Özal's politics with special reference to religion

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OZAL'S POLITICS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO RELIGION

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences of

Bilkent University

by

MURAT ÇEMREK

In Partial Fulfillment Of The Requirements for The Degree Of MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC

ADMINISTRATION

m ·' ,

THE DEPARTMENT OF

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION BILKENT UNIVERSITY

ANKARA September, 1997

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I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration.

Prof. Dr. Metin Heper (Supervisor)

P fo f.^ .'E fg u n Ozbucipn Examining Committee Member

* ^ sst. Prof. Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu Examining Committee Members

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Ali Karaosmanoğlu Director

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ABSTRACT

ÖZAL'S POLITICS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO RELIGION Murat (^emrek

Department of Political Science and Public Administration August, 1997

Present thesis aims to analyze ÖzaTs politics while taking his special reference to religion into consideration. About Özal's politics, domestic and international politics, the Southeast problem, economy and religion form the framework of this study. During 1983-1993, when Özal was on the stage either as Prime Minister or President, religion became an important factor in the life of Turkish society and the style of the relations between politics and religion changed a great deal. Özal introduced a new identity to Turkey since he defined himself as both a Muslim and a modern person. On the one hand, Özal stressed that Turkey is a secular state, on the other hand, he indicated that Islam kept society together. As a conclusion, Özal is evaluated as the last Ottoman sultan who is an engineer-merchant one but not a mullah. This evaluation generates from ÖzaTs style in policy formation as an engineer calculating the optimum risks and as a merchant searching for the most profitable one.

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ÖZET

DİNE ÖZEL GÖNDERMEYLE ÖZAL'IN SİYASETİ Murat Çemrek

Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Ağustos, 1997

Mevcut tez ÖzaTm siyasetini dine yaptığı özel göndermeyi dikkate alarak analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. ÖzaTm siyaseti hakkında, iç ve uluslararası siyaset. Güneydoğu sorunu, ekonomi ve din bu çalışmanın çerçevesini oluşturmaktadır. ÖzaTm sahnede Başbakan ya da Cumhurbaşkanı kaldığı 1983- 1993 süresinde, din Türk toplumunun hayatında önemli bir faktör haline geldi ve siyaset ve din arşındaki ilişkinin şekli oldukça değişti. Özal kendisini hem bir Müslüman hem de modern bir kişi olarak tanımladığından dolayı Türkiye'ye yeni bir kimlik tanıttı. Özal bir yandan Türkiye'nin laik bir ülke olduğunu vurgularken, diğer yandan da İslamın toplumu birarada tuttuğunu belirtti. Sonuç olarak, Özal mühendis-tüccar fakat molla olmayan son Osmanlı sultanı olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bu değerlendirme ÖzaTm politika oluşturmada bir mühendis gibi optimum riskleri hesap eden ve bir tüccar gibi en karlı olanı araştıran çizgisinden kaynaklanmaktadır.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all, I must express my deep obligation to Prof. Dr. Metin Heper for his patience and encouragement throughout the whole process.

I would like to express my special gratitude to Jeremy Salt, Ergun Özbudun, Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, Burak Arikan, Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, Ayşe Kadıoğlu and Evren Esen who have either read or provided their comments and recommendations.

I am grateful to my parents who encouraged me in my studies.

I would like to thank my friends, especially to Ahmet Ali Temurd for their valuable ideas.

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To My Grandmothers,

Illiterate But Wise Women...

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INTRODUCTION

Religion is one of the most important phenomena of Turkish politics. The role of religion has changed a great deal within the Republican period, following the inclusion of the principle of secularism into the Constitution in 1937. Essentially, the roots of secularism can be traced back to the Tanzim at (Reform) period. This is so because in the following period one of the aims of the Tanzimat, was to establish a central bureaucracy, secular in character; from that point onwards, rationalism became the measuring rod for the formulation of the national interest rather than religion. Because the political conception as the basis of the Tanzim at ^Qxxoài is closely linked to the rationalist tradition of the eighteen century Western Europe.'

Until this period in the history of the Ottoman Empire, the state seemed to be subservient to religion, according to the state philosophy of the Sunni interpretation of Islam. But the state kept its autonomous character vis-à-vis religion with the help of the religious bureaucracy loyal to the state in the persona of the Sultan. Moreover, the Adab tradition and the O rf-i Sultani provided the basis for this autonomy.

' Metin Heper, "Center and Periphery Relations in the Ottoman Empire; With Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century," International Political Science Review, 1, 1 (1980), 91 in Menderes

^mar, "An Evaluation of the Recent Debates on Restructuring of the Turkish Government: Federalism and Unitary State Arguments," Unpublished Master Thesis (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1993), 26-27.

^ The formation of m ezheps (sects) is mainly due to the political confrontation and the different

conceptualizations of fate. The dichotomy between Sunni and Shia has been shaped on the basis

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However, the Kanuimames (secular directives of the Sultan) had to be compatible with the provisions of the Sharia (Islamic Canon Law).^ The new formations of the Tanzim at reforms marked the beginning of unending debates between the religious and the secularized new strata of bureaucracy until the abolition of the religious bureaucracy in the Republican period. The Tanzimat reforms pronounced loyalty to the Sharia on the one hand, but on the other, the promulgation of some new laws decreased the significance of the religious bureaucracy and its network.

Since the 1980s, religion has gained an increasingly important place on the agenda of the society and the state in Turkey. For instance, at the present writing, the mass media has been full of news and comments about the İfta ^ given by the Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan.® The leaders of the prominent tarikats (religious brotherhoods) and cemaats (religious communities)^ were invited to the Official Residence of the Prime Ministry on his occasion. The triaP of Ms. Fadime Şahin who claimed to have been cheated by a quasi tarikat leader, Ali Kalkancı, also hit the headlines. The latter event is very interesting because it followed a police operation directed against Müslüm Gündüz -the leader of the

^ Burhanettin Duran, "Kenan Evren's and Turgut Özal's Conceptualization of Secularism A Comparative Perspective." Unpublished Master Thesis (Ankara; Bilkent University, 1994), 7. ^ İftar means the dinner to end the fastening of Muslims.

^ Necmettin Erbakan is the leader of the Prosperity Party (PP) which is pro-Islamic in attitudes as could as possible within the secular laws and the PP is the last chain of the tradition of the National Order Party (NOP) and the National Salvation Party (NSP) which were established again under his leadership.

