NATO's third party role in international conflict management

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NATO'S THIRD PARTY ROLE IN

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

MANAGEMENT

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of

Economic, Administrative

and Social Sciences

of Biikent University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Master of Science

in International Relations

by

H. Yonca Gündüz

Biikent University

February 1995

M

ІЗ Э І

. M I . Í 6 « !>

Approved by the Institute of Economics and Social

Sciences

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is

fuiiy adequate, in scope and in quaiity, as a thesis for the

degree of Master of Science in internationai Reiations.

^

Asst. Prof. Serdar Güner

Thesis Supervisor

~~ --- f

i certify that i have read this thesis and in my opinion it is

fuiiy adequate, in scope and in quaiity, as a thesis for the

degree of Master of Science in Internationai Relations.

Asst. Prof. Güigün Tuna

I certify that i have read this thesis and in my opinion it is

fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the

degree of Master of Science in International Reiations.

ABSTRACT

This study is an attem pt to anaiyze NATO's third party roie in inte rna tiona i co n fiict management in post C oid-W a r Europe which targets to suppiem ent the UN's regime in this regard. Firstiy, an inte rna tiona i co n fiict and its management by third parties, p a rticuia rly governm entai organizations, is examined within the fram ew ork of the UN Secretary Générai Ghali's theoreticai outiine cailed "An Agenda For Peace". This aims at ciarifying the concepts on which the anaiysis is built. Secondly, NATO's gradual adaptation to third party role in conflict management, from late 1990 to June 1994, is sequentially presented to g e th e r with its im plem entation in Bosnia-Herzegovina to dem onstrate that NATO has genuin ely aspired to assume such a role in European conflicts. Thirdly, the possible third party roles that NATO could perform in the m anagem ent of international conflicts are contem plated within the the o re tica l fram ework summarized in the firs t part. Finally, NATO's structural strengths and weaknesses are discussed to illustrate tha t NATO is still the unique regional organization which can assist the UN in managing international conflicts in Europe.

ÖZET

Bu çalışmada, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Avrupa'da NATO'nun üçüncü taraf olarak, Birleşmiş Milletlerin uluslararası anlaşmazlıkların yönetimine yönelik çabalarını tamamlayıcı nitelikteki rolü İncelenmektedir. öncelikle bu çalışmanın temel kavramlarını tanımlamak amacıyla, uluslararası anlaşmazlıklar ve bu anlaşmazlıkların üçüncü taraf olarak uluslararası kuruluşlarca yönetimi kavramları araştırılmaktadır. İkinci olarak, uluslarası anlaşmazlıkların yönetiminde NATO'nun üçüncü taraf rolü üstlenebilmek için nasıl bir değişim geçirdiği 1990 - 1994 dönemini kapsayacak biçimde anlatılmakta ve bu çerçevede NATO'nun Bosna-Hersek sorununda üstlendiği görevler, sözkonusu teorik iddiaların bir uygulaması olarak ele alınmaktadır. Üçüncü olarak, ilk bölümde ortaya konan teorik çerçevede, NATO'nun uluslararası anlaşmazlıkların yönetiminde üçüncü taraf olarak üstlenebileceği roller hakkında bir model çıkarılmaktadır. Son olarak da tüm yapısal zayıflıklarına rağmen NATO'nun Birleşmiş Milletlerin uluslararası anlaşmazlıkların yönetiminde etkili olabilecek yegane bölgesel örgüt olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmaktadır.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to first express my appre ciation fo r the encouragem ent, interest and academic guidance afforded by Asst. Prof. Nimet Beriker, Asst. Prof. Serdar G üner and Asst. Prof. Gülgün Tuna.

I tha nk all my friends who never give up providing me with moral support. I should, however, particularly mention Yonca Argüden, Berrin Meral, Nurtan Meral who have helped me a lot in my d iffic u lt times.

I am also grateful for the sustained patience, support and encourage m en t which my mother, my sister Çimen have provided.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A B S T R A C T Ö ZET

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S ... TABLE OF C O N T E N T S ... LIST OF FI GU RES AND CHARTS LIST OF A B B R E V IA T IO N S ... C H A P T E R I: IN TR O D U C TI O N ... iii iv vi vii ..1 I C H A P T E R II: IN TE R N A TI ON A L C O N F L IC T M A N A GE ME N T BY G O V E R N M E N T A L O R G A N IZ A T IO N S AS THIRD P A RT IE S

2.1 In t e r n a t io n a l C o n flic t and Its M a n a g e m e n t ... 5 2.2 I n t e r n a tio n a l C o n f lic t M a n a g e m e n t by T h ird P a rtie s ... 12 2.3 I n t e r n a t io n a l C o n f lic t M a n a g e m e n t by G o v e r n m e n t a l

O r g a n iz a tio n s As T h ird P a rtie s ... 14

C H A P T E R III: NATO'S A D JU S T M E N T TO THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTY IN IN TE R N A TI O N A L C ON FL IC T M A N A GE M E N T

3.1 N A T O 's T h ird P a rty Role In In t e r n a t io n a l C o n f lic t

M a n a g e m e n t in E u ro p e ... 26 3 .2 A C h r o n o lo g ic a l A n a ly s is o f N A TO 's T h ird P a rty

In v o lv e m e n t in I n t e r n a tio n a l C o n f lic t M a n a g e m e n t ... 37

C H A P T E R VI: AN ANALYSIS OF NATO'S THIRD P ART Y ROLE IN IN T E R N A T IO N A L C O N F L IC T MANAGE ME NT FROM A

T H E O R E T I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E

4.1 A M o d e l f o r P o s s ib le T h ird P a rty R oles Fo r NATO In I n t e r n a t io n a l C o n f lic t M a n a g e m e n t In E u ro p e ... 51

4.2. An Appraisal of NATO's Possible Third Party Roles Model

from a Structural Perspective ... 64

C O N C L U S IO N ... 74 A P P E N D I X I ... 77 A P P E N D I X II ... 81 A P P E N D IX I I I ... 83 NO TE S ... 92 B I B L IO G R A P H Y ... 99

