ABSTRACT
THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS TURKEY 1923-1929
ZALYAEV, Ramil
Ph. D., Department of International Relations Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hakan Kırımlı September 2002
This doctoral dissertation deals with the official Soviet attitude towards Turkey during the years between 1923-1929. It is the aim of this dissertation to elicit the objectives of the Turkish and Soviet foreign policy towards each other during the period in question, and to ascertain what factors played a role in the determination of those policy objectives.
During the period between 1923 - 1929, the contiguity of the Turkish territory to the USSR, as well as internal and external weakness of the Soviets, were factors that determined the Soviet policy objectives towards Turkey. The Soviet government desired Turkey to be the State with a friendly manner towards the USSR. Besides, it wished that Turkey would not take part in aggressions against the USSR, and not allow other powers to use the Turkish territory as a springboard for an attack on the USSR. The Soviet government supposed that a friendly Turkey would be a factor of security for the USSR.
The USSR was also of great importance for Turkey. The Turkish government aimed at preserving the Turkish national state within certain national boundaries and intended to consolidate its military victory by economic reconstruction of the country. The Turkish government was in need of time in order to recover the economy of the
country and to consolidate the regime. Proceeding from this, it was its foreign policy priority to prevent any aggression against Turkey.
As it shared a long sea and land frontier with the USSR, the Turkish government also desired the USSR to be the State with friendly attitude towards Turkey. It believed that the USSR with a friendly attitude towards Turkey would be a favourable factor for the security of its north-eastern and eastern parts of the frontier with the USSR.
As a result of the Neutrality, Non-Aggression and Non-Participation Treaty of December 17, 1925 and the Ankara Protocol of December 17, 1929, the USSR and Turkey achieved their policy objectives. They also needed the benevolence of each other direly. They knew that only by behaving so, they could achieve their policy objectives. In this sense, the relations between Turkey and the USSR in the period between 1923-1929 were mutually beneficial relations.
ÖZET
1923 İLE 1929 YILLARI ARASINDA SOVYETLER BİRLİĞİ'NİN TÜRKİYE'YE KARŞI TUTUMU
ZALYAEV, Ramil
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Hakan Kırımlı Eylül 2002
Bu doktora tezinde Sovyetler'in 1923 ile 1929 yılları arasında Türkiye'ye karşı tutumu ele alınıyor. Doktora tezinin maksadı Türkiye ile Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki bu yıllardaki karşılıklı politikalarının amaçlarını meydana çıkartılması, bu dış politika amaçlarının belirlenmesinde hangi faktörlerin rol oynadığını anlatılmasıdır.
1923 ile 1929 yılları arasında Türkiye ve Sovyetler Birliğiİnin topraklarının bitişikliği ve Sovyetlerin iç ve dış zayıflığı Sovyetler Birliğinin Türkiye'ye karşı olan siyasetini belirleyen faktörler olmuştur. Sovyet hükümeti Türkiye'nin Sovyetler Birliği'ne karşı dost devlet olmasını arzuluyordu. Bundan başka, Sovyet hükümeti Türkiye'nin Sovyetler Birliği'ne karşı olabilecek saldırılara katılmamasını, diğer güçlere Sovyetlere karşı saldırılarda Türk topraklarını köprübaşı olarak kullanılması için müsaade etmemesini diliyordu. Sovyet hükümeti dostane Türkiye'nin Sovyetlerin güvenliğinin bir faktörü olacağına inanıyordu.
Aynı şekilde Türkiye için de Sovyetler Birliği önem taşıyordu. Türk hükümetinin amacı milli Türk Devletinin belirli milli sınırlar içerisinde muhafaza edilmesi, ülke ekonomisini yeniden kurarak askeri zaferi sağlamlaştırılması idi. Ülke ekonomisinin yeniden kurulması, rejimin kuvvetlenmesi için Türk hükümetinin zamana ihtiyacı vardı. Bundan dolayı, Türkiye'nin dış politikası Türkiye'ye karşı olabilecek saldırıları engellenmeyi amaçlıyordu.
Sovyetler Birliği'yle çok uzun deniz ve kara sınırını paylaştığı için Türk hükümeti Sovyetler Birliği'nin dostâne bir devlet olmasını diliyordu. Türkiye hükümeti Sovyetlerin dostâne bir ülke olmasının Türkiye'nin kuzey-doğu ve doğu sınırlarının güvenliğinin önemli bir faktörü olacağına inanıyordu.
İki devletin 17 Aralık 1925 tarihli Tarafsızlık Anlaşması ile 17 Aralık 1929 tarihli Ankara Protokolü imzalanmasıyle Türkiye ve Sovyetler Birliği yukarıda belirtilen amaçlara ulaşmışlardır. Bu iki devletin birbirinin hayırhahlığına ihtiyacı vardı. Her iki devlet karşılıklı iyilik davranışları göstererek bu münasebeti karşılıklı faydalı yapmıştır.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT iii
ÖZET v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS viii
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER ONE - THE BEGINNING OF THE TURKO-SOVIET
CONTACTS 7
The relations between the Soviet Government
And the Ottoman Empire 7
The Beginning of National Resistance Movement
in Anatolia 9
The Leaders of National Resistance Movement
and their Startegy as regards to Soviet Republic at the beginning
of the Movement 12
The R.S.F.S.R. and the East 17
The Establishment of Contacts between the Grand National
Assembly of Turkey and the Soviet Government 26
The Difference of Stands on the issue of the Frontier 35 The Treaty between RSFSR and Turkey of March 16, 1921 43
CHAPTER TWO - TURKO-SOVIET RELATIONS in 1923 62
The Difference of Views of the Turkish and Soviet
Delegations at the Lausanne Conference 69
The Strained Relations 71
The Intention of Both Governments to Maintain
Friendly Relations 82
The Military and Strategic Situation in the Black Sea Basin
After the Lausanne Conference. The Soviet Point of View 88 The Importance of Turkey for the Soviet Republic after Lausanne 93 The revolutionary Importance of Turkey for the Soviet
Government 95
The Overthrow of the Sultanate 97
The Economic Congress in Izmir 98
Declaration of the Republic of Turkey 101
The Abolishment of Caliphate in Turkey 104
The Soviet's Dread of the Turkish Pan-Turkism 106
The Importance of the USSR for Turkey 109
CHAPTER THREE - ZIGZAGS IN THE SOVIET POLICY
TOWARDS TURKEY 121 The Temporary Conditions for the Soviet Consulates in Turkey 121
Lenin's Death and Turkey 126
Continuation of the Problems concerning Consulates 130
Presentation of the Letters of Credence by Yakov Surits, the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR,
on February 27, 1924 131
Presentation of the Letters of Credence by Ahmet Muhtar[Mollaoğlu],
the Ambassador of Turkey, on April 9, 1924 134
Continuation of Difficulties 135
CHAPTER FOUR - THE TREATY BETWEEN THE USSR
AND TURKEY ON DECEMBER 17, 1925 ON NEUTRALITY, NON-AGGRESSION AND NON-PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILE
COMBINATIONS 152
The Soviet Proposal of September 1924 157
The Turkish Project of February 22, 1925 161
The New Turkish Draft of March 24, 1925 161
Difference between Soviet and Turkish Drafts 165
Discussion of Articles concerning the League of Nations 168
The Proviso with regards to Persia 171
The Conference of Locarno 177
The External Situation of Turkey 180
The Conclusion of the Treaty 183
The Treaty between the USSR and Turkey of December 17, 1925 184
The Treaty as a Part of the Soviet Eastern Policy 188
The Importance of Treaty for Turkey 191
