7
The Military, Politics
and Post-Cold War Dilemmas
in Turkey
AYLiN GONEY
I )uring the last four decades tht· Turkish military intervt·m·d in policies thrt'<..' tin1es (in I W,O, I 'J7 I ;111d 1980). Today th<..· high-profik rok of th<..· Tmkish :mn<..'d forces as a political arllly and guardian of the nation is regarded as a lll;tjor 1n1pedi1llent to democratic consolidation. This perception of the 11<.:gative implications of the mili tary role has been revived cspedally by the rise of political Jslalll in che S<..'cond half of the 1990s, challenging the principk of senilarism 011 which the republic was founded. The role pcrfonncd by the lllilitary wing of the National Security Council (NSC) during this crisis and the attitude it adopt<..·d after the crisis w;1s a m;tjor issu<..' of nmtemion both within and outside tht· country. This nisis. to�<..·thcr with tht· prt·ssu1-e for l\lore de1nocr:1tization fi-0111 the European Union to which Turkey is aspiring to becol\le a l\le111bcr, puc the political role of the Turkish n1ilitary under scrutiny and posed a challenge to its traditional 'guardianship' rok.
This chapter aims to t·xpbin these challenges, which left the Turkish military with a dilc1111na. First, the origins of tht· guardianship role of tk Turkish 1nilitary will be explained with reference to the historical cultural legaci<..·s they inherited, which forllled the backbone of their idrnloh'Y, doctrine and principles. Second, the actual exercise of the guardianship role will be elaborated. Finally, the challenges to the perceived role of the Turkish lllilitary will be asst·sst·d with refi:rencc to the i111pact on the military-civilian relations of post-Cold War devdopments induding the Torumtay affair, the challenge of political Islam in late 1990s, the Kurdish issue and Turkey's future melllbership of the European Union.
The Origins of the 'Guardianship' Role
of the Turkish Military
There arc three illlporcant historical legacies that have had an illlpact upon the construction of the guardianship role of the Turkish military: the Ottoman legacy, the lcgat:y of the indcpendcnc:c war; and the legacy of Mustafa Kcmal Atatiirk and the Ken1alist idrnloh'Y·
THE MILITARY, POLITICS ANO POST·COLO WAR DILEMMAS IN TURKEY 163 le is i111pon;tlll m non: rltac the 77-year olcl Turkish R.epublic rests on a (illO YL'ar ( )rro111;11t kgacy. Thi� legacy comains two important craditio11s, one bureau cratic and q;ttisc, rhe otht'r 111ilicary. 111 thl' glorious ri111es of the Om.H11;111 Elllpire, the rok of thl· ;1n11y wa� identified with rhe state; in Ollt' author's words, 'tht' < )cco111:111 govern, 11L'1tt had been an anuy bdc)re anything dse'.' Fron 1 tllL' 11i1lL'tt'L'1tth Ct'ntury 011. tht' 111ilirary bccallll' ;1rdenr supporters of Wt'SCL'mizacion and de1110-natizacio1t as the ruk of the Sultan dcscemkd imo corruption and declinl'. Students at 111ilitary staff colkges and panicularly at till' medir:11 schools lll'came tht' nH'l' lltl'lltbership of SL'<.:ret policil';tl organizations. Sultan Abdiilha111ic Il's attl'lltpt to reverSL' Wcscernizing innovations in many fields whik ;tl}owing che111 co cominu<: in rhc arnty pushed rhe officers further coward the fon:front of social change. Thus arose the convicciou chat the officer corps was rhc vanguard of a new cnlighcenmem, co bL' based 011 the adoption of Westl'rll cechniqul'S and pattl'rns of thought:!
With the demisl' of the ( >ccoman Empire and the foreign -ocrnpations of Anamli;t, the an11y was the institution chat first mobilized the population under the t:1llt1111a11d of Mustafa Kem:11 Acatiirk, a former Occoman officer himself The 111ilitary's roll' was further streugthL'lll'd by victory in the indepen<knce war and the co11st'<]Ul·11t inception of the Turkish Republic. Thus, the ntilicary bcca111e idemified with the republicau Turkish populacio11 front rhe beginning ancl attained a high degree of legitimacy in the eyes of che public as tl1t· guardian of a national destiny prt·st·rvt'd fro111 the doniination of foreign powers. Ac the end of the independence war the new state w.is left with the gent·rals, lieutenants and other arnty otliccrs, 011 Olll' sidt·, and a highly illiceracc, kaderk-ss. devastated and t'Xtrc111cly poor society on the ocha. The challrnges that faced the Jllilicary Wl'rt· the lack of a dernocratic culture, thL' strong intluenct' of Islalltic craditio11 and regional upheavals, as in rhe case of l<mdish sheikhs. Thus rhe itkologic;il roots of· che 11acion-buildi11g process that would fi>llow the indq>L·ndenct' war were shaped wirhin rhe 111ilicary corps and the military pioneaed tht· project char would transform Ottoman identity to Turkish identity.
With rill' vicmry of the independence war :n1d tht· prodantation of the Turkish Republic, tht· tkfinition of che 111ilicary's 111ission and rok becarlll: t·ven ckarer. The founder of the republic, Ataclirk. was aware of till' important role of the military. Yet, hl' also saw ic as an i111pedimt'J1C co the develop111e11t of a dt'mocratic rt·gime. ( )11 the Oltl' hand, hL' enunciated a litany of t'xhortations to the 111ilitary m bt· the bulwark of the state against all dontesric and foreign enemies.' On tlit· other lmid, the ntosc importam principle of the young republic was chat, whik the army was not l'xduded cncircly from the political scene, serving army officers were barred from exercising independent power in tht· cemral organs of the scatt·. The 111ilitary was even deprived of the right to vote and the mnnber of rt·tired oflicers was h·pt quite low in the lifetime of Atatiirk. Thus Atattirk defined rhe Turkish 111ilitary's rok as the 'ultimate guardian of thL· republic especially between the YL'ars 1927-1938':' The basic prindplcs co be protectt·d under tht' guardianship of chc military wne sccularisru, den1ocracy and the integrity of the nHmtry. Deriving their lcgiti111acy from tht'se principles put forward by Atatiirk, the Turkish military have perceived chemsdves t·vcr sinn· as the gu:1rdia11s of the Turkish Republic. This dedication to preserve the secular and delltocratic order lllakL's the Turkish ruilitary diffc:rcnt frolll other n1ilitaries in the world.
164
POLITICAL ARMIESFrom Guardianship to Decision Making: the three military
interventions
The Young �urkish Republic started its experience with the multi-party regime in 1946; the three military interventions that followed the transition to multi-party politics in Turkey should be seen in this light. The army did not intend to get rid of democracy; on the contrary, in each case its professed purpose has been to further consolidate democracy. In neither of the three intervencions have the military entered into an alliance with a political party, social group or cbss. On the contrary, they have demonstrated a deep-lying lack of trnst towards "the politicians, who are regarded as striving for political interests rather than the interests of the state and the nation.