LIST OF FIGURES AND CHARTS

FIGURE 1 Phases of a C o n f l i c t ... 7

FIGURE 2 Third Party Intervention by Governm ental O r g a n iz a tio n s ... 11

CHART 1 Third Party In t e r v e n t io n ... 22

CHART 2 UN's Third Party Inte rve n tio n ... 25

CHART 3 NATO's Third Party I n t e r v e n tio n ... 53

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CJTF Combined J o in t Task Forces

CIS Commenwealth of Independent States

EU European Union

NAC North A tlantic Council

NACC North A tlantic Cooperation Council NATO North A tlantic Treaty O rganization OAS Organization of American States OAU O rganization of African Unity

OSCE O rganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

P f o r P Partnership fo r Peace

UN United Nations

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In course of the Cold W ar years NATO was a classical example of a defense alliance formed against a determ ined threat. As the security organization of the W estern cou ntrie s it was a principal party to the inter-bloc rivalry. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent fall of the Eastern bloc has shattered the Cold W ar security balances in world politics. The direct m ilitary th reat to the Allies' security has disappeared. Small scale conflicts, liberated from chains of the bloc politics, have re- emerged in Europe. NATO who strove to continue to preserve peace and stability in Europe has been com pelled to adjust itself accordingly.

NATO's ad justm e nt to new threats gave rise to two fun da m en tal changes in its self-perception as a defense alliance. First, since new threats would emerge as regional conflicts outside the A lliance territory, NATO could only involve in these conflicts as a third party. Second, in delineating the limits of its involvem ent, NATO should spe cify what kind of third party involvem ent it would conceive fo r itself. With the assets it possessed, the officia ls in Brussels decided that it could skillfully pa rticipa te in the m anagem ent of these conflicts.

th e ore tical fram ework. Concepts such as international conflict, c o n flic t m anagement, co n flict resolution, third party intervention and its dynamics are sought to be clarified through a survey of the literature. These concepts are, then, op era tiona ily defined. Some graphs, charts and tables are introduced to make these abstractions ea sier to comprehend.

Following the presentation of the concepts, NATO's e vo lution ary move towards con flict management as a third party is dealt with through the review of major NATO docum ents issued from the end of the Cold W ar to June 1994. This is followed by the NATO decisions that enabled the im plem entation of these a b stractio ns in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The texts of some of these docum ents and decisions, which seem s ig n ific a n t for the scope of this study, are presented as appendices.

Finally, within the fram ework of the de fin itio n s made in the firs t part, possible third party roles that NATO could assume in inte rn a tio n a l c o n flic t management in Europe are illustrated. Tables are em ployed once more to more explicitly convey the meanings of these descriptions. Since no precedent of such a work existed on this subject by the time this study is done, the model in the final part is visualized by the writer.

The th e ore tical points raised in this study are displayed in the second and the fourth chapters. First, the meaning of inte rn a tio n a l co n flict is probed and why the term 'c o n flict' is preferred to 'crisis' is explained. A conflict is assessed in four phases as pre-crisis, crisis, w ar and post-war in order to readily

m anagement. Furthermore, the difference between con flict resolution and co n flict management is elucidated to avoid confusion. Second, the third party intervention fo r the m anagem ent of an international conflict is handled. The con flict m anagem ent and resolution regime of the United Nations (UN) is categorized as 'a third party intervention in international c o n flic t by a governm ental organization'. The theoretical revision of this m anagem ent regime by the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros- Ghali in a study called "An Agenda For Peace" (1992), calling the regional security organizations to active participation, is regarded as the th e ore tical and legal guideline for NATO's con tribu tion to the regime. Third, NATO's own management regime within the area sketched by the UN is postulated.

R eflections on this study's theoretical analysis constitute the third ch a pte r and some parts of the fourth chapter. NATO's decisions towards adjustm ent to a new role in the m anagem ent of inte rna tiona l co n flict as a third party, beginning from the 1990 London Summ it until the 1994 Brussels Summit, is covered in detail in the third chapter. The Alliance's intervention in the co n flict in B osnia-H erzegovina is also reviewed in relation to the roles that NATO has played. The involvem ent in Bosnia-Herzegovina is also treated as a case which shows the successes and failu res of NATO's em erging co n flict management regime as a third party. Accord ingly, NATO's weaknesses and strong points as a credible third party are evaluated.

As a study done in the field of international relations, this work, firstly, aims at clarifyin g the conceptual confusion on the subject of third party intervention to international conflicts, observed pa rticula rly in the use of the terms crisis and co n flict or peace-keeping and peace-enforcem ent. Secondly, it targets to combine the concept of third party intervention with NATO's new role in co n flict m anagem ent in Europe. Thirdly, it intends to draw a broad sketch fo r possible third party roles that NATO could assume in this regard. Finally, as regards the theoretical con siderations it endeavors to present the academ ic literature on the third party intervention and practitioners' decisions for a better com prehension of the subject.

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT BY

GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

AS THIRD PARTIES

CHAPTER ii

2.1 International Conflict and Its Management

C onflict can be defined as a "form of severely escalated natural com petition between two or more parties about scarce resources, power and prestige" where "parties to a co n flict believe they have incom patible goals and their aim is to neutralize, gain advantage over, injure or destroy one a n o th e r"^ Yet, a d e finition of an inte rna tiona l conflict requires some additional attributes. First, the pa rticipants should be international entities such as states or ethnic groups figh ting for independence etc. Second, an international c o n flic t should constitute a challenge to the existing international political system- regional or global. It "[should affect] power d istrib utio n, actors \ regimes, rules and alliance con figuration " of a system .^

Regional conflicts, fre que ntly seen in the emerging security en viron m en t in the post-Cold W ar era, are those posing a th reat to regional systems. Hence, they are international conflicts, in effect. From a structural point of view any change in the system con stitutes a challenge, as by definition an international system is composed of

An inte rna tiona l con flict is not a stagnant event. It evolves and passes through d iffe re n t phases. They are pre-crisis, crisis, war and post-w ar (see Figure 1). At the pre-crisis phase a conflict is latent. There is an unresolved problem at least from one party's point of view and it carries a potential to transcend into a crisis. Anything which seems to challenge the existing structure, or, any deliberate or unintentional act by either party may alter the prevailing situation in terms of the perceived interests of the protagonists. This can bring a con flict to the crisis phase.

