded as a sign to work on the problem by peaceful means. By this way the third party occupies a unique position to exercise influence.*’*^ Concerning the imposed way of entrance, Rubin underlines the importance of the disputants’ perception of the third party’s initiative.
1.1.5 TIMING OF THE MEDIATOR
Timing can be regarded as crucial in a mediation attempt. As stressed by
Bercovitch,^^ the duration of a dispute and the timing of initiating mediation may to
a large extent determine the likelihood of its success.
Scholars of the field to a large extent agree that a mediator should intervene in a conflict when the timing is “ripe”. However, there are different views concerning the timing of this ripeness. Edmead favours the realisation of the mediation attempt at an early stage, “before the adversaries cross a threshold of violence and begin to inflict heavy losses on each other”.^^ On the other hand, scholars like Northedge and Donelan, Frei, Koh, stress that timing of the mediation should match the signs of willingness to ease the positions of the parties and therefore favour a late entry.^^ Bercovitch, on the other hand, claims the dispute
becomes ripe for mediation at around seven to thirty-six months, at a stage when the adversaries presumably exhausted other modes.
Zartman, takes into account certain events while deciding for the ripe time
to intervene and enumerates three conditions to decide:
1. The existence of a mutually hurting stalemate;
2. The efforts of both parties to impose unilateral solutions should be blocked and bilateral solutions should become conceivable
3. The power reUuions between the adversaries should be changed in such a way that a party which previously had the upper hand in the conflict starts slipping and the underdog starts running.
1.1.6 CHANGES REALISED
The entry of a mediator may cause some changes in the conflict system:
The mediator may increase, decrease or may not affect the relative power
of the parties. In this manner, it may change the power balance between the parties
by providing or not providing certain resources, such as financial capital, arms and recognition.
As an outcome of the mediation, resources may be redistributed between the parties or the mediator may provide resources in an effort to achieve certain changes during the mediation process. For example, territory and power may be
redistributed between the parties. The mediator may offer financial capital or its support in an international organisation to the disputants.
Another change may be realised in the policies or the positions of the parties during or as a result of the mediation attempt. The parties may give up their previous policies or positions such as agreeing on one another’s existence, the withdrawal from a territory and creating communication.
The mediator’s entry may or may not change the duration of the conflict. Mediator may shorten, prolong or may not affect the process of the conflict with its activities.
Another change that may be realised with a mediation attempt is related to
the existence of an overt conflict. The mediator’s activities may increase, decrease
or may not change the state of conflict. For example, a mediator may intensify or de-escalate the conflict by using brute force or offering resources in an effort to gain concessions from the parties.
The entrance of a mediator may result in establishing ongoing
mechanisms, such as a joint committee, a state, democracy, or a periodically
organised summit can be cited as one of the other changes that may result during or as an outcome of the mediation attempt.
Sometimes the mediators, by using the media may change the power structure of the parties. Therefore the media can be an important tool in the process of mediation.
1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
Based on the above literature review, this thesis compares and contrasts three mediation initiatives of the United States which were over the Bosnian conflict, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Haitian conflict, respectively. For this purpose, the following components of the literature on mediation are used as the analytical tools of this study: Power of the mediator, stakes of the mediator, roles/strategies of the mediator, entry of the mediator, timing of the mediator. Besides, such indicators are depicted in an effort to observe the changes realised during or as an outcome of the mediation attempts: The relative power of the parties, redistribution of resources, policy or position changes by the parties, duration of the conflict, existence of an overt conflict, establishment of ongoing mechanisms and use of the media.
With this purpose, the first chapter of this study described the literature concerning the above mentioned components of mediation theory.
The second chapter analyses the United States’ mediation attempts over the Bosnian conflict. The third chapter analyses the United States’ mediation attempts over the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
The fourth chapter analyses the United States’ mediation attempts over the Haitian conflict. In the second, the third and the fourth chapters a brief historical background concerning the conflicts are presented. Then the analysis of disputes with respect to the above mentioned tools are conducted.
The fifth chapter comprises the findings derived from the analyses of three mediation attempts. The last chapter is the conclusion chapter in which the comparisons between the findings are stated.
