SECULARISM IN TURKEY
Prof. Dr. Bülent DAVER
I. INTRODUCTION
Secularism (separatian of state and religion) is the result and the
cause of Atatürk's reforms carried out mainly in the years 1922 - 1935.
This principle, unlike in western countries, had not been realized by .the evolutionary' currents and ideas of philosophers, disseminated among large
parts of the people throughout the centuries, but rather by direct and
. resolute action and revolutionary enthusiasm of a considerably small elite
composed of bureaucrats and young army officers. The Turkish
intelli-gentsia led by Atatürk sought secularism as a modernizing principle. as well as a progressiye idea covering not only the political and governmental life but a whole social and eu1tural milieu whieh was, in its very nature, dominated by superstitions, dogmas and ignoranee. Those faetors prevented the Turkish people from beeoming a modern and prosperous nation. Ho-wever, very strietly applied in the years of one party rule, the principle of seeularism was never meant, in the eyes of its proponents, to be a new dogma or a new religion to replace the old Islam. Instead the republiean leaders were very careful not to attack Islam as a faith. Theirpurpose was rather to "purify" Islam and to open the gate for a reformist Islamic thought and a modern state. Their war-cry was to bring an end to the supremacy of Ulema (Muslim religious officials) and their allies. Thus
the secularist mavement in Turkey appeared mainly ~ an anti-elerical
drive, a protest at the tyranny of religious fanaticism. Indeed, in Islamic thought and system there was no place for a special clergy or superstitions.
Beginning from 1945 with the new era of the mUıti-party system under President İnönü there was some easing and relaxation in govern-mental policies concerning religion and secularism. After 1950, with the crushing victory of the Democrat Party in the general elections, easing the
curbs on religious liberties had reached such apoint a some Westem.
dbservess have often used the expression "The ıslanne revival in Turkey". However, this policy ai giving too much credit to conservative circles was
founded by Atatürk in 1923). The reformist and revolutionary cirdes and
elites saw the religious policy of the Democrat Partyas treason to the
Ke-malist principles. One of the main causes in the appearance of the military's
interventian of 27 May 1960was the "desire to bring an end to the
exploita-tion of religion for political and private purposes".
For a foreign scholar there can be some inconsistency, if not
con-tradiction, in the application of the principle of secularism in Turkey.
For instance,. the state (government)controls religious affairs and
01'-ganizes it as a deparment of State. Each year a great deal ()f money is
poured out from the State budget for religious affairs.1 Indeed, today
almast sixty thousand religious officials recei ve their salary' from the
state budget (During the early' years of the Republic this figure was
around five hundred). In the realm of religious liberties there were same limitations which can seem "excessive" to a liberal- minded foreign obser-ver. These limitations and exceptional measures regarding religious matters
can only be explained in terms of Turkey's special histarical and social
structure and conditions. The students of Turkish affairs are very well
aware of these special factorso Our purpose in this paper is to make a short outline of the secularist movement in Turkey, and to try to give an answer to some questions raised by the delicate problems of the rela-tionship between state and. religion.
In our opinion the most difficult task for Turkey's presenty-day
Icaders, in the era of the multi-party system, is to make a canvenient
arrangement to bring a:bout a broad consensus concerning religion's proper
role in a modern democratic state. This task necessitates a consensus among contending parties and leaders. Some of them are acting in the name of
Atatürk's principles and others are speaking on behalf of democraey.
However, we can say that the secularisation of the masses is stilI the
great unfinished mission of Turkish elites. A convenient balance between
the progressive ideas of Atatürk and the needs of a pluralistic society
reguires a subtle analysis of the situation as well as dedication and courage on the part of leaders.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
ı.
Ottoman PeriodThe Ottoman. Empire was' a theocratic state like the other Turkish
states which appeared on the scene of history, beginning from the 10th
1For a detailed analysis of the subject: Dr. Bülent DAver, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Laiklik (Secularism in Turkish Republic). Ankara, 1955.
SECULARISM IN TURKEY 31
until 15th centuries. The Sharia (Roly Koran) was a fundamental law for
believers as well as the rulers. But few Muslim rulers in history have made it, in praetiee, the main business of the state. The Koran is intended to enforce God's eternallaws.