A crisis usually covers a very limited time span in which the parties rapidly escalate their conflict. A fte r reaching the climax, the co n flict either de-escalates or moves fu rth e r towards a war. Should con flict end with the efforts of at ieast one of the parties a new pre­ crisis phase arises. Due to the vitaiity of the decisions rendered during the crisis phase for the future of conflict, the decision- making procedures at this phase has always been the m ajor focus of attention in the academ ic literature.

A war constitutes the third phase at which at least "one of the party's major objective has become harming the other[s]"^ through use of force. W hat diffe re n tia te s a war from a crisis is the use of force. C onsequently, halting of the use of force among the parties, tha t is securing a cease-fire, becomes the beginning of the post-war period.

The post-w ar phase of a co n flict might be either a new pre-crisis period or a phase during which conflict resolution attempts are initiated fo r the removal of the real sources of a conflict through

degree of tension

(Q C o

negotiations. If problem(s) causing a co n flict are managed to be resolved, then a post-war phase might be labeled as a genuine peace. Otherwise, it becomes a new pre-crisis phase as the past experience of the principal parties would constitute a seed for a conflict which might break out at another time in another form.

The definition of a crisis is significant as in academic writings and sometimes in daily jou rna ls the term crisis refers to the co n flict as a whole. This is actually a heritage of the Cold W ar y e a r s . S i n c e the bipolar world system ended, the international conflicts are to be evaluated from a d iffe ren t perspective. The Cold W ar conflicts were usually in the form of proxy wars between the parties supported by eith er of the superpowers. They usually occurred and were contained in the Third World in order to eliminate the risk of a global nuclear war. W ith o u t following their natural pattern, these conflicts were stabilized at a point where they would not disturb the existing balance between the blocs. In sum from a superpower point of view they were contained at the crisis phase. This bipolarity mentality dominated academ ic and jo u rn a listic writings for over 50 years.

In the post-Cold W ar period, what is som etimes called as crises are the conflicts where parties defend the ir positions with all available instruments, with no superpower support. It is this diffe re n ce between crisis definitions that led to confusion in term inology. 'Crisis' could be a proper term fo r describing the Cold W ar conflicts as they were managed at the crisis stage by the

superpowers, but in the post Cold-W ar period it connotes a phase of an international co n flict (see Figure 1).

Sim ilar to the use of the terms 'c ris is ’ and 'conflict', the m anagem ent attempts had also been viewed with the C old-W ar m entality before 1990. A ccordingly, the crisis m anagem ent literature produced in the course of the Cold War period, concentrated on the decision making analysis, have handled the issue as "foreign policy crisis" of the superpowers .5

A ctually in academic literature the attem pts for managing or resolving international conflicts are categorized under two headings: Conflict resolution and conflict management (see Figure 2). Some international relations specialists assert that 'c o n flic t management' is a proper term for describing a situation in which there exists an agreem ent among the persons with shared goals and values on making a choice among the alternative ways to reach shared goals or values . They claim that these are everyday experiences in the m anagem ent of business and social life and so not appropriate for the terms dispute or conflict.®. They continue that co n flict requires in- depth analysis of its sources and problem -solving in ways that do not compromise values and human needs.^ Therefore, to recognize initially the sources of conflict, and, to develop the ways to remove them are effective in resolving them.

Laue, following this line of thought maintains that people who use co n flict management language "argue that they want to increase

them selves because if conflicts escalate, external agents or agencies will step in and they try to bring the conflict within their own d e finition s of acceptable boundaries of social control."®

On the other hand, the scholars using the conflict management term inology claim that "managing a conflict involves making collective decisions, mounting field operations, exercising leadership, and building consensus"® among the disputants and it could be appropriate for all conflict analysis at any level.

The conflict management concept, here, will be treated as all sorts of efforts, initiated by either the parties to a conflict or third parties, aiming at ending the conflict at any phase without seeking to remove its real sources. Thus, a conflict resolution is taken as a broader area of operation embracing not only all the conflict management efforts but also the attempts to resolve problem(s) that initially led to the conflict (see Figure 2). Consequently, the underlying goal of conflict management efforts at all phases is rather to prevent escalation than to find a plausible solution to the core problems perceived. Therefore conflict management constitutes a large part of a conflict resolution process that lays the groundwork on which the real resolution efforts can be initiated.

With regard to the exclusive targets of conflict management at the d iffe re n t phases of a conflict it can be said that a pre-crisis period is the time span in which all efforts are devoted to prevent a potential crisis to transcend into an active one. These efforts, indeed, are com plem entary to the conflict resolution efforts if they are carried out

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with the concerns of removing the reasons of co n flict perceived by the parties. A crisis is, then, managed through various initiatives short of war to return to the pre-crisis phase or to create a new one which is more con venie nt fo r resolution initiatives regardless of time pressure or war risks. In the course of a war, the endeavors are directed towards regulating and/or halting the use of force by either parties as soon as possible. The post-war management actions, on the other hand, are targeted to establish a regulatory mechanism, principles, and guidelines to arrange the post war relations among the protagonists on the particular issue area that yield to the war. It should be noted that all these efforts can be conducted by both principal and third parties.

2.2 International Conflict Management by Third Parties

A co n flict has been defined as a kind of interaction between at least two parties who have incom patible interests on an issue. Once co n flict manifests itself it might be managed through one or more of the following means: the use of force by the principal parties (both psychological and physical); various forms of direct or indirect ne gotia tion; or the involvem ent of an external party in a binding or non binding fashion^®. Among these possible means of conflict m anagem ent only the third party involvem ent in inte rna tiona l conflicts will be briefly examined for the purpose of this study.

