The US Strategy of China under the Bush Administration (2001-2006)
Eyüp ERSOY
Abstract
In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, several scholars contended that in the absence of the structural constraints of the Cold War, new powers, which were expected to alter the unilateral world order and challenge the US hegemony, would emerge. Although currently the US strategic gravity is predominantly in the Middle East, the relationship between China and the United States will probably become more central to the world politics since China is deemed as the most likely challenger to the unilateral world order and the US hegemonic position in the future. Attempts to understand current relations between the two states and to anticipate prospective changes in these relations in the future, which are expected to transform the international politics, entail an inclusive analysis of the US strategy of China under the Bush Administration. Global pri-macy of the US, Chinese continual economic development, Chinese political activism in diverse aspects of international politics, and Chinese military modernization appear to be the main param-eters of the US strategy of China under the Bush Administration. The Bush Administration aims at integrating China into international political and economic mechanisms, curbing the regional expansion of Chinese influence, and thereby concomitantly containing and engaging China. Yet, containment is the dominant, perhaps the sole, strategy as engagement is deemed as an indirect means of containing China by the Bush Administration. Regarding the future of bilateral relations between two states, whether the rise of China is to be confronted or accommodated by the US is still debated, both in the academia and in political circles.
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Keeyywwoorrddss: Sino-American Relations, The Rise of China, The Bush Administration, Congagement INTRODUCTION
In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, several scholars con-tended that in the absence of the structural constraints of the Cold War, new powers, which were expected to alter the unilateral world order and challenge the US hegemo-ny, would emerge.1 Candidates for the great power status at that time were Japan and a unified Germany. As an example, a celebrated scholar argued that Japan was chal-lenging to the US economic primacy since it had embarked on “a strategy of econom-ic warfare” against the US.2 However, candidates for the great power status have
1 See, for example, Christopher Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise’, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 , Spring 1993, pp. 244-291.
2 Samuel Huntington, ‘Why International Primacy Matters’, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993,, p. 316.
changed over time. Today, India and the People’s Republic of China3 are regarded as the emerging giants that are to gradually increase their sway over international affairs.4
On the other hand, the US, the lone superpower, has reacted to the lamentable events of 9/11 by changing several aspects of its foreign policy5 and embarking on political and military campaigns. Therefore, the Bush Administration has ushered in a new era characterized by an increased US involvement in international politics. In this new era, although currently “the US strategic gravity is in Western Asia and the Middle East,”6 the relationships between China and the United States will probably become more central to the world politics since China is deemed as the most likely challenger to the unilateral world order and the US hegemonic position in the future.7 Accordingly, it is essential to analyze the US strategy of China under the Bush Administration to understand current relations between the two states and to antici-pate prospective changes in these relations in the future, which are expected to trans-form the international politics.
This paper aims at analyzing the US strategy of China under the Bush Administration in three complementary parts. The first part identifies the parameters of the strategy, that is, issues of concern for the US that help define the objectives and determine the means of achieving them. The second part examines the objectives of the Bush Administration’s strategy of China. And the third part contrasts the argu-ments of two schools of thought about the future of Sino-American relations, i.e. accommodatinalizm and confrontationalizm, and concludes.
PARAMETERS OF THE US STRATEGY
There are mainly four parameters that help shape the US strategy, which are the glob-al primacy of the US, the Chinese economic development, the Chinese increased polit-ical involvement in regional and international affairs, and the Chinese military mod-ernization.
The Global Primacy of the US
In the contemporary world order, the US is the lone superpower, or the hegemonic power, enjoying an unprecedented “share of global economic power, and …share of
3 Henceforth in the paper the People’s Republic of China is referred as China and the Republic of China is referred as Taiwan.
4 Emerging Giants is the title of a program about the political and economic affairs of India and China in BBC World.
5 There are new doctrines, such as preemption, new threats, such as rogue states, and new enemies, such as international terrorism embodied by Al-Qaida.
6 Tao Wenzao, ‘Sino-American Relations during the George W. Bush Administration’, American Foreign Policy Interests, No. 26, 2004, p. 410.
7 Joseph Nye, Jr. suggests that “the future of the U.S.-China relationship will be crucial in determining the shape and character of the international environment during the next century”. In ibid., p. 412.
global military power” which “may remain so for another century or more.”8 Although the rise of new powers is not necessarily inimical to the interests of the dominant power or powers in the international system at the outset, a persistent rise of new pow-ers is rather difficult to accommodate for the dominant powpow-ers since, as Robert Gilpin stated, “[a] more wealthy and more powerful state…will select a larger bundle of secu-rity and welfare goals”9, which are likely to get at odds with the goals of the dominant powers. American policy makers has seriously taken this assumption into account as Paul Wolfowitz, the then-US undersecretary of defense for policy who were to become deputy secretary of defense in the Bush Administration, announced after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992 that “our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival” which would dominate “a region whose resources would, under consolidat-ed control, be sufficient to generate global power.”10
A crucial, yet less noticed, feature of the Bush Administration is that its senior posi-tions have been occupied by the erstwhile members of the ‘Project for the New American Century’ (PNAC). Project for the New American Century is an American think thank, based in Washington, D.C., which was established in 1997 with the goal of pro-moting ‘American global leadership’. It declares: “We [Americans] need to accept responsibility for America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.”11 The organization is considered as the embodiment of the neoconservative ideology, which is preoccupied with the perpetuation of the US global primacy.12 Several members of the project were appointed to important positions in the Bush Administration, such as Richard ‘Dick’ Cheney has become the vice president, Donald Rumsfeld has become the Secretary of Defense, John Bolton has become the US ambassador to the United Nations, and Zalmay Khalilzad has become the US ambassador to Iraq. In sum, senior policy mak-ers of the Bush Administration are individuals who are highly concerned about the future of the US global primacy and rather sensitive to issues pertinent to it.
Today, the Bush government contends that its global primacy has been challenged and the US is under the continuous menace of international terrorism. Summarizing the policy of his government, George W. Bush states: “America now faces a choice between the path of fear and the path of confidence. The path of fear appeals to those who find our challenges to great…. The Administration has chosen the path of
confi-8 Michael Lind, ‘The American Century Shows No Sign of Ending’, Financial Times, February 16, 2006, http://news.ft.com/cms/s/e6e084de-9f1d-11da-ba48-0000779e2340.html.
9 In Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘The Future of U.S.-China Relations’, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2, Fall 2005, p. 19.
10 Patrick E. Tyler, ‘U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop A One-Superpower World’, New York Times, March 8, 1992, http://work.colum.edu/~amiller/wolfowitz1992.htm.
11 “Statement of Principles”, http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm.
