New directions in Turkish foreign policy : Turkey's interaction with the newly independent Republics of Central Asia and the challenge of Russian hegemony

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Republics of Central Asia and the Challenge of

Russian Hegemony

A thesis submitted by David A. Benedetti to

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the Degree of Master of International Relations

Bilkent University

Ankara,

TURKEY

October 1999

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I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opmmn it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.

Assistant Professor, Giilgiin Tuna Thesis AdYisor

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With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, five Turkic republics emerged as independent states in Central Asia. Situated to their west, the Republic of Turkey was the first country to officially recognize their independence and initiate diplomatic

relations. In its early years of interaction with the region, Turkey ambitiously embarked on numerous economic and political endeavors, forging close and unprecedented

relations with the republics. Popular explanations for Turkey's activities in the region note the common heritage and linguistic ties between Turkic populations; Turkey's desire to promote itself as a model for regional development; and Turkey's frustrated relations with Europe and its subsequent desire to 're-orient' its foreign affairs toward the east.

Though each of these explanations deserves some attention, this thesis argues that Turkish policy toward the new republics was guided by more significant concerns for the development of a stable region with amicable ties to Turkey. Turkey's efforts to promote intra- and inter-regional cooperation, to integrate the region into global economic and political structures and to bolster the autonomy of the republics all represent Turkish visions of positive development for the region.

Though internal factors limited Turkey's ability to wholly succeed in its Central Asian policies, the greatest challenge emerged from the reassertion of Russian interests and influence in the Russian 'near abroad'. In direct contradiction of Turkey's

objectives, Russia panned to use its military, economic and political leverage in the region to 're-integrate' the republics into a Moscow-dominated network of inter-dependent states, exclusive of non-regional actors (especially the West).

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OZET

1991 'de Sovyetler Birligi'nin <;okmesiyle Otar Asya'da be~ bag1ms1zTilrk CwnhunyetI Devlet1 ortaya <;1km1~tir. Bu devletlerin batismda yer alan Tilrklye CwnhwiyetI bunlarm bagms1zhg1m resm1 olarak kabul eden ve diplomatik ili~lilere

giren ilk iilke olmu~tur. Bolgeyle etkile~imin ilk yllannda, Turkiye bu iilkelerle daha oncelmayan s1k1 ekonomik ve politik giri~imlerde bulunmaya ba~lam1~tir. Tilrkiye ile Avrupa arasmda zaman zaman ya~anan gerginlikten dolay1 d1~ ili~kilerinde, Dogu'ya yonelme istegi, bu devletler ile Tilrkiye arasmda olan ortak miras ve dil baglar1 ve Ttirliye'nin boigesel olarak kendini omek iilke olarak gosterme istegi

Tilrkiye'ninboigedeki giri~imlerinin a91klamas1 olmustur. Biitiin bu ac1klamalara rargmen bu tezde; Tiirkiye'ninasil

endi~esininboilgedekahc1 ban~ baglarm1 geli~irme istegi oldugu savunulmu~tur.

Tilrkiye'nin yurti<;i ve yurtd1~1 bolgesel birligi geli~tirme, bolgeyi global ekonomi ve politikyap1da biitiinle~tirmeve devletlerin yonetiminde daha fazla soz sahibi olmas1m Tilrkiye bolge i<;in geli~me olarak gormii~tilr.

Turkiye'nin kendi ic;:inde bulunan sm1rlamalar11n yanmda hala o bolge de biiyiik bir gii<; olan Rusya'nm ilgive etkisi Tiirkiye'nin bolgedeki ama9lanna ul~masmda olumsuz yonde etki etmi~tir. Tlirkiye'nin biitiin bu ama<;lanm tam z1tt1 olarak Rusya, askeri, ekonomik ve politik etkisini kullanarak bOlgede Moskova merkezli (Bat1 iilkelerinin etkisinden uzak) ve birbirlerine bagh devletler bag1 kurmay1 planlam1~tir.

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The author would like to express his thanks and appreciation to his thesis advisor, Assistant Professor Gtilgtin Tuna, for her many valuable suggestions and assistance in putting together a final product. To the members of his defense committee, Assistant Professors Nur Bilge Criss and Serdar S. Gilner, for their constructive criticisms and guidance on important research items. Finally, the author would like to acknowledge his fellow students in the Master of International Relations program at Bilkent University and their many shared and contested points relating to this thesis topic.

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Abstract bzet Acknowledgments Table of Contents I. Chapter One:

CHAPTER ONE

Turkey's Reaction to Independence in 'Turkic' Central Asia

1.1 Issues Under Consideration:

The analysis contained within this thesis seeks to answer two pnmary questions concerning ihe Republic of Turkey's foreign policy objectives in regard to the newly independent states of Central Asia:

Firstly, immediately following the independence of Central Asia's former Soviet republics, Turkey launched numerous economic, political and diplomatic measures directed at developing solid relations with these new states. The first question of interest to this essay is why Turkey, though itself a fledgling nation among the ranks of industrialized countries, would dedicate substantial financial and human resources to a geographical region with which it had virtually no interaction since Kemal Ataturk's 1923 declaration of the Turkish Republic. In other words, what were the paramount forces which compelled Turkey to embark on an unprecedented and ambitious Central Asian foreign policy? In answering this first question, this thesis argues that Turkey's actions in Central Asia directly reflect its interest in guiding the political and economic development of the region's republics, thereby fostering a more stable regional environment and promoting positive interaction between the Turkish Republic and the newly independent states.

Secondly, after an initial period of energetic contact with the Central Asian republics, Turkey significantly decreased its interaction with the region. Where its regional activities had been formerly pronounced in optimistic and exaggerated wording, two years later, relations came to be characterized by a more realistic and pragmatic agenda. What led to this change in Turkish policy and expectations? An account of Turkey's regional initiatives in these

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early years, followed by a discussion of their shortcomings, will clearly identify the major factors limiting Turkey's ability to successfully implement its Central Asian foreign policy. In so doing, this thesis will argue that the resurgence of Russia's regional interests and influence emerged as the paramount domestic and international obstacle confronting Turkey's success in Central Asia. Russia's regional policies not only renewed old Soviet links with the region but, by their nature, contradicted and stymied Turkish objectives for the development of the region.