The term "third party" represents an intervention to a conflict situation by an exterior actor to the conflict. Rubin simply defines the

third party as an "individual [who] is in some way external to a dispute between two other parties, and who interposes (or is interposed ) between them [ d i s p u t a n t s ] , W h i c h e v e r form third party intervention takes, the relationship between the principals and the third party has certain characteristics. First, "the role and involvem ent of the third party are ... typically peripheral to primary re la tio n sh ip ..." and "the basis of the third party's involvem ent is necessarily d iffe re n t than that of the disputants." Young says that "third party intervention does not cover acts amounting to entry by a party into the crisis [con flict in general] as a participant on the same level as the original o p p o n e n t s . L a u e adds that the third party is the one which is involved in a conflict by having "indirect stakes" (such as reputation or professionalism as intervention) unlike the first or the second parties who have direct stakes.

Second, if the third party becomes cen trally involved in the re la tion ship between the two principals, this would tra nsfo rm a "dyad" into a "triadic interaction".^® Incorporation of a third party in a co n flict between the parties might lead to the form ation of coalitions among the parties such as a coalition between the two principals to exclude the third party if they believe that the third party has a hidden agenda, or another one between one disp utan t and the third party if the third party favors one (or believed to favor). Even if the possible coa litio ns do not form, the po ssibility of the ir existence affects the perceptions of the principals and turns a bilateral relation into a

Third, the third party has in one way or another an aim to change, influence or reform the natural course of the events. Therefore, the term "intervention" is used for the involvem ent of a third party in a conflict. Laue defines the party intervention as follows:

"C on flict intervention occurs when an outside or sem i­ outside party self-consciously enters into a con flict situation with the objective of influencing the con flict in a direction the intervenor defines as desirable. All intervention alters the power configuration among parties, thus all conflict intervention ad vo ca cy."’’ ®

That is why conflict management by third party intervention cannot be described as 'neutral' as it often is. A third party may be impartial (i.e. disinterested), but not neutral (i.e. having no e ffe ct on outcome).

Rubin notes that even the mere presence of the third party alters the structure of a conflict and may have at least two effects on the natural course of the events. It may create a "pressure for movement from the stable stagnation of intractable con flict., or it may make it possible to disrupt this pattern of conflict in te n sifica tio n , by shifting the disputants' exclusive focus away from each other."

2.3 International Conflict Management by Governmental

Organizations as Third Parties

There are only five groups of third parties, which might participate in an international conflict management: individuals - such as a special envoy of UN Secretary General or leader of trusted state.

states, non-governm ental organizations - charity or religious organ ization s, international or regional governm ental organizations, sup ra-natio nal bodies such as European Union (EU) or Commonwealth of Ind ependent States (CIS). Governmental organizations specifically can be categorized in two in terms of their contribution to conflict management: an international organization, the United Nations (UN) and regional organizations such as the O rganization of American States (OAS), the O rganization of African Unity (OAU) or the North A tla n tic Treaty Organization (NATO). The developm ents in the post- Cold W ar era have shown that an effective third party intervention targeting to manage an international conflict requires to secure coordination and cooperation among both kinds of governm ental organizations.

The necessity of coordination and com plem entary fun ctio n in g of regional and international organizations is the ore tica lly expressed in the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali's study called "An Agenda For Peace", written in 1992. The rising num ber of the inte rna tiona l conflicts in world politics and the failu re and inadequacy of both regional and international organizations in the m anagem ent of these conflicts have demonstrated the necessity of arranging new co n flict m anagem ent mechanisms in which d iffe re n t organizations can take several roles in a coordinated and com plem entary fashion.

NATO, as a regional organization, has aspired to con tribu te to the m anagem ent of the international conflicts in Europe as a third party. NATO adjusting to the international co n flict m anagem ent has

always stayed in the functioning area delineated by the UN Charter. This stemmed from the fact the basic failures of eith er organization might be overcome only through the com plem entary fun ction in g of both in this regard. NATO's need for legitim acy for any kind of intervention can only be provided by the UN's consent. W hereas the UN, which proved to be inadequate in resolving and managing the rising number of the conflicts all around the world, should be supported by regional organizations such as NATO.

This urge for such a cooperation between the UN and regional organizations is explicitly defined in Ghali's "An Agenda For Peace":

"The United Nations has recently encouraged a rich variety of com plementary e ff o r ts ... in this new era of opportunity, regional arrangem ents or agencies can render great service if the ir activities are undertaken in a manner co n sistent with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, and if their relationship with the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, is governed by the C hapter VIII." 2"'

Ghali's statem ent reveals that the basic premise of the A llia nce's involvem ent in international conflicts as a third party is derived from the UN Charter. Therefore, a general review of the inte rna tiona l co n flict regime delineated by the UN is considered a a necessity to properly assess NATO's role in this regard.

The UN acts as a third party in its conflict m anagem ent regime because of the concept of collective security. As a supranational body the UN is considered impartial in conflict m anagem ent or con flict resolution attempts as it is backed by the delegated consent of the sovereign states. W ithin this framework, the co n flict m anagement

regime which is embodied in the Charter envisages two broad approaches against violators of the principle of "refraining from the th reat or use of force in any m a n n e r . T h e y are p e a ce fu l settle m en t o f disputes and collective measures fo r the prevention and rem oval o f threats to the peace o r acts o f aggression.

The pacific settlem ent of disputes which is handled in Chapter VI of the Charter provides a logical progression of steps to be follow ed by states involved in disputes. It says if a dispute does arise, the parties should, before submission to a UN organ, "seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, ju d ic ia l settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangem ents or other peaceful means of their own c h o i c e . H o w e v e r the substitution of peaceful settlem ent for the reliance on force in resolving or m anaging conflicts had been disappointing in the UN record. Many con flicts are not submitted to the UN channels but handled through other means. This reluctance to use UN channels results as much from a desire by the parties to maintain their freedom of action as it does from a lack of confidence in UN processes.

The second way of managing international conflicts by the use of the UN is the collective measures of the C hapter VII of the Charter a g ainst the prevention and removal of threats to peace and acts of aggression. According to the collective security system drafted in C ha pter VII, the Security Council is assigned the primary re spon sibility for the maintenance of peace. No autom atic sanctions

are foreseen in the Charter but under Art. 25, UN members are legally obligated to accept and carry out all Security Council decisions.