CHAPTER II
US MEDIATION IN THE BOSNIAN CONFLICT
2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
As one of the republics of former Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence on March 3, 1992, as a result of a referendum on February 29-March 2, 1992. Despite the referendum, the Bosnian Serbs, radicalised by the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, proclaimed “the Serbian Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina” on March 27, and demanded to remain within Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the Bosnian Croats, with Croatia' firmly behind them, proclaimed the “Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosnia” on July 4, 1992. The armed struggle which began in March in Sarajevo was intensified with the international recognition of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 6, 1992.
The first mediation attempt which was realised by the mediators of the European Community and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, namely by Lord Carrington and Jose Cutiliero, did not produce fruitful results. Following the London Peace Conference of August 1992, the second mediation attempt was launched by the European Community and the United Nations headed
by Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance, representing the European Community and the United Nations, respectively. The Vance-Owen Plan, despite its acceptance initially, faltered as the previous attempt. The European Community’s and the United Nations’ second attempt was headed by Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg. The negotiation process, despite achieving a provisional agreement in Geneva on June 13, 1993, faced severe hindrance as the result of a mortar bomb attack by the Bosnian Serbs on a marketplace in Sarajevo, on February 5, 1994. The third mediation attempt which was led by the United States, was an initiative aiming to find a solution to a crucial part of the dispute. The United States’ mediator, Charles Redman managed to achieve a Muslim-Croat Federation by which the fighting between the Bosnian Croats and the Muslims had come to an end and a Muslim-Croat front against the Bosnian Serbs was achieved.
The fourth mediation attempt targeting an overall solution to the dispute in Bosnia was launched by five states, namely the Contact Group comprising the USA, UK, Russia, France and Germany on April 25, 1994. The Contact Group plan called for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into two, giving the Muslim-Croat Federation 51% and the Bosnian Serbs 49% of the territory, but the plan was rejected by the Bosnian Serbs who held 72% of the territory at that time.
On the other hand, the concept of 51% - 49% introduced by the Contact Group plan formed the basis of the mediation initiative of the USA (August 14, 1995), led by the US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke. The change in the balance of power in favour of the Muslim-Croat Federation vis a vis the Bosnian Serbs, as a result of the successful Croat offensive in Krajina of Croatia
and Bosnia and of the persistent bombings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation against the Bosnian Serb positions paved the way to the negotiations and eventually to the signing of the Dayton agreement in Paris on December 14, 1995.
2.2 ANALYSIS
2.2.1 POWER OF THE MEDIATOR
The power of the mediator, that is the United States, stemmed first of all from its being the only superpower of the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union. With its political, economic and military superiority, the United States has unquestionable leverage to be utilised over international issues, in particular in mediation efforts. Therefore, the United States, by using its considerable impact within the international organisations, such as NATO, IMF and World Bank in particular, had the ability to manipulate the direction of the dispute effectively. The second source of the United States’ power was its previous successful mediation attempt, which was finalised in a Muslim-Croat alliance, in May 1994.
2.2.2 STAKES OF THE MEDIATOR
When the war broke out in Bosnia in April 1992, the United States policy under the Bush administration was to accept the European argument which claimed what was happening in Bosnia was simply a “European problem”^ and to avoid getting itself entangled in such an adventure on the brink of the coming elections in November 1992. Contrary to his predecessor’s, the Clinton administration vowed for an active policy called “lift and strike” but was defied, several times, by the Europeans who claimed that it was inappropriate. Following the victory of the Bosnian Serbs in the
United Nations designated “safe-haven” town of Srebrenica in early July, 1995, the Clinton administration left this passive policy.
Behind this change there laid United States’ interests, particularly of the Clinton administration. The primary reason was to secure the outcome of the coming elections in November 1996. The worsening situation in Bosnia was harming to Clinton’s presidency as the Congress accused the administration for the ineffective US stand taken in the Bosnian conflict.^ For example, the bill which was prepared by the majority leader Bob Dole (Republican), the major adversary of Clinton in the coming elections, was targeting to lift the arms embargo over the Bosnian government unilaterallyAlthough the bill passed both the Congress and the House of Representatives, Clinton vetoed it.
