TURKEY
Mustafa
KmAROGLUI. Introduction
A study on Turkey and nuclear disarmament should primarily revolve around the status or Turkey within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Turkey's bilateral relations with the United Stutes in the military sphere. An equal emphasis should also he placed on Turkey's highly strategic geopolitical position, which has some times offered opportunities and sometimes generated disincentives for the Turkish political and security eliles1 lo adopt policies congruent with global and/or regional nuclear disarmament efforts. The deploy ment or nuclear weapons in Turkey was a consequence
or
the coun try's admillance to the NATO alliance and the geoslrategic impera tives or its immediate neighbourhood. Policies adopted by the Turkish political and security elites which have also fitted in with global nu clear disarmament efforts have essentially been an outgrowth of the fundamental principles and objectives of Turkish foreign and security policy, insofar as they were not constrained by regional security consi derations. More often than not, however, the Turkish political and security elites have faced dilemmas arising from conl1icts between their regional and global security concerns.1 Although the phrase political and security elites might he considered self cxplanatory. it is still worth noting that throughout this chapter security elites will denote civilian or military officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry ofDefense, and the military, as well as others, not necessarily ofticials, who are known to lake n scholarly interest in the field of security.
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In their formal statements, the Turkish politi1.;al and security elites consider nuclear disarmament to be ··an absolutely necessary but at the same time a long process during which steps must be taken very carerully by the international community.2" As this rather oblique state ment may suggest, Turkey has not pursued a very consistent policy with regard to nuclear disarmament. For that reason, Turkey should be categorised neither as a strictly anti - nor as an absolutely pro nuclear weapons country. Turkey's allitude has shirted from one side to the other depending on the circumstances a1�d on the threat assess ments of the security elites in specific period:1/Variations in the Turk ish allitude to nuclear mailers can best be observed in the different strategics adopted vis-a-vis the proposals aimed at establishing nu clear-weapon-free 1.ones (NWFZ) in the region to which Turkey be longs3. Proposals for the immediate and complete withdrawal or nu clear weapons from the territories of all non-nuclear -weapons states (NNWS) arc not well-received by Turkey unless there is some provi sion lo replace these weapons systems with other powerful instru ments that would provide comparable security assurances. Jn view of the fact that uncertainty still reigns in world politics, and military builds in weapons of mass destruction by so-called "rogue states", especially in the Middle East, are in progress, Turkey considers nu clear deterrence worth keeping, at least for the time bcing4.
2. The Security Situation After the End of the Cold War
The end of the Cold War had a powerful impact on the security of Turkey in many respects. Since 1952 and throughout the Cold War E-mail correspondence with experts in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Decemher 1996.As will he discussed later al length, Turkey opposed the idea of a NWFZ in the Balkans while endorsing a similar arrangement for the Middle East. More recently, the Turkish security elites have implied that a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe is not desirable for Turkey. while �uch a zone in Central Asia would he welcome.
·1 In 1991. NATO decided to reduce its lan<l hase<l nuclear stockpile in Europe by 80 pcrcen1. and this reduction was complctc<l hy l<J<>'.1. See .. Fm:11s 1111 NATO: Fac:1.v m, NATO'.r N11c:ll'ar Pos111re", in: NATO Review. No.4, July 1996. p.19. Nuclear weapons arc still deployed. as of February 1997. in four non-nuclear weapons state members of NATO. namely Belgium. the Netherlands. Italy and
Turkey. Conversations with Tariq Rauf from the Center for Nonproliferation S1udies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. January 1997.
'fitrkt•y years, Turkey had enjoyed the rather privileged status or heing one or NATO's sixteen nations. With its geostrategic location as a llank country and the second largest standing army in the Alliance after the United States, Turkey hccame an indispensable ingredient or the se curity or the Western world. Hence, not much room was lert for the Turkish political elites to worry about national security. These seri ous mailers were left to the military, which was primarily concerned with the preservation or the uni!y and sovereignty or the Turkish Republic. The Turkish security elites helieved they could count lo a considerable extent on the United States in the rirsl place, and on NATO in general, as far as the Soviet threat was concerned.
However, the other side or the coin should also be me111ioned. When Turkey joined NATO, the parties tacitly agreed that Turkey would help contain the Soviet Union. Should deterrence fail, Turkey would have made its facilities available to NATO and would have distracted as many Soviet forces as possible from a campaign in Cen tral Europe5. In other words, Turkey risked its own devastation and invasion as a NATO ally by virtue or its location in the immediate neighbourhood or the Soviet Union, simply because the military think ing or the Alliance focused on the central front as the main nrca or Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat, putting an overwhelming emphasis'on the contingency or a massive a!lack through Germany into Western Eu rope. NATO's strategic calculations developed around this priority, and Turkey's contrihution was considered a runction or such a con tingency<'. Nevertheless, thinking in terms or the paradoxical logic or strategy, the more threatening the Soviet Union appeared, the more the West was expected to contribute - in the view or the Turkish political and security elites. Their overwhelming helier was that in return for the risks Turkey exposed itself to as a front-line slate, the country would fall under NATO's deterrent and defence umbrella, and the Alliance would provide economic and military assistance to mod ernise the Turkish armed forces. Jn a nutshell, during the Cold War, international politics were generally seen as "business as usual" from ' llrm:e R. KuN1110LM, ""fitrkey and rhe Wesr'', in: Foreign Affairs. Vol.70. No.2.
1991. p.41.
1' A detailetl account of this issue can be found in Ali L. KARA<>SMAN<><.a.u. "/;11mf1e '.v Ceof111/irirnl Parnmeren ", paper presented at an international conference at Hilkenl University. Ankara. March 1996. p.12.
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Turkey\ standpoint in respect or the counlry's 111ili1ary capabililies and polilical conslrninls.
The end of the Cold War, however. which literally meant the dis appearance of the lhreat perceived from the Soviet Union, caused drastic changes in Turkey's security environment. Not all or these changes werc unfavourable. New independent slates emerged from the territory of the Soviet Union, and the most striking outcome of this development is !hat, for the l'irst time in the four-century-old hislory or Turco-Russian relations, the two nations have been geo graphically separalcd7. This dissolution of common borders with the Russian-led ·'Sovie! empire" contributed greatly to the security of Turkey. The minimum time required for Turkey's colossal ex-neigh bour to launch a surprise allack has increased lo one year from a fig ure !hat used to be expressed in weeks, if not daysK. Conventional force reduction levels that were achieved with the CFE Treaty had irnprovcd the disproportionate situation between the two actors in that area, but not so dramatically. It must be mentioned, however, that the change in Russian mililary doctrine decided in October 1993, in tended lo be commensurate with the requirements of the so called "near abroad" doctrine, and Russia's related demand for a revision of !he terms or the CFE Treaty for the Caucasus region, gave rise lo serious concerns among the security elites in Turkcy9
.
The emergence of new independent states in the former Sovie! Union as well as the former Yugoslavia brought with it both new hopes and opportunities and worries and dilemmas related to coex istence in regions where nations had lived together for decades. The most practical end result of this evolution was that the number of Turkey's geographical neighbours doubled overnight; among these were nations with which Turkey had deep historical and cultural lies. Turkey was widely regarded by the Western community as the ·, If one excludes the rather distant neighbourhood ac.:ross the Black Sea and the
c.:0111111on borders with 1hc.: Commonwcahh of lndepende111 Siates CCIS). x I ntcrvi.:ws with Turkish mi I itary experts.