^ The concept of tarikat carries mysticism in essence; cemaat, however, does not connote such a

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A czim endi tarikat-^ Gündüz was accused of having established a gang to destroy the secular character of the state. Şahin was found with him. Another important event is a list of the names linking Fethullah Gülen, a famous figure in the 1990s as a leader of a cemaat"^ which is one of the branches of the Nurcus^^, to the Mafia. Despite, the discussions about religion and its repercussions taking the first seat in popular daily debates, the secular character of the state is strictly underlined by the state elites.

In order to understand today's Turkey within the framework of the relations between politics and religion, we need to go back to the Özalian era. During 1983-1993, when Özal was on the stage either as Prime Minister or President, religion became an important factor in the life of the society and the style of the relations between politics and religion changed a great deal.

^ In fact there are several trials suited by her against Ali Kalkancı, Müslüm Gündüz and the Ministry of Interior. For further information see M illiyet and other Istanbul daily newspapers of

11 January 1997.

® This tarikat is a newly established one which is keen on the execution of Surma (the life and

practices) of the Prophet Muhammad in many ways, most visibly in their dressing.

^ Fethullah Gülen is a retired preacher who is shown as a tarikat leader in the mass media as a

misinformation. In fact. Gülen, or Fethullah Hoca, as he is popularly known, is in debt to Hikmet Çetinkaya, a columnist in Cumhuriyet, Istanbul daily, whom Gülen sued more than one thousand

times, winning each of these trials. Cumhuriyet is known for its harsh attitudes towards the

Islamic circles in the country.

The Nurcu ecole was established by Bediüzzaman Saidi Nursi by pamphlets he had written to

prevent the formation of atheism due to the positivist education. A/br means light in Arabic and

Nurcu is intended to mean the disseminator of the light generating from the Qu'ran to society.

Following the death of Saidi Nursi, the ecole was divided into different branches and groups by his first generation of the pupils and 'others' who followed the methods and discourses. It is interesting that the cemaat under the leadership of Fethullah Gülen and the tarikat under the

leadership of Müslüm Gündüz take the pamphlets of Saidi Nursi as source. Moreover both Gülen and Gündüz are not from the first generation of the pupils. But they can be included within 'others' as they are far from the orthodoxy of the Nurcus represented by the first generation of

the pupils and their followers. However, the deviation in the examples of Gülen and Gündüz is so much apparent even though they are on the different sides of the hill. Because the first generation of the pupils of Saidi Nursi and their followers try to be remote from media, tarikat

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In the first chapter, the issues of religion and politics will be addressed through an etymological analysis. Moreover, special references to the history of the Islamic and Christian culture will be made.

The second chapter will focus on the development of the interaction between state and religion within the context of the Turkish political history both in the Ottoman period and the Republican era.

In the third chapter, I study OzaTs approach to politics and religion within his conceptualizations. I mainly deal with his policies about domestic and international politics, the Southeast problem, economy and religion.

In the final, fourth, chapter, I briefly assess Ozal as the last Ottoman sultan who is an engineer-merchant one not a mullah. This evaluation generates from his style in approaching the matters as an engineer calculating the optimum risks and as a merchant searching for the most profitable one.

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CHAPTER I

POLITICS AND RELIGION

Islam is mainly observed as a total religion rather than a mere composition of theological beliefs and worship rituals. It is also a means of guiding political, social and economic aspects of life for the M uslim s, its true believers.

In the Western understanding, religion is conceptualized as a compartment of life to be reserved for certain ritualistic matters, so it is separated from other spheres of life such as economy. This is in contrast with the Islamic understanding of religion. It is also contrary to the inauguration of the prophets not just Muhammad but Jesus too. All the prophets are expected to invite people to obey the rules of revelation, namely the regulation of life, and not only the ritualistic matters. Yet the Bible depicts "Render to God that which is God's and to Caesar that which is Caesar's"" While, Allah of Islam does not share his power with anyone else.

Before discussing the issue, it will be useful to dwell on the concepts such as religion, politics, secularism from the perspectives of Islam and modern thought. Then, these concepts; politics and siyaset, religion and din·, and secularism will be explained with their historical background embracing them.

" Mark, 12:13; Matta, 22:15, Luke, 20:25 quoted in Ali Bulaç, İslam ve Demokrasi, Teokrasi- Totaliterizm (İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 1993), 119.

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Politics

Politics is such a challenging concept that one can be lost among the various conceptualizations of different writers and theoreticians. In the field of the political science there is no common definition of politics to which all political scientists subscribe. One definition takes politics, the conflicts related to sovereignty claims that is bound to state. If this definition is accepted, then the term "politics" will not include conflicts not related to the state. It is possible to identify politics with power, ruling, distribution of resources, borders and territories, (nation) states and supra-national organizations. According to Geoffrey Roberts and Alistair Edwards, "...in modern usage 'politics' has come to denote the activity in social system, whether the social system of the state or of other communities or institutions, by which the goals of the system are selected, ordered in terms of priority (both temporally and in terms of resource allocation), and implemented."^^

From its etymological origin, politics comes from the Greek word "poli^' which means the political community of citizens identified within the borders of a city-state. In the classical conception of Aristotle in The Politics, he dubbed politics as the master art and suggested that politics necessarily involves a form of practical knowledge concerning both what is good for the community and

Geoffrey Roberts and Alistair Edwards, A Dictionary o f Political Analysis (London: Edward

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how to attain that good.^^ His distinction between the activity of politics and the second order of activity of political theory illuminates a critical disjunction between freedom, power and tru th .P o litic s mainly involves the ways by which political authorities come to power and leave it. To be a "political authority" means having the power and ability to decide goal-oriented matters within the terms of resource allocation. In modern democratic politics, these are represented by parties, interest groups, social movements, and behavior of individuals within the context of participation and their electoral choices and lastly, the organization of government machinery by which political decisions are implemented.^^ Politics is based on the existence of conflict-consensus dichotomy which results in further development of the process of politics.

For the first half of the twentieth century, the institutional definition of politics dominated the discipline of political science, orienting the conceptualization of politics to involve the activities of the official institutions of the state. This approach was severely criticized as failing to encompass the full range of political agents; political parties, political bosses, and pressure groups operating behind the scenes to influence political o u tc o m e s.T o avoid these limitations of the institutional definition, politics can be defined as the "struggle for power." This approach is based on the conception of the individual as being

Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan, eds.. Encyclopedia o f Government and Politics

(London: Routledge, 1992), 24. Ibid., 25.

Roberts and Edwards, Dictionary. 107.