1.2 Si~nificance of the Issues Under Consideration:

For a number of reasons, the questions and issues which this essay seeks to address remain critical for an understanding of present and future international relations in the Central Asian region. Possibly the most publicized cause for global attention to the region is the immense quantities of undeveloped oil and natural gas reserves believed to exist. The majority of the world's industrialized and industrializing states eagerly await the establishment of secure and dependable means of introducing this fuel to the world economy; as do the struggling economies of Central Asia. By analyzing the international agenda of Turkey and those of other neighboring states, this thesis seeks to provide some insight into what forces are involved in the scramble for influence and power in the economic and political development of the region.

Secondly, as will be discussed in later sections of this thesis, Central Asia has witnessed significant turmoil and instability in its past, both as a result of foreign encroachment and internal conflicts. The emergence of the independent republics does not necessarily imply a cessation of this tumultuous history. On the contrary, the Central Asian states have no prior experience with autonomous government or conduct of foreign affairs. In a sense, these nascent states are at the mercy of the international system surrounding them. Russia in particular reserves strong interests

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David A. Benedetti

m the reg10n, as do Iran and China. The effects of these external forces are compounded by the specific internal ailments of the Central Asian republics such as ethnic fragmentation and economic collapse. The introduction of any additional elements of instability may pose frightening consequences for this energy rich region of Asia. Through the discussions included in this paper, the important roles that international actors can play in abetting Central Asian stability and positive development should become apparent.

Regarding Turkey, a country with an undeniable future position of regional power, this essay will provide insight into the perceptions and interests that have and continue to shape the country's foreign policy. Analysis will cover the economic, political and military means by which Turkey is able to exert an influence in its region and pursue its national interests. It will also note Turkey's inherent strengths and weaknesses in the development of this region. Perhaps most importantly, emphasis will be placed on the competing interests of Russia in the Central Asian region and the concomitant challenges and implications this holds for Turkish foreign policy in Central Asia and Russia.

1.3 Historical Backeround to Central Asia:

At the time of their independence, the republics of Central Asia were primarily seen to have two common attributes that bore relevance to their individual foreign policy pursuits.1 _{Each of the territories had been annexed by the Tsarist} government of Russia and subsequently incorporated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) following the Russian revolution of 1917. Secondly, prior to their Russian/Communist experiences, the Central Asian territories were part of a broad, ethnically Turkic civilization, the territories of which are today loosely connected through linguistic, cultural and historic similarities. In the post-Soviet era, 1 _{Craig R. Nation, "The Turkic and Other Muslim Peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the}

Balkans." In Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges For a Rising Regional Power, edited by Vojteck Mastny and R. Craig Nation, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), 97.

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these factors led to a close affinity for Russian institutional and technical approaches to statehood, while simultaneously creating a resurgence in Turkic nationalism and a desire for closer cooperation and identification with the Republic of Turkey.

The descent of nomadic Turkic populations from their northern territories onto the Central Asian steppes and further south into the region's deserts and mountains resulted in the formation of a nomadic empire in the 6th century. From this point forward, the "Turkicization" of the region and especially its language began.2 Though there were short historical interruptions during the Persian and Arab empires, the region would remain under the control of ethnically Turk rulers until Russia's gradual annexation of Central Asian territories in the 19th century. After a short period of rule, the Persian Samsanid dynasty, which introduced Islam into the region, was conquered by the northern Turkic Karakhanids in 999. The Karakhanids, who established their imperial throne at Samarkand, were in tum ousted from regional power by the Turkic Seljuk invasion in the 11th century. These territories remained outside imperial borders during Ottoman times, however, most of Central Asia maintained close religious and political links with Istanbul. Though the Ottoman sultan did not necessarily exercise direct influence over the khanates to the east, it was not uncommon for these Central Asian rulers to seek to legitimize their regime by obtaining formal recognition of the sultan and acknowledging his divine status as the Caliph of the world's Muslims. 3 _{Throughout these many centuries of direct} Turkic rule and close relations with the Ottoman empire, Turkic ethnicity, languages and cultures were absorbed by the indigenous populations.

In earlier centuries, interaction between Central Asia and its northern Russian neighbor, was confined principally to varying forms of trade. As the middle realm of the Silk Road, Central Asia hosted the bartering of Russian gold, East Asian spices and West European technology. The decline in importance of the Silk Road was

2 _{Geoffrey Wheeler,. The Modem History of Soviet Central Asia (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,} 1964), 5.

3 _{Kemal H. Karpat, "The Ottoman Rule in Europe from the Perspective of 1994." In Turkey Between}

East and West: New Challenges For a Rising Regional Power, edited by Vojteck Mastny and R. Craig Nation, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), 10.

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David A. Benedetti

followed by the initiation of Russian military and political endeavors into the region under the reign of Peter the Great (1689-1725).4 Russia's efforts focused on the

construction of army garrisons and the authoring of political alliances throughout much of the region in pursuit of a broad southern security structure. In the early 18th century, economics came to the forefront as scant internal resources forced the industrializing Tsarist regime to look south inside neighboring territories.

The Ignat'ev Mission through Central Asia, from 1856 to 1858, heightened the complexity of Russian designs toward its southern neighbors. In visiting Bukhara, Khiva and various other Central Asian centers of power, Ignat'ev enacted treaties with the local khans, thereby protecting Russian regional interests and securing unique privileges such as rights of navigation on the region's rivers. In addition, Ignat'ev sought to discover routes for possible attack against British colonial-India. Through the unilateral concessions made by the Central Asian tenitories, the Ignat'ev mission formalized the superior and dominant status of Tsarist Russia over its southern, Muslim neighbors.

Russia's regional ambitions did not confine themselves to treaties, however. St. Petersburg pursued its objectives of economic and political dominance through the construction of Russia-centered regional rail links, division and control of the khanates and protection of strategic military positions. Russia marched troops into the region, conquering the capitals of one khanate after another. In October 1864, the taking of Kokand by General Mikhail Gregorievich Cherniaev succeeded in linking the Siberia and Orenburg rail lines. The next year, Tashkent fell to Russian troops. The battles proved little challenge for the expansionist minded regime in St. Petersburg. In winning Khojand, Russia lost just 5 soldiers while there were 2,500 Kokandian casualties. By 1868, Samarkand had come under Tsarist control followed by Khiva in 1873. Just as Russia felt little indigenous resistance to its Central Asian endeavors, the international community appeared apathetic in its response and offered no sincere protest. China had few interests in Central Asia at the time, Iran was too 4 _{Nation, 99.}

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weak to show concern and the Ottoman regime in the west was too far in decline to concentrate on foreign policies in the region. 5

Russia took quick action to formalize its presence in the region. The in-migration of ethnically Russian administrative, military and developmental personnel tended to benefit Tsarist interests, contributing little to the modernization or welfare of the indigenous population. Incorporation into the Soviet Union only intensified this trend, bringing little attention to the needs of the majority population.