Clinton’s veto aimed at the elimination of a drawback his own words created. In an effort to calm down its European allies whose soldiers were taken as hostage by the Bosnian Serbs in retaliation to NATO air strikes in late May 1995, Clinton had promised to deploy 25.000 US ground troops to assist NATO if a full- scale UN withdrawal was realised.^ As lifting the arms embargo would intensify the fighting, this situation would lead the Europeans to withdraw their troops within the UNPROFOR, eventually paving the way for the deployment of the United States’ ground troops in Bosnia. Clinton vetoed the bill due to the fresh memories of Somalia.
Combined with primary concern to end the war in Bosnia before the elections, the threat of United States’ combat troops inclusion due to the
intensification of the fighting in Bosnia led the United States to announce its peace initiative headed by the Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke in August 1995, following the successful offensive by the Croats against the Bosnian Serbs in Krajina.
The complementary concerns were to increase the diminishing prestige of the United States due to the downfall of the United Nations’ safe-havens of Srebrenica and Zepa,^ and try not to lose its in the influence region’.
2.2.3 ROLES PLAYED BY THE MEDIATOR
The United States’ peace plan was based on the division of Bosnia between the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serb entity, along the notion of 51% - 49% respectively. The plan tried to find a middle way by preserving the unitary nature of Bosnia as a federation but also called for the establishment of confederal links between the parties and neighbouring countries.
Within this context, the main objective of the mediator was to end the conflict. In order to realise this aim, the United States played several roles within this dispute ranging from facilitator to manipulator. The United States Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke, as the leader of the United States delegation for the initiative assumed the role of communicator since the parties had refrained from holding direct talks with each other. Holbrooke, by shuttling among Sarajevo, Zagreb, Belgrade^ briefed the parties about what was in progress, discussed the positions of the parties and paved the way for several breakthroughs throughout the process, such as the Geneva meeting (September 8,1995), New York meeting
(September 26, 1995) and Dayton meeting (November 1, 1995). Considering the fact that the parties were not talking to each other for quite a long time, the United States had also acted as a facilitator by bringing them around a negotiation table. The mediator had also issued a visa for the President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, so as to remove an obstacle in front of the peace talks in Dayton and therefore facilitated the peace process.^
However, it would be wrong to argue that communication, solved alone the whole problem. As the only superpower of the world, the United States also used its
leverage by which it became a manipulator. It managed to keep the parties within
the process and to extract the necessary concessions with its power. The most significant example is, the United States’ assumption of leadership in moving NATO allies to decide pounding the Bosnian Serbs’ positions after the brutal shelling of a marketplace in Sarajevo by the Bosnian S e r b s .A s a consequence of the use of force, the Bosnian Serbs stopped refusing to negotiate over the notion of 51% - 49% and came to the negotiation table in Geneva, on September 8, 1995. In addition, with an effective and coordinated use of the NATO air strikes, Holbrooke managed to get a deal lifting the siege around Sarajevo from the Bosnian Serbs.'* With this move the United States acted as a manipulator as it pioneered to change the stream of the conflict.
Towards the end of the Dayton talks, the United States announced three deadlines. By imposing a deadline, the mediator had put a time pressure over the delegates in an effort to move them towards an agreement. The last deadline was reinforced by the president’s agreement to a letter written by the Secretary of State,
Warren Christopher. The United States made it clear that if the deadline was not met at 15.00 (CET) on November 21, 1995, the United States would call off the talks and would definitely withdraw from the process. The delegates were also made known that if the United States withdrew, they would be left with the Europeans who kept announcing: “If the United States withdraws, we will withdraw too”'^. Under the pressure of the last deadline, parties reached a compromise concerning the issue of Brcko which had previously caused a deadlock in the negotiations. Therefore the reinforced deadline made the expected impact and the United States, again, manipulated the process.