The Exchange of Notes 195
CHAPTER FIVE - THE TURKO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN 1926. THE TRIP OF THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER, TEVFIK RÜŞTÜ BEY [ARAS]
TO ODESSA 199
The Repatriation of Turkish and Russian Civilian
Prisoners and Prisoners of War 199
The Decision of the League of Nations on Mosul
and Turko-Soviet Relations 208
The Trip of Tevfik Rüştü Bey to Odessa 213
The Metting of Tevfik Rüştü Bey with Chicherin in Odessa 218
The First Flight from Moscow to Ankara 231 Misunderstandings on the Turko-Soviet Frontier and the Drawing
of the Frontier Line 234
The Convention on the Use of the Waters of Frontier Rivers,
Streams, and Brooks 238
The Permission to Migrate to the Soviet and Turkish Territories 239
CHAPTER SIX - MUTUAL STEPS TOWARDS MAINTAINING OF GOOD NEIGHBOUR RELATIONS AND CONFIDENCE. THE ANKARA PROTOCOL
OF DECEMBER 17, 1929 243
Turko-Soviet Conventions of August 6, 1928 252
The Works on the Elaboration of a new Convention 254
The Forcible Eviction of Trotsky to Turkey 265
The Emigres from Russia in Istanbul 272
The Protocol between the USSR and Turkey on Extension
of the Treaty of December 17, 1925 275
The Difficulties in the Turko-Soviet Trade Relations 285
The USSR, Turkey, and Communism 288
CONCLUSION 295
INTRODUCTION
This doctoral dissertation deals with the official Soviet attitude towards Turkey during the years between 1923-1929. On March 16, 1921, the delegations of the government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Soviet government signed the Treaty between Russia and Turkey in Moscow. The main substance of this Treaty was the establishment of the frontier line between Turkey and the Soviet Republics of Georgia and Armenia. The Treaty of Kars, which was signed by the new Soviet Republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan on the one side, and Turkey on the other, with participation of the government of the RSFSR, confirmed it with some small change.
The Soviet government, worn out by the Civil War and the foreign intervention, and its economy destroyed, could give some material help to the Ankara government. It was in its interest to give assistance to the Ankara government, since the latter struggled against the foreign invaders who were equally hostile to the Soviets. As far as the Ankara government was concerned, owing to these treaties, it could untie its hands in eastern Anatolia, and concentrate all its limited power on the Western Front for the last and decisive blow against the enemy.
After the remarkable military victory of the Ankara government in western Anatolia in August-September 1922, it was invited to take part in the Lausanne Conference. There, the Ankara government won another important and brilliant
diplomatic victory. At the Conference, the Western Powers recognized the independence of Turkey out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire
In 1923 the Turko-Soviet relations entered a new period. The outcome of the Lausanne Conference created a new situation in their relations. Having successfully concluded the War of Independence in Anatolia, Turkey entered into the complicated arena of the international politics.
This work will cover the events which took place in the Turko-Soviet relations until the end of 1929. The choice of 1929 is not an arbitrary one. The matter of the fact is that, on December 17, 1929, Turkey and the USSR signed the Ankara Treaty (or Protocol as it was referred to as such). By this Protocol, they mutually pledged not to initiate any negotiations without notification of each other for the purpose of concluding political agreements with state, which where in the immediate land or sea neighbourhood. This Treaty also signified the beginning of a new period in the Turko-Soviet relations, since it implied active contact and notification of each other about supposed agreements with neighbours of each country.
Regrettably, the history of the Turko-Soviet relations of the period after the Lausanne Conference has been the subject of very few scholarly studies whether in the Soviet Union, Turkey, or the West. Moreover, all of these works were of a general nature. As for the history of the Turko-Soviet relations of the period 1923-1929, the situation is even more deplorable, since no special study that covered specially this period exists.
The Soviet literature (Moiseev, Rozaliev, Gasratyan) described these relations as a "successful development of good-neighbour relations" and "the strengthening of good-neighbour relations and friendship." The Turkish authors (Gürün, Bilge) also
state that the relations between these two countries continued to be friendly and balanced.
The Soviet authors did not bring forward the true objectives of the Soviet foreign policy towards Turkey. The usual ideological necessity to prove that the USSR always treated the Eastern peoples with sincere and inviolable friendship, and that the Soviet government always strove to help them, prevented the Soviet authors to offer a more objective picture. Thus, the interpretation of documents and events was built on this formula. It should also be noted that like many parallel studies, the Soviet authors did not utilize Western sources. They approached them with bias and almost indiscriminately regarded the western historians as "bourgeois falsifiers."
A very limited amount of primary sources were available to the Turkish authors. The Soviet sources were practically inaccessible for them. The overwhelming majority of the archival documents in the Archives of the Turkish Prime Ministry was (and still is) unclassified and in accessible. Therefore, the Turkish authors were obliged to base the coverage of the period on the information provided on memoirs like that of İsmet Pasha [İnönü], on the collection of documents such as Atatürk'ün
Milli Dış Politikası, and Jane Degra's Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. These
published materials, undoubtedly, are important; however, these editions contain a few handpicked documents on the Turko-Soviet relations of the period under consideration.
Apparently, the discouragingly scarce and scattered nature of the relevant source material must have been one of the major impediments for the development of this field. Apart from barely accessible unpublished sources, even some published material of utmost importance, such as the collection of Soviet documents in many volumes Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, Documents on British Foreign Policy
1919-1939, as well as the bulk of contemporary periodicals, has disappointingly not
yet been utilized or analyzed in full measure, with very few and limited exceptions. It is the aim of this dissertation to elicit the objectives of the Turkish and Soviet foreign policy towards each other during the period in question, and to ascertain what factors played a role in the determination of those policy objectives. It is only by doing so that, it will be possible to determine the true nature of their relations during the period between 1923-1929. This study will attempt to do this by consulting the currently accessible and available sources. The largest parts of the published materials consulted are publications in Russian, Turkish, and English. In this respect, the Soviet publications, which were issued in the 1920s and the 1930s, were utilized for the first time.