'1 h>r an exc.:cllent disc.:ussion of th.: importanc.:e of the CFE Treaty in European s.:rurity as well as an as�essment or the threat to Western interests arising from thc Russian demand for revision of the Cl;E rules applying to the rlank zone. ,,,,, Ric.:hard A. F,\I.Kl:NIUl'II. "'Hie CF/:' Flank Displlle: Waiting i11 the Wings". 111: lnkrn:itional Scrnrity, Vol.19. No.4. 1995. pp.118-144.
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role-model for the newly emerged republics or Central Asia and the Caucasus10 and its historical and cultural ties compelled Turkey to offer solutions to the prohlcms or the ·'turkic world". Clashes hetwecn turkic and non-turkic identities in that region increased as the Soviet system disintegrated. Spccirically, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan arising from the dispute over the status of the Nagorno Karnbakh region has become a test case for Turkey with regard to its capabilities and ability to properly ··1cad" the newly independent states or turkic identity. The most Turkey could achieve in this regard, how ever, was to participate in the Minsk Group established under the auspices or the then Conference on Security and Co-operation in Eu rope (CSCE) 11. This dispute remains largely unresolved in spite or Turkey's efforts. As war erupted on the territory or the former Yugo slavia, and especially with the Serbian atrocities commillcd against Bosnians, Turkey round itself in a still more difficult situation. The Muslim identity of Turkish citizens and the pressure arising from the fact that approximately two million or them arc or Bosnian descent compelled Turks to help their Muslim brothers living in the trou
bled lands or the Rumelia12. These communities, or different ethnic 111 The so-called Newly Independent States (NIS) in the Cnucasus and Central Asi;;, with few exceptions. share rnany aspects of their history. culture. religion and linguistics with ho1h Turkey and Iran. albeit lo varying degrees. Henci;, the possibility that Iran would establish comprehensive relations with 1hcse states caused alarm in Western capitals. The fundamentalist Iranian regime and its generally hostile allitude towards the West were the main sources of this concern. One major ohjcctive of the Western countries was to contain Iran's expansionist ambitions by not allowing it to expon its fundamentalist regime lO the NIS. Turkey. with its secular democracy and market economy, was considered in Western capitals to he a feasible alternative to Iran. Turkey was also thought to be well equipped to act ;is a role model for the NIS .ind to help the new slates survive the painful and dangerous period of transition after the collapse of the Soviet sys1em.
1 1 Armenia. Azerbaijan. Belarus. the Czech and Slovak Republics. France. Germany. Italy, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, and the United States participa1ed in the CSCE (now OSCE) negoti,llions that took place wi1hin the framework or the Minsk Group. The function of the Group was to define the emergency lllcasures required to ensure a cessation of hostilities. Later. the Minsk Group served to lll/lnitor the cease-fire imposed by UN Sccuri1y Council Rcsolu1ion 882. of which Turkey was a co-sponsor together with Russia and lhe United St;lles. For a fuller discussion of this question. sec Mustafa K111111mc;1.u, "/mpal'I "/'!he Nurthl'm 'fit,ro11 the Middle l:'<1s1: A Rejoi111ler". in: Security Dialogue, Yol.27, No.3. Sep1ember 1996. pp.319-324.
12 The term Rumelia denotes former Olloman territory in western Thrace and the portion of 1hc Balkans inhabited hy Turks and olhcr Muslim comlllunities such as the Bosnians. Albanians. and Kosovans.
origins, had lived together in peace and harmony !'or centuries under Olloman rule. However, Turkey's elTorls and contrihutions, whether economic or lllililary, were insullicicnl lo rind a solution or save the lives of' hundreds of' thousands or Bosnians.
The extreme disconlcnl or the public with the perrormance or the Turkish g<lvcrnmcnt and military caused deep distrust or the adminis lralion and ewnwally even weakened central authority as demonstra tions were J'requen!ly staged in hig cities like Istanbul and Ankara. The alleged J'ailure or Turkish f'orcign policy on all fronts had serious re percussions on domestic politics, which acquired J'urlhcr momentum with the increasing insurgencies or the PKK terrorist organisation that had launched a campaign against the central political authority. The 14-ycar-old low-intensity war thal has been taking place mostly in the south-eastern part or Turkey bordering the Middle East has so l'ar claimed the lives of' thousands or people, both military personnel and civilians. The invasion or Kuwait by Iraq and its repercussions in the early 1990s eliminated lhc authority or the Iraqi government in ils northern territory. This further complicated Turkey's security situation. The region hccallle a sanctuary for PKK terrorists, which enabled lhcm to nourish and wage !llorc rrcquent allacks on targets inside Turkey.
Turkey lies at the pivotal point or a geographical location encircled by the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Balkans, and is therefore ex posed to the side-effects of intra- and inter-stale conllicts in all or these regions. In this period, the country's unity and stale sovereignly started Lo he questioned and even threatened internally. Such an internal threat unavoidably attracted mosl or the attention or the Turkish political and security elites, and largely undermined their interest in many global is sues. Interest in inlcrnalional prohlcms such as the proliferation of weap ons or mass destruction or NATO expansion was thus confined to a hand ful or security specialists from the government and academia 13. 1-' For some broad considerntions or these matters. sec for instance Nezihi CAKIIR,
"'fi<rkey '.I' Sernrity C/ro/le11g<'s ", in: l'crccplions. J une-Augu�t 1996. Cen1cr for S1rategie Studies (SAM). Ankara, Vol. I. No.2. pp.12-21: and. Olgan BEKM. "Ni\'/'(} '.I' /:'11/org/'111e111: Rll.l'sio w11/ 'li<rk<'y". in: Eurasian Studies, Vol.3, No. I, Ycni Forum Corporation. Ankara. Spring 19%, pp.65-80. Tile author or the first ani<.:le is a rc1ircd Turkish army general, while the author or the second works !'or the Turkish Ministry or Foreign Affairs. For an elaborate and alternative pcr�pcctivc from a,;adernia. sec Duyg.11 ll. S1;zER. "'/i,rkey'.I' New S<'<.:11rity /:'m•im111111• 111. Ntwft,"r W('(//WII.I' anti l'mlifi,rmi1111 ", in: Comparative Strategy. Vo1.14. No.2. 1<)95. pp.149-173.
3. Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Disarmament
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There has not been a serious discussion, Jct alone a public debate, in Turkey about nuclear weapons or nuclear disarmament 14. One or !he main reasons ror this has been the ultimate authority of the n1ili tary in mailers relating to national security. The military has done its best to prohibit the slightest leakage or relevant information to the public. Hence, partly because or the silence or !he polilical and secu rity elites and partly because or the lack of public interest in nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament, governments in Turkey have not experienced any difficulty in adopting policies regarding nuclear weapons deployment on Turkish territory. By comparison with some other NATO countries such as Norway, which preferred to remain nuclear-weapon-free, or Germany, where serious debates took place over the deployment or nuclear weapons, it would be fair to say that there was no discussion in Turkey. Even the disclosure of the clan destine Iraqi nuclear weapons programme was not enough to prompt a substantial public debate.