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actuated primarily by the libido dom inandi, the will to p o w e r.T h e n politics is said to be a essentially zero-sum game in which competition plays an important role and domination for the sake of exploitation is the chief objective.

As a third approach, pluralists have a third conception of politics 'the process of interest accommodation', or of "partisan mutual adjustment."^®

The fourth approach - that of the functionalists - viewed politics as involving the performance of a number of functions without which society could not exist, whereby the task of political science is to define these critical hmctions and how they are performed in divergent cultural and social contexts. Functionalists developed the system approach, that is, how changes in one part of the political system affect other parts and how the system as a whole maintains a homeostatic equilibrium.

A fifth approach in political science, behaviorism, was committed to the belief that definitions must be value-free, that concepts should be operationalized in a thoroughly non-prescriptive manner and that research methodologies must be neutral techniques directed towards the collection and organization of data. However, post-behaviorism challenged neutralityhy suggesting that all research is theoretically constituted and value permeated. In recent years, critical theorists and post modernists have suggested that the notion of critical distance is a myth. They emphasize that every scientific discourse is productive, that is, such a discourse generates positive effects within its investigative domain. The

post-Ibid., 27. ‘8 Ibid., 28-29.

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modernists' approach has asserted that political science must be seen as a productive force creating a world in its own image, even employing conceptions of passivity, neutrality, detachment and objectivity to disguise and conceal its role.“

Politics in Islam

In the Islamic context, politics is conceptualized as the determination of the rights and obligations of people and the establishment of order in society. Muslims are invited to salvation and to enjoy its benefits both in this world and after their death In Arabic siyaset means politics, which is etymologically from the same root as siyasa (to groom or to train horse) Islamic politics aims at the happiness of people in this world and the next, and orients people to this end metaphorically. This conceptualization of politics is related to the phenomenon of the Day of Judgment which is absent in Western political thought. If we trace back the roots of Western thought to Machiavelli, his advice to the Prince was based on the realpolitik. The Prince is advised to employ oppressive methods if necessary.“ Consequently, IslampolitiI<^^ is different from realpolitik as it is ideal, while realpolitik is based on conjectural premises. According to Islamic

Ibid., 32. “ Ibid., 34-35.

Ibn-i Abidin, Reddii'l Muhtar (Istanbul: ?, 1983) Cilt (vol.) 8, 186 in D evlet ve Siyaset, Yusuf

Kerimoğlu (Ankara: Misak Yayınları, 1995), 45.

Bernard Lewis, The Political language o f Islam (Chicago: the University of Chicago press, 1989),

11.

It is not implied that Machiavelli advised the Prince to oppress people all the time but even his ideal way of politics advocated violence when needed, but in the case of ideal way of Islamic politics the ways through oppression are closed.

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political thought, secular politics is zalim (oppressive) politics because it paves the way to the destruction of the world and the nature of human by performing his unbounded ambitions.“ The duty of the ideal Muslim is to establish politics according to the wishes of Allah“ rather than himself which will be the adil (just) politics. Again ac/a/ef (justice) is intended to mean the execution of the Sharia?^

Although the ideal way of politics in Islamic context was practiced during the life of the Prophet Muhammad and in the period of H ulefa-i Ra§idin (Rightly Guided Caliphates) following the death of the Prophet, in the later periods Islam politik became the victim of realpolitik. In the history of Islam within the political context, deviations paved the way to the formation of hostile groups within the same religion.

Generally, the history of Islam is divided as 1. The Period of Muhammad, 2. The Period of H ulefa-i Ra§idin and 3. The Period of Saltanat (Sultanate). Within the period of Saltanat, we encounter both the monarchies and the empires established by Muslim conquers and statesmen as in the examples of Umayyads, Abbasids, Fatim ids and later on Ottomans. I would like to suggest that the period of Mu'awiya, as it is suigeneris, should be placed between the second and third ones as Mu'awiya's grasping of power was not a Monarchical type but by

Islam politik as a concept will be used to denote the ideal ways of politics according to the basic

tenets of Islam versus realpolitik which paves the way to think issues within secular character

according to just worldly benefits.

Imam Fahruddin-i Razi, Mefatihü'l Gayb (Tefsir-i Kebir), (Ankara: ?, 1988), Cilt 5, 13 in D evlet ve Siyaset, Kerimoğlu, 46.

In English, God is not equivalent of Allah but just İlah, that is why we used this term.

Yusuf Kerimoğlu, Islam i Hareketin M ahiyeti (Ankara: Misak Yaymlan, 1988), 26. Yusuf

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sword meaning bloodshed. Following Mu'awiya, the monarchical succession started as his son, Yezid, taking over the office of the Caliphate, not because of his competence but kinship to the Caliph. Of course, nepotism is contrary to the essential spirit of Islam Mu'awiya set a pattern, dynastic succession, which others followed, often accompanied by bloodshed.

Within this context, because of the absence of the notion of "two swords", the historical experience of Islam in the arena of politics did not lead to secularism but instead to the merger of religion and the state. Then, in the monarchical period of Islamic history, religion was employed to legitimize the state in the eyes of its Muslim citizens.

In the state philosophy of Islam, theoretically there is no separation between the religion and the state as they are fused to each other. The exercise of a public office is one of the most important duties of religion, and, public office is essential to the very existence of religion.

In the light of the above, one can ask why did not the religious authorities take responsibility for state administration? Why did the ulema (scholars of Islamic sciences) stratum/class give overt consent to the monarchical character of the so-called Muslim empires and kingdoms? The answer proposed by this author are twofold. Firstly, in the monarchical history of Islamic politics we

writes in Akit, a pro-Islamic Istanbul daily. He uses his original name when writing about world

issues, but he uses his pen name while writing on Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence).

For further information see Mustafa İslamoğlu, İmamlar ve Sultanlar (İstanbul: Denge

Yaymlan, 1990) and Abu ala Mawdudi, H ilafet ve Saltanat, 3’^'* ed. (trans. Ali Genceli) (İstanbul:

Hilal Yaynlan, ?)