12 For a neoconservatist account of the neo-conservatism see, Irvin Stelzer, ed., Neo-Conservatism, (London: Atlantic Books, 2004).
dence….We choose to deal with challenges now rather than leaving for future genera-tions.”13
Whether China is challenging to the US global primacy is a controversial issue among the US policy makers. In the first years of the administration, the Bush govern-ment seemed to consider China as an adversary. Condoleezza Rice, the then-adviser of the candidate George W. Bush and was to become the Secretary of State, stated dur-ing the presidential campaign that “China is not a ‘status quo’ power but one that would like to alter Asia’s balance of power in its favor. That alone makes it strategic competitor, not the ‘strategic partner’ the Clinton Administration once called it.”14 In 2003, the then-director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) George Tenet, who “commented for the past several years on China’s great power aspirations” reiterated that there have been “Beijing’s efforts to maximize its influence within East Asia rela-tive to the US.”15
However, the discourse of the Bush Administration has changed with regard to the ‘China challenge’.16 At a press conference on May 31, 2005 the President Bush, refrain-ing from designatrefrain-ing the US-China relationships in adversarial terms, stated that “the relationship with China is a very complex relationship, and Americans ought to view as such.”17 The Bush Administration seems to contend that although the US does not regard China as an enemy, the future US policy of China depends on the Chinese poli-cies themselves. It declares that “China faces a strategic crossroads. It can choose a pathway of peaceful integration and benign competition. China can also choose, or find itself upon, a pathway along which China would emerge to exert dominant influ-ence in an expanding sphere.”18
13 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, D.C.” White House, March 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/. Quotation is from the foreword.
14 Condoleezza Rice, ‘Promoting the National Interest’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1, January/February 2000, p. 56.
15 George Tenet, ‘The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World’, February 11, 2003, http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/dci_speech_02112003.html.
16 Several reasons of this change in the discourse are stated by the scholars and commentators. Among them are the US need for the Chinese cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue, the war on terror-ism and the Iraq and Iran conundrums. See, for example, François Godement, ‘Escaping the Merchant/Missionary Dilemma: An Imperial Policy for the Asia-Pacific’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2003, p. 181.
17 This was a response to the question of a reporter: “My question, sir, is how should Americans think about China? As an ally? A rival? Competitor? Friend?”. See, ‘President’s Press Conference’, May 31, 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050531.html.
18 US Department of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005, July 19, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf.
The Chinese Economic Development C
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In December 1978, China, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, “embarked on eco-nomic reform aimed at improving its ecoeco-nomic performance and raising people’s liv-ing standards”19, which paved the way for sustained economic growth and increased prosperity in China. Eschewing “the conventional recommendation of rapid privatiza-tion, overnight price reform, and immediate dismantling of trade barriers”20, called the ‘shock therapy’, creating a positive investment climate and fostering foreign direct investment21, and keeping labor costs low, China has maintained a high level of eco-nomic growth for more than a decade. Consequently, today China is the world 3rd largest economy after the US and the EU in aggregate GDP,22 and “has become the world’s third largest exporter after the US and Germany.”23
Christopher Layne argues that unipolarity is an illusion because of inter alia differ-ential growth rates, “that is, in relative [economic] terms, some states are gaining power while others are losing it.”24 However, contrary to the common expectation, Chinese economic development is not causing much anxiety among the US policy makers since it contributes to the economic development of the US regional allies like Japan,25 and the US itself. For instance, in a recent meeting with the Chinese President Hu Jintao, George W. Bush stated his appreciation for the Chinese government’s com-mitment to economic evolution because “as there is more consumers and market access, it will mean that U.S. small businesses and farmers will have a chance to be able to find new market.”26
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However, there are still important economic setbacks between China and the US. That “never in the post-World War II era has the United States had such an important nomic partner that was not a close friend or ally”27 complicates already intricate
eco-19 Wang Zhengyi, ‘Conceptualizing Economic Security and Governance: China Confronts Globalization’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2004,, p. 525.
20 Bates Gill and Sue Anne Tay, Partners and Competitors: Coming to Terms with the U.S.-China Economic Relationship, (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), p.3, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0404_partners.pdf.
21 For instance, “[i]n 2002, China replaced the United States as the number one recipient of foreign direct investment”. Ibid., p. 4.
22 Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book 2005, May 16, 2006, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/fact-book/rankorder/2001rank.html.
23 Gill and Tay, Partners and Competitors: Coming to Terms with the U.S.-China Economic Relationship, p. 4. 24 Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise’, pp. 249-250.
25 David Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia’, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3, Winter 2004/05, p. 85. 26 US Department of State, ‘President Bush Meets with People’s Republic of China President Hu’, April 20,
2006, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/ot/64895.htm.
nomic issues. There are mainly three problems in Sino-American economic relations. The first one is the huge US trade deficit with China. Although Chinese commentators are prone to downplay the imbalance,28 “the United States trade deficit widened to a record $726 billion in 2005” and China “had the largest gap with the United States of any country, at $201.6 billion for the year, up 24.5 percent from 2004.”29
The second problem, which is one of the causes of the huge deficit, is the uation of Chinese currency Renminbi/Yuan. It is reported that “the yuan was underval-ued, with calculations ranging between 15 and 40 percent.”30 Although the Chinese government allowed the renminbi to increase by about two percent in July 2005, it con-tinues to be “reluctant to introduce flexible exchange rates from the fear that they might affect its unemployment rate and upset its financial stability.”31 It is argued by the US scholars that deliberate Chinese policy of currency undervaluation has sus-tained the competitiveness of Chinese companies, which in turn, has caused severe job losses in the US.32 In line with the argument, John W. Snow, the US Secretary of Treasury, has argued that “an eventual move to a current account balance in the United States would require a reduction in the current account surpluses everywhere else.”33 By the same token, the Bush Administration has proclaimed that “[i]n particular, we [the US] will continue to urge China to meet its own commitment to a market-based, flexible exchange rate regime.”34
The third problem is about the effective enforcement of the intellectual property rights. Again, it is argued by the US government that the failure or the unwillingness of the Chinese government to enforce intellectual property rights undermines the
com-28 For instance, to Fu Mingzi, Director of the Institute for American Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, “trade deficit of the United States with China is not a big prob-lem. However, it may be manevaured by politicians. [Chinese] government is stil seeking to resolve the imbalance in the process of development.” Fu Mingzi, ‘Cooperation Needed’, Beijing Review, Vol. 47, No. 36, August 2004, p. 11.
29 Vikas Bajaj, ‘U.S. Trade Deficit Sets Record, with China and Oil the Causes’, New York Times, February 11, 2006,http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/11/business/11trade.html?ex=1297314000&en=bce394b5fe013db b&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.
30 Gill and Tay, Prtners and Competitors: Coming to Terms with the U.S.-China Economic Relationship, p. 15. Emphasis in original.
31 David Hale and yric Hughes Hale, ‘China Takes Off’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6, November/December 2003, p. 49-50.
32 See, for exampl, Nicholas R Hardy, ‘United States-China Ties: Reassessing the Economic Relationship’, testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, October 21, 2003, http://www.iie.com /publications/papers/paper.cfm?researchid=268.