However, this ought not to be the case for a country like Turkey, which sits in !he imme<lialc proximity of the Middle East -!he 1.nosl volatile region in !he world and a region acknowledged lo be fertile soil for state aspirations to develop all sorts or weapons or mass de struction. Turkey's mos! strategic power stations, dams, communica tion and lransportalion lines, and above all, an important proportion of' its population arc already exposed to !he lhreat or ballistic mis siles that exist in the arsenals or potentially hostile states in the Mid dle East. Hence, there is every reason for Turks to wonder and lo 1•1 During the period of short-lived and limited public interest in the deployment of the US Jupiter missiles, the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, and the developments that followed, nuclear issues were only sporadically and super ficially debated in the puhlic domain. Even then. the discussion focussed on the domestic political repcrcussiClns of these issues without touching their substance. It b inu:scsting to note that the word "nuclear" was nCll spelled out in this debate; words like "rockets" and "bases" were enough to denote the whole subject mailer. This unique period is worthy or detailed investigation, and luckily just such a study will appear shortly. For an excellent account of the period covering the imroduction of nuclear forces 10 Turkey, the Cuban missile crisis, and its al'lcr nrnth, sec Nur Bilge Cruss, "Straregic N11dear Mi.l'si/e.1· in 'fitrkey: '/1,e Jupiter A.[/i1ir (1959-1963)", in: .Journal of Strategic Studies. 1997 (forthcoming).
discuss publi<..:ly whether their neighbours arc all empting to develop mass dcstruc1io11 weapons, !heir delivery nH.:ans already having been aG.:quircd 15. The Turkish political and security elites should also seri ously consider the possibility or the acquisition or fissile or rndioac ti ve 111a1<.:rials by the numerous terrorist groups active in the Middle Easl. As control over the stm:kpilc or tons or fissile and radioactive materials on thc territory or the former Soviet Union is weakened to an unprecedented extent, the possibility that terrorist groups could sci1.e such material or even a nuclear explosive device directly a r rccts Turkish interests. Nevertheless, these issues arc barely raised or discussed even in the various publications or the Turkish Ministry or Foreign Affairs"', or in the article writlcn by the former Foreign Min ister (also the Deputy Prime Minister or the coalition government) published by the Center for Strategic Studics newly established in Ankara under the auspices or the Ministry or Foreign Affairs 17• Tur key may soon have lo suffer the consequences or neglecting these issues. The limited scholarly i nterest paid to these issues in Turkey means that no substantial debate commensurate with the dimension or the threat associated with them can take place 18.
1:> Ironically. during lhc war in the Gulf in the early 1990s, the only discussion of this hol topic was related to whether Scud missiles in the Iraqi arsenal were sophisticated enough to hit their intended targets. In other words. Turks preferred to hope ror a lack or precision in the ballistic weapons systems at the disposal or their potential enemies rather than l<> discuss the issue publicly and/or suggest cou ntcr-measurcs.
11' The web site or the Ministry or Foreign Affairs (MFA) on the internet is h ll p://www. m fa .gov. I r.
17 Tansu CH.I.ER, ... ,i,rkist, Foreign l'olicy i11 Its Dy11mnit· 'Ji-aditio11 ". in: Percep tions. Vol. I. No.3. Center for Strategic Studies (SAM}, Ankara, Scp1c111bcr Novcmher I 9Wi. pp.5-16. These concerns were mentioned in passing during the premiership of Tansu Cillcr in a NATO publication which is, however. only rarely accessible in the public domain. Sec Tansu C11.t1:R, "'/i1rkey a11d N/\'J"(): Sw/,i/ity in the \4mex 11/Cha11ge", in: NATO Review, No.2. April 1994, pp.3-6.
During the final revision of this chapter the government has changed in Turkey in early July 1997. The altitude or the government towards such issues is yet to be clarified.
1 x I :or a detailed discussion or ballistic missiles in the M iddl..: East and an assessment or the threat posed lo Turk..:y, sec Sitki EGFLI. /Jalistik F11z.eler ve '/i,rkiye , .. Ballistic Missiles and Turkey"), Ankara, Under-Secretariat or Defcnsc I ndustrics. Turkish Ministry of Dcrcnsc. (Sales no: SSM-10 Stratcji-1 ), 1993; for an account or Iran's nuclear policy and the implications of the recent Bushehr nuclear reactor deal between Iran and Russia, sec Mustafa KmARA<K,l.ll. "/.f Iran Goi11J.i N11clearl", in: Forei�n Policy. Yol.XX. Nos 3-4. Foreign Policy Institute. Ankara, Winter 19%, pp.35-55.
4. The Role of Nuclear Weapons in National Security
Policy and Attitudes towards NWFZ
During the Cold War years, Turkey relied heavily o n the presence of' nuclear weapons 011 its territory !'or national security. The Turkish political and security elites considered these weapons systems to be a credible (albeit limited) deterrent against the Warsaw Treaty Or ganization (WTO) in general and the huge military might or the USSR in particular. Nuclear weapons were deployed according to the mu tual commitments or Turkey and NATO. However, the deployment or nuclear weapons in Turkey under the terms or its NATO member ship owed more to the geostratcgic significance or the country for the United States in its confrontation with the Soviet Union 1 9. The North Atlantic Treaty did not involve any concrete undertaking on the part or the member states with reference to the deployment or nuclear weapons or any other specific weapons systems. There were, however, good reasons for Turkey to rely on a nuclear deterrent. So viet claims on the Turkish Straits20 and on some or the eastern prov inces or Turkey under Stalin gave rise to grave security concerns in the Turkish political and security elites. Turkey's vulnerable.situa tion in the aftermath or World War II and the USA's timely pledge to extend its security umhrclla to Turkey marked the beginning or sub stantial US-Turki�;h bilateral military coopcration2 1. During the
I'> At the NATO meeting in Washington. D.C., in December 1957, it was c..lecicled to deploy long-range h,1llistic missiles in Europe. Around 1960, US Thor ,ind Jupiter missiles became operational in the UK, Italy and Turkey. They had a range of approximately 3,000 km and a warhead yield of 1.5 megatons. Jupitcrs in Italy (30) and in Turkey ( 15) were phased out by 1965. Sec World Armaments and Disarmament, Sll'RI Yearbook 1982. for Stockholm Pca<.:c Research Institute, Taylor & Francis Lid. London. 1982, p.7.
w The straits of Istanbul (Bosphorus) and Canakkalc (the Dardanncles) in northwcstern Turkey arc highly strategic sea routes for the <.:ountrics liuoral to the Black Sea. The status of the straits was agr<.:cd in the Treaty of Montreux of 1936.
�1 It may also he worth noting that Turkish-American military relations suffered from two periods of distrust. Both were related to Turkey's strategy towards and hence interventions in Cyprus. First. US President Johnson sent a biller lellcr to the Turkish Prime Minister lsmct lnonu in June 1964 when Turkey dispatched military air<.:rafl to Cyprus to prcssuri1.c the Greek-dominated Cypriot administration, with a view to inducing the Greek Cypriots to treat the Turkish Cypriots fairly and equally. With the so-<.:allcd "Johnson lcller" the US administration warned its Turkish <.:ounterpan that Turkey coulc..l not he permitted
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1960s and 1970s, the Soviet threat was f"clt more explicitly both in Turkey and in the United States as the Soviet Union closed the gap with the US in the nuclear field. The Soviets increased their military presence and capabilities both in conventional and unconventional weaponry along Turkey's eastern frontier as well as their naval pres ence in the Mediterranean. That period also witnessed intensifying relations betwcrn the Soviets and Syria in all respects, including lhe military lield. The Soviet Union's growing military presence both in quantitative and qualitative terms across the southern flank of NATO prompted the Alliance in general and Turkey in particular to rely extensively (though gradually) on nuclear forces.