Administrative, erirninal, civil and eommercial law have, almost from the beginning of Islamic society, been separated from the domain of the Sharia, though this separation was not fonp.ally and e~plicity eodified
until 19th eentury.2
Islam had also reeoneiled itself to the separation between religion
and the conduet of the state in foreign affairs onee it aequiesced in the peaceful coexistenee of orthodox Islamie states with the Christian and heterodox Islamic nations. As Majid Khadduri pointed out: "The principle of peaeeful relationship among nations of different religions is pcrhap3
the most revolutionary Islamic legal theory and this was for the first
time embodied in a treaty signed in 1533 between Francis I of Franee
and Suleiman the Magnifieent, Sultan of the Ottoman Empire."3
Despite these facts the hold of Islam on the state as well as on believers was very strong, for Islam was not only a faith, a credo, but also a legal
system aimi11Jgat organizing the whole life, including political, social, eivil
and eultural spheres. The first reaction to Islam's daim to administer all these matters, eoncerning the temporal world, came during the Tanzimat
period which was promulgated in 1839 by a Ferman (Royal Deeree) of
S~.lltan.The Tanzimat's administrators, who had been influeneed by
Wes-tern institutions, saw the impossibility of condueting state affairs in a
rapidly ehanging. world according to old religious principles. Under the
heavy pressure of events they felt obliged to introduee western laws and
institutions in Turkey, whieh were based on modern principles existing
in modern nations.
Another breaeh in the orthodox Islamic system was the introduction of public schools whieh were essentially seeular in their nature.
Further-more, along with the religious eourts which wue dealing with private
cases of citizens, speeial secular eourts in the western style were ereated. The judges appointed to these new eourts were different in their approach as well as in their educatian from their colleagues in the Sharia courts.
2 Manfred, Halpem; The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and Africa. Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 130.
3 Majid Khadduri; "The Islamic System: Its Competition and Coexistence with Western Systems", Proccedings of the ,American Society of International Law,
Despite tMse steps of secularization and modernization the Ottornan Empire was stilI mainly theocratic in character and outlook, because the
Sultan was 'officially the head of all Musılms. The firstConstitution of the
Ottoman Empire, promulgated in 1876,explicitıy stated that the main duty of the Assembly was to carry out the principles of the Sharia. Another artiele of this Constitution stipulated that the religion of the state was . Islam.
2. Atatürk's Refonns:
For a radical change in these matters one needed to wait until
Ata-türk's reforms. Mter the liberation of the country from the enemy, a
:series of radical reforms were initiated in order to secularize the state and social life. The first one of these steps was the abolition of the
Sul-tanate in 1922 which was followed by the proclamation of the Republic
in 1923.
in 1924 the Caliphate and the Ministry of Religious Affairs ~were
.abolished. In 192~religiousorders (tarikats) were prohibited. A CiviI Code
in the western st yle was introduced in 1926.In 1928 the Constitution was amended and the artiele stating that "the state's religion is Islam" was ,deleted. Finally, the principle of secularism Was formally introduced into
the Turkish Conitltution by the amendment carried out in 1937. Along
with these legal changes came many other reforms secularizing social
and cultural life. Religious teachings in public schools were suspended. 'The public demeanor of women was changed (especialİy in big cities like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir). The language of prayers in mosques was -ehanged to Turkish instead of Arabic ete ...
Mter the death of Atatürk in 1938and with the new era of the
mUıti-partysystem under President İnönü in 1945, things have somewhat
-ehanged. One of the main controversial issues between the Republicar:ı
People's Party which started secularism and championed it, and the newly created Democrat Party, was the role of religion in Turkish life. Indeed
the Republican People's Party itself had made certain concessionS after
1945 regarding this matter, under the heavy pressure of the opposition
party. For instance, the Republican People's Party had agreed to allow
religious instruction inpublic schools upon the written request of parents.
The party also permitted the openning of some religious places suchas
türbes (mausoleums) to the public. President İnönü's Republican Party
also authorized the creation of a Faculty of Theology in Ankara and
the training of imams (religious officials). Such measures and steps were defended as a safeguard against fanaticism and obscurantism.