The Soviet policy was to turn Central Asian territories into modern nation-states with allegiance to the USSR. In a divide and rule format, Moscow resorted to gerrymandering several ethnicities into the politically designed borders of the republics. For example, the important Tajik city of Samarkand was placed under Uzbek jurisdiction. Similarly, whole ethnic communities were placed within the borders of a rival ethnic republic. At present, 13 percent of Kyrgyzstan's population is of Uzbek origin. 6 _{Through its division of Central Asia into distinct republics} within the union, the Soviet regime in Moscow hoped to preoccupy local politicians with ethnic/domestic issues while making them dependent on Moscow for more critical affairs. The creation of the republics also confronted Moscow with the challenge of encouraging a cohesive nationalism among each republic's ethnically diverse population while concomitantly ensuring alliance to the union itself. The forced introduction of the Russian language assisted in tempering ethnic differences and building patriotism and loyalty to the Union.

Throughout the time of the Soviet Union, govenunent planners in Moscow controlled all administrative aspects of statehood for the republics. The management of industry, agriculture and education was centralized by authorities in Moscow. The republics were prevented from participation in foreign relations or diplomatic

5 _{Firuz Kazemzadeh, "Central Asia's Foreign Relations: A Historical Survey." In The Legacy of}

History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, edited by S. Frederick Starr, (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 209.

6 _{Martha B. Olcott, "Nation Building and Ethnicity in the Foreign Policies of the New Central Asian}

States." In National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, edited by Roman Szporluk, (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 212.

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representation and few non-Slavs were admitted into elite political institutions such as the Foreign Ministry. Economically, the Soviet regime hoped to benefit most by focusing its policy for Central Asian industry on the extraction of natural resources and subsequently shipping the crude materials to Slavic republics for processing and refinement. Under Premier Nikita Khruschev's "Virgin Lands Campaign," Russians and Ukrainians flocked to the Central Asian republics seeking employment opportunities. The administration of agriculture and industry encouraged little indigenous involvement.

As the Soviet Union was breaking apart, Central Asia continued to be treated as a secondary concern by Moscow. Without consulting its Asian republics, Moscow conspired with heads of the other Slavic republics to dissolve the Soviet Union in December 1991. This act was commonly interpreted by officials in Central Asia as a sign that the Slavic republics sought to absolve the burden of responsibility for the administration of the region. 7 _{Thus, throughout its Russian and Soviet experiences,}

Central Asia remained cognizant of its ethnic separateness and subordination to the predominantly Slavic regime in Moscow.

1.4 Central Asian Independence:

Most scholars seem to agree that independence in the Central Asian republics arrived prematurely. The confusion and surprise of the republics at the time of independence is insightfully described by Colgate University professor of Political Science, Martha Brill Olcott, "It is probably a combination of this lack of experience and the failure to comprehend the full significance of their new independence .... that led to a certain naivete, bordering at times on euphoria, in the first foreign policy efforts of the new Central Asian republics." 8

7 _{ibid, 209.}

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In addition to the surprise of independence, republics had to set down immediately to effectively take over the reins of their new governments. Stepping out of a Soviet system in which the republics exercised no foreign relations or significant domestic policy making powers, the new leaders found their states unprepared, ill-equipped and unfamiliar with the task at hand. Suddenly, all the responsibilities of statehood, from education and health care to transportation and communication, fell out of the centrally planned Soviet system and into the novice hands of the republics' officials.

Few individuals within the republics had the skills or experience to manage their large extraction industries, agricultural programs or natural resource bases. The republics had to begin defining their own national interests, an area historically managed and purposefully neglected by Moscow. Most of the republics hoped to maintain close economic and political ties with Moscow, thereby receiving guidance and assistance. On the contrary, however, the newly-incumbent Yeltsin administration could afford to divert little attention away from its own challenges and domestic crises resulting from its attempts to convert to a democratic, capitalistic system. Increasingly, the republics were pushed out of Moscow's orbit and into the international arena. Though none of the republics had any prior experience m conducting their own relations with foreign states, they suddenly graduated to independent actors in a quickly evolving international arena.

During the 1990s, the international environment surrounding Central Asia appeared to be a rather unruly territory filled with powerful and experienced states. States that were well acquainted with the zero-sum nature of international power politics were seeking to implement their individual and self-serving foreign policies in their neighborhood. Directly to the east was China which held vested economic and transportation interests in the region. In addition, China voiced strong reservations about the rise of nationalism in bordering states and the implications of such forces on its western provinces. Other regional powers, including India and Pakistan, pushed for the economic benefits and opportunities presented by the Soviet withdrawal from the region. The state possibly most affected by the Soviet implosion

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was the Islamic Republic of Iran, which shared a 1500 kilometer border with the former Soviet Union. As an Islamic fundamentalist state, many observers expected Iran to pursue a Central Asian policy geared toward increased religious consciousness and anti-western sentiments. In such an international environment, the fledgling and inexperienced republics of Central Asia were hard pressed to identify appropriate and reliable allies.

One of the first steps by the republics was to turn toward each other for guidance and mutual pledges of security. In response to the Slavic decision to dissolve the union, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan organized a meeting of highest-level officials from the newly formed republics. In effect, this meeting of heads-of-state focused on the republics' new responsibilities of economic exchange, inter-community trading and a group defense network. The joint recognition among the republics of the "ethnic dimensions of the collapse of the USSR" led to the creation of a loose assembly of states all sharing in Turkic characteristics.9 This, in fact, could be viewed as consequently leading to a Central Asian revival of 'Pan-Turkism'.10 From within the Central Asian region, its peripheries and as far away as the United States, the common Turkic character of the new republics was acknowledged and considered in policy formation.

1.5 Turkey in the Post-Cold War Environment

As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey enjoyed membership in an exclusive club of nations much credited with the defeat of the Communist revolution and era. However, the collapse of Turkey's powerful northern neighbor brought more than celebrations of victory. Turkish policy makers,

9 _{ibid, 211.}

10 _{The term 'Pan-Turkism' as used in this thesis refers to any movement seeking to collectively group} states into a cohesive international body or framework based primarily on their common Turkic language, cultural and ethnic characteristics.

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in particular those in the National Security Council and Ministry of Affairs, had a number of practical issues for deliberation.