The published Soviet materials of the 1920s are especially important, since during these years the Soviet authors were still able, relatively speaking, to freely express their views, and, at times, unique information can be extracted from their works. It should also be noted that the Soviet collection of documents in many volumes of Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR is also of great importance for the purpose of this study. The documents of this edition shed light to many unknown and unstudied events in the Turko-Soviet relations.
Another importance of this Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSRs edition is that it contains not only correspondence between the Soviet diplomats in Turkey and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow and the reports of these diplomats, but also documents concerning the Soviet foreign policy towards other countries and correspondence, as well as reports of the Soviet diplomats in Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Romania, Persia, Afghanistan to Moscow. These documents also contain a valuable material pertinent to the Turko-Soviet relations.
This study will utilize for the first time the original materials from the Archives of the Turkish Prime-Ministry, and, in particular, the decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkey. The tradition of Turkish record keeping requires the inclusion of a quite detailed introductory part to the final document. Therefore, the decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers concerning the Turko-Soviet relations contain not only the decrees themselves but also information leading to the issuing of these decrees. From these introductory parts, much vital information can be drawn. Besides, some archival material from Public Record Office (London), The Russian Centre for Preservation and Study of Documents of the Most Recent History (Moscow), and the National Archives (Washington, D.C.) were also utilized.
The leading Turkish and Soviet newspapers such as Pravda (Moscow), Izvestiya (Moscow), Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), Hâkimiyet-i Milliye (Ankara) were also thoroughly consulted. The Turkish dailies Cumhuriyet and Hâkimiyet-i Milliye were of great value for the purpose of this study. These newspapers contain editorials of Yunus Nadi and Mahmut Bey [Soydan]. Both not only were prominent politicians in Turkey then, but, at the same time, revolved within the close circle of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Therefore, their articles concerning the Turko-Soviet relations in many cases reflected Mustafa Kemal Pasha's own views.
In order to elucidate the historical sitting, and to demonstrate the roots of factors that influenced their policy objectives towards each other, information (when necessary, and in detail) pertaining to earlier periods will be given. Throughout this study, transliterations of all Turkic names and words are rendered in accordance with the standard Turkish Latin orthography of Turkey. This includes the surnames of individuals and toponyms. The Turkish alphabet of Turkey is phonetic and most of all letters phonetically to their usage in English. The exceptions are:
C: "j" in judge, Ç: ''ch'' in chest,
ı: back ı, similar to ''a'' in final, J: French ''j'' in Jacques, Ö: German ''ö'' in möglich, Ş: ''sh'' in ship,
Ü: German ''ü'' in Bürger.
Transliterations of Russian words from Cyrillic to Latin orthography are based on the Library of Congress system with minor modifications, such as "sovetskaya" not ("sovetskaia"), "Turetskuyu" (not "turetskuiu").
CHAPTER ONE
THE BEGINNING OF TURKO-SOVIET CONTACTS
The Relations Between the Soviet Government and the Ottoman Empire
The Ottoman and the Russian Empires were at war in the First World War. As a result of the military operations, the Russian Army advanced far from the Turko-Russian frontier of 1914 and eventually captured Erzurum, Trabzon, Erzincan, the districts around the Lake of Van, and most of the vilâyets of Muş and Bitlis.1 However, the October upheaval in Petrograd on November 7, 1917 and the advent of the Bolsheviks to power changed the situation radically. The Soviet Government in its first governmental act, in the Decree on Peace, proposed to all belligerent powers to conclude an armistice and to start negotiations immediately.2 As it happened, only the
1
For detailed account on Turco-Russian military operations in the Caucasian front during the First World War see: N. G. Korsun, "Kampaniya 1914 g. na Kavkazskom Fronte," Voenno-Istoricheskiy
Zhurnal (Moscow), 1940, N 5, pp. 25-48; N. G. Korsun, Alasshkertskaya i Khamadanskaya Operatsii na Kavkazskom Fronte Mirovoy Voyny v 1915 godu (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1940); N. G. Korsun, Sarakamyshskaya Operatsiya na Kavkazskom Fronte Mirovoy Voyny v 1914-1915 godu (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1937); N. G. Korsun, Erzurumskaya Operatsiya na Kavkazskom Fronte Mirovoy Voyny v
1915-1916 g.g. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1938); W. E. D. Allen - Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields. A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border. 1923-1921 (Cambridge University Press, 1953);
Akdes Nimet Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı), 1990.
In 1864 the Ottoman Empitre had been divided between twenty seven Vilâyets (large administrative divisions). The vilâyet was divided into Sancâk (administrative unit in size between Vilâyet and Kazâ).
Sancâk into Kazâ (district). Kazâ into Nâhiye ( a smal rural district). Nâhiye into villages.
2 "Dekret o Mire, 26 Oktyabrya (8 Noyabrya) 1917 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow:
governments of the Central Powers, to whose advantage was to put an end to the fighting on the Eastern front, heeded the Decree on Peace.3
The peace negotiations started at Brest-Litovsk in December 1917, and on December 15, Germany, Bulgaria, Austro-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire signed with Soviet Republic an armistice.4 In accordance with this armistice, the Soviet and the Ottoman governments were to determine the terms of the armistice on the Caucasian Front. In this connection, on December 18, 1917, in Erzincan, an armistice was signed between the Russian and the Ottoman armies operating on the Turko-Caucasian Front.5 Finally, on March 3, 1918, the Central Powers and the Soviets signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In article 1 of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, Soviet Russia, Germany, Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire announced that the state of war between them was at an end.6 The same day, the Soviet Government and the Sublime Porte signed a Supplementary Treaty that stipulated the establishment of diplomatic and consular contacts, and the exchange of the prisoners of war.7
With the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, diplomatic contacts were established between Soviet Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman envoy Galip Kemalî Bey [Söylemezoğlu] arrived in Moscow on April 23, 1918.8 These contacts, however, lasted only for six months. Following the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the
3
Helene Carrere d'Encausse, A History of the Soviet Union 1917-1953. Lenin. Revolution and Power (London: Longman, 1982), translated by Valence Ionescu, v. I, p. 78.
4 "Dogovor o peremirii mezhdu Rossiey, s odnoy storony, i Bolgariey, Germaniey, Avstro-Vengriey i
Turtsiey, s drugoy storony, zaklyuchyonnyy v Brest-Litovske 2(15) Dekabrya 1917 g.," Dokumenty
Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1957), v. I,
pp. 47-51.
5 "Dogovor o peremirii mezhdu Russkimi i Turetskimi armiyami, deystvuyushchimi na
Kavkazsko-Turetskom teatre voyny," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. I, pp. 53-56.
6 "Mirnyy Dogovor mezhdu Rossiey, s odnoy storony, i Germaniey, Avstro-Vengriey, Bolgariey i
Turtsiey - s drugoy, 3 Marta 1918 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. I, pp. 119-124.