33 John W. Snow, ‘Don’t Blame Just Us’, Washington Post, April 21, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/20/AR2006042001435.html
petitiveness of the US companies. As an example, Donald Evans, the-then Secretary of Commerce, stated that “China must forcefully lift barriers to free trade and confront widespread intellectual property theft that is undercutting American workers.”35
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In addition to the China’s sustained economic growth and bilateral trade relations between China and the US, China’s global economic policies have become an impor-tant factor in the policy considerations of the US government. Unwilling to rely on the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, China “has adopted a policy of ‘go global’ strategy of securing natural resources, going directly to the source rather than relying on global markets.”36 Due to the continuing industrialization, Chinese consumption of raw materials will increase, which “will prompt a dramatic expansion of its trade with com-modity producers.”37 Indeed, it has prompted. As a result of the increased demand for oil in the Chinese economy, despite the US attempts to isolate the Iranian regime, the state-controlled China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC) signed a framework agreement with Iran, which could worth as much as $100 billion, to devel-op the Yadavaran oil field in southwestern Iran.38
Another dimension of China’s unrelenting search for resources essential for its eco-nomic development is that it is beneficial for developing countries since deals with China “has allowed them to exploit as yet untapped resources or gain leverage to nego-tiate better deals with older customers.39 “We have been producing and exporting oil for more than 100 years,” Hugo Chávez, the President of Venezuela, stated in December 2004. “But these have been 100 years of domination by the US. Now we are free, and place this oil at the disposal of the great Chinese fatherland.”40
However, China’s unrelenting search for natural resources is undermining the US efforts to isolate some states. Accordingly, Christopher R. Hill, the assistant secretary of state, stated that an important undertaking of the US and its Asian allies was “to ensure that in its search for resources and commodities to gird its economic
machin-35 US Department of Commerce, ‘November’s Presidential Election will not Change U.S.-China Relationship’, January 10, 2005, http://www.commerce.gov/opa/press/Secretary_Evans/ 2005_Releases/January/10_China_relations.htm.
36 Neil Hughes, ‘A Trade War With China?’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 4, July/August 2005, p. 105. 37 Hale and Hale, “China Takes Off”, p. 48.
38 Peter S. Goodman, ‘China Rushes Toward Oil Pact with Iran’, Washington Post, February 18, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/17/AR2006021702146.html?nav=rss_wo rld/asia.
39 David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, ‘China’s Global Hunt for Energy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, September/October 2005, p. 26.
40 Kerry Dumbaugh and Mark P. Sullivan, ‘China’s Growing Interest in Latin America’, CRS Report for Congress, April 20, 2005, p. 4, http://www.ndu.edu/library/docs/crs/crs_rs22119_20apr05.pdf.
ery, China does not underwrite the continuation of regimes that pursue policies seek-ing to undermine rather than sustain the security and stability of the international community.”41 The insatiable search for resources also has the potential to challenge the US economic interests by constraining the US to import adequate resources at favorable prices.42 Thus, the Bush Administration warns China against “[e]xpanding trade, but acting as if [it] can somehow ‘lock up’ energy supplies around the world or seek to direct markets rather than opening them up.”43
The Chinese Political Activism
China is gradually abandoning its traditional policy of isolationism and self-reliance. David Shambaugh asserts that the reason behind the increased Chinese involvement in the regional and international affairs was related to the Chinese economic develop-ment since, as “Chinese international affairs experts concluded”, “for a peaceful envi-ronment conducive to domestic development to emerge, China needed to be less pas-sive and more proactive in shaping its regional milieu.”44 Agreeing with Shambaugh, Zheng Yu45 states that “the accelerated expansion of economic globalization through international investment, the continuous growth of international trade at a speed faster than global economic growth, popularity of global distribution of production process…give China’s diplomacy a task to get more involved in world affairs.”46 Coupled with the Chinese leaders’ shifted conception of China from a victimized nation to “an emerging power with diverse interests and responsibilities,”47 this economic necessity has prompted an unprecedented Chinese political activism in regional and international affairs. Although this political activism is observed in various regions of the world, it is especially conspicuous in two regions in the vicinity of China, wherein it seems to have generated favorable consequences for China at the expense of the US.
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The first region is the Central Asia. Although the Chinese interaction with the Central Asia has continued for centuries, Chinese leaders have recently attempted to
formal-41 Christopher R. Hill, ‘Emergence of China in the Asia-Pacific: Economic and Security Consequences for the U.S.’, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 7, 2005, http://www.state.gov /p/eap/rls/rm/2005/47334.htm.
42 For a recent report about Sino-American rivalry over Brazil see, Humphrey Hawksley, ‘Chinese Influence in Brazil Worries US’, BBC News, April 3, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4872522.stm. 43 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006, p. 41.
44 David Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia’, p. 71.
45 Zheng Yu is the Deputy Director of the Center of Regional Security Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
46 Zheng Yu, ‘Being Diplomatic’, Beijing Review, Vol. 47, No. 29, July 2004, p. 27.
47 Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s New Diplomacy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6, November/December 2003, p. 23.
ize and institutionalize the relations between China and the Central Asia. The para-mount political framework established in the region is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). SCO was established in Shanghai on June 15, 2001 by six countries that are People’s Republic of China, Russian Federation, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Tajikistan and Republic of Uzbekistan.48 In addi-tion to six member states, there are four observes states that are Iran, Pakistan, India and Mongolia.49 What is significant for China is that it “is the first time in the history of PRC that Beijing is a formal signatory to a multinational organization the primary purpose of which is security” and also “is the first time that the PRC has taken the lead, an active role, in the creation of multilateral security organization.”50
In July 2005 at the Astana Summit, the leaders of the member states urged the US to withdraw its forces, which were stationed during and after the US campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, from the territory of the members of SCO by urging that “respec-tive members of the antiterrorist coalition set a final timeline for their temporary use of the above-mentioned objects of infrastructure and stay of their military contingents on the territories of the SCO member states.”51 Coupled with the China’s joint military exercise with Russia ‘Peace Mission 2005’ conducted in August 2005,52 this declaration was interpreted by several scholars and commentators as an indication of the rise in the anxiety of China about the US presence in Central Asia and China’s willingness to assert its position.53
Chinese presence in the Central Asia would not have been so disquieting for the US had it not been associated with mounting strategic cooperation between Beijing and Moscow, especially within the organizational framework of SCO. Designated as an “anti-American alliance” and “a bloc against the unipolar world order wherein the US is in the center”54 SCO constitutes an appropriate organizational framework for the
48 ‘Brief Introduction to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’, http://www.sectsco.org/html/00026.html. 49 For more information on SCO see the official web page, http://www.sectsco.org/.
50 David M. Finkelstein, ‘China’s ‘New Concept of Security’ – Retrospective & Prospects’, paper prepared for the National Defense University Conference: The Evolving Role of the People’s Liberation Army in Chi-nese Politics, Washington DC, October 30, 2001, http://dcafsp.tripod.com/readings/China_New_Secu-rity_Concept.doc.