Throughout the Cold War, Turkey was inextricably grouped with the West and with NATO. Its geo-strategic importance relied on the sustained Soviet threat to South-Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The unexpected collapse of the Soviet threat eased Turkey's perceived vulnerability but it also eroded the country's immediate claims to regional and global importance. Turkey suddenly had to question what would be its contribution to the new international order and its continued value to the West. I I The Soviet collapse also erased the monolithic power

structure which had dominated the regions' politics for the past 70 years. In its place, several independent states were forming. Turkey faced geo-political changes in almost every direction, with a new Balkan state system to its northwest, independent Slavic republics north across the Black Sea, the establishment of several states in the Caucasus and the independence of the Muslim republics to its east. Following this dramatic shift, the entire region held the promise of democracy and free trade or ethnic turmoil and foreign encroachment.

In the economic sphere, since the 1980s, Turkey and the Soviet Union had enjoyed increased trade which benefited Turkish exports and industry considerably. Turkey did not welcome the economic weakening and dissolution of this large trade market. These were some of the immediate considerations forced upon Turkey following the Soviet collapse. At the same time that Turkish policy makers were confronted with these issues, the Turkish public and politicians became preoccupied with other consequences of the break-up.

In the face of a rapidly changing regional environment, Turkish public opinion increasingly focused on the establishment of the five newly independent Turkic republics in the Central Asian region; each of which held cultural, historic and linguistic ties to Turkey. Shortly following the declared independence of

11 _{Shireen T. Hunter, The Transcaucasus in Transition: Nation-Building and Conflict (The Center for}

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Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, Turkish politicians and the local press prophesied the coming of a "Turkic Century" and cited proclaimed visions of, in then-President Turgut Ozal's words, an emerging "Turkic world stretching from the Adriatic .... to China." 12 The Turkish media echoed the general excitement over Turkey's emerging "sphere of influence". Newspapers and magazines routinely published articles detailing the condition of the Central Asian republics and Turkey's interests and obligation to lend a helping hand to its brothers in the east. Such attitudes, expressed by the highest officials of the state and popular media groups, indicated both a resurgence in consciousness regarding Turkic culture and identity and a major shift in public attitudes away from the Kemalist legacies dominant in Turkey's government, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.13

In the last days of the Ottoman empire, Enver Pasha attempted to incite Turkic populations in the new Soviet, Central Asian republics into revolting. His aim was the establishment of a Pan-Turkic state, stretching from eastern Europe to the western border of China. Pasha's attempts failed and when Kemal Ataturk declared the founding of the Republic of Turkey he was adamant that Turkey should eschew any tendencies toward reviving Turkic passions within the sovereign borders of other states .14 Instead, as proclaimed in the political philosophy of Kemalism and embodied in the 1924 constitution, Turkey was to commit itself to strengthening the Turkish nation-state (republicanism), cultivating a cohesive and exclusively Anatolian Turkish identity (nationalism) and modernization through integration with Europe.15

Since the Soviet demise, Turkish foreign policy increasingly distanced itself from its Kemalist foundations. The long period of isolation from eastern Turkic populations has been closed and the purview of Turkish foreign policy extended to include Central Asia. Of all the world's states, Turkey acted first in offering formal 12 Erik J. Zurcher, Turkev: A Modem History (London: I.B. Tarus & Co, 1997), 335. For simplicity, Azerbaijan, which is normally referred to in the Transcaucasian context, will be grouped with Central Asia in this thesis.

13 Graham E. Fuller, and Ian 0. Lesser. Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), 67.

14 ibid, 67.

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diplomatic recognition to the new republics.16 _{Shortly thereafter, Turkish statesmen,} including President Ozal and Prime Minister Siileyman Demirel, made official trips to the region. They brought with them economic investment plans, regional development packages, blue prints for the forming of regional (Turkic) organizations and cultural exchange programs. More than ever before in Turkey's history, the public and its elected officials seemed to be pushing for closer union between their Anatolian territory and the eastern Turkic republics.

In light of the Kemalist tradition in Turkish foreign policy and its limited economic, diplomatic and financial resources, the question arises as to why Turkey would commit so much time and effort toward developing influence in one of the world's more unstable regions. Sharing no common borders and emerging from over 70 years of non-contact, what factors led Turkish decision makers to re-orient their foreign policy with an increased emphasis on Turkey's role in Central Asia? This is the primary question to be investigated in the second chapter of this thesis.

1.6 Factors Influential on Turkish Forei2n Policy

As background to the investigation of this question in the second chapter, this thesis will first identify and evaluate the most prominent scholarly arguments over what forces propelled Turkish interests eastward. Following are three explanations dominant in the available literature on this subject, all having been cited by area scholars as reasons for this shift in Turkish foreign policy: 1) a reassertion in Turkey's domestic consciousness of the common cultural and linguistic traits shared with Central Asia; 2) the widely proposed application of the "Turkish model" as the ideal development pattern for the newly independent states and thus Turkey's need for close relations with the region; 3) Turkey's continued frustration in its attempts to join the European Union and its resultant distancing from Europe. An adequate answer to the question of Turkish involvement in Central Asia must necessarily weigh the benefits

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and limits of each of these explanations. As a first step then, this thesis will provide an analysis of the rise in Turkic consciousness inside Turkey during the post-Soviet period and its role in promoting early Turkish-Central Asian interactions.17

The rise in Turkic consciousness stemmed in part from the changing values and identity within Turkish society. As with any state, Turkey's foreign policy is continually evolving, increasingly complex and self-reflective. While Cold War issues dominated the country's foreign initiatives for much of its history, the trend of the early 1990s gave more precedence to issues of concern to the broader populace. Europe no longer represented the undisputed development model and goal for the country. A growing number of movements within the general population have sought to rekindle the Islamic and Turkic identity of the people and to abate the government's decades-long drive for unity with the west.

The changing identity and values of Turkey's populace was evidenced by the immense popularity accorded to Islamic oriented political groups. In particular, before its dispersal at government hands, the Islam-colored Refah Party (Welfare Party), led by Necmettin Erbakan, held the largest number of seats in the Turkish parliament. Under Erbakan, Turkey became increasingly active in the Muslim world; a July 1996 trade pact between Ankara and Baghdad made Iraq Turkey's largest trade partner and a $23 billion purchase of petroleum products initiated a new phase in Turkish-Iranian relations. More controversially, the Erbakan administration pursued Islamic domestic policies. Though the Refah Party was ousted and banned from political activity, the power of Islamic ideals in Turkish politics continues. Islamic political groups were active in many center-right parties including the Sufi orders of Naksibendi, Suleymanci, Kadiri and Nurcu. The core members of the banished Refah Party moved on to form a new religious-oriented Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party).

