Performance of hydraulic structures, lifelines and industrial structures during October 30, 2020 Samos-Aegean sea earthquake

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Bulletin of Earthquake Engineering https://doi.org/10.1007/s10518-022-01353-8

S.I. : THE M7.0 SAMOS ISLAND (AEGEAN SEA) EARTHQUAKE OF 30TH OCTOBER 2020

Performance of hydraulic structures, lifelines and industrial structures during October 30, 2020 Samos‑Aegean sea earthquake

Selcuk Toprak¹ · M. Eren Uckan² · M. Tolga Yilmaz³ · Faik Cuceoglu⁴ · M. Umit Gumusay² · Engin Nacaroglu⁵ · Ercan S. Kaya² · Murat Aksel²

Received: 31 May 2021 / Accepted: 5 February 2022

Abstract

This paper presents the effects of October 30, 2020 Samos-Aegean Sea earthquake on hydraulic structures, lifelines and industrial facilities which mainly located in the western cost of Turkey, within the borders of Izmir and Aydin Cities. These two highly populated cities are known for their importance in contributing country’s economics by their industrialized areas. In addition, Izmir is the third largest city of Turkey with its high seismic hazard zone. Although some disruptions in the aftermath of the earthquake were occurred in gas and electricity services, these issues immediately identified, and all systems were managed to reoperate. Damages to the infrastructures were mainly due to the collapse of buildings and tsunami effects. No significant damages were reported on lifeline systems, large industrial facilities, and dams due to relatively low shaking intensity.

Keywords Dams · Industrial facilities · Lifelines · Pipelines

1 Introduction

The October 30, 2020 Samos-Aegean Sea earthquake affected the most populous and industrialized areas in the western coast of Turkey including Izmir and Aydin cities. Izmir is the third largest city in Turkey with a total of more than 4.5 million residents. Aydin has been an ancient city known for its culture and art heritages for over thousands of years.

Resort towns of Aydin city such as Kusadasi are located just across the Samos Island

* Selcuk Toprak stoprak@gtu.edu.tr

1 Civil Engineering Department, Gebze Technical University, Gebze, Kocaeli, Turkey

2 Civil Engineering Department, Alanya Alaaddin Keykubat University, Alanya, Antalya, Turkey

3 Engineering Science Department, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey

4 State Hydraulic Works (DSI), The General Directorate, Ankara, Turkey

5 Civil Engineering Department, Pamukkale University, Pamukkale, Denizli, Turkey

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natural gas, and electricity pipelines. Site observations and remote sensing systems (e.g.

satellites, air photo) are used for detecting permanent ground deformations for evaluating pipeline damage performance (e.g., Toprak et al. 2018). However, there was no reported ground failure in the region (Cetin et al. 2021). Therefore, wave propagations are considered as the main source of seismic demands for the lifeline systems rather than the permanent ground deformations.

A group of engineers commissioned by the Izmir State Hydraulic Works (DSI) Regional Directorate and an exploration team from the Middle East Technical University visited the site to document the seismic performance of the earthfill and rockfill dams. Moreover, fac- ulties of Gebze Technical, Alanya Alaaddin Keykubat and Pamukkale Universities com- municated with representatives of several municipalities, utility companies, and industrial

Fig. 1 Location of dams, SGM stations, water transmission system, water sources, water and wastewater treatment plants, and large industry plotted on the PGV iso-seismal maps developed by the ELER software

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Bulletin of Earthquake Engineering

organizations about related facilities’ seismic performance during and the following period of the earthquake. This paper presents the findings of these studies on hydraulic structures, lifelines, and industrial facilities.

2 Geotechnical site condition of affected area

There are three tectonic belts located in the Western Anatolia around Izmir region. These are namely, the Menderes massif, the Izmir-Ankara zone and the Karaburun belt from east to west (Erdogan 1990). The Menderes Massif forms a large part of the Alpide orogen in western Turkey (Bozkurt and Oberhänsli 2001). The Izmir-Ankara zone which was first defined by Brinkmann (1972, 1976), is represented by flysch-type sedimentary rocks, vari- ous limestones, mafic volcanic and ultramafic rocks. In the Karaburun peninsula, the Upper Cretaceous lies with an angular unconformity, on the Triassic-Lower Cretaceous compre- hensive carbonate succession, around Balikliova village. Besides, at two more locations, one is near the villages of Karaburun and the other is near Urla where the peninsula meets Anatolia, caotic rocks similar to the Bornova melange are observed (Erdogan 1990).