B. Lewis, C. H. Dellot and J. Schacht, eds.. Encyclopedia o f Islam, Vol. 2 (Leiden: F. J. Brill,

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encounter the absence of the autonomous organization of religion as in the West; only the state could preserve its autonomous character vis-à-vis the other groups and organizations. Consequently, the state became a sacred en tity which was immune from sin, and the sultans, who were at the apex of this sacred entity became in the eyes of people zillullah, the shadow of Allah on the earth. Secondly, the Sunni ulema behaved in a pragmatic and modest manner to the extent that it was possible within the boundaries of Islam. This was formulated in the famous statement of Islamic State philosophy that: "One night without a Sultan (ruler) is worse than the sixty years with an oppressive one."^° In fact, Sunni ulema remained loyal to the state as state kept the main five security principles intact. These were composed of can (life), m al (property), akıl (intellectual), n esil (generation) and din (religion). Also, they did not want to wage war against the state because they feared the results of the bloodshed which would be very severe that they could not afford its cost on the Day of Judgment. Moreover, they refrained from entering into politics, because it is

stated in the in Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad that 'the duty for

administration is not wanted but executed when it is offered'.

Religion

The root of the word "religion" is uncertain as it may be derived from the Latin relegere (to go over again), religari (to bind oneself), or re-eligere (to choose

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again) In terms of usage, it is usually defined as having dealings with the sacred and, in its stricter meaning, it denotes the worship of God that arises out of this concern and reflection. Religion also takes on a social dimension. This is related to the concrete expression of man's infinite transcendence, and the absolute worth of his hopes, his genuine needs and his limitless desires. According to Thomas Aquinas, the task of the religion is to sustain man's orientation towards God, the label "religious" applying to everyone concerned with the basis and the purpose of the world what we call God.^^ This particular understanding of religion within the Christian concept paved the way to its being accused by the proponents of the Enlightenment of being hostile to science, and constituting an obstacle in the way of emancipation and the growth of democracy, because it leads to false consciousness and subjectivism.^^

In this context, it will be useful to dwell on the approach of Christianity towards the concept of the 'state'. From the immediate perspective of Western liberal society, it is obvious that contemporary Christianity seeks to distance itself from political p o w e rH o w e v e r, in Rome, the Church is and always has been caught up in the process of political power. The Protestant churches also play a critical role especially on such social questions as abortion, environment, nuclear arms and etc. Also, the Protestant churches appeal to the individual conscience, with exhortations to scrutinize public policy from the outside and to

Karl Rahner, Dictionary o f Theology, 2"^* ed. (New York: Herbert Vorgrimler, 1981), 437.

32 Ibid. 33 Ibid.

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instruct the public about the moral dimensions of political and social issues. That is why the Victorian Dissenters managed to combine their laissez faire in religion with an insistence that the government should enforce Christian personal morality with use of the state power

In the old "Christendom" model of the Church-State relations during the Middle Ages, organized society was seen as a unit to be divided into spiritualities and temporalities based on the manner they functioned. That up to a point, it was the Church claiming the precedence which was acknowledged by the temporal power. The two areas of responsibility, for the souls and for the bodies of humans were regarded as equally Christian and interdependent. As Edward Norman put it, "The strength of the arrangement was based on the regard that social organization unavoidably embodies ideological preferences which simply imposed Christian beliefs and practices rather than countenance the supremacy of others."^

In Christian thinking, the concrete form of government in a state is not part of a permanent Divine institution but subject to historical change. In the Middle Age, it was the 'divine right' of kings to establish states as responsible only to God. So the state must be servant of the common good and not its master. The separation of the Church and the State is explained as its issue preserves the Christian from regarding the state as "sacred" and "numinous" as Christianity

Edward Norman, "Power and the State," in Companion Encyclopedia o f Theology, ed. Peter

Byrne and Leslie Houlben (London: Routledge, 1995), 778. “ Ibid.

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"demythologized the notion of the s t a t e . S o in the life of a Christian, only God is the sacred entity. Consequently, in today's world Christian thinking is ambiguous towards the conceptualization of state as Christians no longer regard it as providing a suitable structure for the cultivation and propagation of religious idea(l)s.^® The state is too internally divided by moral pluralism or cultural values to be able to prescribe life-styles and ultimate beliefs for its

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citizens.

In Islam, as did^ came to mean primarily the style of life, then the state, as an aspect of life would be shaped according to Islam, and would be the embodiment of religion, because din denotes all the laws promulgated by Allah to guide man to his final end. Then, the submission to these laws means the submission to Allah and the implementation of these laws is conceptualized as worshipping.^^ As Mawdudi puts it, the term of din in Arabic is more inclusive than religion in English as it embraces all aspects of life both for the individual and the society, because din denotes both the faith and the life style established

Rahner, Theology. 487.

Norman, "Power," 792. Ibid., 787.

"...din signifies obligation, direction, submission, retribution. Whether referring to the Hebrew-

Aramaic sense or the ancient Arabic root, there will remain the ideas of debt to be discharged (hence obligation) and of direction imposed or to be followed with a submissive heart...c/in must be translated 'religion' in its most general and frequent sense. There is no doubt about this translation. But the concept indicated by din does not exactly coincide with the ordinary concept

of 'religion' because of the semantic connexions of the words. Religio evokes primarily that which

binds man to God; and din the obligations which God imposes on His 'reasoning creatures'...Now

the first obligation is to submit and surrender one's self to him (s)ince the etymological sense of Islam is 'surrender of self (to God)' in The Encyclopedia o f Islam, Vol. 2, eds. B. Lewis, C. H.

Dellot and J. Schact (Leiden: F. J. Brill, 1983), 293. ·" Ibid., 295.

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over this faith Lewis notes that, within the historical context, we cannot encounter any separation based on the dichotomy of religious and secular, layman and preachers. According to Islam, every Muslim is responsible for the practices of the religion, not just the preachers. And within the framework of these practices, invitation of others to Islam is also included which shows the absence of a special missionary clergy class responsible for this function.

The Islamic world did not have an institutionalization of the mosque analogous to that of the church. One may perhaps remember here the case of the m edrese system, but m edreses were employed as one of the state ideological apparatuses. As Şerif Mardin had indicated, in the Ottoman Empire the religious bureaucracy acted as the agent of the state and the members of the religious bureaucracy ensured the state's control of social life through a network of education, judiciary and administration.^^ But in the era following the Tanzimat, the medresesi prestige waned as they had been dismantled from the decision making process and they had been dominated by the secularized military and civil parts of the bureaucracy. So medreses were actually supplanted by the new schools.

The Ottoman Empire followed the historical tradition of the merger of Islam and the state as in the expression of the din-u devleti'^ Following the

Abu ala Mawdudi, Tefhimu'I Kur'an, Kur'an'm Anlam ve Tefsiri, cilt (vol.) 1, (İstanbul: İnsan

Yayınlan, 1986), 101,102.