51 ‘Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’, July 5, 2005, http://www.sectsco.org/news_detail.asp?id=500&LanguageID=2.
52 David R. Sands, ‘U.S. Will Monitor Beijing-Moscow Military Exercises’, Washington Times, August 4, 2005, http://washingtontimes.com/world/20050803-102024-7672r.htm. Also see, Fred Weir, ‘Russia and China Meld Muscle for War Games’, Christian Science Monitor, August 17, 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0817/p01s04-woap.html.
53 ‘U.S. Urged to Set Troop Pullout Date’, Washington Post, July 6, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/05/AR2005070501602.html. Also see, Pan Guang, ‘The Chinese Perspective on the Recent Astana Summit’, China Brief, Vol. 5, Issue 18, August 2005, p. 6-8, http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/cb_005_018.pdf.
54 Gökhan Telatar, ‘fiangay ‹flbirli¤i Örgütü: 21. Yüzy›l›n Bölgesel/Global Çekim Merkezi’, in Atilla Sand›kl› and ‹lhan Güllü, eds., Gelece¤in Süper Gücü Çin, (‹stanbul: TASAM Yay›nlar›, 2005), pp. 163-229.
advancement of Chinese-Russian relations. Apart from the political cooperation, marked by joint declarations in annual SCO summits, and the military cooperation, marked by joint military exercises, SCO also provides both China and Russia with a framework for the development “of good cooperative relationship relating to commodi-ties, capital and technology.”55 Consolidation of Chinese political, military and eco-nomic relations with Russia through SCO will quiet expectedly buttress Chinese pres-ence in the Central Asia, to the detriment of nascent US influpres-ence in the region.56
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The second region is the Southeast Asia. The milestone of the assertion of a peaceful presence of China in the Southeast Asia can be dated back to the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998. During the crisis, China refrained from devaluing its currency which would have increased its exports but at the same time decreased its imports, that is, would have been devastating for regional economies while buttressing the Chinese economy. Furthermore, Beijing offered aid packages and low-interest loans to coun-tries undergoing the economic disaster, which “punctured the prevailing image of China in the region as either aloof or hegemonic and began to replace it with an image of China as a responsible player.”57 And Chinese leaders incrementally increased their involvement in the regional organizations.
In 1997, “China helped initiate the ‘ASEAN+3’ mechanism, a series of yearly mech-anisms among the ten ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, and South Korea.”58 In 2003, China becomes the first non-ASEAN state to accede to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.59 “This unprecedented step binds China to the core elements of ASEAN’s 1967 charter,”60 which officially binds China with the principles of nonaggres-sion and noninterference, and thus reinforces China’s peaceful presence in the region. It is asserted that today there is a developing ‘strategic partnership’ between China and ASEAN which is “likely to expand in the future”.61 Another example of Beijing’s attempts to shift its profile in the region was that Beijing hosted the Third International
55 Sun Zhuangzhi, ‘New and Old Regionalism: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Sino-Central Asian Relations’, The Review of Internatioanl Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 4, Summer 2004, p. 604.
56 For the US presence in the Central Asia and its effects on China’s regional foreign policy, see Ahat Andican, ‘Çin Satranc›nda Orta Asya’, Avrasya Dosyas›, Vol.12, No. 1, January/April 2006, pp. 27-30. 57 David Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia’, p. 68.
58 Medeiros and Fravel, ‘China’s New Diplomacy’, p. 25. For more information about ASEAN+3 see, http://www.aseansec.org/4918.htm.
59 For the text of the Treaty, see ‘Instrument of Accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia’, http://www.aseansec.org/15271.htm.
60 David Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order’, p. 75. For the ASEAN Charter see, ‘The Asean Declaration (Bangkok Declaration)’, August 8, 1967, http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm. 61 Lu Jianren, ‘Dynamic Cooperation’, Beijing Review, Vol. 49, No. 43, October 2006,
Conference of Asian Political Parties on September 2004. The conference was organ-ized by the Communist Party of China and hosted representatives from 81 political par-ties or organizations of 34 Asian countries.62 At the end of the meeting, a twelve-point declaration, Beijing Declaration, was announced, which emphasized the significance of cooperation among “sovereign Asian countries.”63
Mounting Chinese proactive involvement in the regional affairs can be interpreted as an indication of the China’s confidence to assert and develop its interests in the region. Beijing policies have engendered favorable results for China to the detriment of the US. For Shambaugh, at present, many of the regional countries “are looking to Beijing for regional leadership or, at a minimum, are increasingly taking into account China’s interests and concerns in their decisionmaking.”64 Accordingly, a commenta-tor argues, “more than 50 years of American dominance in Asia is subtly but unmistak-ably eroding as Asian countries look toward China as the increasingly vital regional power.”65 Taking into account the rise in the Chinese ‘soft power’, she contends that “China ramps up its cultural and language presence, Washington is ratcheting down, ceding territory that was virtually all its own when China was trapped in its hard Communist shell.”66 Being anxious about the rise of China but also being conscious of the subtle changes in the attitudes of the regional states towards China, Paul Wolfowitz, the then-undersecretary of defense, stated in 2002 that “[h]istorically, the emergence of major new powers has frequently threatened the stability of the existing order, but we can be much more hopeful of a positive outcome in China’s case because all of the countries of the region are prepared to welcome a strong Chinese role in a constructive regional order.”67 In addition to the regional states, the Bush Administration stated that the US could also “welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China” in a “stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region”, with several reservations nevertheless.68
62 ‘Third Asian Political Parties’ Conference Starts in Beijing’, People’s Daily Online, September 3, 2004, http://english.people.com.cn/200409/03/eng20040903_155808.html.
63 For the text of the Beijing declaration see, ‘Beijing Declaration 2004’, Xinhua Online, September 5, 2004, http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-09/05/content_1946372.htm.
64 David Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia’, p. 65.
65 Jane Perlez, ‘Asian Leaders Find China A More Cordial Neighbor’, New York Times, October 18, 2003, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F50B10FA395A0C7B8DDDA90994DB404482.
66 Jane Perlez, ‘Chinese Move to Eclipse U.S. Appeal in Southeast Asia’, New York Times, November 18, 2004, http://travel2.nytimes.com/2004/11/18/international/asia/18asia.html.
67 Paul Wolfowitz, ‘The Gathering Storm: The Threat of Global Terror and Asia/Pacific Security’, speech delivered at the Asia Security Conference: The Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 1, 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020601-depsecdef.html. For a critique of global terror-Asia/Pacific security nexus see, Peter Symonds, ‘Why has South East Asia become the second front in Bush’s ‘war on terrorism’?’ World Socialist Web Site, April 26, 2002, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/apr 2002/asia-a26.shtml.