SECULARISM IN TURKEY
3. The Democrats İn Power
In 1950, with a landslide, sweeping electoral vietory, the Democrat Party came to power. Tlie Democrats who had been elected on a platform with a concervative tendeney had based much of their appeal in repres-enting the wishes of the people, in implied contrast to the imposed reforms during the early years of the Republic by the Republican People's Party. For a large part of the Democratic vote came from conservative, rural
areas.4 Thus same re1a:xation in the pressures for the total secularization
of Turkish life was allowed during the rule of the Democrat Party. The De-mocrats extended the number of institutions for the training of imams and' allowed them to take on a conservative line. in the field of religious instruction in public (state) schools, the Democrats altered this arrange-ment to allow all muslim children to receive religious instruction
auto-matically unless their parents requested in writing that their children
. should not receive such education. Thus religious education was made
virtually compulsory in public schools, taking into consideration the fact
no parents in Turkey would dare to state explicity that religious instruction was undesirable.
Furthermore, religious education, which was given only in primary
schools outside the official curriculum and class hours, was extended to secondary schools after 1950. Taking another step along their way, the Democrats abolished the law prohibiting the use of the Ariiibic form of
the call to prayer (ezan). The entire country immediately dropped the
Turkish translation which the early law had substituted.5
Other areas of changes in the domain of religious affairs were more
unofficia!' Ramadan (the Muslim holy month) began to be celebrated
more publicly. Religious publications reappeared. The remnants of various mystical orders (tarikats) began tentatively to show their heads. However,
one must say that the troublesome sects like the Ticanis and Nurcu
were severely dealt with and punished during the 1950's.Under Democrat .Party rule, religious associations which had been prohibited in any form under the law of associations promlligated in 1938,began to be founded and their number constantly inc~eased during the years ahead. These religious assocİations bore the names of "Association for the Construction of
Mos-ques," "Association for the Needy Pupils of Koran Courses"etc. During
this period a large amount of governmental funds was used for building
" Walter F. Weiker; The Turkish Revolutionı 1900-1961, The Brookings Institute, Washington D.C. 1965, PP. 8-9.
s See in this matter an artiele written by Paul Stirling: "Religious Change in Republican Turkey", Middle East Journal. Autumn 1958, p. 400.
new mosques in cities, towns and villages. One estimates that some five
thousand mosques were built between 1950 and 1960. This was
approxima-tely the same figure given by the National Ministry of Education' for the eonstruction of new public schools in the same period. One foreign obser-ver dealing with this issue wrote: "This silent struggle for scarce res(}-urces seems highly symbolic of the greater struggle between the forces of secularism ,md ISlam in Turkey".6
The great struggle between the principles of secularism and Islam
has marked a. turning point with 27thMay 1960 Intervention of the Army
led by a group of young officers. The discontent of the Turkish Army with the Democrats should be explained in terms of governmental policies with
which the Turkish military authorities disagreed. Among these policieı:ı
one can state the arnbivalence of Demacrats towards modernity and seeu-larism as weli as ultI"a-conservative, social, and eeonomıc policies in social life.7
4. 27thMay 1960Army Intervention
Indeed General Cemal Gürsel then the Commander of the Land Forces
sent aletter on May 3rd 1960 to the Government through the Ministry of
Defence and liste d in this letter a number of steps which he thought the Government mtİst take if 'the politieal situation was to be righted. These steps, according to him, included among others, ending the exploitation
of. religion for politieal purpose~. After the coup of 27th May on many
oeeasions the members of the military rule shared this view. .
'In July 1961 during the "Yes campaign" for the new Constitution
(referandum) the National Unity Committee (NUC) which seized power
and put on trial all members of the ex-government, published a pampWet entitled "Our Constitution Viewed From the Angle of Religion". In this paper it was stated: "To refrain from relying, even partly, on religious grounds for determining the social, economic, political and legal foundation of the State, is advisable for those who wish to exploit it for politieal or
personal purposes."8 .
In the eyes of the members of the NUC the ehief task for Turkey
was to return to the rapid and drastie reformist policies of Atatürk's era.
because the prineiple of seeularism was the halimark of the period when
Atatürk guided the nation. \
8 David Hotham; "Turks Turn Again to Religion", The Times, February 23, 1960.
7 Frederic Frey; The Turkish Politicw Elite, Cambridge M.I.T. Press, 1965, p. 390.
SECULARISM IN TURKEY 35
5. 1961 Consıitution
Thus artiele 2 of the 1961 Constitution solemnly proclaimed that "The
Turkish RepU'blic is anational, democratic, secuIar and social state".
