Cognitive
styles
and
religion
Onurcan
Yilmaz
Idiscussrecentresearchsuggestingthatindividualdifferences
incognitivestylegiverisetoandexplainreligiousandrelated
supernaturalandparanormalbeliefs.Todoso,Iillustrate
intuitivecognitivebiases(e.g.,anthropomorphism)underlying
thesebeliefsandthenreviewtheaccumulatedevidence
indicatingthatnon-believersaremoreopen-minded,reflective,
andlesssusceptibletoholdingepistemicallysuspectbeliefs(e.
g.,conspiracytheories)onaveragethanthosewhobelievein
supernaturaleventsorparanormalexperiencessuchas
astrologyormagic.However,seeingreligionasasearchfor
truthpositivelypredictsreasoningperformance.Although
thesefindingsarerobustacrossdiversemeasures,evidence
foracausalrelationshipremainsmixed.Strongerandmore
precisemanipulationsandcross-culturalinvestigationsare
needed. Address
KadirHasUniversity,Turkey
Correspondingauthor:Yilmaz,Onurcan([email protected])
CurrentOpinioninPsychology2021,40:150–154
ThisreviewcomesfromathemedissueonReligion
EditedbyVassilisSaroglouandAdamBCohen
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.09.014
2352-250X/ã2020ElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved.
Introduction
“TrustintheLordwithallyourheart,anddonotrelyon yourown insight.”
TheBookof Proverbs
“ItistheheartwhichperceivesGodandnotthereason. Thatiswhatfaithis:Godperceivedbytheheart,notby thereason.”
BlaisePascal
“Intellectisgoodanddesirabletotheextentitbringsyou totheKing’sdoor.OnceyouhavereachedHisdoor,then divorcetheintellect!”
Rumi
Homosapiens isagreatstoryteller. Thesestoriesoften rely on supernatural explanations of events, involving non-physicalphenomenathatcannotbeseenortouched. Althoughsupernaturalstorytellingmayseem likea uni-versalhumantendency,someseethesupernatural com-ponents of these stories as literary ploys, while others literally believe them. Recent research suggests that individual differences in cognitive style give rise to, andinpartexplain,beliefinreligiousandrelated super-naturalandparanormalbeliefs.Here,Ireviewthis liter-ature,focusingbothoncorrelationalstudiesofindividual differences,andexperimentalstudiesmanipulating cog-nitivestyle.Ithencommentontheboundaryconditions and future directions in understanding the relationship betweencognitive styleandthesebeliefs.
Therelationshipbetweencognitivestyleandreligionis complexbecausebothreligion[1]andcognitivestyle[2] are multifaceted. In this review, I mainly focus on the beliefdimensionof religion.Since religiousbeliefs rely onintuitivecognitivebiases (e.g.,teleologicalthinking) and often include belief in supernatural agents (e.g., angels)andparanormalphenomena(e.g.,witchcraft)that arenotbackedupbyevidence,Iwillusetheseasthekey definingattributesofreligiousbeliefandsummarizethe literaturelinkingthesebeliefswithcognitive style. Therearedifferentdefinitionsofcognitivestyleaswell. First,it isimportant to distinguish cognitive stylefrom cognitiveability[3].Althoughpreviousresearchrevealed thatanalyticcognitivestyle—traditionallymeasuredby higherlevelsofneedforcognition[4], rational-experien-tialinventoryorlowerlevelsoffaithinintuition[5]and cognitivereflectiontest[6]—iscorrelatedwithcognitive ability[7],thetwo aredifferentconcepts. Analytic cog-nitivestyle isdefined as awillingness to think delibera-tively, whereas cognitive ability is the capacity to effi-ciently use reflective thought processes [3,5]. Analytic cognitivestyleismore aboutthetendencytoreflecton andreviseanappealingintuitiveanswerwhichiswrong. Ontheotherhand,thetwoworkinteractivelyinthesense thatcognitivestylecanmoderatetheeffectof cognitive abilityandaremoderatelyrelatedtoeachother[7].Iwill hencereviewtheliteraturerelyingonself-reported(i.e., needforcognition)andperformance-based(i.e.,cognitive reflectiontest)cognitivestylemeasuresaswellas intelli-gencetestsmeasuringgeneralcognitive ability.
Cognitive
biases
underlying
religious
and
related
beliefs
Religious belief is traditionally seen as resulting from cultural forces that unite groups of people into moral
communities aroundsacredvalues[8].However,recent studiesclaimthatreligiousbeliefisnotonlyaproductof culturallearningbutalsoofcertaincognitivetraits,which canpredisposepeopletoacquiresupernaturalbeliefs[9– 15]. Whetherthey are evolutionaryadaptations special-izedforreligiousbeliefornot,itseemsclearthat cogni-tive biasessuchas mind-bodydualism[16],teleological thinking [17], agency detection [10],and anthropomor-phism[18],intuitivelyendorsedbychildrenand adults, naturallyleadtobeliefinsupernaturalagents.