During the Cold War, fully aware of the overwhelming superiority or the Warsaw Pact countries in conventional weapons systems, Tur key opposed the proposal to establish a NWFZ in the Balkans22. It
was believed that the non-deployment or removal or nuclear weap ons from the territory of Turkey would expose the country to a very difficult military situation. For Turkey, the existence of nuclear weap ons on its soil meant the active presence and full backing of NATO in general and the United States in particular in contingency plans involving the WTO countries. Hence, the Turkish security elites did not opt for a nuclear-weapon-free 13alkans even though this proposal to use any military equipment of US origin in its intervention in Cyprus. The US also threatened Ill.It NATO might not defend Turkey should the Soviets launch an auack as a result of Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. The second period of poor relations came when the US Senate imposed a milit:1ry embargo on Turkey in July 1975 in the aftermath or the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in July 1974, which followed a Greek-sponsored military coup that aimed 10 annex the island to Gre.:cc. The military embargo lasted until September I 978 hut had some lasting effects on the mindset of the Turkish political and security elites. A clear indication or this were Turkey's allcmpls to diversify its military cooperation and procurement strategics by including other countries such as Germany and France among its suppli.:rs. and ist allempts to develop an indigenous military industry in ortkr 10 hcco111c as self-reliant as possible.
!2 A proposal for a nudcar-wcapons free Balkans was l'irst put forward hy the
Soviet Union on June 25. 1959. As the deployment of US medium range nuclear mi��iles to Turkey was seen on the horizon, the Sovi.:ts initiated counter measures at the international level, ;rnd '·recommended" to the Turks not to accept thc�e weapons. which could hit targets in the Soviet Union and would th.:rdorc he targetled hy Soviet nuclear missiles. However. Turkey did not give way lO this Soviet threat. The proposal was reiterated hy the Balkan members ,,f th.: WTO in the early 1980s.
had political advantages ror some countries and politicians in the region in terms or the opportunities ii presented to conduct ·'high politics" with the help or disarmament rheloric2:I. No1wi1hs1anding its opposition 10 a I3alkan NWFZ, Turkey rully supported the proposal Iha! aimed al establishing a nuclcar-wcapon-rree zone in the Middle East (NWFZ/ME), originally co-sponsored by Egypt and Iran as early as I 974. Turkey also expressed its concern !ha! such a zone should encompass all kinds or weapons or mass dcslruction as well as their delivery means. One principal reason ror supporting !he idea or a NWFZJM E was the threat percci ved from the spread or nuclear, chemi cal and biological (NC13) weapons or mass destruction into the Mid dle Easl. Such a threat, however, was not the primary concern or NATO in ils relations with Turkey24. The Middle East was generally considered by most or the NATO countries 10 he "out or area". There fore, ii was not clear lo the Turkish political and security elites whether or not the NATO "nuclear umbrella" would be effective in dercnding Turkey in the event of' a conventional or non-conventional allack launched by any (or a combination) or its Middle Eastern neighbours. Since Turkey was confident that its conventional arsenal could cope with ils Middle Eastern neighbours, any proposal !hat would cl'\mi nalc the non-conventional capabilities or these states would be to the advantage of Turkey's sccurily. Thus, Turkey supported the idea or a Middle East free or weapons of mass dcslruclion.
The concept or "out or area" and the Turkish attitude lo this ques tion may serve as an indicalor or !he chronic dilemma inherent in Turkey's foreign and sccurily policy. Whereas the United States sug gested the inclusion or an ··out or area'' intervention in contingency plans encompassing the Persian Gulf region, the West European mem
bers or NATO generally opposed the idea as the threat perceived from Eastern Europe was or primary importance for them25. So did Turkey,
�-1 For instance. Greece. despite the fact that it was a NATO ally. not only welcomed till' idea of a Balkan NWrz but also became a co-sponsor or subsequent proposals. !-I Sec Arti<.:lc (i of the North Atlanlic Treaty.
25 The dchat0 hclwccn 1he European members of NATO and the United States is 1101 new and can he 1raced hack to the original drafling of the Nonh A1la111ie
Treaty. For a comprehensive discussion or this question sec Douglas T. STUAlff
& William Tow. The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of-Arca l'rohlcms Since
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because the Turkish political and security elites did not want to get into a bilateral commitment with the United States alone in contin gencies including the Middle East, where the West Europeans would probably not he present. The pos;sihili1y or �uch an undertaking was not desirable politically or militarily ror Turkey ror a number of rea sons. The Turkish security elites believed that the United States did not have a clearly defined strategy with regard lo contingencies in the Middle East, especially those fol ling short or Soviet involvement. Hence they reared that the Turkish military would have lo be involved in US operations specifically designed to hack Israel against the Arab states. Even though Turkey kept its diplomatic relations with Israel at very low levels both de facto and de jure26, and at the same time
tried to keep clear or inter-Arab disputes, the Turkish political elites did not want lo be seen as taking sides in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Furthermore, memories of unsuccessful attempts to institutionalise cooperation among the slates in the northern tier of the Middle East (e.g., the Baghdad Pact and RCD) reminded the Turks of the signifi cance of their institutional ties with Europe and the need to strengthen then127. Hence, based on lessons learned, the Turkish political and
security el iles wanted to keep oul of the highly intricate intra-regional 1'' Turkey was one or the first countries 10 recognize the State of Israel in March 1949. Nonetheless. Turkish politicians have expressed their regrets as regards Israel's invasion and occupation of Arab lands. Turkey abo repeatedly urge<l Israel to return to its pre- I %7 frontiers and to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Turkey dc<.:ide<l to recall all of its high level diplomatic staff from the Turkish Embassy in Tel Aviv in December 1980 (immediately after the military coup staged in Turkey) and asked Israel to match this move. Eventually, as a reflection or the growing pace of recent Arab-Israeli rappro(;hcmcnt. Turkish-Israeli relations gained a new momentum. As an expression or this, a senior Turkish diplomat again assumed his office in the Embassy in Tel Aviv after the Peace Accord hc1ween Israel and the PLO signed in Washington. L>.C .. in September 1995. The l'rnmcwork of multifaceted relations hc1wcen Turkey and Israel will he tllentione<l later in this chapter. 17 Following its accession to NATO, Turkey 1ricd to pursue an active policy in the
Middle East as a regional actor which prnrnote<l Western (nalllcly US anti British) po)i(;ies. The l'a(;t of Mutual Cooperation or Baghdad Pact, signed at Baghdad on 24 fohruary. 1955, was an outcome of this policy. Sec CR1ss, "Stmll'Kic N11cl,•m· Mi.uil,·s iii 'fitrkey: '/1,e Jupiter A.f/<1ir ( 1959-/963)", in:
Journal of Strategic Studies. 1997 ffonhcoming). The RCL>. the agreement of Regional Cooperation for Development, was another link in the chain of US efforts to contain the Soviets hy strengthening cooperation among countries such a� T urkey, Iran and P:ikistan. The RCD remained in existence from 1964 to l'J79.
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politics or the Middle East. In sum, due to their national and regional security concerns and foreign policy principles and objectives, the Turkish political and security elites preferred to keep their political and lllililary frccdo111 to be able to decide independently on whether or not lo gel involved in contingencies in the Middle East, taking into consideration the auitude or the West European 111c111bcrs or NATO as well.