Artiele 153 of this Constitution stipwated also that: "No provision of this
Constitution shall be construed or interpreted as rendering
anti-<:onstitu-tional the Reform Laws which aimed at raising Turkish society to the level of contemporary civilization and of safeguarding the secwar charee-ter, which were effective from the date this Constitution was adopted by popular vote (referandum)" .
. Finally, the 1961Constitution strictly forbade the exploitation or abuse
of religion und er the threat of penalties. Artiele 19 stated that "No person
shall be allowed to exploit and abuse religion or religiollS feelings or sacred things in. any manner whatsoever for the purposes of political or personal benefit or for gaining power, or for even partially basing the
fundamental social, economic, political and legal order of the state on
religious grounds. Those who violate this prohibition, or those who induee oihers to do, so, shall be punishahle under the appropriate laws. In the case of associations and political parti es the former shall be permanently closed down by order of authorized courts and the latter by order of the Constitutional Court".9
However, the Turks argued during many years afterwards about
whether the Democrat Party period was a time of betrayel of Atatürk
principles, ineluding secwarism, which forbade the exploitation of religion, or was the"restoratian of freedom of religion, in other words, the beginning of a new period of "IsIamic revival," "The pertinent fact is that the De-mocrat Party and the Republican People's Party made the interpretation of secularism an evergoing issue. it was mixed with other issues and served to add fuel to a fire which will continue to smoulder."lo
According to Dr. Frey, Menderes and his lieutenants actually neither wanted nar could afford a religious reaction which would endanger the very 'foundations of the secwar republic. The Democrat Party, though in favour of a mild religious revival, was basically quite modern in its top personnel and quite committed, in {ts own way, to a continuation of
mo-demization, even while trying to make political capitalout of the religious
issue.lI
9.Artiele 163 of the Turkish Penal Code sanctions in detail the Vİolation of this principle.
10 Weiker; op. cit., p. 9. 11 Frey; op. cit., p. 1aO.
Some people can argue, of course, that heightened interest in religion is perfectly compatible with secularism and modernization. Robinson for example, asserts that by 1960, despite the existence of a religious conser.
vative element of a politically significant size, it no longer endangered the
secular republican state. Islam itself had been undergoing a subtle trans-formation even at the yillage level. Economic and social incentives, ma-terial well-being, innovations, the machine, commerce and social change no longer appeared as challenges to religion. An accommodations hetween
folk-Islam and modern life was in fact taking place.12
But in the eyes of Dr. Weiker the commitment of the Democrat Party
to secularism and modernization was substantially quite different from
the Kemalist modeL. According to him, secularism was one of the most
central pillars of Atatürk revalutian. Secularism was interpreted by
Ata-türk to mean exclusion of predominant religious influence from pu:blic
life, and insome cases, it meant discouraging private religious observance
as
welL. After Atatürk's death and especially since rise of oppasitionparties in 1945 the role of religion in Turkish life hashecome one of the
most important public issues.13
Anather writer, Dr. Karpat, shared this view. According to him, during
the Democrat Party's rule, .the easing of previous restraints has helped
to undermine the secularist spirit to the benefit of Islam, not the
en-lightened progressiye Islam, but the same old obscurantist, fatalistic type
which has dominated the Turkish masses since time immemorial.I4
Kemalist secularism, in Karpat's opinion, had a different and much
more comprehensive meaning in Turkey than in the Western countries. Atatürk's secularism did not limit itself merely to the separation of religion from political affairs. It also aimed at liberating society from the hold of Islam, and bringing about a new type of free individual. it was a
natio-nalist, positivist, scientific-min ded, anti-traditionalist, antielerical
secu-larism. Therefore the crities of Turkish secularism may be theoretically right in that the conception of religion bound to the state also viol.ated the
principle of secularism.ls
However, given the fatalistic and obscurantist nature of religious
beliefs among the Turkish masses at that time, I can agree with Özbudun
that a mere separationbetween the state and religion certainly would
not to be enough to create a modern society based on national and scientific
12 Robinson; The Flrst Turkish Republic, p. 205. See also Lerner and Robinson; "Swords and Plougshares",' World Politics, vol. XII, Octoher 1966, pp. 19.22. 13 Weiker; The Turkish Revolutian 1960-1961,p. 4.