As manipulative tactics, the United States had often used carrots and sticks in order to make the parties act in desired ways. The most effective use of sticks was NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, as stated above. The United States, at the very beginning of the initiative, offered the parties to give some carrots like lifting trade sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs and rewarding the Bosnian Muslims with economic aid if a settlement was reached.'"* In addition, the United States, as an effort to achieve the acceptance of the Bosnian Muslims concerning the notion of 51% - 49%, offered another carrot, arming and training the Bosnian army, if an agreement was attained. Besides, the Bosnian government was convinced to declare a cease-fire on October 6, 1995, only by promises of large amount of economic aid and military assistance in the event of peace. An important carrot for the Bosnian Muslims was the United States promise to participate in the NATO peace enforcement force.F inally, the most important sticks to both sides was the imposition of a serious deadline for the talks in Dayton.
The United States had also acquired the role of formulator through deciding on the participants to the talks. There was a procedural problem concerning the question of who would speak for the Bosnian Serbs during the future peace talks. Neither the United States nor the Bosnian Government wanted to get into contact with the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb Army general Ratko Mladic, both indicted as war criminals by the International Court of Justice. Holbrooke, in a separate meeting with the President of Yugoslavia,'^ Slobodan Milosevic, achieved a procedural breakthrough according to which Milosevic would lead the joint negotiation team composed of Serbian and Bosnian Serbian delegates.'^ Another example for its formulator role, in the sense of reducing outside pressure during the talks, was realised when it chose the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, in Dayton, Ohio, the USA.'* Due to the nature of the base, the delegates felt free from the pressure of the media during the talk s.B esid es, the United States was generous in providing technological facilities, like the “Nintendo Room”^°, by which the delegates could easily negotiate, therefore the United States acted as a formulator through reducing the procedural complexities.
Another important contribution of the United States was that it acted as an enforcer of the deals and agreements reached throughout the process. Concerning the deal on lifting the siege over Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs, the United States, made it clear that unless the Bosnian Serbs complied with the deal, NATO air strikes would be resumed.^' Another enforcement was realised after the cease-fire agreement among the parties. One of conditions for the implementation of the cease-fire was clearing the roads of Sarajevo, but the Croats seemed to be postponing this in order to gain more territory. Holbrooke intervened and pressured
the President of Croatia who backed the Croats in Sarajevo. Consequently, the Croats started to clear the mines. During the Da)don talks, the agreement which had established the Muslim-Croat Alliance under the pressure of the United States in 1994, was enforced by signing a pact to revitalise the Muslim-Croat Alliance on November 11, 1995.^^
The United States can not be deemed as a neutral mediator since it had a personal preference that the dispute should be resolved by punishing the Bosnian Serbs in one way or another.^'* This preference can be seen in its position towards the Vance-0 wen Plan. The plan could not gain the political backing from the United States on the grounds that it was unfair to the Bosnian Muslims.^^ Therefore, the United States can not be considered as a neutral mediator.
The United States can not be regarded as an impartial mediator either, stemming from the fact that it did not treat the sides equally and mostly sided with the Muslim-Croat Federation, the Bosnian Muslims in particular. For instance, as the United States had supported the legitimacy of the Bosnian government, statements like “opposing any partition of or secession from Bosnia” were mostly spelled out by high ranking officials of the United S t a t e s . B y this way, the mediator had empowered the Bosnian Muslims against the Bosnian Serbs who advocated secession from Bosnia. Another empowerment of the Bosnian Muslims by the United States was realised after the signing of the cease-fire agreement. Holbrooke, in line with a demand coming from the President of Bosnian Presidency Alia Izetbegovic, announced that in case of an attack towards safe havens, “the United States would request NATO action”.^^ Similarly, the United States had also
preferred to overlook the Muslim-Croat offensive so as to give them “time to gain more ground against the Bosnian Serbs” before the Dayton talks. In the opening secession of the Dayton talks, the Secretary of State Warren Christopher, again empowered the Muslim-Croat Federation by emphasising the internationally recognised borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and^^ pushed for the removal of Karadzic and Mladic from office, in line with the demands from the Muslim led Bosnian government.