Yunt Mountain volcanic rocks are widespread in and around the northern part of Izmir Bay. The Upper Miocene volcanic rocks, which lie on top of the Neogene aged sedimentary rocks were formed by several volcanic activities in this region. The majority of Kar- siyaka and Cigli districts are located on a typical alluvial delta in front of the Yamanlar Mountain blocks. The old Gediz River Delta, which is in the north‐western part of Karsi- yaka and Bostanlı districts, was formed by sedimentation of alluvial deposits transported by the Gediz River in the Quaternary Era (Cetin et al. 2021). Pamuk et al. (2018) studied to determine soil dynamic properties of the Bornova Plain and its surroundings using geophysical and geotechnical data (Fig. 2).

Pamuk et al. (2018) gave some borelogs from different researchers in Izmir for the purpose of illustrating the differences in local soil site conditions. These studies show all selected areas (Gumuldur, Sigacik-Seferihisar, Mavisehir, Bayraklı, Karsiyaka Semikler) have very deep (> 200 m) alluvial soil layers. This soil profile condition greatly affects the geotechnical properties of the region. Eskisar et al. (2014) evaluated properties and dynamic behavior of the Quaternary alluvial soils using geotechnical and geophysical data gathered from 461 boreholes and 205 microtremor recordings in the northern coast of Izmir Bay (Fig. 3) and gave the cross-sections which show the subsurface site conditions of the different areas (Fig. 4).

3 Seismic performance of hydraulic structures (dams)

Field teams investigated Urkmez, Tahtali, Kavakdere, Seferihisar, Alacati, Derince, and Balcova dams on site as well as Menderes-Gumuldur reservoir located in Kucuk Men- deres Basin, which mainly supplies both drinking and irrigation water. The epicenter of the earthquake has been plotted in Fig. 1 including the locations of aforementioned dams. The major characteristics of these dams are summarized in Table 1. On-site observations are elaborated rigorously with respect to strong ground motion (SGM) records in the following subsection.

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Fig. 2 The geological map of study area together with geomorphology (Pamuk et al. 2018)

Fig. 3 The general geological of northern coast of Izmir Bay (Eskisar et al. 2014)

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3.1 Strong ground motion records on dam sites

The ground motions records were provided by two accelerometers (Fig. 5), one was installed on the right abutment bedrock and the other was on the crest of Derince Dam.

It is a concrete-faced sand-gravel fill dam on the Derince River located in Mugla at 91 km of epicentral distance. Figures 5 and 6 show the accelerograms obtained at these stations in accordance with the directions (NS, EW and U). According to the SGM records obtained from the bedrock station (Fig. 6), the maximum acceleration was about 0.026 g, whereas the maximum acceleration of the crest station (Fig. 7) was 0.082 g.

Figure 8 also illustrates the pseudo acceleration response spectra graphs (5% damp- ing). It is seen that the crest accelerations at the dam are amplified by a factor of 3 in the longitudinal direction, whereas the amplification factor is insignificant in the transverse direction.

Reference and non-reference site techniques, which are namely Standard Spectral Ratio (SSR) and Horizontal to Vertical (H/V) Spectral Ratio of earthquake data, have also taken into consideration in evaluating the seismic performance of the Derince Dam. Figure 9 summarizes the spectral ratios calculated by these methods, both in the transverse and longitudinal directions. The natural periods of the dam in the transverse direction were obtained about 0.38 s and 0.36 s using SSR and H/V methods, respectively. As for the longitudinal direction, the natural periods were obtained about 0.52 s and 0.54 s using SSR and H/V methods. Ateş et al. (2019) has also reported that the period of the Derince Dam as 2.7 Hz (0.37 s) along the transverse direction which is agreeable with SSR and H/V values. The presence of a larger number of peak amplitudes in the longitudinal direction compared to the transverse direction (Fig. 9) is associated with the impedance contrast as a result of possible 3D effects of the valley geometry and abutments, and stress, thus stiffness variation among different, or within, the dam zones themselves. Cetin et al. (2005) reports similar trends for Kiralkizi Dam.