14 Katpat; Turkay's Politics, p. 288. 15 Karpat; ap. cit., PP. 271.277.
SECULARISM IN TIJRKEY 37
thinking. Alternatives open to the Kemalist cadres in the 1920's wer~
eithei' to reform Islam radically enough to become a progressi ve force
-Atatürk unsuccessfully tried it in some cases- or to restrict religious
liberties to a greater extent than in secular western states. In view of
the enormousdifficulties involved in the first 'alternative, it was only
natural that the latter course was chosen.16
But we must carefully inmcate that Atatürk, the most far reaching of the secularists, md not openly challenge the Islamic faith, nor did any of the political leaders who came after him. Their struggle was not with the Islamic creed, but rather with the superstitions and fanaticism which were borrowed from otber faiths, and which finally damaged the religion. As W.C. Smith wrote "Every honest Turk felt in his deep conscience that
those restrictions on elerical and fanatical forces were necessary".17
"-After this quick review dealing with the origin and evolution of the principle of secularism in Turkey we can conelude that, despite Atatürk's reforms, a gap still remains between the existing social, cultural norms and revolutionary legal norms. In Turkey" officially the most secular of Islamic countries-, perhaps the unique country- religion has not ceased to be a political' issue and the likelihood is that in the future it will still provoke much more conflict. Manfred Halpern wrote in this issue: "honest
(democratic) balloting makes the Turkish peasant the kingpin of 'the
electorate, yet he has been intellectually and socially more isolated from
the Atatürk revolution, and has changed relatively less than any other portion of the population, Appeals to religion may yet become a major substitute for eliciting or retaining rural sl1pport, especially if the almost steady increase of the economic benefits to the peasant should cease, either
because Turkish planners find good cause to reallocate thedistribution
of resources, or else because the economy falters. The growth of religious brotherhoods (dervish orders) with hallowed traditional names but highly modern purposes during the past few years, has been increasingly reported in Turkish newspapers and exposed in court trials. A marriage of
con-venience between them and certain political parti es which attack the
reforms of Atatürk is by no means exeluded",18
6. 12 September 1980 Army Intervention
On 12 September 1980another army intervention happened. The main
reason given for this new intervention was "to estaıblish a solid and
16 Ergun Ozbudun; The Role of MiIitary in Recent Turkish Politics, p. 17. 17 W.C. Smith; "Modern Türkiye Dini Bir Reforma mı Gidiyor?", Ankara İIahiyat
Fakültesi Dergisi, 1953, Sayı: 1, sh. 13. 18 Manfred Haipern, op. cit., p. 152.
38 BÜLENT DA VER
healthy demoeraey and to eliminate the destnıetive forees whieh were
trying to divide Turkeyand were endangering the very essenee of the
principles of Atatürk's repU!blie".One of these principles was seeularism. Artiele 24 of the new Constitution whieh is in a way similar to artiele
19 of the old Constitution of 1961, deals with freedom of religion and
conseienee as well as religious edueation and principle of seeularism.
Accorrnng to this artiele "Everyone has the right to freedom of eonscienee, religious belief and eonvietion".
"Acts of worship, religious serviees and eeremonies shall be eondueted
freely, provided that they do not violate the provisions of Artiele 14.ıg
No one shall be eompelled to worship, or to participate in religious
ceremonies and rites, to reve al religious beliefs and eonvietions." The new Constitution made religious edueation somehow compulsory in schoals, thus deviated from the article 19 of the 1961 Constitution, according to whieh religious instruction was optional. Artiele 24 of the new Constitution said: "Education and instruction in religion and ethics (morals) shall be eonducted under State supervision and control. Instruc-. tion in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the
curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious education
and instruction shall be subject to the individual's own desire, and the in case of minors, at the request of their legal representatives."
Dealing with the sanetions of seeularism the new Constitution adopted almost the same line of the 1961 Constitution and stipulated that "No one sh all be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things
held sacred by religion, in any matter whatsoever, for the purpose of
personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental social, economic, political and legal order of the State. on religious tenets."
CONCLUSION
At the end of my paper i can make the following conclusions and
remarks:
ı.