Mardin, Türk M odernleşmesi, Makaleler (Lsiaribul: İletişim, 1991), 94.

^ Niyazi Berkes, The D evelopm ent o f Secularism in Turire/(Montreal: McGill University Press,

1964), 9-10, Mardin, Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset, Ma/ra/e/er (İstanbul: İletişim, 1992), 117, Binnaz

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conquest of the Egypt in the time of Yavuz Sultan Selim, the office of the Caliphate passed to the Ottoman sultans which meant that, from then on, the Ottoman sultan represented the highest spiritual as well as temporal authority. The Ottomans carried not only the banner and the sword of Islam but were responsible for the political integrity of the Umma (Islamic community). In enforcing the provisions of the Sharia, the Sultan was assisted by the Sheikh-ul- Islam who held the highest office of the religious bureaucracy until the onset of the secularization process in the Empire in the nineteenth century. Theoretically, the position of the Sheik-ul-Islam preceded that of the Caliph.

With the M illet system adopted by the Ottoman Empire, as in the preceding Muslim empires and kingdoms, two types of citizenship developed; the M illet-i H akim e (governing nation) and the M illet-i M ahkum e (governed nation)^^. It must be noted that the meaning of m illet does not correspond to the meaning of nation as it was used in the post-French Revolution period. The usage of m illet by the Ottomans did not denote ethnicity but religion and its laws. M illet, etymologically comes to mean a "w ord" in dictionary usage; it connoted a group of people who accepted a word, meaning a H oly Book^^ In the dictionaries, m illet was interpreted as religion , Sharia, way, tarikat The basis of the m illet system in the Ottoman Empire was established by Mehmed the

Conqueror, but the system goes back to the earlier Muslim monarchical

Bilal Eryilmaz, "Birlikte Yaşama Düzeni: Osmanh M illet Sistemi." Bilgi ve Hikmet, Kış 1994,

sayı:5, 91-97 and for further information see Ali Bulaç, "Ulus-Devletin Suistimal Ettiği

lenm :M illet." Nehir, sayı:2, Temmuz-Ağustos 1993, 38-43 and Bilal Eryılmaz, Osmanh D evletinde M illet Sistem i (İstanbul: Ağaç Yaymcıhk-Altematif Üniversite, 1992)

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p e r i o d s . M illet-i Hakime, in practice meant the superiority of the Muslim population in the Empire compared to the m illet-i m ahkum e, citizens from other religions.

The M illet system was abandoned following the Tanzim at Period. All citizens of the Ottoman Empire were declared to have the same rights, without taking their ethnicity and religion into consideration, in order to gain a new image in the eyes of the West, as one of the reasons. Later on, in the Abdiilhamid period, Islam came to the stage not as a star but with a small role, mostly being "a toy in the hands of the Sultan"^® to unite the Empire once again around Islam. That is why Pan-Islamism was adopted, while other ideologies were also discussed fervently for the same end of saving the Ottoman Empire. But none of them was useful and the Ottoman Empire came to an end. In the days of the War of Independence, Islam became the main means of legitimization for both the K uvay-i M illiye, the Nationalist Forces, led by the Ankara Government and the remnant of the Empire, Istanbul Government. The photographs taken at the opening ceremony of the Grand National Assembly reflect the importance of Islam, as the prominent figures of the forthcoming secular republic open their hands for praying between the crowds of religious people.

^ Bernard Lewis, İslam'ın S iya siZ2f7y (trans. Fatih Taşar) (Kayseri: Rey Yayıncılık, 1992), 62.

Kadir Canatan, "Toplum Tasarımları ve 'Birlikte Yaşama Felsefesi." Bilgi ve Hikmet, Kış 1994

sayı:5,105.

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Secularism

Secularism is one of the most debated issues in Turkey within the context of politics. That the approach to secularism has significantly changed since the Ottoman period that is still one of the most important issues in Turkish politics.

The secularization process in the Ottoman period aimed at the bifurcation of religion and the state. Following the establishment of the Republic, the founding fathers started to execute their own secularization because they evaluated institutional religion as an obstacle to progress. For Mustafa Kemal and his cadre Islam was not thought to function as a 'civil religion' for the modern Turkish polity Turkish secularism has been mainly the interference of state elites directed towards the removal of Islam from state affairs arising from rationalist and positivist attitudes of Enlightened Despotism toward life. Also, it can be conceptualized as a legal institutional separation that gave fruit following the Turkish modernization process.

Secularism etymologically derived from the Latin term saeculum which meant 'era', 'tim e', 'generation' and 'a g é ^ Secularism emerged as a counter phenomenon to the theological explanations of religion in the West. That is why Doğu Ergil defines secularism as the revolt against theological and metaphysical absolutes and universals both in social and political institutions.^^ At its base, secularism aims to substitute reason for such supernatural and transcendental

^’ Ibid.,1. Ibid., 4.

Doğu Ergil, Secularism in Turkey (Ankara:?, ?), 1 quoted in A Comparative Perspective, Duran,

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approaches as Divine Law. Secularism was expected to pave the way to the formation of a new ethical system composed of principles referring to human conscience. At the last instance, this foresaw the abolition of religion with its repercussions on all aspects of life related to the Divine premises.

Laicism as a concept related to secularism etymologically is derived from the Greek term /aos meaning 'people' and 'laikos'm eaning 'la y . It emerged from the constitutional practice of France in the nineteenth century. Laicism connoted the necessity that the state refrain from supporting any religious group at the expense of other religions. It is well to remember the approach of Christianity which is based on the dichotomy of the stratum/class of clergy versus laymen. This dichotomy kept the clergy powerful until the Reformation. On the other hand, until this period in Europe, there had been confrontation between monarchs and the Church. This confrontation had not been continuous since the 'Holy Roman Emperor' was a title granted on submission of the ruler to the Church. The popes were capable of using their power to humiliate monarchs. But after a certain point, as the national state emerged, the monarchs refused to accept the superiority of the 'spiritual sword' held by the Pope and established, eventually, their own Protestant churches. However, the Church remained the only organized and powerful institution in Europe following the fall of the Roman Empire in the Middle Ages until the establishment of national states.

Although both secularism and laicism refer to the separation of church and state with repercussions of duality and separation, Niyazi Berkes indicates a

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difference. According to Berkes, secularism emphasizes "the idea of worldliness" and laicism refers to the 'distinction between the laity and clergy'.“

Historically, the process of secularization cannot be distinguished from the general modernization process that we encounter both in Ottoman and

Republican history. Secularism emerged as the sine qua non of the

modernization process.