7 "Russko-Turetskiy Dopolnitel'nyy dogovor k Mirnomu dogovoru, zaklyuchyonnomu mezhdu
Rossiey, s odnoy storony, i Germaniey, Avstro-Vengriey, Bolgariey i Turtsiey s drugoy, 3 marta 1918 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. I, pp. 199-204.
Ottoman Army began advancing towards the Caucasus and on September 15, 1918 it captured Baku. Besides, the Soviet Government did not give its consent to the results of the plebiscite in the vilâyets of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, which was carried out by the Ottoman authorities in accordance with Article 4 of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.9 The population of these vilâyets had given its consent to remain in the Ottoman Empire. However, the Soviet Government asserted that the Ottoman authorities, beforehand, was terrorizing the population of these vilâyets and the voting had been held under the Turkish control.10 In this connection, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs sent a note to the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs and annulled the Brest-Litovsk Treaty on October 29, 1918.11
Very soon, on October 30, 1918, having lost more than a million killed and wounded in the First World War, the Sublime Porte signed an armistice with the Entente on the British warship Agamemnon in Mudros (on the island of Lemnos) on October 30, 1918. Under the terms of the armistice, the lands of the Empire were clearly placed in the hands of the British and the allies and the Straits were opened to their warships. On November 13, 1918, the warships of Britain and France dropped their anchors in front of the Dolmabahçe Palace, the residence of the glorious Sultan. With the Mudros Armistice, the Ottoman Empire, so long in decay, became half dead. Now fallen under practical Allied influence, and later occupation, any diplomatic relations between Soviet Russia and the moribund Ottoman Government was out of the question.
The Beginning of the National Resistance Movement in Anatolia
9 "Nota Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del Ministerstvu Inostrannykh Del Turtsii, 20 Sentyabrya
1918 g. ," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. I, pp. 490-491.
10 Ibid., p. 491. 11 Ibid., p. 402.
Such an easy advent of the hostile fleet to Istanbul was a hard sad blow for the Turks, who had stopped this fleet with heavy losses in Çanakkale in 1915. At the same time, it was a blow, which triggered the National Resistance Movement.12 There had been resistance groups as early as autumn of 1918. Local "Associations for the Defence of Rights" [Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri] had sprung up all over Anatolia and Thrace as a result of the initiatives of local landowners, teachers, craftsmen and religious notables. Initially, these associations had little connecting among themselves. Only with the participation of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who landed in Samsun in May 1919, the Resistance Movement assumed a much more all-embracing nature. Subsequent practical steps in the organisation of the movement were taken in the congresses, which were held in Erzurum and in Sivas.
In particular, the Erzurum Congress passed important resolutions, which were embodied in a declaration, formed the basis of the subsequent National Oath (Mîsâk-ı
Millî). The declaration stated that the eastern provinces of Erzurum, Diyarbakır,
Elazığ, Van, Bitlis, and the district of Canik (Samsun), were integral parts of the Ottoman territories within the national boundaries. The national forces would be mobilised in order to procure the integrity of the Ottoman homelands, the inviolability of the Sultanate-Caliphate and national independence.13 The Congress also appointed a Representative Committee [Hey'et-i Temsiliye], which included Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Kâzım [Karabekir] Pasha (the XVth Army Corps Commander), and Bekir Sâmi [Kunduh] to act as executive organ and to supervise the National Resistance Movement.14
12 Kemal Kahraman, Milli Mücadele (İstanbul: Agac, 1992 ), p. 41. 13
"Erzurum Kongresinin 7 Ağustos 1335 (1919) Tarihli Beyannamesi,'' in Mahmut Goloğlu, Erzurum
Kongresi (Ankara: Nüve Matbaası), 1968, pp. 187-188.
The next congress was held in Sivas, which decided that, all territories within the national boundaries on the signature of the Armistice, and inhabited by a majority of Muslim population, constituted integral part of the Ottoman State.15 It amalgamated all national and patriotic organizations with identical objectives into one entity known as a Society for the Defence of the National Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia [Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk-u Milliye Cemiyeti].16 The Congress also demanded the Sultan to convoke the Ottoman Parliament.
As a result, in December 1919, new elections were held in Thrace and Anatolia for the Ottoman Parliament and an overwhelming nationalist majority was returned to the Parliament, which assembled in Istanbul on January 12, 1920. On January 28 the deputies approved the National Pact (Mîsâk-ı Millî), based on the declarations of Erzurum and Sivas Congresses. The Mîsâk-ı Millî consisted of six articles and affirmed the unity and independence of those territories in Anatolia and Thrace 'inhabited by the Ottoman Muslim majority.' Certainly, this program was not admissible for the Allies, who clearly intended an absolute political and economic enslavement of the Ottoman State.17 The Allied Supreme Council decided on a reinforced occupation of Istanbul and a firm control over the Straits.18 On March 16, 1920, the Entente Powers employing mainly British forces occupied Istanbul. Besides, the martial law was put in force in the city and in its environs, the National Parliament was dispersed, some of the deputies were arrested and sent to Malta, and those who were able, fled to Anatolia. Consequently, the Hey'et-i Temsiliye decided to convoke a new Parliament in Ankara. On April 23, 1920, the new Parliament, "the
15 ''Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaai Hukuk Cemiyeti'nin Sivas Kongresine Kabul edilen prensipleri ve
tüzüğü,'' Mahmut Goloğlu, Sivas Kongresi (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası), 1969, p. 219.
16 The Society presided in Sivas. On December 27, 1919, the Hey'et-i Temsiliye moved to Ankara. 17
V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin, Istoriya Revolutsii v Turtsii (Moscow: Mir, 1923), p. 105.
18 Bülent Gökay, A Clash of Empires. Turkey between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism,
Grand National Assembly of Turkey" (the GNA), invested with the extraordinary power, inaugurated its work. The GNA of Turkey proclaimed itself the sole legal government, exercising the will of people.
The Leaders of the National Resistance Movement and their Strategy as regards Soviet Republic at the beginning of the Movement
In Amasya, as far back June 19, 1919, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, together with Hüseyin Rauf [Orbay], former Naval Minister and Ottoman Delegate to Mudros, Ali Fuat [Cebesoy], Commander of the XXth Army Corps in Ankara, Refet Pasha [Bele], the highst-ranking member of Kemal's own staff, and Selaheddin Bey, the IIIrd Army Corps Commander, had discussed the matters regarding Bolshevism. At the end of April 1919, the Red Army began the counter-offensive against the Army of Admiral Kolchak in Siberia, which was one of the principal grain-producing areas. As a result of the offensive, the Red Army had captured a substantial portion of Siberia.19 In Amasya, they pondered over the issue about the possible resources and means the National Resistance Movement, and, principally, taking into account of the scarcity of means in Anatolia of those days, whether it would be favourable to establish contacts with Soviet Russia.20 Then, they had come to the conclusion that "since the Islam population of Kazan, Orenburg, and the Crimea had accepted Bolshevism, it would
19 B. N. Ponomaryov (ed.), History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow: Foreign
Language Publishing House, 1960), pp. 322-323.
