JOSHAS Journal (e-ISSN:2630-6417)
2020 / Vol:6, Issue:33 / pp.1814-1822
Arrival Date : 01.11.2020
Published Date : 07.12.2020
Doi Number : http://dx.doi.org/10.31589/JOSHAS.440
Reference : Öztürk, Z.A. (2020). “Politics Of Identity: European-Self And The Turks As The Other-Self”, Journal Of
Social, Humanities and Administrative Sciences, 6(33):1814-1822.
POLITICS OF IDENTITY: EUROPEAN-SELF AND THE
TURKS AS THE OTHER-SELF
Kimlik Siyaseti: Avrupa Benliği ve Öteki Benlik olarak Türkler
Assistant Professor Dr. Zerrin Ayşe ÖZTÜRK
Ege University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations, Izmir/Turkey
ORCID ID : 0000-0002-6585-3448
ABSTRACT
This study aims at analysing the key theoretical debates on identity politics in International Relations (IR) in the aftermath of the Cold War. Firstly, theoretical approaches to identity and interest formation processes will be examined through a social constructivist perspective. Secondly, the issue of identity will be investigated within the axis of European identity - Turkish identity, via an analysis of ‘self’ and ‘other’. Thus, the study suggests that this analysis might provide some explanation of the hesitations of the EU and in some cases, of the Allies of NATO towards Turkey in their implicit or explicit policies of inclusion/exclusion of Turkey into European political/social/cultural structures in the post-Cold War era.
Keywords: Identity formation, European identity, Turkish identity, Social Constructivism. ÖZET
Bu çalışma ile Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Uluslararası İlişkilerdeki kimlik siyasetiyle ilgili temel teorik tartışmaları analiz edilecektir. İlk olarak, Sosyal inşacı yaklaşın çerçevesinden kimlik ve çıkar inşası süreçleriyle ilgili teorik yaklaşımlar incelenecektir. İkinci olarak, kimlik sorunu Avrupalı kimliği - Türk kimliği ekseninde ‘ben’ ve ‘öteki’ kavramaları üzerinden incelenecektir. Bu bağlamda bu çalışma, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Avrupa Birliği ve bazı durumlarda da NATO müttefiklerinin Avrupalı siyasi/sosyal/kültürel yapılara Türkiye’nin dahil edilmesi/edilmemesi noktasındaki açık ve zımni politikalarının ve tereddütlerinin anlamlandırılmasına katkıda bulunulacaktır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kimlik İnşası, Avrupalı Kimliği, Türk Kimliği, Sosyal İnşacılık. 1. INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this study is to analyse theoretical debates on identity politics in International Relations (IR) in the aftermath of the Cold War. Thus, the paper attempts to answer the following questions: Does identity formation require an ‘other’? Should a state’s identities and interests be accepted as given or can they be changed or reconstructed? What is the interconnection between one state’s identity formation and another states’ identity formulation? Firstly, theoretical approaches to identity and interest formation processes will be examined through a social constructivist perspective. Secondly, the issue of identity will be investigated within the axis of European identity - Turkish identity, via an analysis of ‘self’ and ‘other’. As Waever points out, “Europe, security, integration, and identity have been tied together in a specific narrative. Strikingly, the seemingly pure academic term ‘security identity’ has a political appearance exactly at this intersection.” (Waever, 1996: 103). What Waever suggests regarding the interconnectedness of security and identity also holds true in the Turkish case: the historically implicit interaction between Turkish identity formation and providing its security has become a more salient and unavoidable feature of the Turkish case in the aftermath of the Cold War. Thus, the study suggests that this analysis might provide some explanation of the hesitations of the EU and in some cases, of the Allies of NATO towards Turkey in their implicit or
explicit policies of inclusion/exclusion of Turkey into European political/social/cultural structures in the post-Cold War era.