As for the recent proposal to establish a NWPZ in Central and Eastern Europe, the Turkish attitude is again negative. Although the proposal has been informally discussed in Western political and schol arly circles, the Turkish security elites apparently prefer to remain aloor. The reasons for and likely implications of this alliludc will be discussed later. However, it should suffice to say that the assess111ent by the Turkish elites or the political and military repercussions of a NWPZ in Central and Eastern Europe vis-a-vis Turkey's national security interests is not a promising one.
4.1. The Threat Posed to 1\Jrkey by Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East
Turkey is within range or all sorts or Weapons of Mass Destruc tion (WMO) that arc strong!y believed to exist in the Middle East. Only five states in the world arc formally recognised to have a nu clear weapons arsenal, namely the United States, Russia, UK, France and P. R. China, and only three states have formally admit ted having a chemical weapons arsenal, namely the United States,
Russia and Iraq. Moreover, Iraq has also admitted lo have wcaponiscd biological agents for military purposes. Iraq's formal acknowledgement or its possession or chemical and biological weapons is due to the efforts or the United Nations Special Com mittee (UNSCOM) which disclosed, destroyed, removed, or ren dered harmless Iraq's WMD programme as mandated by UN Secu rity Council Resolution 687 following the defeat or that country in the Persian Gulf in I 991 . Regardless or what UNSCOM has un earthed so. far, however, Iraq is strongly suspected of having hidden militarily significant number of operational chemical (and possibly biological) weapons, and of pursuing clandestine efforts to rebuild its devastated infrastructure for manufacturing mass destruction
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wcapons·1�. Whether or not formally admillcd, there is strong evi dence that a combination or nuclear, chemical and biological weap ons and their delivery vehicles do exist in a number or countries in the Middle l:asl, which poses a serious threat lo Turkey. Six particu lar Middle I \astern slates an.: believed 10 possess WMD arsenals, al though the risk or further prolif'cration is not confined solely lo these states. The ·.ix states that potentially constitute a threat to Turkey arc:
Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Israel.
Whereas the first four can be seen as posing a more serious threat, the lal\cr two should be treated as less serious threats by virtue or their apparently unproblematic and even friendly relations with Tur key. For instance, Egypt, being a NNWS party lo the NPT, may pose a much less serious threat for two main reasons. First, the final status or the Egyptian chemical weapons arsenal is unclcar2". Secondly, in
view or Egypt's improving relations with Turkey, one would hardly argue that Egypt is likely lo have the intention, let alone the neces sary technical capabilities, to wage a chemical weapons offensive against Turkey across the Mediterranean.
Israel is also thought lo be a less serious threat even though it is believed to have a considerable nuclear weapons stock pi le. Relations between the two countries arc improving considerably, especially since the restoration or diplomatic relations that followed Israel's peace initiatives with the PLO and Jordan in late 1995. rurthermore, Turkish-Israeli relations entered a new phase with the recent military cooperation agreement which apparently includes clauses aimed al improving hi lateral military cooperation such as can he found in many agreements or this type. ror instance, Israeli military aircrart will he allowed to overfly Turkish territory during training. And, Israel will �x There is convincing evidence !hat lrnq has rccslahlished its procurcmcnl network, and despite the UN embargo. succccdcc.l in selling :;igniricant amounts of oil since the end or the Gulf War hy lane.I and sea through three main routes. Conversations with a UNSC'OM inspector who participated in more than a c.lozen inspection missions in Iraq. 1:chruary 1997.
2'1 Morcover. Egypt is also the originator of the proposal to turn the previous NWFZ/ ME proposal into a zonc free of all weapons of mass dcs1nic1io11. The proposal i:; also known as the "Muharak Zone". For a comprehensive stuc.ly of the r.:asihility of such a mnc ,md policy recommendations. sec Jan P1iAwrr1. & James F. l.EON,\IW / eds). A Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the
1iirkey upgrade 54 Turkish F-4 class military aircraft and will provide the Turkish airforcc with electronic warfare equipment. However, the significance or this military cooperation goes beyond these transac tions. Puuing aside the meaning or the agreement for Israel, the per ception or the rapprochement between Turkey and Israel in the Mid dle East is or utmost importance for the Turkish political and security elites. For instance, Turkey has serious problems with some or its neighbours, especially with Syria�0. The recent military cooperation agreement between Greece and Syria exacerbated tension in the re gion and Turkish threat perceptions. The agreement allows, among other things, Greek military aircraft lo be stationed at Syrian bases as both parties "deem" necessary. Greece has also entered into similar agreements with Armenia and has attempted to do the same with Georgia, these states being newly independent former Soviet repub lics adjoining Turkey's eastern and north-eastern frontier. Such moves by Greece, including its initiatives lo develop and diversify its rela tions with Iran in a number of spheres including the military, have caused a sense or encirclement in the minds or the Turkish political and security elites". Furthermore, the threat posed by the fundamen talist aspirations or Iran and its alleged efforts to destabilise the demo cratic regime in Turkey by proxy have raised the perceived valu,c or relations with Israel. The sta'.e or affairs in the region and the state or
-'0 The principal sources of conflict between Syria and Turkey arc the following: Syria has claims on the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers originating from Turkey: there is good evidence that Syria gives support to the terrorist organization PKK, which is engaged in insurgencies inside Tmkey against both military and civilians which cause heavy casualties; Syria never recognized the status of the city of Hatay (Alexandrctta) which was annexed by Turkey in 1939 as the result of' a local referendum. On Syrian official maps. Hatay is still depicted as "belonging" to that country.
31 The Turkish stance in this regard was made clear in a press release oflhe Ministry or Foreign Affairs on April 5. 19% slating that " ... Greece I was) adopting a more antagonistic altitude not only toward resolving the dispute in the Aegean but toward Turkish-Greek relations overall. In a speech to university students in Thcss,iloniki. Greek l)dense Minister /\rsenis called for the formation of alliances with Turkey's ncighhours. Russia. Armenia. Bulgaria. Iraq. Iran. and Syria in order to pressure Turkey. ln conjunction with the Minister's new plan of pressuring Turkey through its neighbours. the Minister also ominously announced that Greece has entered into a military agreement which would permit Greek fighter plans to land in Syria and fly over Syrian airspace. Clearly the purpose of such an agreement would be for Greece and Syria to join forces ag,1inst Turkey." For details sec the web site or Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (http://www.turkcy.org).
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mind of' the Turkish political and security elites were highly condu cive to an improvcmcnl or relations with Israel that could result in a Turkish-Israeli axis crossculling the one set up by the enemies and rivals or both cmmtries:11.
In addition to Iraq. Syria and Libya an.: also hclicved to have elabo rate WMD dcvclop111c111 programmes, especially in the chemical and hiological f'ields. There arc indications that these two countries have already established large procurement networks for this purpose. These networks pursue not only the procurement or technological items and chemical or biological agents, but also the recruitment of scientists and experts in these l'ields from "supplier" slates like Russia and South Africa'.l'.I_ Iran is strongly suspected or having nuclear aspira tions. Although Iran adamantly rejects allegations that it has a clan destine nuclear weapons programme, its most recent nuclear reactor deals with Russia and China, and its overall nuclear infra- and super structure, tend to strengthen these suspicions'.14. Iran is also suspected
·12 /\ l'ullcr discussion or this topic would he necessary lo highlight many ohscure points 1ha1 could not be dealt with here. However, such a discussion would far exceed the scope or this study.