Other research also revealedindividual differencesthat give rise to the above-mentioned cognitive biases [19– 21]. For example, ontological confusion of core knowl-edge (i.e. attributing mental phenomena to physical causes or vice versa), but notmentalizing abilities (i.e. ability to read the mental states of others), predicts religiousandparanormalbeliefs[20].Thislineofresearch notonlyshedslightonwhyreligiousfaithinsupernatural agents is widespread but also explains the role of indi-vidual differencestherein.
Cognitive
style,
religious
and
related
beliefs
Recentyearsalsowitnessedagrowinginterestinthelink between religious beliefs and analytic cognitive style. One approach conceives of the mind as consisting of interactions between Type 1 (automatic, low-effort, and intuitive) and Type 2 (analytical, high-effort, and reflective) processes [22–24]. An increasing number of findings haveemerged in recent years linking religious and relatedbeliefs toType 1intuitions, astheopening quotes suggest,andfocusingontheroleof Type2 pro-cesses insuppressing thelatter.Morespecifically,since religious and related beliefs rely onheuristics acquired duringsocialization,thedual-processmodelexpectsthat those who are more willing and able to use reflective thinkingarealsomorelikelytocheck andcorrect intui-tive but erroneous initial reactions, which in turn leads them to suspect and question religious doctrines. This expectation is often referred to as the intuitive belief hypothesis.Among self-reported dispositional cognitive style vari-ables, there is evidence showing that, in line with the intuitive belief hypothesis, religious beliefis positively correlatedwiththeneedforclosure[25],andnegatively withtheneedforcognition[26]andopen-minded think-ing [27,28]. More recently, in their large-scale survey, Bronsteinetal.[29]showedthatreligious fundamental-ism is positively associated with delusional ideation, dogmatism,and negativelywithopen-minded thinking. Thebeliefthatmoralityisfoundedonadivineauthority (i.e.,divinecommand theory)isalsowidespreadamong religious believers [30]. Since this meta-ethical belief implies that peopledo nothave the capacityto decide whichactionsaremorallyright,andGodistheauthorof moraltruths,itdiscouragesself-questioning.Accordingly,
muchlargernegativecorrelationswereobtainedbetween beliefin divinecommand theoryand analyticcognitive style, and open-minded thinking [28,31]. Religion and bindingmoralfoundationsofloyalty,authority,and sanc-tityarealsointertwinedwitheachotherinmostreligious traditions[32];endorsement ofthose moralfoundations havebeenfoundtobenegativelycorrelatedwithanalytic cognitivestyle[33].Therefore,differentlinesofresearch consistentlyshowthatreligiousbelievershaveadifferent cognitive stylethannon-believers.
Defining different types of beliefs (e.g., supernatural, superstitious,paranormal)isachallenge[34],and agree-ment is weak amongscholars. Paranormal beliefshave also often been used interchangeably with religious beliefs [34,35]. Evidence is mixed regarding this asso-ciation:Religiousandparanormalbeliefsaresometimes correlated [36] and sometimes not [37], probably because many paranormal beliefs (e.g., UFOs, magic, astrology) arenotpartofinstitutionalizedreligion.The research line investigating analytic cognitive style and paranormal beliefs clearly showed that paranormal believers perform worse at school [38], report lower need forcognition [39],are less likely tousescientific explanationsforthecausesofphysicalphenomena[40], to suspectfakenews and conspiracy theories [41],and are more likely to judge seemingly impressive but randomly generatedvacuous (i.e.,‘bullshit’)statements as profound [42] and to endorse alternative medicine [43].
However,theseindividualdifferencemeasuresmay suf-ferfromsociallydesirableresponding(i.e.,thetendency for people to answer surveys with themotivation to be perceived favorably).Furthermore, behavioral and self-reportmeasuresoftendiverge[44,45,46].Therefore,itis important to show the same associations using perfor-mance-basedmeasures[27,47,48].
There is indeed accumulated evidence supporting the intuitive belief hypothesis using performance-based measures [49–53] and this association holds indepen-dent of demographics and personality characteristics [50,52]. A meta-analysis of all 31 studies conducted in Westerncountries concluded that there was aweak but significant negative relationship (r = 0.18) between analytic cognitive style and religious belief [54]. Self-identified atheists are also more likely (d = 0.72) to have a stronger analytic cognitive style than self-reported believers. This association holds in many non-Westernculturesaswell,includingTurkey[53,55], India [56], and Singapore, but not China [57]. The most comprehensive performance-based evidence to date regarding cognitive ability using a meta-analysis of 83 studies clearly showed that there is an overall negative association (ranging from 0.20 to 0.23) between IQ and religiousbelief [47].