On the other hand, there were times when the United States seemed to be siding with the Bosnian Serbs. For example, the United States prevented the joint
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Croat-Muslim offensive against Banja Luka, a Bosnian Serb controlled town, as it could bring Serbia into the conflict. Although it seemed to be siding with the Bosnian Serbs, the United States was actually trying to secure the peace initiative. For this reason the United States was not an impartial mediator.
2.2.4 TIMING OF THE MEDIATOR
When the duration of the conflict is taken into account, the mediation attempt of the United States may seem as that of latecomer; but as the changing circumstances on the ground is considered, with the victory of the Croats in Krajina, timing of the United States was ripe. The United States administration which was heading towards the coming elections, had already been under pressure from the Congress concerning Bosnia. For this reason, the United States did not miss the opportunity provided when “the underdog started running” while the Bosnian Serbs “that held the upper hand previously, started slipping” .
The parties were also ready to resume the process of diplomatic activities. Despite starting to get the upper hand, the Bosnian Muslims and Croats were open to negotiate as three years of a state of war was very costly for all of the parties.^^ The Serbs having faced a severe blow in Krajina were also sympathetic towards a peaceful solution.^'* However, the Bosnian Serbs showed intransigence about starting to negotiate over the notion of 51% - 49%, by shelling a marketplace in Sarajevo. Therefore, the United States’ taking the lead in deciding to pound the Bosnian Serbs by using NATO air strikes, was very timely and eventually led the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table, in Geneva. In sum, it would not be wrong to argue that these timely interventions of the United States put the initiative on track.
2.2.5 ENTRY OF THE MEDIATOR
The United States did not intervene in the conflict upon invitation. Domestic concerns of the Clinton administration necessitated some action concerning Bosnia. The United States shied away from a militarily involvement and opted for a diplomatic one. For this reason, the United States entered as a mediator when it found a suitable timing. However, this entrance was not an imposed one, because all of the parties welcomed the initiative. The President of Croatia, F. Tudjman,^^ the President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic^^ and the President of the Bosnian Presidency, Alia Izetbegovic,^^ had stated their compliance with the initiative. There were no problems encountered in gaining acceptance from the parties. However, as the talks proceeded, the perception of the Bosnian Serbs of the United States changed, due to the mediator’s partial attitude towards the Muslim-Croat
2.2.6 CHANGES REALISED
The most important change realised as a consequence of the United States’ mediation was achieving an end to the state of war. When the United States entered as a mediator, there was an overt conflict continuing in the battlefield. Although the initiative started in a peaceful manner, the intransigent attitude of the Bosnian . Serbs caused an increase in the fighting. Having the presidential elections at stake, the United States managed to eliminate this intransigent attitude by using its military leverage within NATO at the right time. Without a third party intervention, it would be impossible for the parties to negotiate, as the adversaries were not coming face to face since the failure of the Contact Group mediation attempt. Later on the mediator had also brokered a cease-fire agreement among the parties and
therefore tried to stop the fighting although minor clashes continued to take place39
The United States, increased the relative power of the Muslim-Croat side by pounding the positions of the Bosnian Serbs decisively,'*'^ and by making public announcements siding with the Bosnian Muslims position.'*’ The United States had also promised to arm and train the Federation after the agreement so as to achieve a military balance against the Bosnian Serbs.'*^ On the other hand, the Bosnian Serbs had a psychological gain, which was an official international recognition under the name of Republika Srpska in an effort to keep them within the process.'*^
Through the mediation of the United States, the parties made some
redistribution in resources, like territorial adjustments. For example, the President
of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs was obliged to give up Sarajevo and accept the deployment of NATO forces in Bosnia.'*'* As a
result of such concessions, Yugoslavia freed itself from the United Nations’ sanctions."*^ Under pressure from the United States, Croatia managed to regain the region of Eastern Slavonia from the rebel Croatian Serbs."*^ During the mediation process, there were other resources available to the parties, particularly to the Muslim-Croat side, a total of $ 600 million to be given to the Federation for the reconstruction of Bosnia'^^and most importantly, 20.000 US ground troops to Bosnia for the enforcement of the peace.''* By promising these incentives, the United States ended up with the agreement.