J.l In the case or Libya. Western intclligcm:c rc..:cived reliable information in the late summer or 1994 that the Libyan government was atlempling to rccrnit scientists from the South African Biological Weapons (13W) project to come 10 Tripoli 10 cstahlish a similar program for Libya. US and British intelligence services (CIA and SIS. respectively) mounted a large intelligence operation which was designed l<l thwart this effort. As part or that operation the British and US governments put privmc political pressure on President Mandela. which was not initially succcssf'ul. However, this leaked lO the press and revelations appeared i 11 the London Sunday 'ftme.v on February 26. 1995. The political storm then created in South Africa hailed the Libyan effort. For details, sec James ADAMS, '"/'lw /)augemus New World
1/
Chemic:al and lliological Weap1111.v", in: Brad Ro11E1rr� <ed.). Terrorism with Chemical ,md Biological Weapons, Chemical and Biological Arms Control lnstilllte. Alexandria. VA, 1997, pp.23-42.:i., With the January 1995 protocol signed between the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) and the Awmic Energy Agency or Iran ( Al:01), Russia agreed to construct two I.OOO MW(c) and two 440 MW(c) VVER light-water reactors (LWR) al the Hushchr nuclear site in the south of Iran 011 the Persian Gulf. The construction of two Siemens I .300 MW<c) LWR ,ll lhc same site was initially undertaken by the German firm Kraftwcrk Union (KWU), bul then halted hct·ausc of the Islamic revolution in Iran. China has also agreed to install al least two 330 MW(e) I.WR in Iran. Since Iran is one of the richest countries in prnvcn oil and natural gas reserves. its argumenl that it needs so much in�1:ilkd nul'lcar power capacity lo generate electricity is unwarranted.
'fill'key or having a chemical weapons arsenal and or making recent efforts to enlarge its capability in that field35.
4.2. The Threat Posed to Turkey by Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East
The existence or ballistic: missiles in the Middle East with a range suf ficient to reach Turkish territo1y is a more categorical threat than that posed by the ambiguity su1T0Lmding the status of mass destruction weapons in the region. The open source literature provides detailed graphic informa tion as to which c:ount1y has which c:atego1y or ballistic missiles in its ar
senal36. These sources paint an ala1ming picture or that situation in the
Middle East. To date, the profile or the missile arsenals or Iran, Iraq, Syria and Egypt reveals above all the deployment of Soviet-01igin Scud missiles or varying degrees or sophistication and hence va1ying ranges and payloads. Nonetheless, ongoing research and developments efforts to manufacture indigenously the derivatives or Scuds or non-Scud based missiles with longer ranges and higher payloads constitute a significant threat not only to the Middle Eastern countries and Turkey, hut also 10 states iii the southern pa11s or th<.: European c:ontinent37. The profile or th<.: mis siles deployed in the Middle East can he summarised as follows:
4.2. I. Iraq: All missile development programmes of Iraq over 150 km range were halted by the United Nations. However, Iraq's alleged renewed procurement attempts in the field ofWMD also apply lo the missile area'.18.
-'� In May 1996. India concluded a $15 million deal with Iran lO construct a plant to produce phosphorus pcntasulfidc. a chemical that can be used to nrnkc pesticide hut has been identified by the Australia Group as a component or some chemical weapons. See James AoAMS, ibid.
36 Sec for example Yiflah SllAl'm, "Pml(/c'mlim, <d' Noll(:m1ven1ional Weapons in lh<' Middle /:'mi'', in: Shlomo G,,ZIT (ed.). The Middle East Military Balance 1993-1994, Jaffee Center for Strategic Sllldics, Tel Aviv University, Wcstview Press, 1994, pp.216-238. For a more recent account, sec Ian 0. LESSER &
Ashley J. T1;1. 1.1s, Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean,
RAND. Santa Monica, CA. 1996.
37 A comprche:isive assessment of the the threat posed by ballistic missile programs in th<! Middle East and North Africa to southern European states can be found in Ian 0. LESSER & Ashley J. TEI.LIS. Strategic Exposure, ibid.
Jx UNSCOM sources subst:Hlliatc these allegations with their findings pertaining 10 the detailed irllitiativcs and contracts of Iraq's worldwide procurement network operating through front companie�. Conversations with a UNSCOM inspector. February 1997.
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.J.2.2. lra11: Iran's first Scud missiles were girts from Libya, which enabled lhe former to laum:h missile attacks on Baghdad beginning in 1985. During the 1988 ·'War or the Cities" Iran received Scud missiles from North Korea. Al'tcr 1992, North Korea delivered modi fied Scud-C missiles whose range exceeds 500 km. Iran's allcmpl to acquire I ,OOO km range Nodong-1 (Scud-D) missiles has not borne fruit to dat<.:. Iran is reportedly working on a medium range (800 km) missile called Thondar-68.
4.2.3 Syria: Syria has possessed operational Scud missiles since 1975. These missiles were acquired from the Soviet Union. The first Scud-C missiles were delivered to Syria from North Korea in late 199 1 and early 1 992. North Korea also provided Syria with Scud-C launchers in 1993. China agreed to sell Syria M-9 mis siles with a range of 600 km, hut partly due to pressure put on China hy the United States, it appears that no missiles have been delivered.
4.2.4. Libya: Libya received Scuds from the Soviet Union in the
late 1 970s. Lihya was reportedly involved in the 1 980s in a project called al-Falah, a liquid-fuelled missile with a range
or
at least I ,OOO km. Progress on the project, developed by German engineers, was slow. To date, the !'ate of the missile project is unknown.4.2.5. Egypt: The first country in the Middle East to operate
ballistic missiles on the battlefield was Egypt, which fired three Scuds at Israeli forces in Sinai in October 1973. In the early I 980s, Egypt transferred a few Soviet-made Scud missiles to North Korea. The North Koreans studied the missile through re verse engineering, and then produced and exported them. Egypt is believed to have Scud-B and Scud-C missiles, while the sta tus of efforts lo manufacture Scud-C missiles indigenously is not known for sure.
4.2.6. Israel: The firs! ballistic missiles acquired by Israel in the 1 960s were based on the French missile Dassault M0-660. That mis sile system, then known as Jericho- I, had a range
or
480 km. The modified Jcricho-2 developed in the mid-1980s had a longer range. In 1989 and in 1990 Israel succeeded in launching its experimental satellites, Ofeq- 1 and then Ofeq-2, delivered by the Shavit missile'fitrk,,y launcher. The Shavit missile was reportedly capable of carrying a payload or I ,OOO kg over 4,500 km39.
5.
The Attitude of the Political and Security Elites
towards Nuclear Issues
40The fundamental thrust of Turkish foreign and security policy is to become a state party to international agreements in the security field so as lo contribute 10 their effective implementation and also to reiterate the guiding principle of Turkish foreign policy: "peace at home and peace in the world". This guiding principle was laid down by the rounding rather and the first President of the Turkish Repub lic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Issues pertaining to nuclear arms, nu clear arms control and disarmament arc principally seen by the Turk ish security elites from this perspective. Accordingly, Turkey has become a state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
by signing ii on 28 January 1969, and subsequently ratifying ii on 17 April 198041 • Turkey has also become a state parly to the Biological .w For details sec Yiflah SJJAl'lll, ibid .