20 Feridun Kandemir, Atatürk'ün Kurduğu Türkiye Komünist Partisi ve Sonrası (İstanbul: Sinan
not jeopardize the country."21 They had also decided to use their contacts with the Bolsheviks in order to make the Allied troops leave the country and to insist on the Allied Powers that the stay of the Allied troops in the country might be the reason for the incursion of the Bolsheviks into the country.22
For that moment, Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his friends had concluded that it would be a good idea to send incognito some earnest men to the Bolsheviks, and to initiate negotiations with them. It was also assumed that it would be a step that would prevent the entry of the Bolsheviks into the country with power and in great quantity. At the same time, Mustafa Kemal Pasha did not put aside the possibility of the receiving of the Soviet extraordinary representatives and thus, to negotiate with them regarding whether they were able to provide with weapons, ammunition, technical means and in case of need with people.23 It was also supposed that in case of concluding an agreement with the Bolsheviks, it would be expedient to keep them on the other side of the frontier as a weapon in order to make the Allied troops leave the country. Consequently, as far back the initial stage of the National Resistance Movement, its leaders had the intention of establishing contact with the Bolsheviks. The Turkish leaders had hopes of obtaining from the Bolsheviks arms, equipment, and ammunition for the movement. On the other hand, they considered the Bolsheviks as an "instrument of intimidation", which could be used against the Entente. At this stage, the leaders of the National Resistance Movement were not yet proposing co-operation with the Bolsheviks. All these considerations were expounded by Mustafa Kemal Pasha in a letter to Kâzım Karabekir Pasha, dated June 23, 1919.
21 "Mustafa Kemal to XVth Army Corps Commander, His Excellency, Kâzım Karabekir Pasha, 23
April 1919," in Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi), 1969, the Second Edıtıon, p. 56.
22 Ibid., p. 57.
In early July, 1919, Kâzım Karabekir Pasha had reviewed all these matters with Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Rauf Bey in Erzurum. Kâzım Karabekir Pasha shared these considerations to some extent.24 He had related about the measures, which he had already taken in the matter of the establishment of contacts with the Bolsheviks.25
However, Kâzım Karabekir Pasha held that even if Bolshevism could be harmless and even appropriate, the Russians would still be the previous "Moskof" [Muscovite].26 He advised them to abstain from concluding any agreement with the Bolsheviks without his knowledge, since the essence of their policies was yet unknown.27 Consequently, the Turkish resistance leaders concluded that the Bolshevism would expose the resistance movement into decomposition. In order to avoid misunderstandings, Kâzım Karabekir proposed that himself be named as the only authorized and responsible person, who would directly contact with the Bolsheviks. Taking into account that Kâzım Karabekir Pasha was the Commander of all military forces of the National Resistance Movement in the eastern Anatolia and his connections, he was granted this authority.28 It should be noted that Kâzım Karabekir had started organizing the collection of information regarding Soviet Republic and operations of the Red Army as far back in April 1919. During his stay in Trabzon, he had even published a newspaper, where it had been said, "since the Bolsheviks are enemy of our enemy, hence they might be our natural ally."29 Further, in accordance with their agreement in Erzurum in July 1919, he sent Doctor Fuat
24 Feridun Kandemir, p. 24. 25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.; Moskof is a name, by which the Ottoman Turks, with bitter memories, usually called the
Russians.
27 Feridun Kandemir, p. 24. 28 Ibid.
29 Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 21. Kâzım Karabekir Pasha had installed a radio set and had
employed an official for receiving news in Russian and French. He began receiving news of Moscow radio, Berlin and Paris news agencies, and sometimes from the ships in Istanbul and in the Black Sea. see: Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 24.
Sabit and Doctor Ömer Lûtfü Bey to Baku, and the former was charged to come into direct contact with the Bolsheviks.
The Hey'et-i Temsiliye was intending to create a split in the ranks of the Entente and to enlist the moral support of Western opinion.30 To this end, as early as September 1919, Mustafa Kemal Pasha received the American Military Mission under General James Harbord.31 Despite their belief that Britain was mainly responsible for the occupation of Izmir by the Greeks, the leaders of the National Resistance Movement had considered it unwise to isolate themselves from Britain completely, even if their relations were restricted to unofficial casual meetings between Army officers.32
Towards the end of 1919, the Entente Powers showed some interest and wish for concluding a peace with Turkey. However, the peace was not concluded. In Mustafa Kemal's view, there were two reasons. The first reason was that the Allied Powers could not arrive in a common agreement regarding the matter of the Straits. The second reason was the success of the Bolsheviks and the Allied suspicions that the Turks would dive in to the Bolsheviks.33
In February 1920, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, analysing the policy of the Entente as regards the National Resistance Movement, came to the conclusion that the Entente had drawn up a plan, which would make Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Governments of North Caucasus a barrier to prevent the Turks from the contacts with the Bolsheviks.34 He realized that if this plan would be implemented, Turkey would
30
Salahi Ramadan Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923. Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National
Movement (Sage Publications: London, 1975), p. 23.
31 Salahi Ramadan Sonyel, p. 23. 32 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
33
'' From Mustafa Kemal to the XVth Army Corps Commander Kâzım Karabekir, 6 February 1920,'' in Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 441.
be unable to carry out resistance.35 On the other hand, the establishment of the contacts with the Bolsheviks would give the Turks an opportunity for getting weapons, ammunitions and other technical means for the Resistance Movement from the R.S.F.S.R. [the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic].36 On February 6, 1920, he expounded these considerations in a telegram to Kâzım Karabekir and stated that the Caucasus was 'the only possible front where the Turkish National Movement could initiate a counter attack against the Allied Powers. Mustafa Kemal Pasha urged that the Turks should do everything in the Caucasus to facilitate the Bolshevik control of the region.37 Thus, in his view, the extermination of the Caucasus barrier had become one of the most immediate necessities.
It should be noted, however, in February 1920, Mustafa Kemal, firstly, had intended urgently to get into contact with the Islamic government of Daghestan and Azerbaijan and to learn their attitude to the Entente' plan.38 He proposed to make arrangements with the Bolsheviks only in case if the Caucasian nations were willing to play the role of barrier against the National Resistance Movement in Anatolia, as the Allies would tide them to become.
Kâzım Karabekir Pasha did not share this view. In his opinion, the occupation of the country from all sides and the destruction of the country as a result of the creation of the Caucasian barrier by the Allied Powers were impossible.39 Therefore, there was no necessity at all to start military operations in the eastern provinces.40 In his view, while the Bolsheviks had not yet crossed the Caucasus and Azerbaijan, such
35 Ibid. p. 442. 36 Ibid. 37
"From Mustafa Kemal to Kâzım Karabekir, 6 February 1920," in Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl
Harbimiz, p. 443.
38 ''From Ankara to the Commander of the XVth Army Corps, Ankara 6/2/1920,'' in Kâzım Karabekir,
İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 443.