68 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, D.C.: White House, September 2002), p. 27, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
The Chinese Military Modernization M
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The Chinese military modernization is a comprehensive and multidimensional pro-gram. Its implications have become more important considering the Bush Administration’s statement that the US “will seek to dissuade any potential adversary from pursuing a military build-up in the hope of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States and [its] allies.”69 The Chinese military modernization has a host of dimensions. First of all, the Chinese government has been increasing the defense budget. “China’s defense budget for 2006 is expected to hit 283.8 billion Yuan (about 35.1 billion U.S. dollars), 14.7 percent higher than [2005].”70 Second, the Chinese mil-itary structure has undergone institutional transformations. For instance, China’s five main defense companies were merged into ten defense-industrial enterprise groups in July 1999, which is expected to increase the efficiency of defense companies by expos-ing them to market competition.71 Third, the traditional Chinese military doctrine, i.e. People’s War of Mao Zedong (1893-1976), has been modified and a new theory of ‘lim-ited war under high-tech conditions’ emerged after the 1991 Gulf War, which was reportedly coined by Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Jiang Zemin.72
In particular, China has emphasized the development of indigenous military capa-bilities. Accordingly, it has indigenously developed relatively modern weapon systems, such as a new road-mobile, solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile (DF-31), its first new class of guided-missile destroyers (Type 052B and Type 052C), the first indigenous Chinese submarines that approach the modern standards (Type 039), and its first fourth generation fighters (J-10 and J-11).73 China has also purchased advanced weapon systems from Russia, such as Sovremenny-class destroyers, which have become the largest ships of the PLA Navy,74 advanced Kilo-class diesel submarines, and Su-27SK, Su-30MKK multirole and Su-30MK2 maritime strike aircrafts.75 These
69 Condoleezza Rice, ‘The President’s National Security Strategy’, in Irvin Stelzer, e.d., NeoConservatism, (London: Atlantic Books, 2004), p. 83.
70 ‘China’s Defense Budget to Increase 14.7% in 2006’, People’s Daily Online, March 5, 2006, http://english.peo-ple.com.cn/200603/05/eng20060305_247883.html. However, suspicious of the reliability of these figures, the US Department of Defense estimates that “the defense sector in China could receive up to $90.0 bil-lion in 2005”. Department of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, July 2005, p. 22, http://www.dod.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf.
71 Evan S. Medeiros et al., A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2005), p. 40.
72 David Shambaugh, ‘China’s Military in Transition: Politics, Professionalism, Procurement and Power Projection’, The China Quarterly, No. 146, June 1996, p. 280.
73 For detailed information on these weapon systems see, http://sinodefence.com.
74 J. Marshall Beier, ‘Bear Facts and Dragon Boats: Rethinking the Modernization of Chinese Naval Power’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 26, No. 2, August 2005, p. 292.
developments notwithstanding, the Chinese army today suffers considerable setbacks on its path of modernization. As an example, with regard to the Navy, “Chinese com-batants lack long-range air defense systems, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) weapons, and advanced electronic warfare capabilities needed to outfit its new ships.”76
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Even though some scholars argue that “[t]he main problem with current China policy is the growing tendency in the U.S. to overestimate Chinese military capabilities,”77 the Bush Administration has expressed its suspicion and wariness about the Chinese modernization program.78 In February 2005, Porter Goss, who recently (May 5, 2006) resigned as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), bluntly expressed that “Beijing’s military modernization and military buildup is tilting the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. Improved Chinese capabilities threaten US forces in the region.”79 In June 2005, at a conference in Singapore, Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, has conveyed the US uneasiness about the program by asking that “[s]ince no nation threatens China, one must wonder: Why this growing investment? Why these continu-ing large and expandcontinu-ing arms purchases? Why these continucontinu-ing robust deploy-ments?”80 It is indicated that Rumsfeld’s comments about China at the conference “exhibited a greater degree of belligerence toward China than had been expressed in any official US statements since 9/11, and were widely portrayed as such in the American and Asian press.”81
Yet, official US documents are no less sensitive about the Chinese military modern-ization than the remarks of Donald Rumsfeld. The Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006 points out that “[o]f the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time off set traditional U.S. military advantages.”82 In
76 Evan S. Medeiros et al., A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry, p. 153.
77 Ivan Eland, ‘Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the United States?’ Policy Analysis, No.465, January 2003, p. 2, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa465.pdf.
78 The US Department of Defense publishes an annual report on the modernization of the Chinese military entitled Military Power of the People’s Republic of China.
79 Porter J. Goss, ‘Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long-Term Challenges with a Long-Term Strategy’, testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 16, 2005, http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/Goss_testimony_02162005.html.
80 Donald Rumsfeld, ‘Speech’, speech delivered at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Conference, Singapore, June 4, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2005/sp20050604-secdef1561.html.
81 Michael T. Klare, ‘Reviving Up the China Threat’, The Nation, October 6, 2005, http://www.thenati-on.com/doc/20051024/klare.
82 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006, February 6, 2006, p. 29, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf.
83 US Department of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006, May 23, 2006, p. 7, http://www.dod.mil/pubs/pdfs/China%20Report%202006.pdf.
84 For the current EU position and its critique see, John J. Tkacik, Jr., ‘China’s Military Power’, statement be-fore the US-China Economic Review Commission, July 27, 2005, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Asi-aandthePacific/tst072705.cfm.
85 Glenn Kessler, ‘Rice Warns Europe not to Sell Advanced Weaponry to China’, Washington Post, March 21, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A51181-2005Mar20.html.
86 Here, first the characteristics of the strategy are to be mentioned and then the strategy is to be denot-ed.
87 See, for example, William Kristol and Robert Kagan, ‘National Interest and Global Responsibility’, in Irvin Stelzer, e.d., NeoConservatism, (London: Atlantic Books, 2004), p. 70-71.
88 Kishore Mahbubani, ‘Understanding China’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 4, September/October 2005, p. 54.
addition, a recent report of the Department of Defense reiterated the US suspicion about the Chinese military ambitions and proclaimed that “[k]ey aspects of China’s military modernization goals and trends are not transparent….As China’s capabilities grow, its leaders could consider using force or threats to achieve their strategic objec-tives.”83 Furthermore, the dispute over the European Union’s military embargo applied on China in 1989 is indicative of the US position over the Chinese military modernization.84 Witnessing an increased willingness of some European leaders, notably Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac, to lift the embargo Condoleezza Rice, the incumbent Secretary of State, reportedly “warned European allies on [March 20, 2005] that they ‘should do nothing’ that alters the military balance of power in Asia through sales of sophisticated weapons to China, suggesting that those arms ultimate-ly could be directed at Americans.”85
OBJECTIVES OF THE US STRATEGY
The US strategy of China under the Bush Administration has two main objectives.86 The first objective is to support and facilitate the integration of China into the interna-tional political and economic mechanisms. The second objective, on the other hand, is to curb and make preparations against the expansion of the Chinese regional influ-ence.