. m The information summarized in this section is partly derived from the author's person.ii correspondence with members of the political and sccuril'j elites belonging w diffcrcn1 ins1i1u1ions in Turkey. Some of this corrcspon<lcncc. however, took place during the author's doctoral research ( 1993-96). Nonetheless, in view or the fact 1ha1 no drastic changes have occurred in the fundamental thrust of Turkish foreign policy since then, these views arc thought lo he still relevant to the subject mailer of this study and arc therefore brought inrn the discussion at this point.
•11 Turkey's rather late ratification of the NPT may give rise to the question of whether Turkish politicians wanted 10 keep lhc nuclear option open. The conventional wisdom docs not suggest 1ha1 this is likely. However, lhc traditional weight and hence the undisputed influence of the military on the decision making process crn matters relating to national security was probably a factor that delayed ratification for some time. During the 1970s. when interest in nuclear as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means was growing in neighbouring countries like Iran, Iraq. and Syria. the Turkish military elites might 1101 have wanted 10 give an impression by means of' a hasty ratification th:11 Turkey would definitely forgo the nuclear option. Ahhough 1hcy had no real intention in that respect, the Turkish elites might have wished 10 leave the issue ambiguous as a deterrent to regional rivals and enemies. The 01hcr side of' the coin should also be mentioned. In the second half of 1970s, Turkey went through a period or chaos which prompted the military intervention in 1980. which, according to many political analysts, rescued the country from the brink of an all-out civil war. Therefore. one should not be surprised if' the Tmkish Grand National Assembly did not prioritize the ratification of the NPT
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Weapons Convention or 1972 and signed the Chemical Weapons Con vention or 1993 followed by ratification by the Turkish Grand As sembly in April 1997. Turkey recently assumed l'ull member status in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva artcr a long period or allcnding its meetings with observer status. Its willingness to be come a full member can be considered a rclkction of the importance allributed by the security elites to disarmament and non-proliferation nrnllcrs. At the Extension and Review Conl'crcncc or the NPT held in
New York in April/May 1995, Turkey gave its full support to the in definite and unconditional extension or the Treaty. Turkey also used its ini·luencc ;m the lurkic republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus to induce them to do the same. As a country that never sought to acquire weapons or mass destruction, Turkey is striving hard to strengthen the non-proli reralion regime and also participates actively in efforts to enhance the IAEA's verification system. Therefore, Tur key pays close allention to the proceedings of the "93+2 Programme" as an allempt to make IAEA safeguards inspections more intrusive. In a broader framework, the abolition or nuclear weapons is viewed as a noble aim, which should stay on the agenda. Nevertheless, the international context seemingly requires the elites to acknowledge that this aim could only be reached in stages. Furthering the START process, the conclusion or the CTBT, and a cut-off in the production or fissile material arc al I considered to be such stages.
5.1. Attitudes towards a Test Ban
As a member or the Conference on Disarmament, Turkey is "pleased" to have joined the overwhelming majority or nations in the effort to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The complete ban on nuclear testing, the core function or the Treaty, is thought by the Turkish security elites lo be an effective measure lo control nuclear weapons technology. The international monitoring or this ban that the CTBT provides for is believed lo serve as an important confidence-building measure amongst the states that arc (and will be) al a 1im..: when the country was struggling with anarchy anc.l lherc was no non prolifcralion culture. In ac.ldilion, the two very small-scale nuclear research anc.l training reactors were prohahly nol <.:onsidered by polieymakcrs as <.:ompelling reasons for speeding up the ratil'ication process or concluding a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
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rariy to the Treaty. With specific reference to India's position on tile CTBT, the Turkish security elites hope that India will reviL'W i1, po sition and ensure !hat the Treaty will co111e into force. This exp�eta tion is in full conformity with the Turkish security elites' conviction that consolidation or the CTBT will be an i111portant step towards the eventual elimination or nuclear weapons.
5.2. Attitudes towards a Cut-Off of t,he Production of Fissile Material
In a period when !here arc extended discussions in progress re garding the management or tons or excess plutonium and highl y en riched uranium left over from weapons dismantling programmes in both the United States and Russia, questioning the significance or a universal cut-off treaty is obvious42. Therefore, the Turkish security elites fully support such an eventuality and believe that the entry into force of such a treaty should secure the ratification of the so-called threshold states like India, Pakistan and Israel. /\ cut-off treaty is accordingly thought to constitute another significant step towards the ultimate goal or eliminating nuclear weapons. With special reference 10 the obvious danger of further nudearisalion or the Middle East, Israel being a de facto nuclear power, any development that would facilitate the acquisition of fissile material by other aspiring states in the region is believed to be counter-productive. Hence a cut-off in the production of fissile material is considered by the Turkish secu rity elites in the context or its merits in contributing to the non-pro liferation goal.
5.3. Attitudes towards a Change in NATO Strategy to "No-First-Use"
At the conceptual level, a change in NATO strategy is considered by the Turkish security elites to be a natural consequence llf 1he revo lutionary changes that have taken place in the Soviel bloc. lo which
·12 Ongoing discussions in some scholarly circles involve divcrgcnl views ahout the significance of a cut-off tn.:aty, while India\ position is unamhiguous afler its rejec1ion or the CTBT.
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poli1ic.:al system the Alliance was conceptually opposeu·I.I. The origi nal N/\TO strategic concept changed several limes during the Cold War in response to changes and developments in the military halanee between the two mi litary hlocs-1·1• The NATO strategy of the 1990s incorrorates the objective or establishing c.:oopcration with the coun-1rics or the rormcr WT0-1�. The military structure or the Alliance is therefore undergoing changes commensurate with its new strategic.: c.:oncept41•. These changes arc mostly welcomed by the security elites in Turkey insofar as they rcduc.:e the likelihood or war. Nevertheless, ii 111us1 be rclllelllbcrcd that all or NATO's strategic.: concepts through out the Cold War, asserted the right or the Alliance to resort to nu c.:lear weapons at any stage or a conllicl. To put it simply, the under lying concept or N/\TO strategics has always been (and still is) a "first-use" strategy, and this is also strongly supported hy the Turkish security elites47. As stressed elsewhere in this study, N/\TO countries relied on their nuclear c.:arabilitics to offset the superiority or the WTO in conventional weaponry. I3ccausc it was envisaged that NATO might not win a war without resorting to nuclear weapons, whereas the
- - - - -- ·-- -
-.n Though no spedric.:a1io11 or the name of any group or countries as adversaries is found in the 1ex1 or lhc North Allantic Trealy. The geographical delimitation thal exists in the text. however. identifies the dcrcnse commitment or 1he J\llianc.:e.
•1•1 The so-called '·ncxihlc response" strategy or NATO. designed and adopted in the 19(,0s. was regarded as defining the characteristics of the Alliance. It priori1i1.ed conventional responses lo conventional aggression. keeping nuclear weapons as a secondary option lhal could he resorted to during a protracted conrlict. The previous NATO strategy had relied on "massive r ct.Jliation", according to which the immediate resort to nuclear weapons would be possible in case or an :itl.tck on the allied countries.
·15 NATO's new strategic concept places more emphasis on "crisis management" and '·conflic.:l prevention", and is mindrul or the ract that Central and Eastern Europe arc now rcnilc zones for potcnti.tl instahilitics resulting from the ethnic composition or the states or the region.
•111 Accordingly. smaller and more flexible rorcc units at lower levels or readiness with greater mohility arc replacing the previous concept that relied on rather stntic linear dcfcnsc.