The first intervention took place on 27 May 1960 when the Turkish army overthrew the Democrat Party (Demokrat J>arll) government, mainly in reaction to the perceived threats to the democratic and secular functioning of the republic. The increased auchoritarianism of the government, its ambivalence toward modernity and secularism and its ultra-conservative social and economic policies were the main reasons for the intervention. However, the transition to democracy took only one year and the 1961 constitution, prepared in the aftermath of this coup d'etat, has been regarded as one of the most liberal constitutions by many students of Turkish politics. One of the central elements of the new system was the creation of the National Security Council as a legal mechanisrn to assure a voice for the milicary.5 The second military intervention came about ten years later through a prommciamiento. It was a reaction to the culmination of a deteriorating political situation marked by a rising tide of violence, the fragmentation of political parties and weak and ineffective government.1' However, rather than a full intervention, it was a dedaration stating that the generals would use the ;rnthority vested in them to protect· the state and would take power directly only if the civilians refused to provide more effective rul�.7 As a result of this pronuncinmiento, the military was satisfied with a promise from the leading parties to enact a series of constitutional amendments designed to strengthen the hand of the government in dealing with violent dissident groups.H
The next military intervention took place on 12 September 1980. The factors which compelled this intervention were
the incapability of the governments to fight with infiltration and destructive effects of armed conflict which accumulated to a level that threatened the very existence of the State and nation, because of the political squabbles, petty party politics, capriciousness, funtasies, unreasonable demands and both overt and hidden aims whid1 ran contrary to the charactc:ristics of the Turkish state. ''
This was regarded as the most profound crisis of the state ever to occur during the history of the Turkish Republic. Even though actual military rule lasted for only three years, the 1982 constitution - prepared under the supervision of the military and approved by the Turkish people through a referendum - envisaged an enlarged constitutional role for the Turkish military, a role whid1 endures and continues to be contested today. The most important legacy of the 1982 con stitution consists of the artides that laid down the institutional organization of the military's guardianship role through the National Security Council as established under Act No. 2945 of9 November 1983 (see Box 7.1).
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165
Box 7. 1 The Turkish military and the National Security Council in
the 1982 constitution
Art. 1 1 8 of che "1982 conscicucion stipulated:The National Security C:ourn:il will consist of che presidem of the l"l'public as presiding officer, the pri111e 111inister, chc: chief of che general staff, the 111inisters of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Defence and che conunanders of land, air and naval forces and of gendar111nie. Depending on the issue discussed n:lcvant pcrs�.ms <.:an be called in co express their views. The Council of Ministers is obliged r, > 'consider with priority tl1l· decisions of the National Security Council concerning necessary nwasures for the protection of the existence and indepcndencl' of till' state, the ur,ity and indivisibility of the country and the peace an,J secm;ry of s,ociety'. The duties of the National Security Council under the Act No. 2945 include: 111
I The deterlllination of policies concerning the pbnning and implementa tion of the state's national security policy decisions and the necessary co ordination;
2 The determination of the measures relating co the implementation of national objective plans and programmes prepared in accordance with national security policy;
3 Following closely and evalu.iting the national elements of power that influence the state's natioml security policy and the social, economic, cultural and technological environment and developments;
4 The determination of the fundamental principles that will further the direction of national objectives;
5 The decerlllinacion of the measures required to maintain the existence and independence of the state, the imegrity and indivisibility of the coumry and to maintain public peace and security;
6 The determination of the measures to maintain constitutional order, to ensure national unity and integrity, to unite the Turkish nation1 around the ideology, principles and reforms of Atatiirk and the national values and ideals, all of which will guide the nation towards the national objectives; 7 The determination of views for states of emergency, martial law,
mobilization and state of war;
8 The determination of the necessary principles for the inclusion of measures ,md funds related to the following issues in the developrm:nt of plans, programmes and annual budgets: general defence made by the public, private instiwtions, organizations and citizens in peacetime, wartime or in the pose-war periods, national lllobilization and other issues;
9 The determination of measures for the inclusion of programmes and annual budgets, services oriented to the society - financial, economic, social and cultural - and other issues required by the general defence services; I O Proposing options n:garding the p:ist and future international treaties signed
in the field of national security. The NSC notifies the Board of Ministers about the views, measures and principles of court decisions and fulfils other casks as specified in the acts.
The definition of the concept of 'national security' is iniporcanc i11 this respect, since it is the main reference point for thc military. Tht"l'ats to n;uioual security provide the basis for intc.:rvencio11 in policies by the Turkish mili
wry.
'Natio11al security' is defi11ed as the protc.:ctio11 and lllaintenance of the state's constitutional ordc.:r, the national image, integrity, and interests, and the contr;ictual l:1w that constitutes the legal parameters of the policy.'' The potentially wide range of issues that could be covered by the N:1tional Security Council agc.:nd:1 constituted the source.: of future.: challc.:nges to the.: 'guardianship' role of the military.Political Islam and the Military in Post-Cold War Turkey
The collapse of the Berlin Wall, the dismantling of the E:1stern bloc and the disappearance of the illlmediate con1munist threat necessitated a restructuring in the armies of the Western Allies and the United Srntes. NATO started to reconsider its priorities and the US dosed down most of the bases that had been of crucial importance in containing the Soviet Union during the Cold War years. Despite these developments, however, the emerging ethnic and regional conflicts in the Ualkans, the Caucasm and the.: Middle East, and the crisis that followed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait did not :11low a reduction in the role of the Turkish military. The military continued to be.: very important in the problc.:rnatic geo political contc.:xc chat surrounded Turkey. In the context of the.: Paris Charter and the Conventional Forces i11 Europe Treny (CFE) (Avrupa Kon V:rnsiyond Kuv vetler Anlasmasi) signed in 1990, the threat to national security was defined as the 'sc.:paracist movements of che terrorist organization the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partita Karkaren Kurdistan, PK K) '. 12The first challenge to the 'guardianship role' of the military calllc in 1991 whc.:n the Gulf crisis erupted. The crisis confinned once again the perception that the military displays professional traits in dealing with matters of national security, whereas the civilians lack thc.:m. The then chief of the general staff, Necip Torumtay, had been critical of President Ozal for frequencly leaving the niilitary out of the decision-making process on isStt(iS they deeml'd critical.1.1 f:or example,
when Turkish radio :iml television stations rl'porced thl' closure of the pipeline along the border, this was how Torunitay bccame act1uainted with the decision. He didn't approve of C)zal's meddling in military matters and he.: cu111plai11ed that the military received no guidelines from the government 011 the basis of which to determine military strategy during the Gulf War.1·1 Ozal's persistence in making military suggestions and delllands, including an operation against Iraq, was the last straw: it led to Tornmtay's resignation on 3 December 1 990. His stat<::nic.:nt of resignation read: 'The principles I believe in and my understanding of the way the state should function make ic impossible for 111e to go on holding this office.'" It was rhe first time in Turkish history that a chief of the general staff had resigned as a result of a conflict of views with a civilian leader. The incident was also an important sign of the military's reluctance to take action and become directly involved in politics, even when they totally opposed a givt'.n course of action.