Integrating China into the International Political and Economic Mechanisms
Instead of instigating instability within China as endorsed by some neoconservative scholars,87 the Bush administration has opted for supporting policies that are expect-ed to engender a gradual transformation in the Chinese society and politics since, for example, an abrupt end to communist rule “would prove disastrous for the people of China, the region, and the rest of the world; it could unleash the strong populist and nationalist forces that Beijing has managed to hold in check so far.”88 Two examples of this policy, one political and the other economic, merit further elaboration.
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Politically, the US has fostered the political initiatives of the Chinese leadership in set-tling the North Korean issue. As a response to the intensification of the situation over the North Korean nuclear program, in October 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the ‘Agreed Framework’ according to which North Korea agreed to freeze its plu-tonium production program in exchange for fuel oil, economic cooperation, and the construction of two modern light-water nuclear power plants.89 The confrontation escalated in December 2002 “as the United States took the first step to terminate the Agreed Framework in November, suspending fuel oil shipments.”90 As a reaction, Pyongyang withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003 as “the only country ever to do so.”91 Taking the initiative, China “boldly stepped into the fray, suspending crucial oil shipments to North Korea, sending high-level envoys to Pyongyang, and shifting troops around the Sino-Korean border”92 and compelled North Korea to attend the tripartite talks held in Beijing in April 2003. Although China’s mediation was not successful in settling the dispute at that time, it was China who ini-tiated a multilateral framework.
The first round of the six-party talks was held in August 2003 with the participation of China, South Korea, Japan, North Korea, Russia and the US, and provided an oppor-tunity to achieve a solution but the declaration of North Korea in February 2005 that it possessed nuclear weapons strained the relations between the US and North Korea. Before the North Korean declaration, “President Bush dispatched an emissary to see China’s President Hu, urging him to intensify diplomatic pressure on North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons programs.”93 After the declaration, calling for the cooper-ation of China, “Secretary Rice…urged Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing to apply strong pressure to get North Korea back to the negotiating table” but “Chinese leaders insisted that…the key to reviving the flagging Six-Party Talks resides in Washington.”94 Seriously taking the Chinese suggestions into account, the US held bilateral
meet-89 ‘Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, October 21, 1994, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/agreed_framework.cfm. 90 Robert Alvarez, ‘North Korea: No Bygones at Yongbyon’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 59, No. 4,
July/August 2003, http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=ja03alvarez.
91 Robert S. Norris, Hans M. Kristensen, and Joshua Handler, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Program 2003’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 59, No. 2, March/April 2003, http://www.thebulletin.org/ article_nn.php?art_ofn=ma03norris.
92 Medeiros and Fravel, ‘China’s New Diplomacy’, p. 22.
93 Bonnie S. Glaser, ‘U.S.-China Relations: Rice Seeks to Caution, Cajole, and Cooperate with Beijing’, Com-parative Connections, Vol. 7, No. 1, April 2005, p. 30, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0501qus_chi-na.pdf.
94 Ibid., p. 31.
95 For detailed information on the fourth round of the Talks see, http://www.china.org.cn/english/featu-res/talks/135084.htm.
ings with North Korea, which culminated in the fourth round of Six-Party Talks in July 2005.95 During the meetings, China took the lead in resolving disputed issues. Christopher R. Hill, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, who was the head of the US delegation, expressed his appreciation of the constructive role Beijing played. The Chinese delegation also acted as a kind of Secretariat, extracting from the positions put forward by all the parties’ elements that could be combined to form the basis of a joint statement. China circulated five drafts of the joint agreement during the fourth round, and I must say the Chinese drafting was deft.96
Finally, the Talks resulted in the adoption of a joint statement on September 19, 2005. According to the preliminary agreement, North Korea agrees to abandon its nuclear weapons program in return for economic cooperation and assistance, repeat-ing its right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while the US recognizes North Korea’s sovereignty and proclaims that it has no intention to attack North Korea.97
The first phase of the fifth round took place in November 2005 and resulted in the announcement of a joint statement with six points. However, on October 9, 2006, North Korea abruptly announced a successful nuclear test, that was to be verified by the US authorities on October 11. North Korea blamed ‘the hostile US policy’ as the rationale for such a deterrent act.98 In response, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1718 unanimously condemning North Korea. Sanctions involved economic issues, ban on the exchange of military units, WMD-related parts and sensitive tech-nology, and a prohibition on certain luxury goods.99 On October 31, 2006, China announced that six party talks would resume. The US negotiator later stated that the resumption could happen in the next month and that North Korea had not set precon-ditions for the talks. The deadlock was broken by “frantic behind-the-scenes negotia-tions to try to restart talks” by China.100
As the Six-Party Talks continue, necessity for the Chinese cooperation prevails. Thus, President Bush expresses that he will “continue to seek President Hu’s advice and cooperation, and urge his nation to use its considerable influence with North Korea to make meaningful progress toward a Korean Peninsula that is free of nuclear weapons.”101 In sum, the US has urged, and will likely to do so, China to participate in
96 Christopher R. Hill, ‘The Six-Party Talks and the North Korean Nuclear Issue’, statement before the House of Representatives International Relations Committee, October 6, 2005, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2005/54430.htm.
97 US Department of State, ‘Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks’, September 19, 2005, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm.
98 ’Extra: North Korea Nuclear Tension’, http://www.cnn.com/2006/EDUCATION/07/17/extra.north.korea/ index.html.
99 For the text of Resolution, see, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm. 100 ‘North Korea Talks Set to Resume’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6102092.stm.
101 The White House, ‘President Bush and President Hu of People’s Republic of China Participate in Arrival Ceremony’, April 20, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/04/20060420.html.
international political frameworks, as in the case of North Korean nuclear issue, where the ‘constructive’ role played by the Beijing is conducive to the US interests.
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Economically, the Bush administration has aimed at realizing the integration of China into the international structures particularly by supporting Beijing’s membership to the World Trade Organization (WTO). With the China Relations Act 2000 (HR 4444), the Clinton Administration assigned the US Trade Representative to prepare an annual report entitled China’s WTO Compliance and submit to the US Senate.102 Subsequently, after 15 years of negotiations, China became 143rd member of the WTO on November 11, 2001103 “on the condition of submitting to an annual review of its implementation process known as the Transitional Review Mechanism (TRM),” which can be deemed as “a discriminatory process since no other WTO member was subject-ed to such a review.”104 The Bush Administration’s support for or at least its absten-tion from opposiabsten-tion to,105 China’s membership to one of the major internaabsten-tional eco-nomic organizations can be ascribed to three reasons.
First, it seeks to convince China to abide by international commercial rules, which China has overlooked. Disregarding rules, such as those pertaining to intellectual property rights, has given China a significant competitive advantage at the expense of the economies of the developed countries. It was expected that “its transition to a mar-ket economy, and its integration into the global economy drove the first legal reform: a move toward an accountable regulatory environment, with well-defined laws.”106 Chinese compliance with WTO regulations will likely to prevent China from making exorbitant profits through economic free riding. Accordingly, almost all major US doc-uments on the Chinese economy highlights this issue. For example, the US Trade Representative stated that “[w]hile China has made important progress in implement-ing specific commitments and in adherimplement-ing to the ongoimplement-ing obligations of a WTO mem-ber, there are still serious problems in some areas- especially in the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR).”107 By the same token, the Bush Administration
102 US Department of State, ‘Annual Report on China WTO Compliance Shows Mixed Results’, December 15, 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Dec/15-959311.html.