If the S ecurity Council finds a threat to peace or breach of the peace or act of aggression in a particular case, it invokes Art. 39. An e xp licit determ ination of this kind indicates that the issue is considered appropriate for measures under C hapter VII. It will decide on a course of action to maintain or restore peace. The measures are calling on the parties concerned to comply with " provisional peace", typica lly , a cease fire or withdrawal is a provisional measure (Art. 40), resorting the non-forcible measures fo r applying economic, com municator, and diplom atic sanctions - such as econom ic embargo (Art. 41), or calling for military sanctions if the non- forcible measures outlined in Art. 41 would be inadequate.

In addition to these two broad approaches to conflict m anagement. C hapter VIII of the UN Charter recognizes regional arrangem ents and agencies as appropriate means fo r maintaining peace and security, provided that these activities are con sistent with the purpose and principles of the Charter. Indeed , Article 52 of the C ha rter requires states to make every e ffo rt to achieve peaceful settle m en t of "local disputes " through regional arrangem ents or agencies before referring such disputes to the UN S ecurity Council. This proves that the Security Council had been initially intended to be the forum of last resort when states were unable to resolve conflicts between them through the peaceful means listed in C hapter VI or through regional instrum entalities.

The Charter expressly directs the Security Council to utilize the regional arrangem ents or agencies covered by C hapter VIII for e n force m en t action v\/here appropriate, in Art. 53. The regional bodies are indirectly authorized to undertake enforcem ent action in as much as Art. 53 states that they may not do so w ithout the authorization of the Security Council. Thus, in principle, the failure of the Council to grant permission for enforcem ent action would obstruct such action.

These clauses aim to equip the UN with necessary tools to manage international conflicts endangering international peace and security. The amalgam of its structural deficiencies and the bipolar nature of the international system hindered proper functioning of this m anagem ent regime during the Cold W ar years. Accordingly, the necessity fo r an effective management regime led to a UN activity called as 'peacekeeping'.

The classic UN peacekeeping and the developm ent of tech niqu es to control violence through means other than enforcem ent or cou nte r violence derives largely from the experience of UN op era tions during the Cold War. " Peacekeeping has tra ditio n a lly been described as various forms of legitim ized collective intervention by UN members aimed at avoiding the outbreak or resurgence of violent c o n flic t between disputants. " Peacekeeping activities, though not included in the Charter, are the most sign ifica nt and common form of a third party intervention to international conflicts.

The 13 operations launched by the UN between 1948 and 1988 produced a body of principles for peacekeeping operations. These principles are:

• exclusive authority of UN • im pa rtiality of the troops

• non-use of force or coercion except self defense • consent of the parties involved in the con flict

• national character of the participating troops i.e. no n-existence of a standby UN force.

Besides peacekeeping which has been added to the UN's co n flict management due to the practical reasons the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has the ore tica lly revised it in accordance with the changing dynamics of the world politics. In the pam phlet entitled as "An Agenda for Peace" the general course for action in conflict management by the UN is categorized in four headings;

"Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. Peace-making is action to bring hostile parties to agreem ent essentially through Such peaceful means as those foreseen in C hapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. Peace-keeping is the deploym ent of a United Nations presence in the field hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally incoming United Nations military and or place personnel and fre q u e n tly civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique tha t expands the possibilities for both the prevention of co n flict and the making of peace. Peace-building action to identify and support structures which will tend

to stre ngthen and s o lid ify peace in order to avoid relapse into c o n flic t." 2®

M oreover, an o th e r category of action called peace-enforcem ent is also exam ined under the heading of peace-m aking. It is described as a m ission to restore peace and m aintain cea se-fires through use of force. A ctu a lly, this in te rve n tio n m echanism is d iffe re n t from the other form s of peace-m aking in th a t it envisages to secure a com pliance to ce a se -fire among parties through enforcem ent. It entails the use of ground troops or air forces. T herefore, even if it u ltim a te ly serves to lay the necessary groundw ork fo r the peace-m aking e ffo rts , it is a d is tin c t category of a ctio n .(se e C hart 1)

Peace en force m en t also d iffe rs from peace-keeping. The d e fin itio n of p e a ce-enforcem ent con trad icts with some of the basic prin cip le s of the UN in this regard. Peacekeeping troops are e n titled to disengage the fig h tin g parties. They have never been deployed w ith the aim of fo rcing parties to com ply with any kind of action w h e th e r negotia ted or not. Peace keepers never use force except in s e lf-d e fe n se . However, a p e ace-enforcem ent action involves the use of force by a third party fo r the sake of halting aggression among w arring p a r t i e s . T h e r e f o r e , peace-enforcem ent, here, is exam ined as d is tin c t category of third party in te rve n tio n m echanism.

These cate go ries are the general d e fin itio n s of the leg itim ate pa tterns of third party in te rve n tio n by in te rn a tio n a l or regional governm ental org a n iza tio n s. To com plete the picture, now, the co rresp ond ing m ethods of co n flic t m anagem ent w ill be incorporated

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w ith the co n flic t analysis derived in the firs t part of these general gu id e lin e s.

P reventive diplom acy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out. Hence, it ba sica lly refers to the attem pts in itia te d in the p re -crisis period of a co n flict. Peacem aking e ffo rts are various kinds of third party a c tivitie s to reach tem porary peace th a t protagonists could n e gotia te. In oth er words, they are the in itia tiv e s taken to reach a real peace through n e gotia tion. Peace building fo llo w s peacem aking e ffo rts in order to con solida te the peace or the post w ar status quo achieved at the end of a war. All effo rts in this phase are devoted to the rem oval of the real sources of co n flict. Hence, peace building actio ns are th e o re tic a lly analyzed as c o n flic t re solutio n attem pts. It is a ctu a lly the peace-building e ffo rts which e x p lic itly de lin ea te the concept of c o n flic t resolution from 'the concept of c o n flict m anagem ent'.