The Bosnian Muslims were previously ruling out Serbian confederal links with Yugoslavia. In the agreement, the parties were assigned the right to form “special parallel relations” with neighbouring countries if only such relations honoured the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia.''^ The parties accepted one another’s right of existence within a single state. The Bosnian Muslims
recognised the Republika Srpska as a separate entity within the Bosnia-
Herzegovina State while the Bosnian Serbs gave up their demands of secession. Diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and Bosnia were established.^" Bosnia became the 18U' member of the International Monetary Fund.^' Another important change was prohibiting war criminals, namely, the President of the Serbian leadership, Radovan Karadzic, and the general of the Bosnian Serb Army, Ratko Mladic, from standing for office. With the help of the United States’ mediation, such policy changes were realised by the parties.
Concerning the duration of the conflict, the United States’ intervention, particularly the one in which it used NATO air strikes, was influential in
accelerating the peace process. With this move, the Muslim-Croat side felt more confident and the Bosnian Serbs accepted to start negotiating over the notion of the 51% - 49% and to lift the siege over Sarajevo. In addition, the deadline scheduled for the afternoon of November 21, gave momentum to the talks and can even be accepted as saved the process.
The media had shown great interest in the conflict, especially towards the
talks held in Dayton, Ohio. The United States had also used this interest to change the power balance in favour of the Bosnian Muslims and to weaken the Bosnian Serbs. The most striking example appeared when there were three days left for the Dayton talks. The United States supplied evidence of the Bosnian Serb forces’ crimes against the Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia to the public.
The United States helped the parties to establish the State of the Bosnia- Herzegovina with constitutional arrangements. Furthermore, it aimed to enforce peace by taking the leadership for deployment of Implementation Forces (IFOR) in Bosnia, as an ongoing mechanism. Besides, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank were pulled into the process for Bosnia’s reconstruction.^'*
The findings related to this mediation attempt will be presented in the fifth chapter.
CHAPTER III
US MEDIATION IN THE PALESTINIAN - ISRAELI CONFLICT
3.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:
I'he conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians may be regarded as one of the most complicated disputes in the international arena. The roots of this long-running problem go back to the establishment of Israel with the support of the United Nations, in 1948. Eventually, the Arab States’ rejection of the new status quo paved the way for a series of wars and a great amount of hostility between the Arabs and the Israelis.
The 1967 Arab-Israeli War during which Israel occupied the whole of Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, forms the crux of the dispute between the Israelis and Palestinians. The Six Day War had ended with the occupation of almost all of the Palestinian lands and therefore the immigration of the Palestinians to Arab States. In response, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 242 which called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories occupied in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Following the 1973 War between the Arabs and Israelis, the United Nations Security Council had
also adopted Resolution 338 which called for negotiations in order to realise Resolution 242.
Hostility culminated had embraced the beginning of a peace process with the President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat’s, visit to Jerusalem and eventually ended in the Camp David Agreement in 1978. The agreement which was achieved under the mediation efforts of the United States gave the Sinai peninsula back to Egypt and opened the way for autonomy talks to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Palestinians were by then politically and militarily organised under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which was neither recognised by Israel nor the United States. The primary reason behind this was the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s guerrilla warfare with the intention to destroy the State of Israel and establish an independent Palestine state in that area. Therefore, the Camp David Accord which enabled the Palestinians to have autonomy talks with the Israelis did not satisfy the Palestinians. Following this agreement, Israel occupied Lebanon in an attempt to force the Palestinian guerrillas to leave their bases.
As years went by, the frustration of the Palestinians living under Israeli military occupation had grown and led to a popular uprising in 1987. The impact of the uprising or intifada was so intense that it started to affect the domestic politics of Israel. The Palestinian problem became an important topic affecting the election propaganda of the parties. The Labour Party had announced that it accepted the principle of “land for peace” while the conservative Likud Party, staying firm on its hard-line position, stressed that no concessions should be made to the Palestinians. On the side of the Palestinians there were clear signs of flexibility, like declaring to
rule out their determination to destroy Israel. Following such a flexible declaration, the United States resumed its contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organisation in 1988, and proposed a plan in 1989 but was rejected by both of the parties of the dispute.