2. IDENTITY FORMATION – PROCESS AND STRUCTURE
Theoretical discussions on identity challenge IR theoretical orthodoxy as “neither of the two orthodox theories of IR [neorealism and neoliberalism] sees identity as a major analytical or political problem.” (Krause and Williams, 1997: vii) Although they admit the influence of political identity to a certain extent, they do not see it problematic as they simply accept a state’s identity as a predetermined social fact rather than being a subjectively and intersubjectively constituted social process. For instance; IR scholars like Krause and Renwick articulate their dissatisfaction with orthodox approaches to the study of IR and focus on issues of identity in order to explore the implications of identity problems on the world politics in an explicit way (Krause and Renwick, 1996: xiii). They state that “the worldwide upsurge in identity politics in the past three decades and the re-awakening of long-suppressed expressions of identity in the post-Cold War world have all pushed International Relations to put the question of identity onto its research agenda in recent years.” (Krause and Renwick, 1996: xiii). Thus, they see the examination of identity as one of those different ways of understanding the contemporary world, which pose theoretical challenges to the state-centric approaches of IR in the post-Cold War era. In a way, this can be understood as a return of IR theory to its normative commitment, as Neufeld has asserted.
Farrands makes some crucial observations on the issue of identity that sheds a light on their understanding in their study of identity in IR. First, he clarifies the false tendency to equalise the concepts of identity and nationalism. He asserts that the “link between conceptions of nationalism and the emergence and development of the ‘modern’ [society] … cannot be taken granted or used as a whole explanation.” (Farrands, 1996: 19). Second, he points out that an exclusively political basis for identity would not be sufficient to contain the social, economic and cultural dimensions of identity formation, which all “interact in shaping and transforming identities” (Farrands, 1996: 3-4) of human societies. Third, Farrands states that socially, historically and materially grounded identities “are not wholly explicable in terms of calculations of interest, or even in terms of rational responses to threats or outside pressures.” (Farrands, 1996: 20). Hence, a simple reading of reasoning would be inadequate for exploring the complex nature of identity formation. Finally, Farrands draws attention to the tendency of associating identity and nationalism in the study of IR. He articulates that in the post-Cold War world, “other forms of identity [such as local or regional identities] have become of increasing significance alongside concerns with nationalism, and at the same time the definitions of nationalism have become necessarily broader and more difficult to separate from other forms of identity.” (Farrands, 1996: 20). Although the evolution of modern nationalism and the emergence of the modern states are viewed by many IR scholars as simultaneous and mutually reinforcing processes, Farrands draws attention to the fact that “the idea of a fixed identity linked to the modern nation state is challenged by the argument that there is nothing natural or fixed about identity itself.” (Farrands, 1996: 13). Thus, the deconstruction of old identities and the reconstruction of new ones have become much more complicated and understanding the dynamics of this continuous social process of identification with a more coherent approach may help us to make sense of the current condition of the post-Cold War world.
On the other hand, Jabri sees the understanding of the process of identity formation as a crucial component of the contemporary world politics. She establishes a firm connection between the construction of identity and the discourse of violence, which are both seen as social constructions. She points out the importance of the dichotomy between self and other, which “has early origins in the life cycle of the individual and provides the basis of social differentiation in later social interaction.” (Jabri, 1996: 125). Thus, the differentiation of self and other is the most important factor in shaping social identity that is “constituted around modes of interpretation and complexes of meanings which are drawn upon in the process of self-description and articulation.” (Jabri, 1996:
131). Jabri defines national identity, which is seen as the commonplace of all identities, as “a self-perception based on history, mythology, tradition, language, culture … an important constituent of administered social systems.” (Jabri, 1996: 134). Hence, the conflicts that have emerged in the post-Cold War are a result of these constructed identities and discourses of self and other in an exclusive way. Her solution to the current discourse of exclusion leading to more conflicts can be found in constructing transformative and critical discourses on peace, which would also require a re-examining of current uniform interpretations of identities in a pluralistic perspective (Jabri, 1996: 140-141). In the light of the growing emphasis on the issue of identity in IR, Wendt has formulated “a constructivist approach to the international system” (Wendt, 1999: 33) in which he attempts to theorise identity formation processes. First, he views international politics as an ongoing social construction, that is to say, as an intersubjective domain, which is meaningful at a particular time and place to the actors who make it, live in it and understand it. In this world, the existing social structures consist of three main elements, which are constitutively playing their roles in shaping up the structure of a social system: material conditions, interests and ideas (Wendt, 1999: 139).