39
"From Kâzım Karabekir to the XXth Army Corps Commander, 14 February 1920," in Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 443.
a move would expose the National Resistance Movement to danger of being crushed by the Allied Power and the country would be destroyed.41 He advised Ankara to wait for the right moment, and for the time being, to be careful and circumspect, at the same time doing everything to obviate the despair of the people and its hopelessness.42
The R.S.F.S.R and the East
Until the end of October 1919, all those measures, which the Soviet Government had accepted for the establishment of mutual relations between Soviet Russia and the East, had been accidental.43 There was no planned and steady policy in this matter.44 The pronouncements of the Bolshevik leaders on policy on Asia at this time scarcely went beyond the assertion of the right of self-determination for oppressed peoples and the denunciation of imperialism.45 Until 1919, the question of revolutionization of the East had existed in the mind of only a few Bolshevik leaders.46 For instance, in November 1918, Stalin, addressing the First Congress of Muslim Communists in Moscow, said "the liberation of the peoples of these countries [Persia, India, Afghanistan, and China] from the yoke of the imperialists world …
41 Ibid. 42
"From Kâzım Karabekir to the XXth Army Corps Commander, 14 February 1920," in Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 444.
43 M. Sultan-Galiev, "Sotsial'naya revolyutsiya i Vostok," in Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, Izbrannye Trudy
(Kazan: Gasyr, 1998), p. 199.
44
Ibid.
45 Edwart Hallet Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923 (London: Macmillan, 1953), v. III, pp.
undermine imperialism at its very foundation."47 However, the Congress confined its attention primarily to the Muslims of the former Russian Empire.48 Owing to the lack of knowledge concerning the East and as consequence of this fear of the East, the idea of participation of the East in the world revolution was profaned.49
European or world revolution was the acknowledged condition of the building of socialism in Russia and the very survival of the regime. The Bolsheviks held that if the peoples of Europedid not arise and crush imperialism, the Soviet regime would be crushed.50 The Bolsheviks thought that revolutionary ferment among the working classes of Britain, France, Germany, and America, where, in their opinion, material and moral power of world imperialism had been collected, could give rise to the world social revolution. The Bolsheviks believed that there were all conditions for the progress of the social revolution in the developed countries of the West. For them, the working classes of these countries had already understood that capitalism was exploiting them.51
However, during the two years since the October revolution, there was no social revolution in the West. In January 1919, the Spartacist Union, a group that split off from the majority of socialists and favoured the seizure of power by violent means, was decapitated in an unsuccessful uprising by the killing of its two leaders, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht.52 Then, the majority of the socialists turned the
46 M. Sultan-Galiev, "Sotsial'naya Revolyutsiya i Vostok," in M. Sultan-Galiev, Izbrannye Trudy, p.
200.
47 Ibid.
48 Edwart Hallet Carr, p. 234. 49 Ibid.
50
Vtoroy Vserossiyskiy S"ezd Sovetov (Moscow: 1928), pp. 86-87.
51 In connection with this, the Communist Party of Bolsheviks was carrying on intensive propaganda in
the West. With that end in view, within a few weeks of the revolution the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel) had established a section for propaganda under Karl Radek. For this, see: Edward Hallet Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923 (London: Macmilan, 1966), v. III, p. 18
52 Moore - J. R. Barrington, "Power Politics in the West," in Arthur E. Adams (ed.), Readings in Soviet
conservative forces in the army to suppress the uprising. Similar outbreaks in Munich on April 7, 1919, and in Hungary on March 21, 1919, ended likewise in failure.
In the face of these frustrations, in early 1919, the Bolsheviks began turning their eyes to the East. The First Congress of the Commintern, which met in March 1919, did not concern itself greatly with the Eastern Question.53 Still, in this Congress, Mevlevizade Mehmet Mustafa Suphi, a Turkish Communist émigré and a member of the Central Bureau of the Muslim Organizations of the Russian Communist Party, vigorously argued that revolution in the East was of central importance in impelling the proletariat of the West to seize power.54 By revolting against their colonial masters, Suphi believed, the East would deprive the industrial nations in the West of raw materials, thereby generating crises that would inevitably bring down the capitalist system. Thus, to Suphi, revolution in the Orient was necessary "not only for the liberation of the East from European imperialism, but for the support of the Russian Revolution as well."55 The Congress, in one section of its manifesto, after referring to a "series of open rising and revolutionary unrest in all colonies," observed that "the purpose of Wilson's programme, on the most favourable interpretation, is merely to change the label of colonial slavery". It also declared that "the liberation of the colonies is thinkable only in connection with the liberation of the working class in the metropolitan countries."56
Later, in the same month at the Eight Congress of the Russian Communist Party, Nikolay Bukharin pointed out that if the Communist Party propounded the solution of the right of self-determination for the colonies, it would lose nothing by it,
53 Edwart Hallet Carr, p. 235. 54
George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey (Stanford: Stanford University, 1967), p. 55
55 Ibid.
for the national gain as whole would damage foreign imperialism.57 The Congress adopted a revised party programme which noted that the world-wide growth of imperialism had brought about "a coupling of civil war within particular countries and of oppressed peoples against the yoke of the imperialist Powers," and demanded "a policy of bringing together the proletarians and semi-proletarians of different nationalities for a common revolutionary struggle against landowners and bourgeoisie."
In October 1919, Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, the leading Kazan Tatar Bolshevik, the Chair of the Central Moslem Military Board under the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs, in his article Sotsial'naya Revolyutsiya i Vostok [The Social Revolution and the East], which appeared in parts in October and November issues of
Zhizn' Natsional'nostey, the organ of the Commissariat of Nationalities, also
accentuated the importance of the East for the revolution. He came to the conclusion that "the Eastern Question was one of the problems, to which the revolution was advancing in practical form", and that "in conditions of the present-day reality and political situation in the world, this question was no more no less as one of the phases of the natural development of the world social revolution."58 He considered it necessary to learn the Eastern Question comprehensively not only in social-economic but also in international-political aspects in order to settle it. Moreover, in order to define the attitude of the Bolsheviks to it once and for all, he also suggested that the Bolsheviks should consider and pre-determine all forms of the development of the East could take.59
57 Vos'moy S"ezd RKP (B), 19-23 Marta 1919 g. (Moscow: Institut Marksa-Engel'sa-Lenina, 1933), p.
49.
58
M. Sultan-Galiev, "Sotsial'naya Revolyutsiya i Vostok," in Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, Izbrannye Trudy, p. 199.