The most de lica te d e fin itio n , in this context, is of peace-keeping a c tiv itie s . They can be required fo r the firs t three phases o f c o n flic t each serving the aim of preparing a conducive ground fo r a re solutio n. At the p re -crisis phase the preventive deploym ent, th a t is the physical se p ara tion of the p o te n tia lly hostile parties through the UN peacekeeping forces, targets to prevent the escalation of a co n flict. In a crisis or a w ar period peacekeeping aims at halting violence and the pre se rva tio n of peace, once it is attained in order th a t peace-building m easures could be in itia te d to avoid the recurrence of violence (see C hart 2) In sum the UN, which is based on the concept of

co lle c tiv e secu rity, has a com plete th e o re tica l picture of the resolution and the m anagem ent of inte rn a tio n a l co n flicts. In response to the rising demand in UN’s c o n flic t m anagem ent actions since the end of the Cold W ar, the UN S ecretary General Ghali has revised this regim e and increased third party in te rven tion m echanism s by the governm ental o rg a n iza tio n s. G hali's co n trib u tio n is s ig n ific a n t in the sense th a t besides giving the d e fin itio n s fo r several third party in te rve n tio n s, he calls the regional o rgan ization s to a ctive ly p a rticip a te in these actions in a com plem entary manner.

This situ a tio n has concurred with NATO's a sp iratio ns to adopt such a third party role in inte rn a tio n a l c o n flicts in Europe. This e la b o ra tio n of the UN m anagem ent system has provided the necessary legal fram ew ork fo r NATO. NATO has, consequently, alte re d its fo rty -fiv e years old defense allian ce id e n tity and added a new dim ension which is presented as a regional se cu rity o rg an ization w hich seeks to co n tribu te in te rn a tio n a l c o n flic t m anagem ent in Europe, as a third party in supplem enting UN's role in this regard. In the next cha pte r NATO's adaptation to this new id e n tity is elaborated .

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P r e v e n t iv e D ip lo m a c y P e a c e -m a k in g P e a c e -k e e p in g P e a c e -e n fo r c e m e n t P e a c e ­ b u il d in g P r e -c r is is

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CHAPTER III

NATO'S ADJUSTMENT TO THE ROLE OF

THIRD PARTY IN INTERNATIONAL

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

3.1 N A T O 's T h ird P a rty R o le in In t e r n a t io n a l C o n flic t

M a n a g e m e n t in E u ro p e

Follow ing the end of Cold W ar the North A tla n tic Treaty O rganiza tion (NATO) which was o rig in a lly a defense a llian ce has been g ra d u a lly transfo rm ed into a re gion al se cu rity o rg a n iza tio n . Its basic o rie n ta tio n has accordingly s h ifte d to c o n flic t m anagem ent. This tra n sfo rm a tio n , under the pressing urges of the changing nature of threats perceived by the A llia n ce , has taken place in a laggard m anner. The dem ise of the sing le th re a t a g a in st the secu rity of the A llie s has yielde d to a de lib e ra te in itia tiv e w ithin the o rg a n iza tio n to develop th e o re tic a l and p ra ctica l tools fo r an e ffe c tiv e c o n flic t m anagem ent in Europe.

As a defense o rg a n iza tio n NATO managed to prevent an intra a llia n ce c o n flict, w ith some exce ption s such as Cyprus, along w ith ave rting any outside aggression against its m em bers fo r 40 years. In

c o n flic ts among non-m em bers to preserve peace and s ta b ility in Europe fo r the common b e n e fit of all mem bers.'' This e n tails the necessity of carrying out operations outside the alliance te rrito ry, thus, in te rven ing in co n flicts as a third party whose in te re st lies at the preservation o f peace and s ta b ility in the region.

A careful review of the evolution of NATO since its inception shows th a t it has always been in a mood of change in response to the developm ents in in te rn a tio n a l arena. In the course of Cold W ar years, these changes were directed by the events on the E ast-W est agenda, re spective ly cham pioned by the two superpow ers. The A llia n ce was faced only with the S oviet threat and its a b ility to attack an ally. The changes in the nature of this th re a t were directed by e ith e r te ch n o lo g ica l developm ents in conventional and the nuclear w eapon production or the S oviet e xp ansio nist m aneuvers. NATO stra te g ie s w ere co n tinge nt upon the Soviet ca p a b ility to in flic t damaae upon the allia n ce countries and a possible e xp ansio nist assault. A cco rd in o lv it was easier fo r NATO stra te o ists to form ula te defense plans fo r the A llie s.T h e sudden fa ll of the S oviet Union, also leading to the dism em berm ent of Eastern bloc, however, altered the nature of th re a t in two radical ways. First, the threats to s ta b ility and peace in the A llia n ce area have becom e m u ltid ire ctio n a l: nobodv w ould easily p re d ict from w here threats m ight emerge. Second, threats were no lon ger solelv m ilitary in nature. Economic, social, environm ental

challenges infla m ing e th n ic ten sions w ithin states, and n a tio n a list a sp ira tio n s made con tinge ncy planning a to u g h e r w ork to handle fo r NATO stra te g ists.

This situ a tio n urged a fundam ental change in the stra teg y of the a llia n ce which, otherw ise, w ould be charged w ith being ob so le sce n t w ithin the newly em erging in te rn a tio n a l secu rity stru cture . Some circles started to joke about NATO saying th a t the acronym NATO stood fo r "No A lte rn a tive To O b so le sce n t".2 Thus a series of tra n sfo rm a tio n attem pts com m enced w ithin the A llia n ce im m ediately a fte r the traces of a radical change in world p o litics had surfaced.

Under the guidance of these changing dynam ics of the in te rn a tio n a l security system , NATO has altered its p rio ritie s on the basis of the prin ciples of its fou nd in g W ashington Treaty (1949) and the UN C harter. Indeed, NATO has always been a p ro lo n g a tio n of the UN se cu rity regim e as sum m arized in the firs t chapter. The W ashin gton Treaty setting up a defense a llian ce was concluded in refere nce to A rticle 51 of the UN C harter w hich acknow ledges in d ivid u a l or co lle ctive se lf defense as nations' in h e re n t rig h t in case of an aggression.