Narrowing down the broad concept of ‘ideas’ into ‘knowledge’, Wendt examines culture as a common and collective source for knowledge. In his definition of common knowledge, he draws attention to the fact that the concept of ‘common knowledge’ or putting it in a constructivist way, ‘intersubjective understandings’, consist of “actors’ beliefs about each other’s rationality, strategies, preferences, and beliefs … need not to be true, just believed to be true.” (Wendt, 1999: 159). These intersubjective beliefs and understandings “are often inscribed in “collective memory,” the myths, narratives, and traditions that constitute who a group is and how it relates to others.” (Wendt, 1999: 163). This collective knowledge is kept alive through generations and would “be hard to shake their long-term effects, even if a majority of individuals have “forgotten” them at any given moment.” (Wendt, 1999: 33). During interaction, Wendt states that actors need to define the situation that they are in before they can act; and in the process of this definition actors would consider two things: first, actors think in terms of their own identities and interests, which means their own beliefs about ‘self’ and second, actors think in terms of its beliefs about ‘other’ and its identities and interests (Wendt, 1999: 186-187). Thus, shared knowledge and repetition of interactions between actors based on such intersubjective understandings would generate an established pattern in actors’ practices and ideas in relation to each other.
Wendt identifies four kinds of identities, with which he attempts to clarify the identity formation of a state: the first two are personal/corporate identity and types identity. These identities do not depend on a definition of ‘other’, since personal or corporate identities can be seen as consciousness and memory of ‘self’ and type identities can be described as social categories with which actors relate themselves such as attitudes, values, skills, languages, experiences etc. (Wendt, 1999: 224-226). On the other hand, neither role identity nor collective identity can be defined without a certain reference to ‘other’; in other words, they are constituted through an interrelated identity formation of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. A role identity of an actor is defined not only through one’s own beliefs of ‘self’ but also through its beliefs regarding how ‘other/s’ think of who or what the actor is (Wendt, 1999: 227). Collective identity requires identifications between ‘self’ and ‘other’, which “induce actors to define the welfare of the Other as part of that of the Self.” (Wendt, 1999: 229). According to Wendt, whereas the identities of actors constitute the roots and beliefs of who or what an actor is, interests provide a motivational force to actors for realising what they want. In addition to three classical national interests of physical survival, autonomy and economic well-being, Wendt suggests a fourth one, which he calls ‘collective self-esteem’, which can be defined as “a group’s need to feel good about itself, for respect or status.” (Wendt, 1999: 236). Positive collective self-images and the relationship with the ‘other’ in terms of mutual respect and an equal status prove to be important for the establishment of a collective self-esteem of an actor. So, does it really matter to try to understand and evaluate relations between states in terms of identities and interests? It does
matter, as “these four interests are needs that must to be met if state-society complexes are to be secure.” (Wendt, 1999: 237). Moreover, interests and identities constitutively form the base for actors’ actions. Unless an actor identifies its own ‘self’, it cannot know what its interests are; that is to say, to know what you want requires knowing who you are at first. Hence, how an actor defines its own identity and how it relates with the ‘other/s’ would have a deep impact on its interests and ultimately on its actions. However, it should be noted that the formations of identities and interests are interactive continuing processes, in which the conceptions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ are under constant construction.
With the conceptual examination of identity formation of states and the construction of self and other as a result of intersubjective understandings and perceptions, I have tried to clarify that the definition of identities and interests are key in replying the primary questions of the post-Cold War security environment: whose security?, from whom or from what threats?, security for which values and interests? In the following section, I will try to illustrate the reflections of these theoretical formulations on identity through the example of ‘European-self’ and Turkey as the ‘Other-self’ within the European identity formation.