Sultan-Galiev put forward a thesis that the Western bourgeoisie was the world bourgeoisie, and for overthrowing which, it necessitated concentrating on the revolutionary will and energy of all proletariat, including the proletariat of the East.60 He forewarned that if the Bolsheviks struggled against the world bourgeoisie only with the proletariat of the Western Europe, they would leave to the world bourgeoisie complete freedom of action and manoeuvre in the East.61 He wrote, "as long as world imperialism would have the East as a colony, where it was the owner of all natural resources, the world imperialism would be successful in all skirmishes with workers in mother countries, and it would have a possibility to stop workers' mouth, satisfying their economic demands."62 In his opinion, even if the workers won a victory over their bourgeoisie, Soviet Russia would have to encounter with the East, since the bourgeoisie of Western Europe would concentrate all its power in "outskirts" and, in the first place, in the East."63 In the final part of his article Sultan-Galiev grounded a revolutionary importance of the East. In his opinion, the East was the main resource of world imperialism and, therefore, imperialism without the East would pine and die of its natural death.64
At the same time, he wrote, "the East was a cradle of despotism and that there was no guarantee that Eastern imperialism, having won a victory over imperialism, would not revive. In his opinion, there was also no guarantee that the feudal of China, India, Persia, and Turkey, having been freed from foreign yoke with the help of Soviet Russia, would not join the imperialists of Japan and Europe and would not take
60 Ibid., p. 201. 61 Ibid., p. 200. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid.
64 M. Sultan-Galiev, "Sotsial'naya Revolyutsiya i Vostok," in Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, Izbrannye Trudy,
the field against their 'liberators' in order to escape from the 'infection' of Bolshevism.65
Sultan-Galiev's article had appeared on the eve of the Second All Russian Congress of Muslim Communist Organizations, which was held in Moscow from November 22 to December 3, 1919. The delegates of the Congress discussed the Eastern Question. It was supposed that the Congress would carry the energy of Communism from Soviet Republic to the East in order to excite it.66 Lenin spoke openly of the need to translate the true communist doctrine which was designed for the communists of more advanced countries into the language of each nation. Sultan-Galiev repeated once again that the World Social Revolution could not be put into effect without the participation of the East.67 He stated that "in the first place the Soviet government needed to have done with the World bourgeoisie," and, for this purpose, "it had to support any movement which shared this aim."68 He pointed out that the Bolsheviks would have to support these movements until World imperialism was overthrown and the worker class of the Western Europe established the authority of the Workers and Peasants Deputies Soviets in Western Europe.69 He said that after the defeat of World imperialism, Eastern imperialism could be born, and the imperialists of Turkey, Persia, India, China, and Japan would start a campaign against Europe.70 He stated that it would be a new robbery. He suggested to follow a policy
65 Ibid.
66 Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, "II Vserossiyskiy S"ezd Kommunisticheskikh Organizatsiy Narodov
Vostoka. Rech' Pri Otkrytii S"ezda, 22 November 1919," in Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, Izbrannye Trudy, p. 205.
67 Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, "Doklad po Vostochnomu Voprosu, 26 November 1919," in Mirsaid Sultan
Galiev, Izbrannye Trudy, p. 216.
68
Ibid., p. 219.
69 Ibid. 70 Ibid.
aimed at setting up the Communist Parties in the East, and to group socialist elements, which, subsequently, could be the nucleus of the Communist Parties.71
On November 26, 1919, the Congress passed the Resolution on the Eastern Question that declared the problem of the international social revolution to be insoluble without the participation of the East, and determined the task of Communist Parties in the East. In accordance with it, the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was to set up gradually Communist Parties in the East as sections of the Third Communist International, and to support to a certain extent the national movements in the East, which aimed at overthrowing of power of the Western imperialism there.72 Consequently, towards the end of 1919, not only the workers of the developed countries of the Western Europe, but also of the East were regarded by the Communist Party of Bolsheviks as part of the world revolutionary movement.
The failure of the peace decree to evoke any response from the Entente and the pressing need to end the war with Germany first forced on the Soviet leaders the conception of a policy directed to meet national interests and national requirements. The Bolsheviks strove to uphold and maintain the authority of the State against the encroachments of other states until such a time as their dream of revolution in Europe should come true.73 They had at all costs to take the Soviet Republic out of the war.
In this respect, another significant factor had made its appearance. The East, and the Middle East in particular, from the point of view of national security, began gaining exceptional importance. As matter of fact, the British contingents in the Caucasus and in the Central Asia made in the first months of 1919 several moves
71 Ibid., p. 220. 72
Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, "Proekt Rezolyutsii po Vostochnomu voprosu, 26 November 1919," in Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, Izbrannye Trudy, pp. 222-223.
openly directed against Soviet forces.74 Mikhail Pavlovich, a leading Soviet Orientalist, stated the situation as such:
Britain tries to draw the Mohammedan masses into struggle against us [the Soviet Republic]. Leaning on the support of the propertied classes, landowners, big merchants, speculators, and high ranking clergy in Bokhara, Afghanistan, Persia, and partly, in the Ottoman Empire, Britain is preparing a front against us from the Asia Minor through north-eastern Persia (Khorasan), Afghanistan, the mountainous Bokhara and the Russian Pamirs to the basmaci Fergana, where the Basmaci mutinied. … In response to our striving for consolidating the working-masses of the East, Britain begins making advances to the Pan-Islamist movement and tries to turn the whole Mohammedan world against us. Britain is preparing a Holy War of the Mohammedans against Soviet Russia, carries out intrigues in the Caucasus, Turkestan, and Fergana, and supports the devastating operations of the Basmacis (the Fergana brigands).
In that way, Britain tries to encircle us by the iron ring of states that are hostile towards us. These states will have to play the role of a buffer between the Soviet Republic and the British possessions and colonies in the East. On the other hand, Britain provokes the Mohammedan world against us, and incites it to Holy War against us. Britain, implementing this plan, pursues defensive ends, i.e., the defence of the avenues of approaches to India, Persian Gulf, and the Bosphorus, but, at the same time, it pursues offensive ends.75
Consequently, the Middle East became in 1919 the theatre of an all but declared war between Great Britain and the RSFSR.76 As Istanbul, the Black Sea, and Anatolia were the parts of this geography, the Soviet government began to strive to prevent any attacks against Soviet Republic from these parts of the Middle East. For this purpose, at first, the Soviet government tried to rely upon the workers and peasants of Anatolia in order to stir them up against the Sultan and the Allied Powers. With this end in view, on September 13, 1919, Chicherin, the Foreign Affairs Commissar, issued a broadcast appeal to the workers and peasants of Turkey. The appeal read:
74
Ibid., p. 235.
75 Mikhail Pavlovich, "Revolyutsionnaya Turtsiya," in Mikhail Pavlovich, Sobranie Sochineniy
Comrade Workers and Peasants of Turkey!
Your country has always been a military camp. The European Great Powers, considering you a "sick man," have not only failed to offer you a care, but, on the contrary, have intentionally maintained your condition, because each of these Powers has aimed at driving you away from the European continent, at seizing the Straits, or, at least, at bleeding, weakening, and enslaving you…
The salvation of your country and of your rights from alien and domestic vultures is in yourselves…
Your brothers, the workers and peasants of Russia - fed up with the meanness of their own domestic vultures and bloodsuckers, who were in the habit of selling Russia to foreign vultures, the European robbers - have now decided to take the government into their own government.