The.: military faced another serious challenge which they perceived as infringing the democratic and secular character of the republic: political Islam. This time the military did not refrain from involvement in politics. Yet the crisis was resolved not by resorting to arms, but eh rough a 'civilian coup'. The.: military managed the crisis through the following stcps.
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167
Sl<'J) I: '/1,c 111ili111ry as m11tia11s t>/1sc•r,1c•rsThe' 1 995 genaal clt·nions in Turkey resulct·d in the emergence <>f tht' rcligion orienct'd Wel[1re Party (Refoh J>arrisi) as the niost popular party. The' military did not :1ct inm1ediately after this result: they obscrvt·d the political process witholtt i1m:rvening. ( )11 28 JL111e 1996 tht' Wdfore P:lrty and tht' True Path Party (I )ogru Yo) Partisi) formed a n>alition government, generally reforred to as R.efohyol. The coalition w:1s a major sltrprise inside and omsidc· Turkey, since it was the first tintt' i11 rhe history of tht· secltlar TL1rkish R.epublic that a rdigion-oricnted party had e·111erged as the bt'st-supported party in the dt'nions, obtaining 21 pe·r cent of the· votes and finally coming co power in a c:oalition governnicnr. Ncvt·rthekss, the coalition governniem obtained a vote' of confide·tKe' from parliament (278 to 265), even though it reniaincd a qlle'stion whether tht' Welfare Party would pllt its anti �ec:L1lar projects into anion in1111ediatdy. The military did not lifr a finger when the· Welfare Party came co power in its coalition goven1111et1t through democratic 111eans. The military did not appear to bt' lacking in confidt'nce bm at the samt' time rn11ained cautious, not wanting to act with prejlldin· agaimt the govern mrnt. However, during the Sltpreme Military Council meeting on I Augllst 199(>
13 military officers who were involved in some kind of rearrionary initiarivc wert' dismissed from rhe :mny: this was a first ckar sign chat the military wcre highly sensitive about the isslte. "'.
Slt'JJ 2:
n,c
111ili111ry fll(IY/1 d11i/i(ll,sThe military nevertheless expressed its COIKt'nl to the govcrn111ent and rhe presi dent about separatist and fundamentalist n10vemcncs which were aiming co over throw the I<e111alist, secular and democratic order. For imtanCL', in a briL·fing given by the chief of rhe gene·ral staff to Presidem l>e111irel. thL· military infonned him that 're·actionary activities' had become the primary itHL'rnal threat, rogetht·r with tht' separatist movements. Some neighbouring cou11tries, especially Iran and Syria, provickd support to the terrorist activities of the l'I<K and to so111e religious organizations in Turkey. The briefing was a dear sign that the 111ilitary were considering intervention. The Turkish armed forces formulated the West Opera tion Concept and formed the West Working Group/' made up of imelligencL' experts who closely monitor radical lslamist activities and acten1pts to subvert the secular regime.
Step 3:
·n,c
military take' stc·psHowever, the military was not satisfied with the rok of the presicknt, who was not really able co do much more than .;;.;,rn the governn1ent and at1cen1pt to solve the crisis through democratic n1eans. On the basis of intelligence reports gathe·red fro111 the National lntdligem:e Agt·ncy and the General Directorate of Security, the military had bccon1e extremely alanm·d by tht' 'reactionary activities''� caking place within Tmkey, aimed at initiating an lslamist revolmion against the secular statt' by creating an alternative structure and joining forces with big business supporters.,., The inc:rcasing mm1ber of religious onkrs (tarikatf" and religious associ;ttions (drn;<'k) as well as their fundamemalisr vision11 and abuse of 'spiritual power' to get n1accrial benefits1� from the poorer part� of the society revealed the inte·nsity of the threat to the secular and democratic order. Mcanwhik-, Erbakan's invitation to the major religious order kaders to attend a dinner at the prime minister's palace in religious garb during the holy month of Ilarnadan was
168
POLITICAL ARMIESintolerable for the military as well as for the secular dice of TurkcyY It was perceived as giving recognition to the religious orders at the: st:m· lcvc:l, and so undermining the secular character of the Turkish Republic.
According co the military's own intelligence, the increasing m1mber of prayer leader-preacher schools (imm11-h11tip ok11/111r,), the number of their graduates, the Koran courses and the mnnber of students who enrolled in those <.·ourscs, were: alarming.�·• The political behaviour and prcfcrenc.:e:s of th<.: graduat<.:s of these schools and the Welfare Party voters showed similarities, and yet the values of the former were harsher and more extreme than chose of the latter. The students arc educated in conformity with Islamic values and principles. The i11c.:re;1sing m1111bcr, financial strength/' and illegal structurini'' of private sector companies that gave support to these lllOvements, and the supp,ort given by the govern mem to these companies, were also perceived as alarming devdoplllents by the military.
Increasing numbers of Islamic cadres and practices in state organizations, and Welfare Party projects for restructuring some sr.1te institutions, were another problem for the lllilitary. There were also important projects directly ai1ned at the military itself, such as making the: chief of the general staff acemmtabk to the Ministry of Defence i1mcad of the prime minister, revising the rules about dismissals of officers from the Turkish armed forces on the basis of their involvement in lslamist activities, and changing the regulations regarding entrance to the officers' clubs. The response of the military to these issues was harsh and immediate. First, the military stated that the attachment to the Ministry of Defence was an issue that concerned the whole system of military organization. I 11 order to be able to make a slight change in the structure of the military organization, it might be necessary to change the whole system. Regarding the second issm-, it was stated that military personnel were not permitted any involwmcnt in political activities; nor were they allowed to enrol in political parties or associations. According to the Personnel Code, if they did so they were expelled from the army. With respect to the third issue it was stated that 'those who are dressed so that they reveal a certain political or religious tendency, which is against the dress code, may not enter the officers' clubs' .2''
The increasing mnnber of armed lsbmic mlitants and their links with terrorist
organizations was another problem. A report prepared by the: security forces· and
submitted to the National Security Council stated that H izbullah (The Party of God) and the Great Islamic Raiders' Front (lslami Uiiyiik Akincilar Cephesi, IUDA-C) were among the most active :md violent organi1-ations in Turkey. These organizations percL·ivcd the democratic and secular republic as an enemy and they targeted it.2" It was known that some civil society organizations including the National Youth Foundation (Milli Genc.;lik Vakfi) provided support to these groups.