Secularism in Turkey appeared, in the beginning, as a movementwhieh aimed at curbing the supremaey of the Islamie "clergy" whieh was
ıg Artiele 14 of the Constitution prohibits, inter alia, "creating diseriminaJion on the basis of language, raee, religion or seet, or establishing by any other means a system of government based in these concepts and ideas". The same article -adds: "The sanetions to be applied against those who violate these prohibitions .. and those who incite and provoke to the same end and shall be determined by law".
SECULARISM IN TURKEY 39
very stroIllg in political, cultural and social life. The State still controls
religious affairs and even organizes it as a department embodied in the
general administration. A great number of imams ("Islamic clergy") are
civiI servants and receive their salary from the government budget.
Certainly this is incompatiıble with the principle of secularism as
un-dersstood and applied in Western countries. Turkish reformers knew
well that the Turkish secular state was a kind of "Caesarism". But to adopt a complete secularism, at this stage, meant according to them, to endanger the reforms and to restore the old theocratic state with all iis fanaticism and superstitions. Since the religious elements were so strong
in the social structure of Turkey it was almost impossible for the state
to be able to apply a broad seculansm and to secure a complete religious freedom to alL.
2. ActuaHy Turkish law-makers do not depend anymore on the
ruling of the Sharia in making the appropdate laws for a society which
is undergoing a deep. social and economic change and which desires to catch up with the speed of modern nations.
3. During the republican era, a national educational system was
created, drawing its inspiration not from the religious dogmas of the past, but from the scientific values of modern times. it is true that religious education was suspended, once in pU'blicschools, for there were not enough competent and enlightened teachers. of religion. Most of the "hodjas"
were almost totally ignorant people unaware of the basicknowledge and
necessities of modern society. From 1945 onwards with the beginning of the multi-party system period, Turkish leaders tolerated religious teaching in public schools under government auspices and control.
This also may seem irreconciliable, in the eyes of some westerners, with the principle of secularism which forbids religious teaching in public (state) schools. In my opinion, this too, is an exceptional public order measure, dictated solely by the necessities of the time. In the future, when the majority of people attain a degree of maturity enaıbling them to un-derstand the real meaning of religion, and when the dogmas as well as the superstitioııs wither away, then the time will rome to adopt a {:omplete secularism. Religious affairs will then be the business of private associations and conununities as in westeren countries.
4. In my personal opinion, in curıbing in some instances the freedom
of religion on behalf of the secular state, the Turkish reformers never intended to create a new religion or to suppress Islam, thus banning all moral and religious values in society. The Turkish reformers rather aimed at setıing up a new "milieu" for the free development of religious
li-berties. Some limitations on religion were either inspired by nationalistic feelings (such as the prayers in Turkish in the mosque) or by the streıng desire to oppose obscurantism and idleness as in the case of the abolition of the religious orders (tarikats).
5. in the new era, which began with the new Constitution of 1982,
one can assume that the easing of same more limitations on religious
matters may still be expected in the future. Actually, this had already
happened after 1980, especially since with the coming into power of the
Motherland Party. Thes~ developments certainly aroused much criticism from the leftist parti es a1.d progressive cirdes. However, after the
ex-perience of the 1960 and 1980 interventions, we hope that this time the
parti es in power from now on will be very cautious in handling religious °issues and certainly will not give concessions to fanatical and obscurantist
cirdes.
The secularisation of political leadership and social institutions at
this moment seems not very well-established in Turkey. In the domain of social life, religious marriage and polygamy still reign in many regions
-especially in some rural areas- despite the reform law which punish
such acts. There are some politicians -eve n in the reformist and socialist
parti es- who capitalize on religious issues during electoral campaigns.
But viewed from the general perspective of the situation, it can be argued that Turkey taday had passed the most critical point and is on the high road of modernization.
The rapid economic and social change will certainly have an enormous impact on the minds and behavior of the leaders, as well as the whole people.
However, taking into the consideration the upheaval of the recent
IslaIDic Revalutian in Iran and the fundamentalism of thenew Islamic
drive in same Islam countries, Turkish political leaders as well as the intellectuals and elites must courageously defend the dynamic and healthy principles of the Kemalist movement which aims at to establish a mo-dem and prosperous nation.