Fig. 4 The cross-sections showing the subsurface site conditions of different areas in northern coast of Izmir Bay (Eskisar et al. 2014)

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Table 1 List of inspected dams by DSI reconnaissance team Urkmez DamTahtali DamKavakdere DamSeferihisar DamAlacati DamBalcova DamDerince Dam Location (District)Izmir (Seferihisar)Izmir (Menderes)Izmir (Seferihisar)Izmir (Seferihisar)Izmir (Alacati)Izmir (Balcova)Mugla (Milas) PurposeIrrigationDrinking WaterIrrigationIrrigationDrinking WaterDrinking WaterIrrigation Construction Comple- tion (year)1991199620061994199719802014 Dam TypeZoned EarthfillClay Core RockfillZoned EarthfillZoned EarthfillZoned EarthfillClay Core RockfillConcrete faced sand- gravel Dam Volume (103 m3)9913,3702,1001,4852751,0111,300 Height from Founda- tion (m)44.557.5425917.373.467 Total Reservoir Capacity (hm3)7.92306.6513.8829.1016.618.120.6 Active Storage (hm3)7.5730613.628.1816.117.9420 Reservoir Area (km2)0.6123.50.961.79420.690.97 Distance from EQ Epi- center (km)26.732.233.937.554.658.591

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3.2 Seismic performances

In the field studies, not only visual inspection methods but also instrumental methods were used to make an elaborated seismic assessment. Therefore, all parts of the dams including dam bodies, crests, abutments, upstream and downstream slopes as well as the auxiliary structures (inlet, spillway, etc.) were gone through in detail one by one (Figs. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14). The actual photos back in the date of crest and spillways along with cross-sectional views for Urkmez, Kavakdere and Seferihisar dams were given respectively in between Figs. 10 and 12. Figures 13 and 14 illustrate the cross-sectional views of Alacati and Bal- cova dams, respectively. Figures 15 and 16 present the crest and spillway photos for Tahtali and Menderes-Gumuldur dams which were taken on November 6.

At first glance, there was no sign of seismically induced permanent deformations affect- ing dam crests and abutments. Moreover, not even any damage or settlement on or near the lightning poles and bollards located on the crests were observed. There was also no observed falling rocks, bulges, or settlements on both upstream and downstream slopes.

All above mentioned dams were seismically designed in accordance with the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) regulations. For this reason, the design basis event acceleration was taken 0.11 g (PGAdesign ≈ 0.11 g) for Alacati and Urkmez dams. During the Samos- Aegean Sea earthquake, the accelerometers closest to the sites recorded 0.11 g of peak horizontal ground acceleration. In this case, it can be concluded that these two dams experienced an earthquake almost equal to the design basis event and completely behaved in an elastic range.

On November 9, another group of engineers from the General Directorate of DSI visited a 90 m high concrete-faced rockfill dam under construction (Fig. 17). Follow- ing the event, minor cracks have been reported at an elevation of about two-thirds of the dams’ total height. It has also been reported that these cracks continue parallel to the dam axis in between face slabs No.14 and No.17, as shown in Fig. 18. In order Fig. 5 Accelerometer configuration on Derince Dam, Muğla. Modified from Ates et al. (2019)

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to inspect the depth of those cracks, concrete cover along the cracks was peeled off (Fig. 19). It was concluded that the cracks were surficial and not deeper than 2–3 cm.

The reason for these minor cracks was that the empty reservoir, with a concrete face slab of 38 cm thickness, has undergone more tensile stresses than a full reservoir during the earthquake. Bayraktar et al. (2009) and Saberi et al. (2019) have studied the effect of reservoir water level during earthquakes. According to their numerical analyses, concrete-faced rockfill dams suffer less damage when the reservoir was full and horizontal Fig. 6 Accelerograms from Derince Dam (Right Abutment)

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displacements toward the upstream side are increased by reducing the reservoir water level.

4 Lifelines/pipelines performance

4.1 Natural gas and electric distribution systems

In the aftermath of the earthquake, there were power and gas outages which affected 74,500 and 3000 homes, respectively (ETKB 2020). Although the gas restoration process last Fig. 7 Accelerograms from Derince Dam (Crest)

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Fig. 8 Pseudo acceleration response spectra of Derince Dam accelerometer records

Fig. 9 Comparison of spectral ratio estimations by two different methods for the transverse and longitudinal directions