Another ;1larmi11g tkvclopment for the 111ilir.1ry were the public speeches of some deputies and municipality leaders of the Wclfan· Party, which targeted openly the Atatiirkian principles, the democratic and secular nature of the regime, and the unity and integrity of the country. Represl·ntative of thesl' was one of Prime Minister Erbakan's public speeches:
Jihad is the first pr<.:ccpt and all of us will be im:ludcd in this anny and bt·conit· soldiers .... This is the army of tltt' Welfare P;my. You haVl' to work to strt·11gtht·11 this army. If you do not work then you arc from the potato religion. The lkgrcc of Muslimncss of a
THE MILITARY, POLITICS ANO POST-COLO WAR DILEMMAS I N TURKEY 169 pt'r.mn is mcasmcd by how much he/she donates money co jihad. You have to give your ::cl.:11111 jrdigious donarionsl to the Wdfan: l':my. Wdfart· IIIL\llls to wtirk for clw establishment of chc Ktiranic order. If you support any orhe,· cause, y<rnr place is hdl.''' The foreign visits paid by Prime Minister Erbakan to some Middk Easwrn coumries such as Iran, Libya, Egypt and Pakistan further aggrav:ncd the tensions between the Welfare Party and the military. Despite m:1ny warnings that Iran and Libya espcci:dly were the supporters of terrorism both in Turkey :md in the world, Erbak:m decided to visit the leader, of these countries with the purpose of establishing good relations between his and their governments. However, the Libya visit especially was regarded as a total failure; chc Libyan leader Muammcr Quaddafi put both Turkey and Erbakan in a difficult situation with so11J.e of che things he said. He criticized past governments, pointing at what he called their 'pro-American and pro-Israd attitudes', said thac Kurds were being mistreated in Turkey and, last but not lease, called for the establishment 'of ,111 independem nation of Kurds unda chc Middle Eastern sun'.
Quadaffi seated that although · Libya had some business connections with Turkey, Libya wasn't pleased with Turkish foreign policy. �fr also said chat his sole consolation was that Erbakan had become the prime minister in Turkey: 'There is a Supreme lsbm Colllmandcrs Council and Erbakan is a member of this council. I salute him as a colllmander of Islam.' The visit was considered as a great failure on the part of Erbakan and was subject to har:;h criticisms in Turkey. However, the harsh criticisms directed against him by the opposition parties and the media did not scclll co bother the prime minister at all. He calmly stated: 'These rcnwrks arc unfair and reflect negative propaganda. They will all disappear with one blow of our breath when we recurn to Turkey.'
The above-mentioned concerns of the military finally drove them to pla<:e the issues on the agenda for the first time at the National Security Council meeting held 011 28 February I 997. le was certain that che military's perception of the internal threat had changed and chat priority was now being given co the activities of political Islam. At the first llleeting the military wing of the National Security Council listed chc above-mentioned issues, which they considered as a thn-at to the dc111ocratic and secular order of the Turkish Republic, and mggcsted some measures that should be taken by the coalition government. They also mentioned that some 'sanctions' might be applied if these nieasurcs were not taken.
·step 4: 'f71C 111i/itary\ 111ai(-a11d-Sl'C jJ()/icy
All these poillts made by the military wing of the National Security Council revealed that the military was extremely sensitive regarding some basic principles. The most important four principles seated by the chief of general :staff were: (I) Atatiirk nationalism, seen as the source, foundation and infrastruccure of Turkey's unity and integrity; (2) Atatiirkian prin<:ipks and revolutions, seen as the starting points of development and modernization, and their dynamic inner content; (3) secularis111, seen as the essence of intellectual development and the freedom of religion, conscience and thought, and ;is the si11c: q1111 """ of dcmouacy; and ( 4) liberal democracy, seen as the way of life for free and civilized people and the natural path of devdopmcllt. These arc the common denominators and esscnti:il considerations of chc nation. 'We have to stick to these and we do not give any concessions to anyone under any conditions.' '"
170
POLITICAL ARMIESThe 111casun.:s put forward by the military in their declaration of 28 f=ebruary wt·re followed t1p at the other National Security Cot111cil lltL'l'tings. Tht· lllilitary wanted to give some ti111e to tht· coalition lt:adcrs to stare i111pleme11ting the suggested measures. For this reason they did not prcsst1re tht· government too n1t1d1 during the second 111eeti11g, which took place on 31 March 1 997. Howev<:r, after two 111ot1ths, at the third National Security Council meeting on 2(> April 1997, military members of the National Security C:ot1ncil said that �1tkqt1ace steps had not been takl.'n in the past 111011th to check on ft1nd:tntl.'t1talist activities; that such activities continued despite the internal mt·morandlltll tht· I ncerior Ministry had st·nt to the provincial officials. They displayed two videos, one called /111 l:11<·111y
'!f"
G<>d, a controversial theatrical play pcrfonrn:d in Erwru Ill (an Eastl'rn province of Turkey) and the otlit·r depicting street scenes front Istanbul's ratih district, ceetuing with people dressed in an anachronistic manner in violation of tht· dress code. The commanders also <.:riticized the way the Welfare Party deputies had turned that year's pilgriniage into a political show." The military contint1ot1sly drew attention to the politically loaded spt·echcs of Welfare Party deputies at the µilgrimage and in Turkey. Even thot1gh the military made its uneasiness public, Prime Minister Erbakan kept on saying chat his governn1ent had vny harmonious relations with the military and that no efforts to destroy this harntony would bear fruit. Finally the secretary -general of the chief of grneral staff, Ero! Ozkasnak, niade the cot1nter-statement: 'The Turkish Armed Forces arc in harmony only with the ones who believe in the secular Republil." that Atatiirk founded and who work with this purpose. It can and will not be in harmony with any others.'uOn 2<> May 1997 the milit:1ry decided to convene a spe<."ial 1 m•eting of the Sllpreme Military Colln<.:il with the pllrposc of expelling officers who had engaged in 'reactionary activities'. The second pllrpose of this n1c<:ting was to get Erbakan to approve the prioritizing of 'reactionary activities' within the National Military Stratq;ic Concept (Milli Askeri Strateji Konscpti). During the Sl1pre111c Military C:ollncil niet·ting the niilitary also pointed Ollt chat they wollld miot permit the infiltration of lsla111ist forces into the army, and that they had expdlcd l (, l colll missioned and 1H>n-colllmissioned officers who inclined tow;irds 'fondallll'ntalislll '. This ;1ppeared to be a direct rt·sponse by the llpper ranks of the military to 'divisive efforts' by the Wclfore Party to sllggest that it had plenty of Sllpporters within the armed forces who were in total disagreement with senior offic.:ers. ·1•1 According to
the vice-chief of general staff, <;:evik Bir, 'if anybody can find someone who is involved in dirty bllsiness and has not been expelled frolll the army yet, we throw away our ranks' . . 1-1 This revealed the determination of thl' military to stay away
from political lslalll and politics in gennal. .)/<'fl 5: '/"/1(• 111i/il11ry (I(/ as <I flYC'SSIIYC' .�Y<>llfl