Outside of the political realm, increasingly active religious groups also propelled the resurgence in Turkey's Islamic identity. In the media sector, the rise in

17 _{For an in depth discussion on Turkic consciousness and Pan-Turkism see, Yavuz, Hakan. "Turkish}

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the market share for Islamic periodicals rose from 7 percent in 1980 to 4 7 percent in 1996. In education, the creation of religious Imam Hatip high schools (numbering 561 in 1997) and the establishment of compulsory religious courses for all public schools began a broad process of closer identification with religious and cultural ideas.

The dynamics of social identity were also evident in the country's conduct of international relations. For example, despite its concerns to appease and conform to NA TO policy during the Bosnian war, Turkey clandestinely sent arms and support to Bosnia's Muslims.18 _{Europe's failure to effectively protect Bosnia's Muslims led to a}

belief in Turkey that Europe held a discreet policy to prevent the emergence of an Bosnian state on the European continent. This view was adopted even at the highest levels of Turkish government and led Turkey to chastise Europe for its Christian prejudices.19 Hence, in response to noticeable changes in public perceptions and identity, Turkey's policy makers struck new directions for the country. One manifestatio_n of the evolving Turkish identity and its influence on government policy was evident in the rise of Turkic consciousness and the accompanying demands for Turkish representation in the newly 'liberated' Turkic regions.

Spawned from Turkey's significant progress in education, freedom of the press and the expansion of the middle class, the resurgence of Turkic consciousness focused on the recognition of common ethnic, linguistic, historical and religious traits shared among Turkic populations stretching from the Balkans through the Transcaucasus and extending to the western border of China. In their most extreme form, such sentiments have been labeled 'Pan-Turkism' and espouse the political creation of an organized international body encompassing all the Turkic peoples of Eurasia. Pan-Turkic adherents, both Turkish and Central Asian, regard the Republic of Turkey as the epicenter of a newly emerging 'Turkic world'.

18 _{This information was reported by Hakan M. Yavuz from his interview with ex-Deputy Defense} Minister Hasan Cengic. See M. Hakan Yavuz. "Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise ofNeo-Ottomanism." Critique (Spring 1998), 23.

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Political and media forces were active m calling the public's attention to Turkey's role regarding Central Asia's new republics. Groups such as the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), led by the well-known Turkish politician Alparslan Turkes, were vociferous pursuers of Pan-Turkic ideals. Following the collapse of the Soviet

Union, the MHP called for the creation of a new bloc of Turkic states, to be led by

Turkey, with increased influence for all Turkic people in the emerging new world order.20 Turkes presided over three general assemblies of the Turkic States and Turkic Peoples' Friendship and Cooperation Group, attended by Tansu <;iller, Turgut

Ozal and Si.ileyman Demirel. Periodicals such as Y eni Dusunce, Tiirkiye and Zaman

reinforced this Pan-Turkic stance by advocating the establishment of close ties with the republics and calling for government recognition and support for Turks all over the globe.21 Famed Turkish politicians also were active in stressing the country's ties and obligations to Central Asia. Possibly the most avid of these statesme1i. was Turkish President Turgut Ozal, who made several public references to Turkey's shared characteristics with the region and undertook immediate diplomatic initiatives to bolster relations between Ankara and the respective regional capital cities. These 'Turkic' campaigns sought to reassert Turkey's prominence in the Muslim world and won significant support from Turkey's populace, many of whom were only second generation settlers with ethnic origins from various parts of the former Ottoman, Russian and Chinese empires. 22

Despite their broad appeal to area scholars, domestic factors such as Turkic consciousness and Pan-Turkism played a greater role in public relations than in actual decision making during the immediate post-Soviet order. While bonds with Turkey's "eastern cousins" won popularity for the country's new Central Asian policies, these bonds cannot be credited as the true impetus for the complex and concrete initiatives undertaken. Culture is too thin a fabric on which to stitch a country's foreign policy;

20 Heinz Kramer, "Will Central Asia Become Turkey's Sphere of Influence?" Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs (March-May 1996),114.

21 Fuller, 68.

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the first visits by the ambassadors of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan to Ankara revealed that Anatolian Turkish was a significantly different Turkic dialect from their own. Furthermore, the Central Asian nations seemed reluctant to wholly embrace Turkic culture and identity at the risk of offending their large minority populations, thereby risking their fragile ethnic balances. The engineers of Turkey's foreign affairs in Ankara were well aware of the limits of culture as an essence of foreign policy.

Mustafa Aydin, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Ankara University, perceptively exposed an early change in Turkey's Central Asian policies from a cultural, linguistic and religious focus to more practical economic, security and political concerns.23 _{However, Aydin's reference to "Ankara's new attitude" was in} part mis-diagnosed. This thesis argues that in Turkey's nascent regional policies, economic, security and political concerns for Central Asia always held precedence, despite their lack of public attention or endorsement by politicians. While Turkey's political circles became euphoric over the opportunities to re-establish relations with their "long lost cousins", the mood in Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and National Security Council was quite different. At the ministerial level, there is evidence of a political dichotomy between the Ministries of Culture and Education, which placed Turkey at the center of a newly-formed Turkish world, and the MFA, which sought "cautious and realistic" means of preserving Turkey's interests in the region.24 _{In the eyes of Turkey's foreign policy practitioners, much more was at stake} than the solidarity of Turkic cultures. MF A policies were formed around practical concerns, particularly the development of a stable eastern region with solid ties to Ankara. In short, though common Turkic identity deserves attention as an important facet of Turkey's post-Soviet interaction in Central Asia, such sentiments have had marginal influence outside of the domestic political realm.

23 Mustafa Aydin, "Turkey and Central Asia: Challenges of Change." Central Asian Survey 15 (2) (1996), 161.

24 _{Garreth M. Winrow, "Turkey's Relations With the Transcaucasus and Central Asian Republics."}

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A second popular explanation for Turkey's entrance into the Central Asian arena asserts that Turkey sought to present itself as a regional model for development. This claim was based on Turkey's "70 years of independence and secularism, 50 years of democratic practice, and 150 years of Westernization and modernization rather than on an ethnic and religious foundation."25 Surrounded by insecurity and hostility, Turkey hoped to direct Central Asian states away from malevolent entities such as Iran, Syria, or Russia and toward the Turkish state model of secular, democratic and western oriented values. Statesmen in Ankara hoped that their country's relative economic, political and social prestige would convince the new republics of the success of this model.