But that is not enough. A union of the toilers of the world against the world oppressors is necessary. Therefore, the Russian Workers' and Peasants' Government hopes that you, the workers and peasants of Turkey, in this decisive and momentous hour will stretch out your fraternal land to drive out the European vultures by joint and united effort, to destroy and to make impotent those within your own country who have been in the habit of basing their own happiness upon your misery.77
However, neither the workers nor peasants of Anatolia and Istanbul could rise on their own against the Sultan. In all probability, the Soviet authorities were little, if at all, acquainted with the situation in Anatolia. In most cases, Soviet papers were informed about events in Anatolia and in the East in general, by relying upon the foreign press.78
The workers of Turkey were very small in number. Most of them were working in small-scale enterprises, which employed either one or two workers. Furthermore, the coup d'etat of 1908 had been a purely military affair. True, in 1908, several peasants did follow Enver and Niyazi then, but they were only Macedonian peasants. The six years of the rule of the Young Turks were the years of ceaseless political
76 Ibid.
77 "Obrashchenie Narodnogo Komissara Po Inostrannym Delam RSFSR k Rabochim i Krest"yanam
Turtsii, 13 sentyabrya 1919 g.," Izvestiya (Moscow), 13 September 1919: For the text in English, see: "Soviet Appeal to the Workers and Peasants of Turkey, September 13, 1919," in Jane Degras,
struggle. However, this struggle was not of the type which would embrace of segments of the society. The Young Turks, having come to power, isolated the workers and peasants with great care from the politics.79 In the colourful expression of Gurko-Kryazhin, a leading Soviet Orientalist, "the workers and peasants had kept silence during all this time," and "up to the end of the First World War, Anatolia had been fast asleep."80
Besides, at the moment of the appeal, there was already the Representative Committee [Hey'et-i Temsiliye], a body of authority of the National Resistance Movement in Anatolia. Therefore, Chicherin's appeal cannot have been wholly agreeable to the Turkish national leader.81 The appeal had undermined the discipline in the army and encouraged the resistance of the Armenians.82
The using of only appeals did not meet the Bolshevist cause. The matter required the working out of other measures. On November 26, 1919, as it has been said above, the Second All-Russian Congress of Muslim Organizations passed the resolution, in accordance with which, the Soviet Government would start supporting the national movements in the East.83
The Establishment of Contacts between the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Soviet Government
78 Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, "Polozhenie Turtsii v poslednee vremya," in Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev,
Izbrannye Trudy, p. 277.
79 V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin, p. 57. 80
Ibid. p. 45.
81 Edward Hallet Carr, p. 246.
On March 16, 1920, the Allies occupied Istanbul. All the official buildings in Istanbul, including the Chamber of Deputies was forcibly occupied by the troops of the Entente Powers and a great number deputies, who were acting in accord with the aims of the National Resistance Movement, were arrested. The same day, the XVth Army Corps Commander, Kâzım Karabekir Pasha received a telegram from the General Staff, where some provisions of the future peace treaty with Turkey had been set forth. In particular, it read as follows: "Syria, Palestine, and Iraq are to be separated from Turkey. Syria will be granted independence but under some restrictions. In Izmir, the Greek administration will be set up under the Ottoman Law. The local administration in Thrace will be established under the French protectorate."84 Kâzım Karabekir Pasha came to the conclusion that since the British and the Army of Denikin had suffered an absolute defeat in the Caucasus, the British, with their measures threatening the Turkish nation, were endeavouring to hand eastern provinces of Turkey to Armenia in order to establish contacts with the British forces through Mosul.85 In this connection, with the purpose of precipitating a contact with the Bolsheviks, the Representative Committee in Ankara approved Kâzım Karabekir's proposal regarding the giving permission to proclaim Bolshevism in Batum and asked him for starting the realization of this plan.86 On April 23, 1920, the Grand National Assembly opened, and the liberation of Anatolia assumed systematic and organized character. The GNA got down to work under an extremely difficult situation. The Allied Powers who numbered some 200,000 men had occupied large areas all around
83 Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, "Proekt Rezolyutsii po vostochnomu voprosu, 26 November 1919," in
Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, Izbrannye Trudy, p. 222.
84 ''Kâzım Karabekir to Hey'et-i Temsiliye and the Army Corpses, 16 March 1920,'' in Kâzım
Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 503.
85 ''Kâzım Karabekir to Hey'et-i Temsiliye and the Army Corpses, 16 March 1920,'' in Kâzım
the country. Together with this, different Armenian detachments amounting to 10,000 men and detachments of the local Greeks, seeking an independent Pontus State, numbering from 20,000 to 30,000 men, and other detachments of the local Greeks, operating with the Greek Army in the western Anatolia, were supporting the occupiers. These internal upheavals, which began against the national organisation spread rapidly throughout the country.87 It was clear that the idea of the National Resistance had not yet been assimilated by the whole population of the country. In that way, the newly established government of the GNA was forced to fight on external and internal fronts. Moreover, the leaders of the National Resistance Movement expected the intensification of pressure on the part of the Allied Powers.88
The National Resistance Movement was in dire need of financial sources. Because of the rupture of contacts with Istanbul and, the resulting impossibility of getting money out of Istanbul, financing provincial administrations became extremely difficult.89 The large-scale agricultural centres, which specialised in commodity production, were on the western shore of the Sea of Marmara (Thrace), in the southern Aegean districts (Izmir, Aydın), and in the Adana district.90 Moreover, the basic industrial plants were concentrated in Adana, Bursa, Izmir, and Istanbul.91 All these territories were now under the occupation of the Allied Powers. There were no
86
"From Mahmut, the XXth Army Corps Commander to Kâzım Karabekir, 16 March 1920,'' in Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 505.
87 Anzavur's insurrection which began on September 21, 1919, north of Balıkesir, was repeated on the
same ground on February 16, 1920 and on May 11, 1920; on April 13, 1920, a band of 400 men in the districts of Bolu and Düzce also rose; on March 14, 1920, Postacı Nazım, and Çerkes Kara Mustafa rose in revolt in the village of Kaman belonging to Yenihan; for these occassions, see: A Speech
Delivered By Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 1927 (Istanbul: Ministry of Education Printing Plant, 1963),
pp.383-389.
88 ''From Kâzım Karabekir to Their Excellencies Halil and Nuri Pashas, 17 March 1920,'' in Kâzım
Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 509.
89 ''From Mustafa Kemal to His Excellency Kâzım Karabekir Pasha 26 April 1920,'' in Kâzım
Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 626.
90 Çağlar Keyder, Dünya Ekonomisi İçinde Türkiye (İstanbul: Yurt Yayınları), 1993, p. 17. 91 Ibid., p. 66.