It was obviolls that after these National Security Collnl"il meetinb�, the lllilitary was not convinced that the measures it had called for were being illlplcmented sllfficiently by the coalition government. It then resorted to other means and started a series of briefings that were given co the media (29 Ap1-il 1997), to the civil society organizations, to universities (2 May 1 997), and to judges and pllblic prosecutors ( I O June 1997). This was another way to enlighten different sections of society about the per<.:eived threat from the radical lslamist anivities that had gained ground in Turkey. General GHven Erkaya, comlllander of the navy, later state�! in a newspaper imerview th:1t 'they [the c0111manckrsl regarded their
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111ission as based on two pillars: first, they should 111akt· the Turkish people realize that reaccionary activities wen.: a threat and, second, this problclll should be solved not by thc arllled forces, bm by the civilians ... civil society ... organizations ... i.e., the unarmed forces'.-'5 Thcse briefing.�. directed at society at large, were probably the bc.:sc means the 111ilitary could employ in aillling at a civilian solution. 1 n the bridings the lllilicary explained the perceived 'threat frolll the lsla,1nic reactionary 111ove111ent' in a very detailed and don1lllented way. The ailll of the briefings was st:m·d by the chief of the general staff as 'to concribme to cl,..: civil society's struggle with che reactionary n10ven1ems by exposing che situation'. The military also took care to establish tht· legal basis for its briefings by poiming to the rdevam articles of the constitution and the Turkish ar111ed forces :internal service code. The lllilitary stated in the briefings that;1li:er 1984, :1gainst tht· tl1rt·,1t pt'rn·ived fi-0111 the separatist terrorist organization, ;111 inct·mal st·curicy opnation concept was forlllulatt·d. I )olllt'Stir tkvclop111t·nts in Turkey and tht· attitude of nn1mrit·s around Turkey required a n.:arr:mge111e11t of the national ddi.·nn· ronn·pt. This rearrangt·1m·11t has been 111ade. and first priority has bern giwn to tht· internal threat, n:1111t·ly the rt·anionary activitit·s of politic:il lsl:111l directnl ag:1inst the coumry's indivisible unity and against the basic char:1neriscics of the rt·puhlic defined by tht· constitution:"·
The lllain issues presemed in the briefings were.: not very diffcn:nt from the agendas of till' National Security Council 111eetings. In addition, the 111ilit:11·y .1lso revealed their complaims about insufficient implen1em:1tion of the National St.:rnrity Council decisions, even though the National Security Council clocumenc had bt·en signt·d by the govcrnn1t·11t.
Step 6: ·11,<' ri11i/i1111 m1111
All in all, the milit:1ry concluded that, tkspite the National Set·urity Council decisions, the 'reactionary forces' had bcl'll intC11sifying their activities in a coordinated way. The duty of the Turkish arn1cd forces is defined dearly in article 35 of the I mernal Service Code
(h
l-li.::111,·1 Ka,1111111) No. 21 I as 'to defend and to protect the Turkish territory and the Turkish Republic that is defined by tht· Constitution', and in the I ntemal Service Uy laws, art. 85/ I as 'to defend the Turkish territory and the Rl·public against imernal and extnnal thrt·ats through arms if it is deemed necessary'. It was dear that the military were trying to justify co civil society their indirect involvenll'llt in politics through the National Security Council.Meanwhile, two other initiatives strengthened the position of the military. First, the attorney-general of the Council of State, referring to article (18, paragraph 4 and article 69, paragraph 6 of the Turkish constitution, applil'd to tht· Constitutional Court with the allegation that 'the Welfare Party is leading Turkey inco a civil war'. The allegation was primarily based on the speeches and state-1m·11ts of some lllembers of the Welfare Party, including the prime minister. 17 The pressures 011 the Erbakan-led government augme1m:d with the support of the politicians and the civil socit·ty organizations. Many politicians made statc111ent� supporting the reaction of the military. For inst:ll�ce, the leader of the Republican People's P:1rty, Deniz Baykal, stated that
rhe Turkish Armed Forct·s h:1w worked like a democratic mass org:111izacio11 aud romribuccd to rhc for111acio11 of a public opinion against tht· Wei fart· Party. Tht· mask of
172 POLITICAL ARMIES
the Welfare Party has fallen without an interruption in the democratic lif.c. This is tot:,lly a new strategy, and a new phase in the :nilitary-<.:ivilian rcl:1cions from which everyone should derive a lesson.· ..
The joint dcdarati()l1 of some leading civil society organizations confirmed Uaykal's observation: 'The Welfare Party has been trying to destroy democracy by using democracy.' They stated that they would do whatever they could to protect Atattirkislll and called on the parliament to do its duty: a secular govern ment, attached to Atattirkian principles, should be formed in1111ediatcly:1
'' The
tension ended when the Erbakan governlllent resigned as a result of the above mentioned pressures from the military, civil society organizations and the media.
President Demirel appointed Mcsut Y1lmaz, leader of the Motherland Party, t<>
form the new government 011 20 June 1997:'" The decision created iiitensc debate since some party leaders, including Erbakan and Giller, thought this decision co be totally undemocratic. �ilkr, who was expecting co be asked to
form the new government, even called it a '<;ankaya !presidential! coup':11
President Demirel, 011 the other hand, defined his decision as a 'political rather
than a numerical one'. Even though the second-largest party in parliament was the True Path Party, it was obvious that if �ilk-r had been asked to forlll a government, she would have reverted to the same coalition. What would change would only be the name of the coalition: Yolrcfah instead of R.cfohyol. And the tension would continue.
The one-year period of the coalition government between the Welfare and the True Path parties Qunc 1996-June 1 997) marked some very important changes in milit.1ry-civilia11 relations in Turkey. Despite the anti-secular policies of the Welfare Party, who led the government, the military did not take power in its hands, but rather acted as an interlocutor by bringing the vitally important issues to the agenda. It is obvious that the Turkish military arc a learning instimtion and have learned a lot from their past experiences. 1 n the past the military have been criticized for intervening in the political life of the country. This did not mean, however, that the lllilitary kept silent when it perceived a threat from increasingly 'reactionary activities'. The military used two constitutional channels simul taneously to overcome this crisis. The first was the presidency which had been strengthened by the 1982 constitution. In this regard, President Delllird was a m.�or constitutional channel through which the military could transmit its unease to the political elite and to society. Second, the military declared its unease several times through another democratic and constitutional channel, the National Security Council. It gave briefings concerning the external but especially the internal threats tl1;1t Turkey was facing. In this way, the military tried to do whatever it could without resorting to arllls.