3. EUROPEAN IDENTITY RECONSIDERED - TURKEY AS THE ‘OTHER-SELF’
This part of the study examines the contemporary formation of the ‘European-self’ and the ‘Other-self’. It is argued that even today as it has been for centuries, this ‘other-self’ of the ‘European-self’ partly corresponds to the ‘Turks’. As noted by Wendt, myths, narratives, and traditions have a constitutive role in forming the collective memory; thus, it proves useful to look back to the origins of the word ‘Europe’ itself in history. Coming from the Greek word ‘Europa’, it was first used in the Greek mythology as the name of the daughter of Agenor, the king of Phoinikia, the kingdom that was situated on the territories of today’s the Lebanon, Syria and part of Israel including many colonies in the coastline of the Eastern Mediterranean and the south coast of Turkey (Necatigil, 1957, 39). According to the myth, Zeus, the king of Olympus, fell in love with Europa, kidnapped and took her to the other cost of the Mediterranean, where he married with her in the island of Crete. The myth continues as the beautiful Europa had lots of children from Zeus and then married the king of Crete and never returned to her country at the Eastern side of the Sea. From that time onwards, the countries in the West and North of Crete began to be known as “Europe” (Necatigil, 1957, 39). Hence, it may be inferred that the word ‘Europe’ “was principally a geographical expression and subordinated to Christendom which was the dominant identity system in the West” (Delanty, 1995: 30) beginning from the late 15th century.
The conquest of Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1453 marked an important turn in the encounter with non-European peoples; moreover, through the resistance to the Ottoman expansion towards the West “the idea of Europe itself became the focus for the construction of an especially European identity.” (Delanty, 1995: 30). The ‘Turkish threat’ was intensified with the expansionist military policies of the Ottoman Empire moving into the inland Western Europe up to the doorstep of Vienna. Campbell states that Turks have always been amongst the enemies of the West: “Thinking that western civilization was besieged by a horde of enemies (Turks, Jews, heretics, idolaters, and witches, to name but a few),” (Campbell, 1998: 54) they have been used to foster a culture of fear, which was resulted in defining several forms of ‘otherness.’ In the 16th century, forming a “European union” through common money and common army was seen as the main condition for resisting to that existential threat coming from the Turks (Sakallı, 2001: 21). Sakallı, a Turkish historian, suggests that the idea of European unification as a solution for the ‘Turkish threat’ had not been able to put into practice as the threat that Turks were posing to Europeans was not treated as a common knowledge in the collective memories of all Western European countries. Germany, labelling the Turks as ‘eternal enemy’, used the fear of Turks to justify the collection of taxes and used it as a balancing tool for managing the political and civil unrest in their country at that time. The French on the other hand, saw the Turks not as a direct threat to themselves but as the ‘enemy of Christianity’. The diplomatic
relations between the British and the Ottomans date back to 1580s, and up to that time there has been no reference to Turks in British written literature. When it comes to the Slavic culture, the Ottoman sultan and the Turks were seen as ‘enemy’ but also ‘just’ people (Sakallı, 2001: 21-22).
Beginning from the Ottomans, Turks have been seen as the representatives of Islamic threat and the unknown Easterners who were associated with references to cruelty, despotism, barbarism and dishonesty: “The characterization of the ‘Other’ by Europeans was almost always stereotyped and degrading. Identifying the ‘Other’ substantially shaped the forms of policy applied to particular areas and peoples of the world.” (Murden, 1997: 377). As noted by Delanty, “to imagine Europe involves the privileging of a particular discourse over others. In the Middle Ages this was Christianity against Islam.” (Delanty, 1995: 31). The fear from Islam and the common Western view of identifying the Eastern cultures as alien and threatening had reinforced the Western idea that ‘the Turks’ were the ‘others’ as Turks were Muslims and the Ottoman Sultan was the caliph, the religious leader of all Muslims. Mastnak, noting Islam’s constitutive role in European identities, points out that according to the logic of the Western irenic tradition, Christendom and Europe must exist in peace and “the construction of the Muslim world as the enemy of Christendom and Christianity, of Europe and civilization” (Mastnak, 1998: 575) has been constitutive of this irenism. Mastnak focuses on abbé de Saint-Pierre, a prominent representative of Western irenism, whose peace project was that of establishing a European Union to provide perpetual peace in Europe for Europeans and Christians (Mastnak, 1998: 570-598). For the construction of such perpetual peace in Europe, abbé de Saint-Pierre proposed a universal crusade to chase “the Turk out of Europe and even out of Asia and Africa … [since] this crusade-generating Union was … the only means for making Europe and the European order reign in all parts of the world.” (Mastnak, 1998: 590). Mastnak claims that this idea of ‘chasing Turks out of Europe’ has been very influential in “the word Europe becoming the bearer of political collective consciousness in the West, and thus for the formation of Europe as a political community.” (Mastnak, 1998: 588). Moreover, Mastnak draws attention to the fact that in his “Grand Design” peace project, abbé de Saint-Pierre “was zealous to propose ‘an offensive League for the extermination of the Turks’.” (Mastnak, 1998: 588).