According to adherents of this view, the Turkish government was not the only proponent of this model. Many states of Europe also promoted Turkey as the ideal regional model. As Europe continued to expand its boundaries eastward into the former Soviet sphere of influence, Turkey became an ever-closer neighbor. Turkey, well established as a regional leader, would facilitate European trade and investment into Central Asia. Moreover, the Turkish model was seen to provide the best hope for stable and fruitful political development. With nationalism tearing apart regions of eastern and central Europe, it was hoped that Turkey's influence in the region might help to consolidate the power of the new republics and the legitimacy of their rule.

The United States, concerned over Iran's regional activities and ambitions, also quickly portrayed the Turkish model as an ideal path to modem statehood for Central Asia. Under the Bush administration, the United States emphasized Turkey's democratic and secular nature, as well as its western identity, as significant factors for the successful growth of the new republics.26 Turkey was encouraged to take advantage of its cultural, linguistic and religious links as a means to expand trade and investment into the region, in effect laying the groundwork for western involvement. In a 1992 visit to Central Asia, Secretary of State James Baker positioned Turkey as

25 Oral Sander, "Turkey and the Turkic World." Central Asian Survey. 13(1) (1994), 41.

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America's preferred image of development for the region. Washington's recognition of Turkey as a lone force of stability and western principles in an increasingly fundamentalist and anti-western Muslim world was complemented by the belief that Turkey could stand as a model for economic growth as well.

The Turkish philosophy of mixed economy promoted the state as the leader of economic development in the early period, slowly allowing private enterprise to move into functional positions within the economic structure. The result was a substantial degree and depth of industrialization with an increasingly proficient private capital base. By 1990, the country hosted an extensive, self-supporting private sector, which was active beyond the domestic sphere and solidly involved with international investment and foreign business ventures. In addition, with economic growth rates of 5-6 percent, among the highest in the developing world, Turkey was relatively open to and integrated with world markets.27

The significant number of scholars and statesmen espousmg the Turkish model of development for Central Asia demonstrates that Turkish democratic and secular society was an enviable target for the region. Such a model, however; simply reflected an idealistic tendency of promoting vague concepts such as democracy and free market economics. Neither an announcement by Turkey of its intention to act as such a model, nor the application of this model to the republics were completely appropriate or feasible. The republics faced very different geographic, political, economic and social challenges than Turkey had seemingly overcome in its history. In addition, Turkey's awareness of its precarious state of relations with its neighbors prevented it from the public adoption of such a model.

The Turkish model had some obvious political and economic blemishes. Apart from an on-going insurgency in its southeast and continual tensions with neighboring Greece and Syria, Turkey still faced its own challenges of chronic

27 _{For further information on the economic aspects of the Turkish model for development see Onis,}

Ziya. "The State and Economic Development in Contemporary Turkey: Etatism to Neoliberalism and Beyond." In Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges For a Rising Regional Power, edited by Vojteck Mastny and R. Craig Nation, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), 155-178.

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David A. Benedetti

inflation, high unemployment levels, indebtedness, disparity in regional development and an inefficient tax collection system. These problems placed limitations both on Turkey's ability to promote itself as a model and on the exact degree of its appeal to developing states.

Turkey, in promoting itself as a model, would face senous international challenges from the reactions of other interested powers. In particular, Russia was extremely wary of Turkish activity in the region and appeared poised to attack any Turkish policies that smacked of Pan-Turkic ideals. Similarly, Iran proved equally sensitive and critical of Turkey's activity in the region. Iranian officials frequently attributed the regional competition that had developed among the outside powers to Turkey's intense ambitions. In promoting itself as a regional model of development for the Central Asian republics, Turkey would likely invite the censure and ill-will of the neighboring powers and, in effect, defeat its regional policy goals.

As for the new republics, most took the time to reassess their situations and discover their new identities. Though they wanted very close relations with Turkey, they sought to keep the approach open to all states interested in relations. Some of these sentiments resulted from the disappointment following Turkey's initial pledges of aid to the region.28 In addition, most republics did not wish to be dealt with in a condescending manner, as w.as inferred from an arrangement where Turkey would be idealized.29 _{Ultimately, the Turkish model should be viewed as a desirable end for} the West and for Turkey. Turkey concerned itself about the development of the region but it remained cautious not to specifically promote itself as the model for regional development at the risk of offending and inviting recrimination from the other interested powers.

The final argument considered by this thesis relates to Turkey's failed efforts to gain full admittance into the European Union (EU) in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Disgruntled over repeated European snubs, offended at Greece's considerable

28 Kramer, 120.

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efforts to prevent Turkish acceptance, and indignant that several East European nations, formerly adversaries of NATO, should be ahead in the queue for EU admittance, the Turkish public grew increasingly disenchanted with the European community. Many view this as evidence that Europe has not shed its image of the Turks as an Islamic breed of conquerors opposed to western Christianity. Europe's "irrational" characterization and enduring prejudice toward the Anatolian nation provoked frustration and fueled public demands that Turkey "reorient" itself toward the east and, in effect, begin the construction of a regional grouping that would one day challenge the primacy of the EU. 30

This thesis argues that such ideas were primarily domestic politics and did not come under serious consideration by the more practical minded policy makers in Ankara. The Middle East countries could not be relied on as a 'solid pillar' of Turkish foreign policy. As noted by Dr. Sukru Elekdag, a retired, high level MFA official, when Europe becomes difficult for Turkey, "the Middle East is not an alternative."

"It does not hold the same value or weight."31 For enduring economic, political and

security reasons, Turkey continued to view European integration as one of the paramount goals of its foreign policy.

As a state bordering both the Middle East and Europe, Turkey was almost inextricably tied to Europe. It was an active member in several Western European intergovernmental organizations, joining the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952, associate membership in the European Union in 1963, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, associate membership in the Western European Union in 1992 and the European Customs Union in 1996.32 _In continuation of its gee-strategic importance during the Cold War, Turkey remained an 30 Ihsan D. Dagi,"Turkey in the 1990s: Foreign Policy, Human Rights and the Search for a New Identity." Mediterranean Quarterly (Fall 1993), 73.

31 These quotes were taken from a lecture presented by Dr. Sukru Elekdag at Bilkent University on 1 February 1999.

32 _{Birol Ali Yesilada, "Prospects for Turkey's Membership in the European Union." In Turkish}

Foreign Policy: Recent Developments, edited by Kemal H. Karpat, (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1996), 40.