·17 In order to avoid any confusion or misinterpretation or the 1cnns. it should he made clear that NATO's "l1N use" strategy by no means implies "pre-emptive u�c". which means 1hc use or nuclear weapons before any aggression occurs. Ralhcr. rirst-usc implies that NATO may be lhc first to use nuclear weapons. during an aggression. in view or the fac1 that no other option might provide a better way of defending NATO territory against an aggressor. Telephone <:onvcrsation with Turkish amhassador Omer Ersun. Ouawa, C,inada, April 22. 1997.
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WTO might, with its conventional superiority. In contrast to this ar gument, the Soviet Union declared .in 1982, as part of a peace offen sive, that it would not be the first to resort to nuclear weapons and initiated a "no-first-use" strategy. The Turkish security elites consid ered the Soviet ·'no-first-use" pledge Lo be a mere propaganda tool at the time it was initiated.
However, the tide has turned with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dissolution
or
the WTO. As NATO survived and is moving towards enlargement, Russia is undergoing drastic changes. The imbalance in conventional weapons systems is now more strongly in favour of NATO (even excluding the potential contribu tion of the prospective members) than it was in the WTO's favour during the Cold War48. Therefore, the Russian military elites felt compelled to revise their decade-old ·'no-first-use" strategy, and to de clare instead, in 1993, that Russia would again reserve its legitimate right to resort to nuclear weapons in case of aggression by a nuclear weapon state or an ally of a nuclear-weapon state, regardless of the weapons used by the aggressor. This change in Russian policy was concomitant with the declaration of the so-called ·'near abroad" doc trine. The implication of this is that in the case of aggression, given its now inferior position in conventional forces, a feasible alternative for Russia would be to resort to tactical nuclear weapons. This could in theory lead to an exchange of strategic nuclear forces, that is an all-out nuclear war49 .
. ,x Although a clear retrospective comparison between the conve111ional arsenals or the NATO and WTO countries is hardly possible, it was genernlly estimated that WTO had a "1.5 to I" or even "2 to I" superiority over NATO. However, the imbalance between NATO (short of new members) and Russia (short of its loose CIS alliance) is now said 10 amount to "3 to I" in neighbour or NATO. In case or NATO enlargement and Russia turning the CIS into a military alliance as a reaction. NATO still seems likely tn be belier off. Conversations with Turkish military experts and with Dr. Nikolai Sokov rrom the Center for Non proliferalion S1udies or the Monterey Institute or International Studies. February
1997. Dr. Sokov worked with the Soviet Foreign Ministry in the late 1980s ,llld participated in the START I and II negotiutions .
. J'J Strategic nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the United States and Russia can he targeued in ten minutes. This means that the world is ten minutes away from Cold War contingencies. Conversations with James Goodby when he paid a visit to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of Inter national Studies, November 1996.
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J\llhough si111rle logic might suggest that NATO, which now has an indisputahk superiority in c01wcn1ional forces, should now adopt the ·'no-first-use" strategy in order to avoid a catastrophe, things arc not so simple. A switch in NATO strategy in that direction may not (and probably will not) bring about a concurrent change in Russian strntegy rrolll "rirst-usc" hack to ··no-first-use". Moreover, the present Russian .. l'irst-use" strategy is not only an outcome or Russia's inre riority vis-a-vis NATO's conventional posture, but also a reflection or the Russian military elites' assessment or threats rrom the south. The cumulative threat posed hy nuclear weapons in China and by the nuclear capabilities or India and Pakistan, al whatever level, is ap parently no less signiricant a threat 10 Russia. Tn addition to these two principal reasons, the traumatic effects or the dissolution or the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact on the state or mind or the Rus sian security elites should also he taken seriously50. Therefore, a "no firsl-use" declaration by NATO would he or limited significance in the short term51• On the other hand, NATO has its own constraints as for as the threat or prolireration or WMD, especially in the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, is concerned. It is anticipated that within a dccade, "Western European capitals will he within the range or ballistic missiles based in North Africa and the Middle East", and that the "southern members of NATO will he the first to feel the political and military consequences or proliferation trends on Eu rope's periphery"52. Therefore, in June 1996, NATO foreign and d e l'cnce ministers endorsed a comprehensive approach to counter the lllilitary risks posed by such thrcats53. NATO's efforts to adapt itself 50 The Russian elites have lost almost all their conJ'idence in their Weslern counJer
parts. especially because of the assurances given to thclll during the unification or <.icrlllany, now proved to he void, as regards the future composition of NATO. Thcrcrorc, even if NATO turns to '·no-first-use", Russia woultl probably expect further concrete steps from the West to rebuild confidence. This, however, may he a very long process. Conversations with Nikolai Sokov.
51 It coultl. however, contribute to confidence huildinp. efforts hctwecn the parties. In other words, NATO's switch to a "no-first-use" strategy is considered by the Russians lo he a "necessary hul not sufficient condition" or improved conlidence. Conversations with Nikolai Sokov.
52 Sec Konald D. A�MllS, F Stephen LMRAIJEE & Ian 0. L1:ss1:1t "MC'di1errm1ell11 Sernriry: New Clwl/e11ges. New ·/ii.,·ks", in: NATO Review, No.3. May 1996, pp.25-31 .
.
n This issue is explicitly cited in the Communique <� 29) released after the meeting or the North Atlantic Council in Dcfcnsc Ministers Session. on 13 June 19%.
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lo mccl lhc challenges of lhe new security environment have produced guidelines ror appropriate responses 10 proliferation. The overarching principles envisaged to guide NATO's defence response arc, among others, to ·'maintain freedom of action and demonstration to any potential adversary that the alliance will not be coerced hy 1hc threat or use of WMD.54"
In view or the facl lhal a change in NATO strategy lo ·'no-firsl use" would nol induce an immediate reciprocal change in Russia's current "l'irsl-usc" strategy, and considering thal the proliferalion of WMD in the proximity of NATO is likely to constitute a more seri ous threat in the near future than it docs now, the exigency and vi ability of such a change seems questionable55. Therefore, the Turkish security elites do not sec any prospect of a switch to a "no-first-use" strategy, at least for the foreseeable future. Although dramatic (and also favourable) changes have taken place in Turkey's security envi ronment, the credibility of the nuclear posture and hence NATO's dclcrrcncc policy, including the implicit ·'first use" strategy of the Alliance, is of the utmost importance for the Turkish security elites.
5.4. Attitudes tow}lrds a START Ill Treaty and the lnclusion of the French, British and Chinese Nuclear Arsenals in International Nuclear Arms Limitation and Reduction Treaties
The START III Treaty, although it is unlikely to be signed in the near future, is likely to set US and Russian strategic nuclear forces at levels at which they will remain for some time. START II still awaits ratificalion by lhe Russian Duma. This lreaty lays down a level or 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads in the arsenals of lhe lwo sides, and it is hoped that lhis will be further reduced to 2,000 warheads each in lhc �TART Ill Treaty. As for 1he idea of including the French, British
>I For .i fuller discussion. sec Ashton B. C,wrrn & David H. OM11N1>. "Co1111tering
rlw l'ml/fem1im1 Rish: Ad11pri111: 1/,e Allianc:e 10 1/re New Sewriry 1.::11virn111111•111". in: NATO Review, No.5. September 19%. pp.10-1 5 (emphasis added).
55 It is nonetheless interesting 10 note that in the post-Cold War era. both NATO
and Russia have to pay even more attention 10 factors beyond each other\
intentions and capabilities in defining their new dcfcnsc and security itlentilies; this may have serious consequences for both parties.