It will also be useful to dwell on the concept of Byzantinism , referring to the domination of religion by the state. Byzantinism, in this sense, is just the opposite of theocracy in which religion governs state activities. In this context, Ali Bulaç, a prominent Muslim intellectual in Turkey, rejects the claim that Islam allows a type of government to be conceptualized as theocracy.“ As the concepts secularism, laicism and Byzantinism are related to the historical experience of Christianity, so theocracy should be conceptualized within this context and, he reminds us Christianity and Islam are different.^ As the institution of the Church does not have an institutional counterpart in the Islamic context, then it will be useless to search for the meaning of theocracy within the boundaries of Islam.

The secularization process within the legal proceedings in the Tanzimat period included codification, or the adaptation of secular legal codes, and the opening of secular courts. This brought a clash within the judiciary system until the abolition of the religious courts following the foundation of the Republic. The clash was due to the absence of judges trained in the secular tradition.

Berkes, D evelopm ent o f Secularism. 5.

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The Ottoman State could not dismantle its religious identity so easily, Berkes has remarked that secularization throughout the Tanzim at and M eşrutiyet periods was not the separation of religion and the state into two different spheres but rather was a process of bifurcating through a series of changes in one sector of life while another sector of life remained static.®^ In the Constitution of 1876, the K anun-i Esasi, even constitutionalized form of the Tanzim at reforms could not develop into secularism as Islam was declared as the official religion of the state (article 2) and the Sultan-Caliph remained both the head of the state and religion (article 4).^ Briefly, Islam preserved its status within the state; however, it soon lost its ability to shape the policies and goals of the state as in its heyday.

During the reign of Abdülhamid II, there emerged a paradoxical approach to secularization. Abdülhamid wanted to benefit from Islam to deal with the following issue: how could the Ottoman Empire could be saved and revert to its golden days? Abdülhamid was undoubtedly a devout Muslim, devoted to modernize the state, but this 'ideological' use of Islam was directed towards strengthening the state outside the heartland- in relations with Arabs, and, establishing the possibility of Muslim unity as a threat to the western powers. But Duran has noted that the strength of the state in Abdülhamid's period was such that Islam became 'an ideological tool in the hands of the Caliph, rather

^ Ibid., 133.

Berkes, D evelopm ent o f Secularism. 480.

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than an end in itself^^, because Abdiilhamid supported the modernization and secularization process of the state by promoting the secular education, as noted before. In the Young Turks Era nationalism was favored rather than religion meaning the radicalization of the secularization process within the Ottoman State. Essentially, the reforms of Young Turks were the basis of the forthcoming Turkish Revolution.'’®

Religion played a very important role during the War of Independence. However this role was rather paradoxical as the m üftis of both Ankara and Istanbul governments were issuing counter fetwas (legal proclamations) each pointing the finger at the other as traitors to Islam. Later in the war, Islam was used as a successful rallying call to defend the nation against the attacks of the infidels. Eighting in the war against the attackers had its attraction: one would become a şehit (martyr) and go to heaven after dying for the fatherland or one would become the g a zi (war veteran) and a savior of the country. The Ankara government used the religious symbols liberally and, at the beginning of the war even declared its aim as being that of saving the offices of the Sultanate and Caliphate. This aim was confirmed at the congresses of Erzurum and Sivas and at the inauguration of the National Assembly in Ankara However, following the

Burhanettin EHiran, p. 13.

Murat (^emrek, "The Historical Background of the Reforms in the Ottoman-Turkish Tradition.' Unpublished Manuscpript, 23.

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victory in the Independence War, contrary policies were adopted. The Caliphate as well as the Sultanate were abolished

The abolition of the Caliphate opened a new chapter in Turkish politics, as an office which represented the unity of Muslims all over the world no longer existed. At the end of World War I, the Middle East witnessed the emergence of nation-states accelerating the exclusion of Islam from the political arena both at the theoretical and practical levels. Subsequently, Islam kept its low profile except for the activities of such movements as the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. Following the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the leadership of Ayatullah Khomenei, Islam was regarded as a third major ideology after liberalism and communism. But the development of the modern international system forced every country, including Iran, to behave according to the secular

norms of the system. This brought confusion between Islam politik and

realpolitik.

“ The abolition of the Sultanate paved the way for contemporary Muslim theorists to rethink the relation of Islam and monarchy and conceptualize it as a historical experience of Islam due to the conditions. N ew Islamic state models have been suggested other than the Sultanate. One example, here, is Ali Bulaç's Medina Document Project, see Ali Bulac, M odem Ulus D evlet

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CHAPTER II

ISLAM IN OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND TURKISH STATE

The Iranian Revolution in 1979^ opened a new chapter in world politics, as Ayatullah Khomeini returned to Iran as a glorious commander and declared the establishment of the Islamic stated Speculation that the message might elicit a similar response elsewhere in the Islamic world^ brought the question mark into minds of people about Turkey, because Turkey carried great potential as a neighbor of Iran's and as a country that was the seat of the Caliphate for a long time. These factors, it was thought by some, made Turkey a possible candidate for the same process. Moreover, the chaotic political climate of the country bolstered this anticipation.

The question behind the thesis was whether the Islamic revival in Turkey would pose a threat to the survival of the modern Turkish state and undermine Turkey's relations with Europe.·* The 'Save Jerusalem' rally on 6 September 1980 in Konya, organized by the pro-Islam National Salvation Part)^ (NSP), was the catalyst for military intervention on 12 September 1980.

' For further information about the Iranian revolution see Asaf Hüseyin, İslam Dünyasma Siyasi Bakışlar (trans. Murat Çiftkaya) (İstanbul: İz Yaymcılık, 1991), 255-260 and John L. Esposito ed.,

The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact Florida International University Press, 1990) ^ Barry M. Rubin, M odem Dictators: Third World Coup Makers, Strongmen, and Populist Tyrants

(London: H. W. M en, 1987), 232.

^ İlkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, "Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey," Government and Opposition, 18 (1983), 421.

Richard Tapper, "Introduction" in Islam in M odem Turkey; Religion, Politics and Literature in A Secular State, ed. Richard Tapper (London: LB. Tauris, 1993), 1.

^ Burhanettin Duran, "Kenan Evren's and Turgut Özal's Conceptualizations of Secularism: A ComparaHve Perspective." Unpublished Master Thesis (Ankara: Bilkent university, 1994), 37.