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David A. Benedetti

active member in NATO, allowing its allies, particularly the United States, to utilize air bases and store nuclear weapons in Turkey. Apart from politics and security, Turkey continued its commitment to economic integration with Europe through increased trade, investment and business ventures. Culturally, the many migrant Turkish laborers and permanent immigrants to Europe provided one more example of the strong European pull on Turkish identity.

While Turkey may one day tum away from the EU in defeated frustration, during the immediate post-Soviet era, the country's general leadership remained dedicated to acquiring EU membership and further solidifying its ties to the western world. Disenchantment with its relations with Europe did not produce an evident shift away from Turkey's European focus, nor did it provide a popular impetus for an eastern reorientation.

1.7 Framework of Analysis

Why then has Turkey become so interested and involved in the Central Asian region? The change in Central Asian politics brought both opportunities for Turkey and also potential dangers to be exploited by any one of its regional rivals. Immediately following independence, the region's oil and gas reserves, transportation links, untapped markets and non-allied military forces were rudderless in a sea of hungry neighbors. The region bordered powerful actors, namely Russia, Iran and China, whose intentions were questionable at best. The immediate proximity of these powers, Turkey's history of difficult relations with them, and the encouragement received from Turkey's western allies all acted as factors which hastened the creation and implementation of Turkey's regional initiatives.

This essay will demonstrate that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkish policy makers correctly identified the economic, political and military implications of Central Asian independence and determined that immediate steps toward the securing of Turkey's interests in the region were of vital importance to the

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state. Principally, these interests concerned the development of the region on terms favorable to Turkey; these terms included the preservation of regional stability, the integration of the region with global markets, the strengthening of the republics' independence and autonomy, and the establishment of mutually beneficial and positive inter-state relations.

The next chapter of this thesis will detail the initiatives taken by Turkey to secure these interests. Discussion will begin with an analysis of Turkish perceptions of its geo-political existence and of Central Asian independence. This discussion will identify what Turkey's interests are in the region and what significance Turkey places on the proper development of Central Asia. Finally, a demonstration of Turkey's pursuit of these interests and an evaluation of its initiatives will constitute the remaining part of the chapter.

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David A. Benedetti

CHAPTER TWO

Turkish Foreii:n Policy in Post-Soviet Central Asia

2.1 Turkey's Neiehborbood and its Influences on Turkish Foreien Policy

Throughout the Cold War period, Turkey's foreign policy was closely linked with that of its NATO allies. Turkey's policy of contributing toward the containment of Soviet/Communist expansion into the Middle East and Mediterranean region took precedence over its many regional concerns, including serious disputes with Greece and Syria. Its specific role was to provide a strong NATO presence to the "soft underbelly" of the Soviet Union. It thus posed a formidable deterrent and defensive force against potential Soviet expansion and also represented a significant threat that demanded Soviet attention and military presence along the USSR's southern border.1

The unexpected disappearance of the Soviet threat eased Turkey's perceived vulnerability but it also eroded the country's immediate claim to regional importance. Released from its Cold War dictates, Turkey suddenly had to question its future contribution to the emerging international order.2 _{This change in the regional and} global power structure resulted in a significant alteration of the forces that shaped Turkish foreign policy.

In the post-Cold War era, many of Turkey's traditional geographic, political, economic and socio-religious concerns reasserted themselves to influence the country's foreign policy. Principally, the country's perceptions, particularly its security perceptions, had always been linked to its geographic positioning. To its benefit, Turkey was blessed with strategic waterways, long coastlines, historic land routes and natural resources unavailable to many of its neighbors. However,

1 _{Sadi Erguvenc, "Turkey's Security Perceptions." Perceptions: Journal oflnternational Affairs}

(Summer 1998), 34.

2 _{Shireen T. Hunter, The Transcaucasus in Transition: Nation-Building and Conflict (The Center for} Strategic & International Studies: Washington, D.C., 1994), 163-165.

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surrounded by thirteen neighboring states, rangmg from weak democracies to totalitarian regimes--which in total represent eleven different ethnicities, ten language groups and six religions--Turkey's geographic advantages also acted as disadvantages or handicaps against cordial relations with its covetous neighbors. Its geographic desirability combined with the numerous unpredictable states in its close proximity created a "reciprocal sensitivity which in turn necessitate[ d] vigilance" in defense of those privileges.3

Politically, Turkey had disputes with many of its neighbors. Since its inception, Turkey recognized the continual threat to the integrity of its borders and felt the constant scrutiny against its actions in the region. Partly stemming from the "painful and unhealthy" dismantling of the Ottoman empire, Turkey had been the target of skepticism and mistrust by former Ottoman provinces.4 _{To its west, the long}

simmering confrontation with Greece over the status of Cyprus showed little sign of abatement. Along its southern border, Turkey's relations with Syria remained strained over trans-boundary water and terrorism issues. In the southeast, the regime in Iraq continually tested Turkey'.s commitment to supporting the Western policy of Iraqi containment. Iran in the east was a rising regional power with a government whose policy of exporting Islamic fundamentalism alienated it from its neighbors seeking stability. Along its northeastern border, Turkey had historical contentions with Armenia and hesitated to antagonize Russia with its activities in Azerbaijan. The on-going Kurdish insurgency in Turkey's southeast provided additional opportunities for rival states to frustrate Turkish internal affairs. It was known and documented that countries such as Syria and Greece hosted and assisted the militant Kurdish group, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), as an element of strategy against their Turkish adversary. Conditions such as these expectedly fostered Turkish perceptions of insecurity about its "bad neighborhood."5

3 Erguvenc, 35.

4 Ibid, 32.

5 _{For more information on Turkey's relations with its neighbors see John Tirman, "Improving Turkey's}

'Bad Neighborhood': Pressing Ankara for Rights and Democracy." World Policy Journal (Spring 1998).

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David A. Benedetti

Religion is an additional factor influencing Turkey's foreign policy. Though the majority of its population is faithfully Muslim, the Turkish state is dedicated to secular government with separation of religion and state. It stands as the most successful political experiment with secularism and democracy in a swath of territory where governments are heavily influenced if not controlled by Koranic scriptures. This secular structure is something that the country's National Security Council and military are sworn to protect. Thus, foreign policy makers perceive credible threats of collusion between domestic fundamentalist movements and foreign adversaries wishing to destabilize Turkish society. Iran, in particular, is suspected of fomenting religious activism in Turkey both through diplomatic channels and surreptitious support for Islamic periodicals, opposition groups and domestic terrorist organizations. 6 _{The Turkish government took great offense at a former Iranian} ambassador's call for Turkey to institute the Shar'ia law and, even more seriously, at mounting evidence that Iran was involved in the assassinations of high-profile individuals, including the famous secularist and journalist, Ugur Mumcu. Through its political philosophy and practice, Turkey had a distinct identity that was somewhat at odds with those of its Muslim neighbors. These perceptions of a secular Turkey as an atoll in an Islamic tide had indelible influence on the formation of Turkish foreign policy.