The conducive political environment for a peace initiative in the region following the Gulf War, led the United States to launch an initiative to convene a Middle East Peace Conference in 1991. The initiative was based on the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the principle of “territory for peace”. Besides, the security and recognition of Israel and the political rights of Palestinians were to be provided.
The negotiation process started with the convention of the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid. This had become feasible due to the intensive shuttle diplomacy of the United States Secretary of State, James Baker, and produced an important result like breaking the taboo of “no negotiations” between the parties.
The Declaration of Principles on Palestinian self-rule in the Gaza Strip and West Bank was achieved after a series of clandestine meetings between the parties in the light of secret Norwegian mediation. Following the signing of the accord in September 1993, the parties started to negotiate over its implementation. Eventually, they signed the Protocol on Economic Arrangements in April 1994, the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho areas in May 1994, the Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip in September 1995 and the Hebron Agreement in January 1997. The process is still continuing.
3.2 ANALYSIS
3.2.1 POWER OF THE MEDIATOR
The United States’ most important source of power was its status in the international arena at that time. The impact of the former Soviet Union over the Middle East eroded while the prestige of the United States was enjoying its peak as an outcome of the Gulf War. As a consequence, the United States found a suitable political atmosphere to exert its influence so as to convene a Middle East Peace Conference.
The United States, being the sole superpower of the world, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union undoubtedly constituted a considerable degree of leverage in the eyes of the disputing parties. The United States’ superpower utilities was welcomed by the parties whenever they needed military or economic assistance during the thorny peace process.
However, the decisions and therefore the power of the United States over Israel, particularly during the Clinton administration, have been limited due to the effective Jewish lobby and the strategic importance and preponderance of Israel in comparison to the Arab States’.
3.2.2 STAKES OF THE MEDIATOR
The Middle East is a region that carries vital importance for the United States. This fact did not change with the end of the Cold War. For this reason, the United States had certain interests to be pursued when intervening to the conflict.
The primary concern of the United States is its access to oil from the area where it imports half of its petroleum needs.' The existence of a conflict or a source of instability in the region that may threaten the flow of oil constitutes a crucial danger to the United States’ interests. Stemming from this fact, the United States stood firmly against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait during the Gulf Crisis and War.
The United States also pursues a containment policy towards extremist Islamist regimes like Iran that are considered as origins of exporting terrorism, in an effort to eliminate sources of instability. In addition, the United States view Iran, Iraq and Libya as threats because of these countries’ intention to become nuclear powers of the region.
In line with this concern over stability in the Middle East, the United States has long been aiming to resolve another source of instability: The Arab-lsraeli conflict. Therefore, the Post-Gulf War era was suitable enough to intervene for a comprehensive Arab-lsraeli peace agreement.
Another interest for the United States at stake was economic. The hostility present in the region, required the United States to make financial aid to the Middle East for a long time. As its strategic ally Israel is surrounded by unfriendly states, the United States has been channelling a great amount of financial capital to Israel, reaching $3 billion each year.^ Moreover, the United States has been investing financial and political capital during the peace process so as to achieve stability in the region, like organising an international donor conference for the Palestinian infrastructure and promising $ 500 million between 1994 and 1998 for its share.
Therefore, the elimination of this hostility between the Arabs and the Israelis may lead to a considerable cut in the flow of financial capital to the region and eventually may result in the achievement of stability, with less cost to the United States.
The dispute between the Palestinians and Israelis which worsened due to the terrorist activities of the Islamist extremists has been constituting a threat to the United States’ interests. For this reason, it would not be wrong to argue that the mediator has been pursuing defensive motives rather than altruistic ones while deciding to intervene in the conflict.
3.2.3 ROLES PLAYED BY THE MEDIATOR
The United States’ peace initiative over the Middle East envisioned a two track approach according to which Israel would negotiate with the Arabs and the Palestinians separately. The initiative did not bring a specified, detailed proposal for the solution to the problem, but set a framework for the beginning of the negotiations among parties.