During Cold W ar years NATO has always tended to operate w ithin the legal fram ew ork of the UN C harter. This tendency continued under the recent drives of change th a t led NATO to a d just its e lf to a new role in in te rn a tio n a l c o n flic t m anagem ent. NATO's new role as

th ird party is envisaged in fun ction in g area fram ed by C hapter VIII of the UN C ha rter which authorizes the regional se cu rity o rgan ization s in this regard. NATO's in te rven tion to co n flicts takes place in reference to the Art. 52 and Art. 53 of the UN C harter th a t e n title regional security org a n iza tio n s to manage co n flicts through e ith e r peaceful means or through various enforcem ent m echanism s including the use of force co n d itio n a l upon a request by the UN S ecurity C ouncil.

Intern ally, NATO's adjustm ent to c o n flic t m anagem ent in Europe has occurred in a tw o-track fashion. W ith a p o litic a l approach NATO has planned to prevent possible co n flicts w ith and among the form er ad versaries through in te gra ting them into the allia n ce se cu rity system. Through a m ilitary approach it has targeted to m anage in te rn a tio n a l c o n flicts ranging from civil wars to ethnic c o n flic ts by means of m ilita ry assets.

The fo rm e r co n flic t m anagem ent m ethod used by NATO which m ight be called prevention by in te g ra tio n ta rg e ts to contain possible h o s tilitie s among the newly independent states and NATO countries throug h in te g ra tin g them in some kind of a coo peration structure w hich w ould enable NATO cou ntrie s to control these c o n flicts. It has been m anifested with the newly established secu rity forum s like North A tla n tic C ooperation Council (NACC) (1991) and the P artnership for Peace (P fo r P) (1994) scheme. The A llie s them selves are the mem bers of these forum s, they attem pt to prevent co n flicts through

such coo peration forum s at which co n flicts can be managed or resolved.

On the oth er hand NATO has also launched to re -stru ctu re its m ilitary assets in order th a t it could more e ffe c tiv e ly inte rven e in the c o n flicts endangering peace and s ta b ility in the region. The reduction in nu cle a r and con ventio nal w eapons, the shrinkage in num ber of tro ops through various in te rn a tio n a l arms re ductio n tre a tie s, and the designs tow ards the form atio n of new forces called Com bined Jo in t Task Forces (CJTF, 1994), fo r more rapid and fle x ib le in te rve n tio n , are the e ffo rts which u ltim a te ly serve this end.

In te rn a tio n a l p o litica l tra n sfo rm a tio n attem pts w ithin NATO in itia lly started to be chartered at the London Sum m it, of the NATO heads of the state and governm ent, July 7-8 1990. 16 leaders declared th a t the secu rity of every state is in se p a ra b ly linked to the se cu rity of its neighbors. The allia n ce co n sequ ently becam e an in s titu tio n in w hich 16 p a rticip a tin g states not only continued to provide fo r th e ir common defense but also to build new re la tio n sh ip s w ith all the nations of Europe includ ing form er adversaries. At this sum m it the NATO leaders also declared th e ir in te n tio n to enhance the p o litic a l com ponent o f the A llia n c e .3 The Sum m it was the beginning of NATO's gradual a d aptation to its c o n flic t m anagem ent role in Europe. S urrounded by the rapidly evolving European g e o p o litica l

landscape, it prepared the A llia nce fo r a cooperation w ith the W arsaw Pact nations.

The turning point in the A lliance history as regards c o n flic t m anagem ent took place in Rome in Decem ber 1991. The m eeting of state and governm ent heads of 16 NATO members changed the stra teg y of the A llia n ce and issued 'A New S tra te g ic C oncept'. Unlike the previous stra te g ie s w hich were designed fo r a possible c o n fro n ta tio n w ith the S oviet Union in Europe, the new strategy is a general g u ideline fo r NATO as to how it w ould adapt its e lf to the role of c o n flic t m anagem ent. This docum ent which o u tlin e s NATO's fu tu re p o litic a l and m ilitary approaches tow ards c o n flic t m anagem ent in Europe is analyzed in detail below to dem onstrate the th e o re tica l p re p a ra tio n of NATO.

This docum ent expressively states th a t NATO's perception of th re a t has changed. The A llies enunciate th a t "the risks to A llie d se cu rity .... are m ulti-face ted in nature and m u ltid ire ctio n a l which makes them hard to predict and assess" and add th a t these risks m ight em erge from "the serious econom ic, social and p o litica l d iffic u ltie s includ ing ethnic rivalries and te rrito ria l disputes w hich can be faced by many countries in C entral and Eastern Europe". These risks are expected to e ith er d ire ctly threaten the A llie s or to come fo rth as c o n flicts which are "inim ica l to European s ta b ility and even to armed c o n flicts which could involve outside powers or spill over into

NATO countrie s, having d ire ct e ffe c t on the se cu rity of allian ce". T here fore NATO should be ready to respond to such risks w hiche ver form they m ight take fo r the security of the A llie s (See A ppendix ill paragraph #10).

The New S tra te g ic C oncept also defines the essential purpose of the alliance as follo w s:

"The means by w hich the A llia n ce pursues its security policy to preserve the peace w ill continue to include the m aintenance of m ilitary ca p a b ility s u ffic ie n t to prevent w ar and to provide fo r e ffe ctive defense; and overall ca p a b ility to manage su cce ssfu lly crises a ffe ctin g the security of its members and the pursuit of p o litica l e ffo rts favo ring dialogue with o th e r nations and the active search fo r a coo perative approach to European secu rity including in the fie ld of arms control and disarm am ent.'"^

Even if the defense purpose of the allian ce is preserved, NATO’s fun da m en tal ob jective is, now, described as the "succe ssful m anagem ent of the crises" a ffe ctin g the secu rity of its members.

This s h ift in the allian ce p rio ritie s is unveiled when the fun da m en tal task is outlined. W hile "de terren ce and defense a g ainst any th re a t of aggression against the te rrito ry of any NATO mem ber state" is enum erated as the third, achieving the esse n tia l purpose of;

"[p ro vid in g ] one of the in d isp en sable fo u n d a tio n s fo r a stable se cu rity en viron m en t in Europe, based on the growth o f dem ocratic in s titu tio n s and com m itm ent to the pe aceful re solutio n of disputes, in which no country w ould be able to in tim id ate or coerce any European nation or to im pose hegem ony through the th re a t or use of force"

The m ilitary approach to c o n flic t m anagem ent is e xp licitly displayed in the force posture. The m issions of the A lliance m ilitary forces are enum erated as guara nte eing the security and te rrito ria l in te g rity of member states and responding to "diverse and m u lti­ d ire ctio n a l risks A llia n ce forces have in perform ing d iffe re n t fu n ctio n s in peace, crisis and war" (See A ppe nd ix III paragraph # 41).