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The predicted scenario did not eventuate: as İlkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak had predicted, "Islamic politics (of the National Salvation Party and the street politics of radical Islamic groups) was strong enough to figure in the equation of democratic breakdown, but far too weak to detonate an Islamic revolution."* Nevertheless, Turkey faced a military intervention which was partially directed against the politics of the NSP. The rally in Konya was an important reason for the military intervention. Kenan Evren, head of the junta, said: "...The events in Konya indicated the extent of (religious) reaction. The events in Konya showed us the imminent danger and its nature."^ At the rally, the demonstrators marched in long robes and fez and carried green flags. They shouted slogans calling for the restoration of the Sharia. Moreover, some of the participants refused to stand up during the playing of the national anthem. In this context, the result was harsher than the NSP anticipated, because they lost control.®

Military intervention was the beginning of a new chapter in Turkish politics as the military brought the breakdown o f democracy fo r the sake o f the

^ Sunar and Toprak, "Islam in Politics," 421.

^ Kenan Evren, D evlet Başkanı Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri 1980-1981 (Ankara: TBMM

Basımevi, 1981), 17 and Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren'in Anıları, vol. 1 (İstanbul; Milliyet, 1990), 220

quoted in A Comparative Perspective, Eharan, 37.

® Mehmet Keçeciler was the mayor of Konya at that time. Following the military intervention, like all mayors, he lost his office. Later on, he would become one of the founders of the Motherland Party (MP) and kept his post as the Senior Vice Chairman of the party. This post was created for him specifically, and he was regarded as the leader of the conservatives in the party. He kept his office in the party until the assassination attempt on Özal. Ironically, he was one of the closest men to Özal but Özal prevented his ministership, indicating that Evren did not want to see him in that post. Later on. Keçeciler found out in conversation with Evren that his name was not even included in any tentative list of the ministers given to Evren.

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dem ocracy until they returned to their barracks, a characteristic of military interventions in Turkey.

The Role of Islam in the Ottoman Period

ClassicaLAge

Islam was the core factor of the Ottoman state, motivating to the formation of the Empire. The founder of the Ottoman state, Osman Bey became the leader of the Ottoman tribe following the death of his father Ertugrul Bey. The tribe maintained the g a zi tradition, meaning that they were executing attacks against the castles of the Byzantine.^ The motive behind these attacks was the notion of jih a d (holy war), against the infidels. Osman Bey was the son-in-law of Sheikh Edebali who is accepted the spiritual father of the Ottoman state because of his prominence in Islamic sciences. As could be observed in the founding of the state, religion was one of the most important components of the state formation.

Later on, following the conquest of Istanbul by Mehmed II the Conquer, FatiH^- the state would need to expand its territorial reach in order to be termed an Empire. Again, behind the conquest, the aim was the same: the N izam -i Alem , (Order of the World) according to Islam.

While Islam kept its prominent role in the state, it figured in the imperial- patrimonial structure of the Empire at two basic levels. First at the center, Islam

’ Sunar and Toprak, "Islam in Politics," 425.

Fatih in Arabic means the 'one who opens' and this conquest is commemorated as the opening

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appeared "as a scripturalist. Sharia-minded, ulema-governed orthodoxy" and at the periphery "as a primordially embedded heterodoxy permeated by sects, tarikais, sheikhs, saints with supernatural powers, and as a latitudinarianism tinged with mysticism, tasawwui."^^ But an alliance between the central and the peripheral Islam had been struck in which their sharp edges had been rounded off and a degree of overlap had been achieved. "This imbricative pattern would serve to minimize conflict, allow for co-existence and to bridge the gap between the two worlds."'^

The Ottoman state had a large territory and the population was not just Muslim but included a multiplicity of religious groups ranging from Jews to Orthodox Christians. In order to deal with these different religious communities, the M illet (religious community) system was established, as previously noted, on the dichotomy of m illet-i hakim e (governing millet) and m illet-i m ahkum e (governed millet). In this system the religious communities were granted autonomy and could apply their own judiciary systems.’^ The system worked smoothly during the heyday of the Empire until the nationalist winds started to blow in the Ottoman territories following the French Revolution in 1789.

In the Ottoman Empire, because of the lack of contact between state and society, the religious establishment was used as substitutes for linkage.R eligion

" Sunar and Toprak, "Islam in Politics," 422. Ibid.

Bilal Eryilmaz, "Birlikte Yaşama Düzeni: Osmanli Millet Sistemi." Bilgi ve Hikmet, Kış 1994, no.

5, 91-97 and Kadir Canatan, "Toplum Tasarımlan "Birlikte Yaşama Felsefesi." Bilgi ve Hikmet,

Kış 1994, no. 5,98-108.

Şerif Mardin, "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution." International Journal o f M iddle East Studies, 2 (1971), 205.

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was institutionalized within the bureaucratic structure and religion was effective in supplying the ideals of political legitimization among the people. Moreover, religion was quite efficient in the socialization process with its close connections of politics. According to Şerif Mardin, Islam was the main institution of controlling culture as a means of establishing a generalized social control which is also valid in norm formation.^^

The prominent role of Islam did not eclipse the prominence of state which was superior to everything. The Ottoman state retained its sovereignty vis-à-vis Islam despite the fact that the aim of the government was to realize the ideals of Islam in the society. Thus the Sultan had an ambiguous position towards religious law.’^ The Sultan had autonomy vis-à-vis the religion. The fact that the members of the religious institution were appointed and could be dismissed by the Sultan, made religion part of the whole bureaucracy. Considering the patrimonial character of the Ottoman bureaucracy, it is easy to understand why Islam could not develop an autonomous structure vis-à-vis the state, since the religious bureaucracy was expected to be loyal to the Sultan.

However, as noted, there was an ambiguous balance between state affairs and religion as each depended upon the other. Members of the religious bureaucracy had the theoretical right to denounce the acts of the Sultans by promulgating their contrary opinions by the fetw as of the Sheikh-ul-Islam.'^ But

'5 Ibid., 206.

Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey { Walkington: The Eothen Press, 1985), 27.

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this did not give them the right to interfere directly in state affairs as they could promulgate their fetw as ov\y following the enactment of the laws.