103 ‘China Becomes Formal WTO Member’, People’s Daily Online, November 11, http://english.people 2001,.com.cn/200112/11/eng20011211_86339.shtml.
104 Gill and Tay, Partners and Competitors: Coming to Terms with the U.S.-China Economic Relationship, p. 21. 105 The US has blocked Iran’s application 22 times; nevertheless it agreed to withdraw its veto in May 2005
as a part of its strategy to deal with Iranian nuclear program. See, Donna Borak, ‘Iran Begins Membership Talks with WTO’, Washington Times, May 27, 2005, http://washingtontimes.com/upi-break-ing/20050526-051716-5279r.htm.
106 Elizabeth Economy, ‘Don’t Break the Engagement’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 3, May/June 2004, p. 101. 107 US Trade Representative, ‘2005 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance’, December 11, 2005, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/asset_upload_file293_8580. pdf.
recently announced that it will “continue to work closely with China to ensure it hon-ors its WTO commitments and protects intellectual property.”108
Second, the US tries to encourage China to take responsibility in the maintenance of the international economic structure wherein China has successfully developed its economy. Behind the policy is the assumption that “the more deeply embedded China becomes in the web of regional and global institutions, the more the beliefs and expec-tations of its leaders will come to conform to the emerging universal consensus that those institutions embody.”109 In short, the US aims at preventing China from being a revisionist state by making Beijing a part of the system created and sustained by Washington as it is proclaimed by the Bush Administration that “[a]s China becomes a global player, it must act as a responsible stakeholder that fulfills its obligations and works with the United States and others to advance the international system that has enabled its success.”110
Last, but not the least, the US policy makers embrace the view that economic pros-perity will engender a middle class in the Chinese society which, in turn, will initiate political liberalization in the Chinese politics. This liberal view has been expressed by several scholars. For instance, Kishore Mahbubani asserts that “[t]he best way to trans-form China…remains the East Asian way: paving the road to political retrans-form by pro-moting economic growth and international integration.”111 Prior to its appointment to an official position in the Bush Administration Condoleezza Rice, with regard to China, contended that “[i]t is in America’s interest to strengthen the hands of those who seek economic integration because this will probably lead to sustained and organized pres-sure for political liberalization.”112 As the Secretary of State she has kept her convic-tion that “as China’s populace become more educated, more free to think, and more entrepreneurial, [she] believe[s] this will inevitably lead to greater political free-dom.”113 In sum, for the US, opening up the Chinese economy through economic inte-gration will open up the Chinese society to global dynamics that, in turn, will increase the consciousness of the Chinese people about their rights and freedoms. Thus, a political transformation of China within itself is expected to ensue.
Curbing the Chinese Regional Expansionism
Balancing China and curbing the actual and prospective Chinese expansionism requires a multidimensional policy. So as to check and balance China, the US, in gen-eral, opted to strengthen its alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, it reaf-firmed its commitment to oppose any forceful change in the Taiwan Strait.
108 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006, p. 28. 109 Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘The Future of U.S.-China Relations’, p. 36.
110 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006, p. 41. 111 Kishore Mahbubani, ‘Understanding China’, p. 59.
112 Condoleezza Rice, ‘Promoting the National Interest’, p. 55.
The US-led alliance system is the predominant security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region. This alliance system “is usually referred to as the ‘hub and spokes’ model, with the United States serving as the hub of a wheel with each of the five bilat-eral alliances (Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand) serving as the spokes.”114 According to François Godement, ‘hub-and-spoke’ concept of the US relations with its allies in the region aims at creating a political situation wherein all regional powers need the US while they are precluded from forming alliances against the US.115 Specifically about China, coupled with the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, “the ring of U.S.-led alliances (formal and informal)…constitute a de facto containment policy [of China].”116 Although the US has not endorsed a de jure containment policy of China, tracing the trajectory of its relations with the key region-al region-allies may provide a clearer picture of its policy in the region. The development of the US-Philippines relations can be illustrative since it has evidently displayed the US will to forge stronger politico-military relations with the Philippines.
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In 1999, the Philippines signed the ‘Visiting Forces Agreement’ with the US, giving per-mission to the US forces to conduct military exercises in the Philippines.117 It is reported that “since then, the size of US participation in joint exercises has steadily expanded, doubling between 2003 and 2004.”118 The foremost joint military exercise is called ‘Balikatan’, “shouldering the load together”, which was first conducted in 1981 and resumed in 2000.119 It is “an annual bilateral training of the US and the Philippines that aims to enhance the coordination of their military forces in combat operations.”120 Although it is contended that the Balikatan exercises are “the flagship initiative of US counter-terrorism policy in the region,”121 “the focus of the exercises
114 David Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia’, p. 95.
115 François Godement, ‘Escaping the Merchant/Missionary Dilemma: An Imperial Policy for the Asia-Pacific’, p. 176.
116 Ivan Eland, ‘Is Chinese Military Modernization a Threat to the United States?’ p. 3.
117 For the text of the agreement see, The Philippine Army, ‘Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines the Government of the United States of America Regarding the Treatment of United States Armed Forces Visiting the Philippines’, http://www.army.mil.ph/miscellaneo-us/vfa.html.
118 Robert S. Ross, ‘A Realist Policy for Managing US-China Competition’, Policy Analysis Brief, November 2005, p. 7, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/reports/pab05china.pdf.
119 Paul Stone, ‘Exercise BALIKATAN Kicks Off in Philippines’, February 8, 2000, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2000/n02082000_20002086.html.
120 Anthony Vargas, ‘US to Cut Troops for Balikatan Exercise’, Manila Times, January 26, 2005, http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2005/jan/26/yehey/top_stories/20050126top10.html.