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about 3 days, the inspection studies of the damaged buildings were continued for several weeks. Izmirgaz and Disaster and Emergency Agency (AFAD) collaborated in providing service to inspected buildings. Izmirgaz announced that gas service was cut off to approximately 160 buildings that collapsed or are planned to be demolished as of 26.11.2020 (Izmirgaz 2020). The electricity transmission from the producer to the service providers in the cities is carried out by TEIAS (Turkish Electricity Transmission Corporation). There was no reported damage in the electricity transmission network in earthquake affected cities such as Aydın, Mugla, Denizli, and Izmir. GDZ Electricity Distribution Inc. is the main service provider with around 2,568,600 power users in Izmir when the Samos-Aegean Sea Earthquake occurred. Power outages affected much larger area when compared to gas disruptions in Izmir. An intentional blackouts and brownouts were used against building damage and tsunami effects. Almost half of the power users (35,000 residences) were provided with the electrical service again within two hours after the blackout. AFAD organized a real-time evaluation for providing electrical service back for the remaining 40,000 residences gradually in the order of safety priority.

Figure 20 explains the number of users those were affected by the outages and restored numbers of service users in Izmir for following the Samos earthquake. The company GDZ provided portable transformers, generators, lighting poles and other supplies to be used in the damaged/collapsed buildings (Fig. 21) for the purpose of search Fig. 10 Urkmez Dam on November 6

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and rescue operations in the field. In addition, the urgent need of electrical service was immediately met for the 14 temporary shelters (Fig. 22). The tent camps were built at several areas in Izmir by AFAD and Izmir Metropolitan Municipality to provide shelter for the victims due to safety concerns.

Most of the power cuts were experienced in Bayraklı and Bornova districts of Izmir, the areas with the most severely damaged buildings. These areas were being powered through 154 kV Piyale transformer substation as depicted in Fig. 23. In addition, some users in Bayraklı district, using power services of Piyale substation, were also affected by temporary blackouts in Bayraklı district for safety reasons, 32,500 users in total. Assessment studies for detecting network damages were also limited on account of search and rescue works conducted by AFAD teams where the destruction was most intense. A transformer facility (No: M-2561) had to displaced due to demolishment works of damaged buildings (Fig. 24). Moreover, a transformer facility (No: K-2530) was damaged because of collapsed building in Bornova. As a result, 1,175 users ended up without power services for about 30 h. A new power distribution unit was established for the use of residents (Fig. 24).

Along with the earthquake-induced electricity disruptions, an intentional power outage was planned for the Sigacik Kaleici region, Seferihisar District till the conditions become stable due to safety concerns against the risk of sea level rise (Fig. 25a). This power outage affected 435 of users which were mainly business enterprises until re- establishing substation (No: L-37) at noon on October 31 (Fig. 25b). In addition, there were some feeder problems at several locations. Remote feeding and control systems (SCADA) were preferred to overcome these problems.

Fig. 11 Kavakdere Dam on November 6

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4.2 Potable and wastewater distribution systems

Water supplies of the city were based on the resources that located about 30 km northern and southern parts of Izmir city center. The transmission line passes through Gordes and Guzelhisar dams in the northern side, and Tahtali dam in the southern side of the city Fig. 12 Seferihisar Dam on November 6

Fig. 13 Alacati Dam Typical Cross-section. Courtesy of DSI

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center (Fig. 1). In addition, there were 53 water tanks and 4 treatment plants (Fig. 26) in a total of 11 districts. Water is being transferred to the tanks’ site by mechanical devices (pumps) (Fig. 27) and distributed to the city by means of gravity. The total length of the potable water network is 8565 km (IZSU 2020). The segmented pipes used for wastewater and stormwater are 3585 and 650 km in length, respectively. Tables 2, 3, and 4 provide Fig. 14 Balcova Dam typical cross-section. Courtesy of DSI

Fig. 15 Tahtali Dam crest and spillway view on November 6

Fig. 16 Menderes-Gumuldur Dam crest and spillway view on November 6

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mechanical properties of the pipelines including pipe diameters and material characteristics corresponding to the total length of the pipelines. In addition, there are 22 large-scaled wastewater treatment plants in and around Izmir (Fig. 28).

The total length of the potable water network pipelines of Aydin city is around 1771 km (ASKI 2020) whereas 856 and 167 km of segmented pipes are used for wastewater and stormwater, respectively.

Moderate shaking at the ground level generally indicates liquefaction or slope failures which known as main indicator for damages to such systems (Toprak et al. 2019).