As was noted above, social constructivists argue that identities are not given but are constructed through social interactions and practices; thus they can be changed or even remade. Since ideas and identities are not only constructed by the real world but they also play a crucial role in shaping the world and the social and political structures that we live in, the fundamental dualism of ‘East-West’ or ‘European-Other’ are “not merely the product[s] of abstract ideas, a struggle of civilisations or incompatible world-views, but … [are] reproduced in social, political and economic conflicts.” (Delanty, 1995: 121). As Wendt puts it, interdependence, common fate and homogeneity can be characterised as the “efficient causes of collective identity formation and thus structural change.” (Wendt, 1999: 357). Homogeneity or alikeness of the European states require them to perceive each other alike in terms of their institutional form, function and power; and their regime types or at least sufficiently homogenous to allow some degree of shared identity to be sustained alongside often competitive national identities, especially when contrasted with a non-European ‘other’. However, homogeneity does not constitute collective identity on its own. Interdependence plays an important role in identity formation as well when one actor sees its choices and acts through the perspective of the other actor and each of them “experience each other’s gains and losses as their own, as “interdependent,” by definition.” (Wendt, 1999: 344). Common fate is another master variable in the formation of collective identity as common fate determines whether actors are ‘in the same boat’ and “when their individual survival, fitness, or welfare depends on what happens to the group as a whole.” (Wendt, 1999: 349).
Hence, when facing a common threat posed to each other’s existence and well-being, as happened in the case of the ‘Turkish threat’, the European states have used this common threat as a unifying factor in the formation process of the European identity. This common threat was not only used when the
threat was a real one but it has been used long after the real threat had been eliminated: the attributed or imagined characteristics of the enemy (in this case, the Turks) were kept alive in the collective European memory and the anticipation of a possible threat was inscribed as a shared knowledge in the European mind. As a result, the use of the ‘other’ and the use of the ‘Turks’ have been, and continue to be one of the crucial constituents of the dichotomy between the ‘European-self’ and the ‘Other-self’ in the on-going formation of European identity. Thus, the Turks as one of the other-selves have been employed to highlight the homogeneity, to underline the interdependence and to emphasise facing the common fate in Europe for centuries. Initially, the construction of the ‘European-self’ was originally an opposition of the ‘self’ to the ‘other’, which was rooted “in the sixteenth century resistance to Turks. It was a consciousness that was sustained by the principle of exclusivity rather than on any kind of imminent collective cohesion.” (Delanty, 1995: 37). Pope Pius II was “one of the first to use the adjective ‘Europeans’, in which he did in the context of the Turkish threat.” Interestingly, the term of ‘Cold War’ “was first applied to the resulting tension between Muslims and Christians in the thirteenth century and the dichotomy of Self and Other that it postulated remained a determining force in the European identity for centuries.” (Delanty, 1995: 34). Lipmann later reinvented the ‘Cold War’ phrase after the end of Second World War, which labelled a period of the ideological conflict between two superpowers under the dualism of West versus East for 45 years. No matter how old, the search for a unified ‘European identity’ has not been completed yet. As Castells notes, there is no such thing as a fixed ‘European identity’ but a ‘European identity project’, which is under construction as a complex unification of Europe (Castells, 1998: 333). Today, the European Union (EU) is carrying out the unification of Europe and the formation process of a collective identity in Europe, but whether this has been achieved is still a matter of debate. The revitalisation of ethnic and cultural disputes after the end of the Cold War has placed the European idea at the centre of “a contradiction; the antinomy of political, economic and military integration on the one side, and on the other social and cultural fragmentation.” (Castells, 1998: 132). Clearly, in the short-term, the European project cannot replace the national projects, but it can contribute to the unity of Europe through a cultural project on the grounds of democracy, human rights, welfare state, and a collective identity, which involves “a commitment to cultural pluralism based on post-national citizenship.” (Castells, 1998: 163). Although this is a relatively new prospect based admittedly upon a long existing ideal, the European project was able to advance decisively since 1945 as a result of the considerable advances towards the creation of a unique system of governance coupled with the determination of not returning to the costly failures of its past. Thus, the European project has turned out to be a compromise of building an overarching identity and a sense of community that led to the development of a pluralistic ‘security community’.