The initiative called for a solution based on the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 on the principles of land for peace so as to guarantee the security and recognition of Israel and legitimate political rights of the Palestinians.“^
The mediator’s primary objective was to bring the parties around a negotiation table as there existed no negotiation among the parties, namely Syria,
Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, the Palestinians and Israel. For this reason the United States under the Bush administration, aimed to facilitate the whole process, in an attempt to convene a Middle East Peace Conference.
In its facilitator role, the mediator acted as a communicator between the Palestinians and Israelis since they did not recognise each other. The United States Secretary of State, James Baker, held several separate meetings with the Palestinian and Israeli delegation during his intense shuttle diplomacy to the region, started in early 1991 and lasted until late 1992.
Other than acting as “a telephone wire”^, the United States had suggested several proposals that might change perceptions and as a result change the positions of the parties over the main rules of the Conference, and therefore served as a
formulator.*^ For example, Israel was ruling out the possibility of residents from
East Jerusalem to be represented in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation while the Palestinians were insisting on their representation. The United States made a proposal according to which a Palestinian from a well-known Jerusalem family,
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residing currently in Jordan may be included in the joint delegation. By this way, the Palestinians would agree that the East Jerusalem residents were represented while the Israelis would not be threatened that Jerusalem might appear as topic of discussion during the talks. To give another example to its formulator role, the United States had also tried to make an impact over the way the parties’ thought on the issue of the United Nations’ representation during the Conference. While Israel objected, the Palestinians insisted on the representation of the United Nations. The
United States Secretary of State, James Baker, proposed for a United Nations representative as an observer, whose rights were limited taking notes only.^
A mediator as a formulator may also try to diminish outside pressure over the parties^ in an effort to protect the process, just like it was in Baker’s secret diplomacy. Baker preferred to hold private talks with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Shamir, without accepting even a note-taker in the room. During his separate meetings with the Arabs, mostly a translator was present. This protection against leakages might be seen necessary to impede the leaders to back off from fundamental concessions in the face of domestic opposition.'®
When parties failed to name the date and venue for the next round of talks, the United States can be viewed to have served as a facilitator in the sense of
formulator due to its efforts to move the parties to the negotiation table, by doing
the job in proxy.” On the other hand, such announcements on the date and venue may also be viewed as an open sign of impatience of the United States about deadlocks over procedural matters, and therefore may be considered as
manipulating the process by imposing a solution to the impasse.
United States under the Bush administration sometimes, applied
manipulative tactics like sticks and carrots when the process faced impasse. The
most striking example of the United States’ appearance as a manipulator occurred over Israel’s settlement policy in the territories which belonged to the Palestinians before the 1967 war, namely the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. This
policy has been causing strains and deadlocks throughout the whole process, as the Arabs and particularly the Palestinians have been very sensitive on this issue.
In an effort to protect the peace process from faltering, the Bush administration exerted pressure over Israel. Firstly, the United States Secretary of State, James Baker, labelled the settlements as “an obstacle to peace”’^. However, such words were not enough to persuade the hard-liner Shamir government, committed to its settlement policy. Secondly, the United States used its economic
leverage against Israel when the Likud government announced another settlement in
Eshkolot, the West Bank, during Baker’s intense efforts to convene the Conference. Thirdly, the Bush administration tried to force Israel to stop building new settlements in the disputed territories by calling the United States Congress to delay for 120 days its approval of loan guarantees to Israel. Furthermore, the President of the United States, George Bush vowed veto if the loan guarantees were approved by the Congress on September 6, 1991. Although the Congress acted in line with the president’s will, Israel kept on building while bilateral talks were going on between the parties in Washington, DC. As this situation led to the Palestinian reaction. Baker announced that the United States would not provide $ 10 billion in loan guarantees to Israel unless settlement building was halted in the disputed territories by February 24, 1992.'"* By this way the United States created a direct link between an economic need of Israel to halting of settlements which would eliminate an important source of conflict in the dispute.
The United States’ sticks or withholding carrots policy, aiming to change the policy of Israel over settlements, did not lead to the expected outcome until the