According to the previous studies, it has also been revealed that the peak ground velocity (PGV) which is also correlated to transient ground strain is the independent shaking hazard parameter for pipe damages. Figure 1 shows the estimated isoseismal PGV maps (ELER software) immediately after the earthquake and the PGV values observed at strong ground motion stations (AFAD, KOERI, ALKU). Note that the PGV contour values involve region specific ground motion prediction equations, using shear wave velocity distributions and Fig. 17 Typical cross-section of the concrete faced rockfill dam. Courtesy of DSI

Fig. 18 Minor cracks at slab 14. Courtesy of DSI

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Fig. 20 Restoration of electricity in Izmir

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strong ground motion data for the improvement and bias adjustment of theoretical estimations which may not include local variations associated with different site responses.

However, it was reported that site amplification was observed in Izmir (Cetin et al. 2021).

Deep alluvial soil layers of soft, mostly low plasticity clayey soil profiles with interbedded silt, sand and gravel were considered to be the governing factor behind these pronounced site effects. The maximum PGV values obtained from AFAD stations in Karsiyaka and Bayrakli districts of Izmir were 22 cm/s and 17 cm/s, respectively.

According to the information provided by the Izmir and Aydin Municipalities, no damage was reported in the water and wastewater systems after the earthquake (Oral communication, IZSU and ASKI). Proposed pipeline damage correlations (e.g., O’Rourke and Ayala 1993; ALA 2001; O’Rourke and Deyoe 2004; O’Rourke et al. 2014) are used in predict- ing approximate pipe repair numbers by taking average seismic values and pipe lengths into consideration. By means of these methods, it was predicted that approximately 70–100 pipe repairs will be required for Izmir potable pipelines. Any tears or leaks on the pipe wall is defined as a pipe damage which requires a pipe repair. The discrepancy between observed and predicted values may be due to the reliability of the damage identification techniques used by site crews. Difficulties are experienced in determining these leaks and losses in low-scale ground shaking that might resulted in differences between observed and predicted values. More detailed and complex investigations are preferred for accurate Fig. 21 Portable electrical support systems provided by GDZ in Izmir (GDZ 2020)

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Fig. 22 Providing electricity to tent camps in Izmir (GDZ 2020)

Fig. 23 The area powered through 154 kV Piyale transformer substation in Izmir (GDZ 2020)

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Fig. 24 New transformer facilities in Bayraklı and Bornova, Izmir (GDZ 2020)

Fig. 25 Tsunami related electricity distribution problems at Sigacik neighborhood, Seferihisar, Izmir (GDZ 2020)

Fig. 26 The Gordes Dam Kavaklidere (left) and Karaburun Mordogan Potable Water Treatment Facilities in Izmir (IZSU 2020)

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Fig. 27 The Goksu (left) and Yahselli (right) pump stations in Izmir (IZSU 2020)

Table 2 Pipeline lengths corresponding to the potable and wastewater pipe diameters

Diameter (mm) Potable water

length (m) Wastewater length (m)

0–110 4,744,100 301,891

110–200 2,761,636 395,750

200–300 451,888 2,222,501

300–400 148,838 237,257

400–600 159,404 208,802

600–800 38,479 71,535

800–1000 70,668 51,757

1000–1200 40,901 21,812

1200–1400 15,138 14,375

1400–1600 7562 5773

1600–1800 3201 0

1600–2200 0 18,473

1800–2000 44,709 0

2000–2500 80,213 0

2200–2400 0 22,416

Total 8,566,737 3,584,825

Table 3 Potable water pipeline lengths with respect to pipe material

Material Steel DI HDPE PVC Others Total

Length (m) 166,635 3,422,963 3,310,673 270,776 1,395,691 8,566,737

Table 4 Wastewater pipeline lengths with respect to pipe material

Material Reinforced concrete Rubber gasketed concrete HDPE PE Others Total

Length (m) 2,220,272 399,372 280,736 39,799 644,646 3,584,825

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estimations by adopting pipeline inspection robots etc. There was also no loss of pressure integrity in the SCADA system for the water transmission and distribution systems (Oral communication, IZSU). However, it will be revealed whether there is any hidden damage or weakening in the network after a detailed investigation or during the long-term opera- tion of the system. For example, after the Van Earthquake in 2011 (7.1 M_w), there was no water interruption or leakage in the pipeline system. Therefore, the system was initially reported undamaged. However, careful investigations after the earthquake revealed that leaks and damages were intensified after the second earthquake that occurred in the South- ern Van (5.1 M_w) a month later. Hence, it is underlined that the damages might be cumula- tive (Uckan 2012).