Economically, Turkey was unique to its region as an example of open-market policies and well-established trade with the general international community. As an energy dependent country, Turkey sought reliable, efficient and affordable access to oil and gas supplies. In return, it made strides to export its variety of manufactured products around the world. Turkey actively privatized its state-owned enterprises by inviting participation from foreign firms. Simultaneously, it sought opportunities for Turkish business and industry abroad, construction projects in Russia, joint ventures in Eastern Europe and agricultural exports to the European community. The

6 _{John Calabrese, "Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship." British Journal of Middle}

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promotion of export-oriented trade comprised a major part of Turkish foreign policy, reflective of its values as an economically competitive state and of its strategic economic direction.

It also made efforts to promote political cooperation and understanding through bilateral and multilateral economic interaction with its neighbors. Though it had outstanding disagreements with Iran, Iraq and Russia, Turkey nevertheless entered into lucrative trade agreements with these states. The Turkish initiative in forming the Black Sea Economic Cooperation area is another example of Turkish foreign policy seeking to use economic cooperation and engagement as a means toward political harmonization. 7

From the brief discussion above, one comes to understand some of the important geographic, political, socio-religious and economic factors that shape Turkey's interests and hence its foreign policy endeavors. In addition to these factors, the drastic change in the international balance following the demise of the Soviet Union had profound effects on Turkey's perceptions of its existence in the international realm. For example, the unity in purpcse between Turkey and its NATO allies was lost. Turkey's strategic devaluation implied less western support for its own international agenda and less Turkish confidence in its western relationships. 8 _In the Cold War setting, should Turkey have been attacked by the Soviet Union, all of NATO would have rallied to its support (as deemed proper within the terms of the treaty). In the early 1990's, could Turkey be as certain of such a collective defense guarantee if one of its regional rivals were to initiate violent conflict? The country had entered a new period of relative isolation and felt more vulnerable to the plethora of newly emerged threats in the region; in a sense, it lamented a perceived loss of stability. Ethno-nationalism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime and out of control migration flows constituted some of these

7 _{See Faruk Sen, "Black Sea Economic Cooperation: A Supplement to the EC?" Aussenpolitik III} (1993): 281-287.

8 _{Duygu B. Sezer, "Turkey in the New Security Environment in the Balkan and Black Sea Region." In}

Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges For a Rising Regional Power, edited by Vojtek Mastny and R. Craig Nation, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), 74.

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David A. Benedetti

emerging security concerns. 9 _{Furthermore, in the new era of international affairs, the} Middle East, Eastern Europe and Central Asia were each witnessing heightened activity by outside states. This enlarged region was no longer simply a chessboard for ideological strategizing among the superpowers. Less powerful, regional players could now greatly affect the outcome of local events and the internal dynamics of their neighbors' existence. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was the most publicized of such accounts. Increased activity among the regional powers in turn led to increased competition between these powers as they grappled for greater regional influence, prestige and power. Hence, the area surrounding Turkey has witnessed a significant rise in regional threats and challenges. This occurrence has made stability a paramount concern for vulnerable states such as Turkey.

Through an understanding of the factors influencing Turkish perceptions of its international environment and a knowledge of the regional context of Central Asian independence, this thesis can begin to address how Turkish policy makers reacted to the sudden expansion of their strategic region and identified specific objectives for the development of relations with the area's new states.

2.2 Cballenees and Opportunities of Central Asian Independence

Turkey's initial concerns in the early period of Central Asian independence focused on both the evident perils of political instability and competition among external states, and the apparent opportunities for beneficial economic and political relations. Just as Turkish policy makers perceived their regional situation in somewhat precarious terms, they recognized that the new Central Asian republics were also born into a tumultuous international arena. Similar to Turkey, the region shared borders with many dubious states, such as Russia, China, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. With its vast natural resources, coveted energy reserves, largely Muslim populations, and large market potential, Central Asia was a certain target for

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intense competition among the region's powers.10 In particular, Iran, which has the longest common border with Central Asia, as well as fervently active foreign policies, heightened Turkish concerns (and those of the West) for the region's development.

Turkey's concern for Iran's influence in the region stems from a rocky history of relations between the two regional powers and the obvious incompatibility between Turkish and Iranian visions for regional development. The first major disruption to Turkish-Iranian relations resulted from the 1979 fundamentalist revolution in Iran. The success of this movement radically transformed the identity of Iran's government and led to equivalent changes in foreign policy. Rather than shadowing US Middle East policy as it had under the Shah, the new Islamic republic sought to encourage and support Islamic revolutions throughout its neighborhood, going so far as to incorporate this revolutionary principle into its new constitution. Turkey, at the time under martial law and trudging through its own domestic crisis, viewed the changes in Iran's orientation as an additional threat to the essence of Turkey's secular, democratic and pro-western identity.

Since the Iranian revolution, the majority of obstacles to amiable relations between the two states result from mutual suspicions and distrust. Opposite views on several divisive issues polarized Turkish-Iranian relations: 1) opposing views of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 2) disagreement over the US-led patrolling of northern Iraq, 3) deepening of Turkish-Israeli ties, 4) continuance of Turkish-American relations and 5) unease over the Iranian expatriate community in Turkey (were they anti-Khomeini insurgents in exile or "guests" encouraging Islamic fundamentalism?)I 1 This brief historical record of Iranian-Turkish relations demonstrates the mutual unease with which these states view each other's foreign policy initiatives, especially in Central Asia.

IO See William R. Kunzweiler, "The New Central Asian Great Game." Strategic Review (Summer 1998), 24-33.

11 _{The framework for this analysis of Turkish-Iranian relations is condensed from John Calabrese's} article "Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship."

New directions in Turkish foreign policy : Turkey's interaction with the newly independent Republics of Central Asia and the challenge of Russian hegemony

Republics of Central Asia and the Challenge of

Russian Hegemony

A thesis submitted by David A. Benedetti to

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the Degree of Master of International Relations

Bilkent University

Ankara,

TURKEY

October 1999

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

Turkey's Reaction to Independence in 'Turkic' Central Asia

CHAPTER TWO

Turkish Foreii:n Policy in Post-Soviet Central Asia