The military continued to perform its 'guardianship' role, however, even after the new government was established. On 3 1 October 1997 the National Security Council approved the National Security Political Doet1111c11t, whid1 encompassed the list of principled measures considered vital by the National Security Council and submitted to the Council of Ministers. The principles, in summary, included the following points: (1) the 'separatist and rcaction:iry' activities arc equally important threats :md should be given priority; (2) political Islam continues to be a threat for Turkey; (3) there are tendencies within Turkish nationalism to revert to racism and the radical right-wing Mafia want to take advantage of the situ:ition; (4) the
THE MILITARY, POLITICS AND POST-COLD WAR DILEMMAS IN TURKEY
173
extre111e left is still a threat, if somewhat diminished; (5) relations with the Turkic republics should be strengthened and their governments should be supported; (6) attention should be paid to the perceived threat from Greece. Even though Turkey docs not desire one, it should not overlook the possibility of a c.:onflic.:t; (7) structures should be created to develop local and culmral traits without imposing them in the public sphere; (8) the objective ofTurkey's full membership to the EU should be maimained, but the negative attitudes of so111c member states should not be:: disregarded; and (9) economic efforts, including privatization, should be increased in integrating Turkey within a globalized world:'?
The Military and the Kurdish Question
Another important c.:hallcnge to the 'guardianship' role of the Turkish military in the 1990s was the so-called Kurdish question. The direct involvement of the army since 1984 in a sort of gucrrilla warfare with the extremely violcm organization PKK was a focal point of critical debate on Turkish issues, especially internationally. Uy many the situation was perceived as a war against the Kurdish population in south- cast Anatolia, who wanted to establish their own state. However, the military enjoyed considerable legitimacy among the people living there. They often supported military operations ag:iinst the PKK insurgents, who threatened their lives. The head of the PKK was finally arrested on the initiative of the military, who threatened a declaration of war to gain the dismissal of Ocalan from Syria. Ocalan was finally arrested in Kenya and brought to Turkey. together with other PKK leaders. Since then their activities have been kept under control. Regarding the death sentence on Ocalan, the milit:1ry stated that 'fast the judiciary and then the parliament could decide about the issue according co the constitution':'·' The arrest of Ocalan increased the credibility of the army in the eyes of the Turkish public: an opinion poll showed that it was considered the most important entity behind the successful arrest:•·•
The decreasing intensity of the armed conflict in south-cast Anatolia left the 111ilitary to review its mission there. At present the mifaary is involved in a campaign called 'Citizen and Soldier Hand in Hand'. In the context of this campaign the military spent 3.4 billion Turkish Lira in ·1999 to support social programmes aiming to rehabilitate the region. These activities involved
providing electric lim·s co 77 villages, building water pipdincs co I 12 villages. paving roads in 1 ,028 villagc•s, providing health servic:t·s in 9,368 villages. Tht· aid also included the repair and maintenance of schools, providing clothing and school cquipmcnr w children, and giving assistance to the smdents taking university exams. forestation,
maintenance of the health centres, building carpentry establishmt·nts.'1�
This kind of civil- military dcvclopmcm effort is apparently appreciated by the local population, as it is elsewhere. It even places the state's efforts under scrutiny. When, for e::xamplc. the national government put a budget ceiling on development in the region, the regional chamber of commerce was not satisfied with the amount of aid. They stated that they would submit a report to the office of the chief of the general staff who they saw as one who knew the situation in the south-cast much better than the c_ivilians, and therefore would guard their interests.'"'
174 POLITICAL ARMIES
The Military and EU Membership
The 1-ldsinki European Council hdd 011 I 0 -1 I I kcc111ber 1999 produced a breakchrough in EU-Turkey rdations since the Presidency C:011<.:lusions of tht· Europe;m Council stated chat
Turk<'Y is :1 candidat<' scat<' destined to join tlw Union 1H1 the basis of tlw s:111w critL'ria as applied co tlw other ca11didate statL'S. Building on tlw exi\ting Emop<':ln Stratq,'Y, Turkey, like oth<'r candidate states, will hcndit from a pr<·-:1cccssion str:m:gy to st11nul:1t<' a11d support its n.:forms. This would inch11k L'llh:111rcd political dialogu<·, with <·111ph:1sis 011 progressing cowards fi.illilling the politir:11 rriteria for :1n:essio11 with partirular rdt·rencc to the issm· of lnn11:111 rights, as wdl as 011 the isst1<'S rdt·1..-cd to in par:1graphs -4 aml 9a.