The Ottomans, maintained the earlier Turkic-Iranian state traditions, namely that when necessary for the sake of the common good or the raison d'être of the state, the ruler could take measures that might be against the law.'® In this context, it is useful to point out the existence of the concept Orf-i Sultani which was developed because of this issue. Orf-i Sultani meant the "will or the command of the Sultan as a secular ruler." This issue was based on the codification of the Kanuns (laws) in compilations called Kanunnames, drawing on Islamic traditions as well as Turkish, Byzantine, and Slavic legal sources.’’ These kanuns were enacted from the fifteenth century onward and, in time, were modified or abolished according to the time and situation in order to formulate legislation parallel to the Sharia. The Ottoman Sultans would benefit from kanuns by promulgating hundreds of them which were concerned with public law, state finances, taxation, economic life and criminal issues. Even the Giilhane Rescript (1839) was prepared in the form of a decree.^® On the other hand, this secular rule was based on the measuring rod of "necessity" and "reason", and not "the personal whims of the Sultans."^' This paved the way for the emergence of the adab tradition as a secular and state-oriented philosophy

Heper, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey Toward A Reconciliation?" The M iddle East Journal,

51, no. 1 (Winter 1997), 33.

Ali Kazancigil, "Democracy in Muslim Lands: Turkey in Comparative Perspective."

International Social Science Journal, 128 (1991), 348.

“ Halil İnalcık, "The Nature of Traditional Society (:Turkey)." in Political M odernization in Japan and Turkey, eds. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Princeton: Princeton University

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which developed as a consequence of efforts to bring about a state structure with established values.“

All these were consistent with the Ottoman state philosophy based on the concept of "justice''. The absolute power of the Ottoman Sultan would be supported in the "old Oriental m axim that a ruler can have no pow er w ithout soldiers^ no soldiers w ithout m oney, no m oney w ithout well-being o f his subjects, and no popular well-being w ithout justice." This saying had been repeated in Turkish political literature from Kutadgu Bilik, in the eleventh century, to the Gülhane Prescript of the nineteenth century, and was regarded as the summation of practical statesmanship.“ The main aim of the state was articulated as that of preserving justice which meant maintaining the order of unalterable tradition by reassuring the position of each social stratum according to its functions and merits.“

However, the heyday of the Empire did not last and the glorious victories came to an end. The magic had gone and the Ottoman State started to lose its brightness following the end of the Classical Age. Thus emerged the question of "H ow can we save the state?"w hich was repeated until the end of the Empire. Koçu Bey, a seventeenth century official and courtier, in his famous detailed memorandum in 1630 to Sultan Murad IV, suggested some reforms in order to return to the golden days of the state. According to him, it was necessary to

Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, 25.

Ibid.

İnalcık, "The Nature of Traditional Society (Turkey)," 43. Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey. 26.

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resurrect the strong sultanate. Thanks to Sultan Murad IV and the grand vizieis of the Köprülü family, tighter control of the bureaucracy was back once again, and the state became to some extent s t r o n g e r B u t this was not enough to end the decline. The incapability of the succeeding Sultans played a significant role here.''

Because the reforms and their execution were not effective, the state had to search for further reforms as the Ottoman Empire fell into a weak position against the West. European expansionism had begun to create a remarkable awareness in the Ottoman in the eighteenth century, such that Muslims faced trouble from the infidel world. This new formation oriented them not to look down on the infidels any longer, but to learn how to beat them at their own game." This would give birth to a new chapter in Ottoman history with further repercussions, among which was the Tanzim at

The

Tanzimat

Period

The Tanzim at starts with the reading of the Giilhane H att-i H üm ayunu (Imperial Rescript of Gülhane) by Mustafa Reşid Pasha in the reign of Abdülmecid (even though the main figure of the period is remembered as Mahmud II) and continues until the Kanun-i Esasi, the first Constitution of the Ottoman Empire in 1876. The aim was obvious: in order to save the Empire, the Ottomans had to imitate their enemies, who had gone a long way in the

Ibid., p.35

Heper, "Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective." The M iddle East Journal, 35 (1981), 347.

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development of the war techniques and artillery in addition to trade and production. Firstly, the Ottomans were interested in developing the artifacts and strategies related to war. In the first steps of modernization, it was thought that it would be enough for the army to be modernized. However, the reformers could not see the all-embracing character of modernization which would penetrate every aspect of life and state affairs. But in time they experienced various effects of the modernization process.

According to İlkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, Islam that was related to the state went through a "mutation"^®. Following the consolidation of the Ottoman Empire, Islam animated the g a zi warriors of the state against the infidel in their sacred struggle. However, Islam became a factor involved in the imperial power mechanism and the accommodation with the "incipient secularism of the Ottoman state"^^ This resulted in further centralization of power and secularization of the state. And it was understood that modernization in the military sphere alone, i. e. without it taking place throughout society, would be fruitless.

The reforms through modernization were designed by the state elites to strengthen the state and the administration. With this in mind, reforms were gradually extended to the establishment of a secularized judicial and educational

Carter Vaughn Findley, Ottoman Officialdom, A Social H istory (Vrmceton·. Princeton University

Press, 1989), 20.

Sunar and Toprak, "Islam in Politics," 424. Ibid.

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system and improvements in the status of the non-Muslim minorities.^® These reforms would give an end to the M illet system by making all citizens of the Ottoman Empire equal without taking their religion into consideration. Moreover, due to the modernization process, the meaning of justice changed to the "promulgation of secular legislation outside the jurisdiction of the Islamic traditions and autonomous from them;"®^ this type of legislation would allow for the free functioning of the new bureaucracy based on reason vis-à-vis the prescriptions of the Sharia. This would pave the way for the eclipse of the ulema. Accordingly, they started to lose the important educational, judicial and religious posts which they had earlier gained while they were incorporated into the state bureaucracy through a giant network of central and provincial offices. Thus the state began to extricate itself from the holy authority of Islam;®^ the whole issue can be related to the changing basis of legitimization of the Ottoman state from Islam to reason and the secular laws of the judiciary system. In sum, the T anzim at's secular modernization would cause a serious split within the state between the ulema, the religious part of the bureaucracy, and the other secularized parts, the civil and the military bureaucracy.®®

Following the Tanzimat, the Sultan started to distinguish equally between his office as ruler of all Ottoman citizens and his office as caliph only to the

Kazancigil, "Democracy in Muslim Lands," 350.

Niyazi Berkes, The D evelopm ent o f Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: The Mcgill University

Press, 1964), pp. 94-95 quoted in "Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective," Heper, M iddle East Journal, Vol. 35,1981,349.

Toprak, " The State, Politics, and Religion in Turkey," in State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 121.