The A llie s signal th a t they m ight undertake several fu n ction s in such periods through the d iffe re n tia tio n of the m issions of the m ilitary fo rces in the course of peace, crisis and war. In peace "the role of A llie d m ilitary forces is to guard against risks to the security of A llia n ce members". In tim e of crises "which m ight lead to a m ilitary th re a t to the security of A llia n ce members the A llia n ce 's m ilitary forces can com plem ent and re in fo rce p o litica l actions w ithin a broad approach to secu rity and the reb y co n tribu te to the m anagem ent of such crises and th e ir peaceful re s o lu tio n ." W ar referred as a general w ar in Europe is regarded as "h ig h ly unlike ly [bu t] it cannot fin a lly be ruled out". Hence, the "a p p ro p ria te mix of [A llia n ce 's m ilitary] forces" and ca p a b ilitie s "which have as th e ir m ission to p ro te ct peace, have to provide the e sse ntial insurance a g ainst po ten tial risks at the minimum level necessary to prevent w ar of any kind, and should aggression occur, to restore peace". (See A ppe nd ix III paragraphs 42,43,44)

NATO's new force posture is designed in response to the changing nature of the threats. The e ffe c tiv e response to in te rn a tio n a l

c o n flicts in Europe ne cessitates an alliance which will be able to fle x ib ly respond to a wide spectrum of con tinge ncies. They, thus, properly co n trib u te to crisis m anagem ent, peacekeeping and war prevention w hile m aintaining the means to defend the security and te rrito ria l in te g rity of m em ber states.^

A sm aller, more fle x ib le , and mobile new force posture is foresee n. The new forces can ge nerally be m aintained at low er states o f readiness focu sin g on the pro te ctio n of peace and the m anagem ent of co n flicts. They include a g re a te r role fo r m u ltin a tio n a l formations.®

Indeed all categories of the main defense posture are structured to respond to the required c o n flic t m anagem ent fu n ctio n e ffe ctive ly. Three types of essential forces are designed fo r an e ffe ctive fu n c tio n in g of the c o n flic t m anagem ent: the main defense forces, the reaction forces and the augm entation forces. Even the defense forces are designed in a form that could e ffe c tiv e ly be used fo r the c o n flic t m anagem ent. These forces w ill also be m u ltin a tio n a l in nature.

In ad d itio n to the m ilitary approach, the successful m anagem ent o f c o n flicts th re a te n in g s ta b ility in Europe was then intended to be handled in te n se ly through the prevention by in te g ra tio n scheme. This ten de ncy caused a s ig n ific a n t in itia tiv e tow ard the c o n flic t m anagem ent in Europe via settin g up security forum s between NATO and the form er W arsaw Pact countries . This special security arrangem ent, which is called the North A tla n tic C ooperation Council

(NACC)is form ed as "a forum fo r dialogue and co n su lta tio n on po litica l and security related issues and fo r p a rtne rship in practical cooperation a ctivitie s, in areas of NATO com petence" in 19 9 1 7 Form erly an expression of the prevention by in te g ra tio n policy NACC was intended to co n trib u te "as the prim ary co n su lta tive body between NATO and liaison states on secu rity .... issues and [su b sid ia ry] body in co n trolling crises in Europe" as then the US S ecretary o f S tate Baker stated in 1992.® However, NATO countries tend to view this forum ba sically as a co n su lta tio n mechanism w hile the liaison partners have been stressing the co o perative dim ension. NATO cou ntrie s acted as a un ified body as opposed to the new partners on various in itia tiv e s fo r common security coo peration schem es which put them into the position o f a principal p a rty .^

As regards the changes broug ht by the New S tra te g ic C oncept the term ino lo gy used in the docum ent is worth being stressed. The role th a t NATO attem pted to assum e in the European secu rity system is term ed as a co n flic t m anagem ent in this study due to the reasons referred in the second chapter. H owever NATO docum ents or the w riting s in the in te rn a tio n a l press described it as crisis m anagem ent or peacekeeping. In fa c t in several paragraphs of the New S tra te g ic C oncept the term s of c o n flic t and crisis are used in te rch a n g e a b ly w hile in some others they are d iffe re n tia te d in line w ith the analysis of this paper. For instance in paragraph 10 of the New S tra te g ic

C oncept the term 'crise s' is d iffe re n tia te d from 'arm ed c o n flicts' which are, here, term ed as w ar . In some paragraphs such as #14, 20, 30, 32, 38 (see A ppendix ill) the term 'crisis' is used vaguely. In some o th er paragraphs such as #33, 43 (see A ppendix III.) "re solutio n of crisis [inste ad of c o n flic t] at an early stage" is m entioned whereas the term crisis m anagem ent is stated in the fo llo w in g sentences of the same paragraph.

As the m issions of the a llia n ce m ilitary fo rces are outlined in the New S tra te g ic C oncept (see A ppe nd ix III, paragrah # 41-47), it is stated th a t the forces w ould be used in peace, in crises a ffe ctin g the se cu rity of the A llia nce, and in w ars in which NATO is involved. This e x p lic itly dem onstrates w hat is m eant by 'w ar'. W ar would be an armed c o n flic t w here NATO is a prin cip a l party. That's why the term "crisis" seem ed to be used to d iffe re n tia te the c o n flic ts which requires an e ffe c tiv e m anagem ent as a th ird party. In conclusion the term crisis is em ployed to re fe r to the d iffe re n t phases of a co n flic t tha t a ffe c t the se cu rity of the A llia n ce . In consequence, the New S tra te g ic C oncept, though disp la ying the Cold W ar m entality, and co n trib u tin g to the term ino lo gy confusion, a c tu a lly foresees a com plete course fo r action fo r the m anagem ent o f c o n flic t at all phases.