r,
The milirary's attitude towards chis decision of che EU was positive ::ind they staccd that 'they support1:d the EU derision in this n:spect'.'" The milir:1ry also stated n·peat1.·dly that it is the responsibility of the policicians to lllL'et the criteria of theEU and that T urkey should dt·vdop its legal syscen1 and democracy_.,.,
However, the devdoping rdacions betweL'll Turkey and the EU had SOtlll' import:int repercussions for the 'guardianship' role played by the military in a couple: of ways. First, the EU 11\ade known its concern over thL· L'nhanced role of the army in Turkish political lifr and criticized the National Security Council as an undemocratic institution. The autonoll\ous role of the National St·curity Council was conu:ncious if Turkey was to 11\cet the politirnl requirements of the Copen hagen Criteria"' and was even regarded as an 'obstacle' to full Turkish 11\emlK·rship of che EU .'1 The 11\0St recent EU document, 'Progress Report 011 Turkey for tht· year 2000', only restated the EU's disquiet about thL' role the National Security Council played in the political lifL· of Turkey. The report stated ch:it th1.·rL' was 110 change in the role of the National Sccmity Council and ch;1t its presence see111cd to place serious li111itatio11s 011 the functioning of the govern111c11t. l.11 addition, the report stated that there see111<:d to hL· a cle;1r lack of parlian1encary control on issues related co deft·n<.:e and security. To counter this cricicism, rL·c1.·11cly it was proposL·d to increase the lllllllber of civilians in the National Securicy Coull(.:il from five to eight. The military response was ultilllatcly positive to this propos:al.;2 Under tht· new arrangcmencs, the reprt·sencatives of the l-lu111a11 l(ights Coordinating High Coun<.:il, the Mi11istry of F;i11ance and the Ministry of JustiL-c, together with thL· vice-pri111e ministers, would be present at National Security Counc:il n1eecings.;·1
Another issue is the status of che office of the chief of the general staff Tht·
chief of the ge11eral staff is appoimed by the presidt•nt and is responsibk to thl· prime 111i11ister. The basic argument of che EU is that in developed de111ocratic regimes th1.· chief of the general staff is rL·sponsibk co the Mi11istry of 1)1.'fcnce, and that this should also be che case i11 Turkey. However, the T urkish military oppose this proposal, arguing that the prL·sent arrangement is due to the srti grncris status of the military in Turkey, a11d that there is no necessity to cha11ge it. A second issue of contention between civilians and the military is the report the sc<.:retariat of clw Hlllnan Rights Coordination High Council prepared in the light of the EU's Copenhagen Criteria. The report sers out the changes Turkey needs to make regarding human rights issues. ThL· representative of che N:ttional Security Cou11cil secretariat had some reservations 011 che changes that would be made in articles 13, 14, 26, 27 and 28, which stipulate 'li111itatio11s' 011 funclament;1l rights and freedom of thought.,.,
THE MILITARY, POLITICS AND POST-COLD WAR DILEMMAS INI TURKEY
175
I kspitc officially stating their firlll attitude on the niaintenance of the integrity, sn:ularity and cknwc.:ratic character of the Turkish Rt·public, the Turkish military seem awarl' of tht· necessity of making changes in their str:1tcgies and policies to integrate more with civilians. One l'Xaniple of such an initiative are prep:1rations for 'brainstorn1ing or brown-bag meetings' to be held between the chief of the general staff and the press. The basic aim of these 111t·cti11i-,rs is 'to :ivoid i11co1nplcte and 111isinforn1atio11 of the peopk inside and outside Turkey 011 irnportam issues ronclTning Turkey'." The hosts at the recent cocktail-hour invit:1tio11 issued by thl' military to leading journalists were in c.:ivilian clothes, a symbolic sign of the· will to OVl'r<.:onJl' differences. The invitation to the journalists Meh 111et Ali Bi rand and C:engiz ,:andar was another sign of goodwill, sit Kl' before this journalists were banned from entering the officers' dubs.;,.Concluding Remarks
The post-Cold War role of the Turkish military in politics revealed some impor tant changes. Even though the Turkish military contilllll' their 'guardianship' rok, its scope seen1s to have changed depending 011 the circl1111stanres and especially when it is compared to the period whl·n the three direct military interventions
cook place in Turkey. The military seems to be learning front their past mistakes
and arc making an effort not to repeat them. The resign:1tio11 of the chief of the general staff during the Gulf crisis and the constitutional role that the military trit·d to play in cackling the challenge of political Islam were the two main indicators of this learning process. A second aspect of this change is the will to cooperate with civil society in spreading awareness of threats to national security. The publication of the 111cnH>irs ofTorumtay in the aftermath of his resignation from office and the
bridings given to the civilian sectors of society by thl' military during the crisis
stemniing from the rise of policic:il Islam constitute two exatllplc of this will. le is obvious that the Turkish military wam people to rc:1lizc thac thl·ir ultiniate
aim, like that of all professional armies, is to rl'lllain in the barracks. They never tire of stating this. ¥cc the weakness of the political system in Turkey -undermined by petty party policies, high kvcls of corruption, the clu-cac of political Islam and perceived threats co the unity and i11tegrity of Turkey - will provide the military with arguments to c.:onci1n1e their 'guardianship' role. Ch:1llc11ges t<) rhe role of thl· military in the pose-Cold War pl-riod have revealed the face chat the scopl' of the 'guardianship' role 111ay remain limited and less 'pohtil"al'. Even in such a casl\ this will be the result not of increasing domestic and international pressures, but of sclf-evaluacion by the military.
Notes and References
I H:1k (1994: 2).
2 1-l:1lc (1994: 2), Rustow (1957: 5 1 5). 3 Harris ( 1 988: 181).
4 Ozda� ( I 'J: 43).
5 Harris ( 1 CJ88: 182).
<, J-lcpl'I" and Tadiau ( I ')83: 23). 7 1 1:trris ( 1988: 187).
8 I-leper and T:1d1:1u ( I 'J83: 23). 9 Bi rand ( 1991 ).
176
1 n Iba ( 1998: 185 - C,).
l I iba (1998: 185).
12 iba ( 1 998: 10(,).
13 Heper and Cii11ey ( 19%: (,28). 14 I-leper and Goney (19%: 628). 15 Torumtay ( 1993: 130). 16 ib:, ( 1998: 221).
17 S11/,11/1, 12June 1997, T11rkisl, D11ily News, 1 4 J1111c 1 997. The 11an1e of the gr(Hlp comes fro111 Turkey's secular, dc111ocr;1tic structure which it perceives as Wcstcrn-oricmcd, and which ai111s to send the message that they arc combating fimdamcntalist threats b:1cked by neigh bouring eastern countries. The intelligence dcpart111cnt chic(;; of land, navy and ground forces, the operational bureau chief of the gendarmeric ;111d two 111ajor--ge11erals of the general staff arc the key figures who determine the agenda of the West Working Group. West Working Group investig;1tors probe 111a11y diffi:rem spheres. including various lcvc.:ls of government, the local administrations of provinces and towns, alleged radical lslan1ist infiltration of tht· ar111y. outlawed fundamentalist organizations such as Hizbullah, pro lslamist busim:s,mc11 who allegedly back the fundame11talis�,. pro-lsl:1111ist media outlets, certain parties' yomh branches, and pro-lslamist priv,ite s<.:hools and universities. The West Working Group is authorized to demand directly :my infor111ation fro111 all 111ilit:1ry headquarters and intelligence dcpart111cnts, and from other state intelligence institutions such as the National lntellige11cc Agency.
18 For a detailed account of the reactionary activities perceived as a threat by the 111ilitary, sec I-leper and c;om:y (2000).
1 9 This is stated in the 'Report 011 Reactionary Movc111c11ts' s11bmitted m the military. St·c Milliyet, I March 1997.
20 The dictionary definition of 111rik111 is 's111all brotherly grouping, of mystics living in con1111u11ities'. 'Ji,rik,11s an: traditional Islamic (1rga11izations whi<.:h have responded to various cultur.11, social and political needs. Ati:cr the cstablish111cm of the Turkish Republic the networb of secret mystic brotherhoods were pushed undcrgrou11d when the 111rik<11s were outlawed by a law that banned rekkes and z,wiyc, in 1925 during one-party rule. In this period they provided a semi-secret platform for conducting covert lsl:1111i.c activities. Aftn the casing of the rigid sewlarist measures during the period of the Demo<.:ratic Party rule (1950 - (,0) and the provision of civil liberties by the 1961 rnnstitution, r11rik11f.< began to operate on a semi-legal basis :md they forged alliances with politic:tl parties.