Another way of determining the effect of earthquakes on the water distribution systems is that the comparison of the repair rates per day or daily rate (e.g., total repairs for each week divided by seven days). For this, the regular repair records for pre-earthquake and post-earthquake periods are taken into consideration by the utility companies as adopted by O’Rourke et al. (2014) in Christchurch water distribution system damages.

5 Industrial facilities

Large-scale petrochemical industrial zones containing hazardous materials are mainly located in the northern part of Izmir. There are also small and medium-scale industrial zones and production facilities in the region. Two of these facilities, which consist of buildings, prefabricated structures, and non-building structures such as storage tanks and silos, are located in the southern and northern sides of Izmir (Fig. 1). No damage was reported from the Samos-Aegean Sea Earthquake on these facilities, and this can be associated with the low strong ground motion values at these sites (Fig. 1).

Fig. 28 The Cigli wastewater treatment plant (Izsu 2020)

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Most of the large-scale industrial and petrochemical facilities exists in the vicinity of Aliaga (Fig. 29), approximately 40 km of northern part of Izmir city. The above ground liquid storage tanks, which contain dangerous substances, are among the most critical structures in the region, as any of their failures may result in leakages, environmental pollutions, and fire disasters. Damages observed in such structures are mainly related to the high (impulsive) and low frequency (convective-sloshing) vibrations of the tank.

Possible forms of deformations on these elements including elastic and plastic buckling of the tank walls, anchorage damages, sliding, baseplate damages are taken place due to Fig. 29 Aliaga petrochemical industrial zone

Fig. 30 Base isolated twin LNG tanks in EGEGAZ (https:// www. egegaz. com. tr/)

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the base uplift and sloshing effects in fixed and floating roof tanks. There also exist twin LNG tanks which are isolated by Lead Rubber Bearings (Fig. 30). The nearest strong motion station has recorded a PGA value of 0.09 g that is located in Foca (AFAD 2020), 20 km of south-western part of the site. There was no reported damages on conventional above ground tanks and the base isolated tanks. The isolation systems of the LNG tanks were not activated due to low PGA value in the tank area (Oral communication). PGA value was not intense enough to activate the base isolation systems of the LGN tanks.

6 Conclusions

The earthquake-affected area on the western coast of Turkey was considered as a high- risk area according to all seismic hazard and risk studies prepared before the Samos- Aegean Sea earthquake. The question, “Are we ready and prepared for the possible earthquakes?” have always been on spotlight for the locals and citizens. Therefore, a particular attention was drawn to the earthquake damages and responses in the region after the Samos-Aegean Sea Earthquake. This solicitude has become more stronger after 120 people get killed and several buildings were collapsed even though the earthquake source was relatively far from the highly populated area. Essentially, this earthquake provided an opportunity to assess the current situation and prepare for a possible more devastating earthquake. In this context, this article presents earthquake effects on hydraulic structures, lifelines and industrial facilities after the Samos-Aegean Sea earthquake.

The peak ground acceleration that hydraulic structures were exposed to in the Samos- Aegean Sea Earthquake was measured as 0.11 g. The dams, which are more than 30 m high and composed of crusty clay cores ranging from semi-permeable to rock fill, per- formed significantly well under the seismic load of the Samos-Aegean Sea earthquake.

No damage was observed after extensive investigations of six small to medium sized earthfill and rockfill dams. Only one 90 m high concrete-faced rockfill dam under construction has reported minor cracks in the concrete surface at heights corresponding to two-thirds of the dam height. It was concluded that the reason for surficial cracks were due to additional tensile stresses as a result of empty reservoir.

Some disruptions were reported on lifeline systems, particularly in gas and electricity networks. Power outages affected much larger area when compared to gas disruptions in Izmir. However, the power service restoration was relatively faster (1–3 days) than gas works (1–3 weeks). Damages to the infrastructures were mainly due to the collapse of buildings and tsunami effects. No significant damages were reported on lifeline systems, large industrial facilities, and dams due to relatively low shaking intensity. Tsunami also caused some local damages to electricity distribution systems. As learned from this earthquake, it cannot be ignored that Turkey is open to the effects of tsunami. Therefore, additional protection measures should be provided against electricity and other infra- structure facilities, especially along the sea border.

Acknowledgements The authors express their gratitude to Sefa Piskinleblebici, the Deputy General Man- ager of Electricity Distribution Incorporation (GDZ EDAS) for providing all necessary information in writ- ing this journal article. Special thanks are also extended to the devoted employees of ASKI, DSI, EGEGAZ, IZSU, IZMIRGAZ and TEIAS for their kind collaboration.

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