As Wendt puts it, “states will always seek to preserve their individuality, but this does not preclude them from making the terms of their individuality more collective.” (Wendt, 1999: 364). Therefore, the construction of a ‘European identity’ should not be seen as “an alternative to nationalism but a confirmation of the hegemony of the nation-state.” (Delanty, 1995: 157). The member-states continue to be a primary part of the European system; yet the European project of constructing a collective identity has a more complex nature and is not simply a sum of the national collective identities. Therefore, the definition of other/s proves to be more crucial on the European level rather than the national one. Viewed from this perspective, Neumann’s inference may point to a crucial aspect of the contemporary European identity project, which “still can be said to carry the marks of that constitutive exclusion of “the Turk” that was so central to the becoming of “the European”.” (Neumann, 1999: 60).
At this point, the last master variable of Wendt’s formulation of collective identity formation and identity change may prove to be crucial: self-restraint, the permissive cause of collective identity formation, requires actors to “overcome their fear of being engulfed, physically or psychically, by those with whom they would identify.” (Wendt, 1999: 357). In self-restraint, an actor needs to give
“a critical look at the “Me” from the standpoint of the “I” ” (Wendt, 1999: 362), that is, a self-reflexive critical examination of the ‘self’, which would also include to reconsider the position of the ‘self’ in respect to the ‘other/s’. Therefore, as Robins puts it straight, “coming to terms with ‘the Turk’ is a crucial aspect of the cultural reordering and re-association that must be undertaken in the European space.” (Robins, 1997: 64). This re-examination of identity and cultural change in Europe has coincided with the redefinition of security and reconfiguration of the European security order in the post-Cold War world. Hence, it becomes much more crucial in determining not only how the ‘European-self’ will be reconstructed, but also how this European construction will affect the future of the ‘other-selves’ such as the ‘Turkish-self’ through which the Turkey-EU-NATO relations will evolve.
4. CONCLUSION
In this study I have analysed theoretical debates on identity politics in International Relations (IR) in the aftermath of the Cold War. The theoretical approaches to identity and interest formation processes as well as the axis of European identity - Turkish identity were evaluated through an analysis of ‘self’ and ‘other’. The redefinition/reconstruction of security and the definition/redefinition of identity are becoming more like two sides of the same coin in the post-Cold War era. As Lipschutz puts it, to define security “is meaningless without an “other” to help specify the conditions of insecurity.” (Lipschutz , 1995: 9). Thus, defining the ‘other’ and the ‘self’ points out the insecurities; yet, the definition of identity and the definition/construction of one’s security are continuous social and political processes of practices and perceptions. It may be inferred that ‘other’ or ‘security’ are not defined according to an objective reality of what they are, but rather as a result of how they are perceived intersubjectively. Therefore, not only Turkey’s efforts in reshaping its social/political identity would be enough to alter the Turkish identity in the European minds – it further requires a re-definition of the Turkish identity in the collective mind of the EU member-states.
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