2 1 An interview with the le:1dcr of the A<.:2mcndi 1mik11r in one of the le:tding ncwsp:1pers
confirmed this <.:oncem of the milit:1ry. The leader stated that:
even if the regime today docs not want to go, it will have to go. If the leaders che111sclves do not d1oosc S/111riar, tht· people will bring it. And God forbid, there will be a lot of bloodshed then. Now we arc at the third stage of this struggle. And 111a11y other orga11izacio11s that want to bring the ,Sl,11ri111 order arc moving u11dcrg:round . . . . We arc peaceful people. However, we do not remain silent ifwc arc insulted regarding religion. If we arc forced to, we do not listen to any rules and regulations. And what we can do in this case ca1111ot be compared with either DHKl'-C [I >evri111ici J-blk Kurtulus Panisi Cephcsi -Front of the Revolutionary People's lndcpc11dcncc Party, a radical kftist terrorist organiz;nionl or with the PKK.
The leader also answers the question, 'What if chc anny docs not let Sl111riar come?'
We believe that the army will become wiser. There comes such a point that the army will he weakened. le kills 011c, a thousand and then remains helpless. As in the case of Iran, when the nation revolts, the only thing that the army can do is either to join them, or to leave the <.:oumry with the rt·d passports (Milliyer, 5 October 1996).
22 The illcg:tl commercial activities of the religious order leaders and their sexual abuse of their disciples were the 111ai11 issues that attracted the attention of the 111ilit:1ry. The main example of such a scandal was revc:1lcd by cht· wife of such a leader, who made confrssions about the inner orga11izatio11 of the religious order that she was in and the st·xual abuses of her husband
THE MILITARY, POLITICS AND POST-COLD WAR DILEMMAS IN TURKEY 177
mwards his disciplc.:s. In addition she confessed that hl·r IH1sh:md had some illegal links with
the municipal leaders of thl· three 111ajor metropoks (Istanbul, Anbr:t ;rnd Turkey) who
were 1m·1nbers of the Wei fore Party. This issue on:upied the headline� of the ncwspapl·rs in
Tmkey for Wl'eks. 1-/iirriy<'I. 20 Jamiary 1997.
23 Prime Ministn Erhakan ma1k so111e statenll'lltS m the leaders of the religious onkrs such as 'Wt· an· waiting for your pr:1yers. Maintain your unity and cogethernl·ss. cvnybody should rl'frain from :1t:tivicies char would harm the govcrnnu:nc.' One of the religious orda leaders stated after the dinner that 'we all pr:iyl·d m God and we talked about the orders of God. We always help ltl1l' partyl, we gather votl'S levt'lll from othns (Hifr,-iy<'/, 12):ulllary 1997).
24 h1r instance, even rhongh the yearly nccd for i111allls is 2,288. the 11u111hn of graduates from
these schools every year readic·s 53,553. The rest of the graduatt·s (51 ,2(,5) art· orit'lltl'(l
towards the fowlties of political scicncc, law and police ac:idelllies. Tht· main ol�jl'(:tive is w
forlll the rndrt·s of politic.:al Islam. (Hiirriy<'I, 1 2 June 19'>7). These numbcrs were thcn prcse11tt·d by tht· milit:iry in tht· briefing cliat w:is given co the media on 1 1 Jum· 1997.
25 Of the six c.:omp:mit·s that support reanionary activities t·ac.:h has a r:1pital :1cn1mul:ttion of
more than a hundred trillion Turkish Lir:1 (Milliy<'I, I I June 1997).
26 They have t'nlarged themselves through the money that is collt'nl·d from the Turkish workns in fon:ign cou11tril-s by che Europt·an N:1tio11al Vision ( hganization (a rdigious
organization), through hundreds of foundations they have established in Turkey, and
through the income ohtaincd from the collection of sacrifidal skins (Milliyl'f, I I June I 997).
27 Milliycl, 19 Nove111ber 19%.
28 It is also stated in the report that the aim of these organizations is co establish a state bast·d on Shari111 in three stages. The first stage is called 11•/,/ii (connuuniration). in which :111 the peopk arc invitl·d to fight for the acct·ptauce of Isla Ill by all tht· pt·oplc. The st·cond stage is callcd rc111,wr (conununity), in which the c.:ommunity fit for the conmH111itatiou1 is fomu:d. The third sc:1ge isji/1111/ (holy war), in which chert• is a call for armed struggle for tlu: t·stablislunrnt of :m Islamic stat<.:.
29 Milliycr, 2 May 1997.
30 S11/Jt1h, 25 December 199<,.
31 '/iirkis/1 Daily News, 28 April 1997.
32 1/iil'riy<'f, 3 March 1997. Also sec Ymi Yii::yil, 2 February 1997.
33 '/i,rkish Daily Ntws, 15 May 1997.
34 1-/iirriycl, 25 Dec.:ember 1997.
35 Interview with journalist Yavuz Donat, Milliycl, 1 3 August 1 997. 36 ']'1,rkis/1 Vaily N<'111S, 30 April 1 997.
37 Milliyet, 22 May 1997.
38 Ywi Yii::y,I, 1 8 Junc 1 997. 39 Sabal,, 22 M:1y 1997.
40 Ycui Yii::y,/, 21 Jlme 1997.
4 1 �:ankaya is the prcsidt·ntial palace.
42 Hiirriycr, 4 November 1997. 43 lvfilliyd. 18 December 1999. 44 Milliyd, 2 Febru:1ry 2000.
45 lvfil/iy1·1, I 4 April 2000.
46 Milliycl, (, April 2000.
47 Prcsidency Condusions, Helsinki European Council, I 0-1 I Jkcember 1999, paragraph 12.
48 Milliyn. 18 Decembcr 1 999.
49 1<111/ika/, 12 April 2000.
50 The Copenhagen Criteria contain three main requirements: (1) to provide thc stabiliry of inscicutions that sec.:urt· dcmocracy, the supremacy of the rule of law, human rights and rcspect for minoritics; (2) w have a fonc.:tioning market t·conouiy and co be abk to cope
with the competitive pressures and market forccs in the European Uniou; (3) to be able to
111cet the responsibilities chat would stem from full ,m:mbership as well as from thc political,
178
POLITICAL ARMIES51 Hiirriy,·1, \') February 20fl0.
52 Th,: diief of general staff starr.:d that 'the numba of rill' ..:ivilians ..:an even bc im:reascd w a hundn:d. 1t docs not m:mer. The National Sn:urity Council takes dc·..:isions by comensus umlcr the diainnanship of the presidem, nm by lifting lingers' (l'vlilliy<'t, 25 July 2()01)). 53 Milliy,·r, 25 July 2000.
54 t'vlilliycl, 18 June 200fl. 55 Milliycl, 23 September 21)1)0. 56 Milliy<'I, 15 Nowmber 20()0.