121 Catharin E. Dalpino, ‘Separatism and Terrorism in the Philippines: Distinctions and Options for US Policy’, testimony before the House of Representatives International Relations Committee, June 10, 2003, http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/108/dal0610.htm.
has expanded beyond antiterrorist activities to include U.S. participation in amphibi-ous exercises in the vicinity of the Spratly Islands.”122 Particularly, “The Philippine and U.S. troops…carried out joint military exercises in 2003, which were also targeted at combat reinforcement in Spratly.”123 It should be noted that both China and the Philippines have conflicting claims over the Nansha/Spratly Islands in addition to Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei.124
Balikatan 2006 “is one of the 37 joint U.S.-Philippine military exercises planned dur-ing fiscal year 2006.”125 More important than the high number of exercises is the increasing number of the US personnel participating in the Balikatan exercises. About 2500 US military personnel participated in Balikatan 2000.126 This number has reached to 5500 in Balikatan 2006.127 Furthermore, “since 2001 annual US military assistance to the Philippines increased from $1.9 million to a projected $126 million in 2005, and the Philippines is the largest recipient of US military assistance in East Asia.”128 To sum up, “whereas for most of the 1990s the Philippines was hostile to the U.S. military, it is now a ‘major non-NATO ally’ with an expanding US presence on its territory.”129
The US administration has presented its participation in joint exercises with the Philippines Army in non-aggressive terms conducted mainly against international ter-rorism. For instance, for the US Embassy of Manila, Balikatan 2006 exercise “demon-strates U.S. resolve, consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty and Visiting Forces Agreement, to train, advise and assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines.”130 However, according to some Chinese commentators, “U.S. entry in the region in the name of counter-terrorism provides a new base for alliances” and aims at transforming
122 Robert S. Ross, ‘Assessing the China Threat’, The National Interest, Fall 2005, p. 83. For US naval forces participating in Balikatan 2006 see, The US Navy, ‘Forward Deployed ARG to Conduct BALIKATAN 06 in the Philippines’, February 17, 2006, http://www.ctf76.navy.mil/Releases/2006/FDARG%20-%20Balikatan.htm.
123 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘The Worrisome Situation of the South China Sea’, May 29, 2006, http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2004/southchinaseamilitary.htm.
124 Allen S. Whiting, ‘The PLA and China’s Threat Perceptions’, The China Quarterly, No. 146, June 1996, p. 601.
125 United States Air Force, ‘Forces Prepare for Exercise Balikatan 2006’, February 15, 2006, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123016337.
126 Paul Stone, ‘Exercise BALIKATAN Kicks Off in Philippines’.
127 United States Air Force, ‘Forces Prepare for Exercise Balikatan 2006’. 128 Robert S. Ross, ‘A Realist Policy for Managing US-China Competition’, p. 7. 129 Robert S. Ross, ‘Assessing the China Threat’, p. 83.
130 Embassy of the United States in Manila, ‘RP-US Military Exercise ‘Balikatan 2006’ to be Held in Cebu, Luzon , and Sulu’, January 10, 2006, http://manila.usembassy.gov/wwwhr701.html.
131 Sun Jinzhong, ‘Return to Southeast Asia’, Beijing Review, Vol. 47, No, 28, July 2004, p. 13. 132 Tao Wenzao, ‘Sino-American Relations during the George W. Bush Administration’, p. 412-413. 133 Here only the positions of Beijing and Washington are to be explained. Taipei’s position is to be
omit-ted.
134 Information Office of the State Council, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.
135 ‘Full Text of Anti-Secession Law’, People’s Daily Online, March 14, 2005, http://english.people.com.cn/200503/14/eng20050314_176746.html.
136 Same position was explained in a firmer manner in China’s National Defense 2004: “Should the Taiwan authorities go so far as to make a reckless attempt that constitutes a major incident of ‘Taiwan Independence,’ the Chinese People and armed forces will resolutely and thoroughly crush it at any cost.” Information Office of the State Council, China’s National Defense in 2004, http://china.cn/e-white/20041227/index.htm.
related countries into its “de facto military bases”.131 Although it is not so easy to delineate the US policies as against ‘the China Threat’, that the US has increased its military cooperation with the Manila and buttressed its military presence in the region seems to be indicative of the long-term strategic aspirations of the US, in which China must play an important role.
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In addition to strengthening its alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, the Bush Administration has reaffirmed its commitment to oppose any forceful change in the Taiwan Strait. It seems to be a plausible argument that “the Taiwan question is the only issue in the world today that could realistically lead to a war between two major pow-ers.”132 The cause is the adamant positions of the two major parties of the Taiwan issue, China and the US.133
According to the Chinese Constitution, “Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People’s Republic of China. It is the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people…to accom-plish the great task of reunifying the motherland.”134 China has consistently adhered to the basic principles of ‘peaceful unification’ and ‘one country, two systems’. In 2005, National People’s Congress of China adopted Anti-Secession Law stating that “[a]fter the country is reunified peacefully, Taiwan may practice systems different from those on the mainland and enjoy a high degree of autonomy.”135 However, it reiterated the unwavering position of the Chinese government that “possibilities for a peaceful reuni-fication should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integri-ty.”136
Chinese government’s political obsession with the unification with Taiwan or inde-pendence of Taiwan can be explained by three reasons. First, considering the history of
China, the Chinese scholars argue that “Taiwan is a living example of Chinese humili-ation over the past century and a half, when almost all imperialist countries, large or small, invaded and bullied China…Taiwan is the last piece of territory that foreigners still endeavour to remove from China.”137 Second, there is the fear among the Chinese policy makers that the failure of the Chinese government to prevent ethnic Chinese from seceding will strengthen the positions of separatist movements in China’s autonomous regions inhabited by ethnically distinct peoples.138 Third, Taiwan is con-sidered by the Chinese scholars and policy makers as a part of the US containment pol-icy, albeit de facto, which aims at curbing the power of China.139
With regard to the dispute, the US policy is referred by some scholars as ‘dual deter-rence’, that is, deterring Beijing from using force to achieve unification and deterring Taipei from proclaiming independence. The basis of the American policy is the ‘Taiwan Relations Act’, promulgated in 1979 and proclaimed that “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.”140 On the other hand with three communiqués signed with China in 1972, 1979, 1982, the US reassured China by acknowledging “the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China” and stating that it “has no inten-tion of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’.”141
The Clinton Administration has tightened the official US position with the ‘Taiwan Security Enhancement Act’ adopted in February 2000 and fervently endorsed by the Bush Administration.142 The act proclaims that “the maintenance by Taiwan of forces adequate for its defense is in the interest of the United States in that it helps to main-tain peace in the Western Pacific region” and “[i]n accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States has, since 1979, sold defensive weapons to Taiwan, and such sales have helped Taiwan maintain its autonomy and freedom.”143 Against the proclamation of the ‘Anti-Secession Law’ by China, Richard Boucher, the State Department spokesman, expressed that “the U.S. Government has been quite clear that [it does not] think either side should take unilateral steps that try to define the
sit-137 Chu Shulong, ‘National Unity, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity’, The China Journal, No. 36, July 1996, p. 99.
138 Allen S. Whiting, ‘The PLA and China’s Threat Perceptions’, p. 614.
139 See, John J. Tkacik, Jr., ‘China’s Military Power’, statement before the US-China Economic Review Commission, July 27, 2005, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/tst072705.cfm. 140 US Department of State, ‘Taiwan Relations Act’, January 1, 1979,
http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_In-dex/Taiwan_Relations_Act.html
141 US Department of State, ‘Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China’, January 1, 1979, http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/joint_communique_1979.html. 142 For the text of the Act see, http://usinfo.org/sino/taiwan_enhance.htm.