Boundary
conditions
and
causality
Although the relationship between religiosity and ana-lyticcognitivestyleandIQseemstobeclearlyborneout incorrelationalstudies,someboundaryconditionsapply. Thenegative religiosity-IQlinkisstrongerfor religious belief (versus practice), and for adults (versus younger people).However,sincepreviousresearchpredominantly relied on Western samples [47], little-to-nothing is known about the cultural moderators of this link. For thereligiosity-analyticcognitivestylelink,Gervaisetal. [57] conducted a cross-cultural test using 13 different culturesandfoundaweakbutoverallsignificantnegative relationship,althoughthisrelationshipwasnotfoundin eachculture.Besides,Bahc¸ekapiliandYilmaz [53] con-ductedaseriesofstudiesinTurkeyandfoundthatwhile analytic cognitive style is negatively associated with intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity (seeing religion as a personal guide and as a meansfor social ends, respec-tively), it is positively associated with quest religiosity (seeingreligionasasearchfortruth[58]).Thesefindings suggestthatthelinksbetweenreligiousbeliefand cog-nitivestylearecomplex,andthattheyincludeboundary conditions such as cultural background and individual motivation.
Despitethese boundary conditions, theintuitive belief hypothesis is generally supported in correlational find-ings.Experimentalresults,ontheotherhand,donothave the same clarity. Initial experiments by Gervais and Norenzayan [49] and Shenhav, Rand, and Greene [51] found that activating intuitive thinking leads to an increase, and activating reflective thinking leads to a decrease in religious belief. Yilmaz, Karadoller, and Sofuoglu[59]replicatedthisrelationshipina non-West-ernsample.Theclearpatternrevealedin initial experi-mentswasneverthelessblurredbysubsequentfailuresof replication[45,60,61].
More recently, in two high-powered experiments and usingtime-limitsto manipulateanalyticcognitivestyle, YilmazandIsler[62]testedwhetheractivatinganalytic cognitivestyleinfluencesreligiousbelief.Thefirst exper-iment found that, in contrast to the intuitive belief hypothesis, analytic cognitive style increased religious belief, and this association was stronger in atheists and agnostics.Inapreregisteredfollow-upexperimentusinga within-subjects design, the participants were asked to maketheirdecisionsfirstundertime-pressure(i.e. intui-tively), and were then given a chance to revise their decisionsundertime-delay(i.e.allowingreflection). Con-firmatorytestswereconsistentwiththeideathatanalytic cognitive style increases religious belief, especially among non-believers. Additional analyses have shown that the overall shift in mean religious belief tended toward themiddleof the scale(i.e. towards‘not sure’), andmoresofornon-believers.Thisfindingsupportsthe reflectivereligious doubthypothesis(i.e.reflection increases
self-questioningaboutone’sintuitivelyheldbeliefabout religion). Given thesemixed findings, more research is neededtounderstandthecausaleffectofanalytic cogni-tivestyleonreligious belief.
Possible
explanations
Whatliesbeneath thenegativereligiousbelief-IQ asso-ciation?Zuckermanetal.[47]proposedthree explana-tions.First,intelligentpeoplearelesslikelytoconformto societalnorms;andtherefore,theyaremoresuspiciousof religiousorthodoxy and tradition.Asecond explanation proposes a compensatory control mechanism whereby intelligencecompensates for several adaptive functions of religiosity (such as self-regulation), rendering super-naturalbeliefunnecessary.Athirdpossibleexplanationis that,due to the analytic cognitive style-IQ correlation, intelligent people are more likely to become skeptical against epistemically suspect beliefs. In supportof this argument,Zuckermanetal.[47]showedthatindividual differencesin analytic cognitive style partially explains theassociation betweenIQ andreligiousbelief.Saribay andYilmaz[52]alsodemonstratedthatanalyticcognitive style,but notIQ,uniquelypredictsreligiousbelief. Butthen,whydoesthenegativereligiousbelief-analytic cognitive style association emerge? One explanation is thatreflective thinkersare more likelyto correct initial intuitiveresponsesbyspendingmoretimeonthe ques-tionathand andontheirinitialresponse[63],aprocess thatincludesquestionsaboutreligion.Asecond explana-tionrefersto individualdifferencesincognitive mecha-nismofconflictdetection:Reflectivethinkers mightbe moresensitivetoconflicts betweenbeliefin immaterial supernaturalentitiesand realitiesof thematerialworld, whereasreligiousbelieversarelesslikelytodetectsuch conflicts[64].
Conclusion
Overall,consideringthefindings inthefieldas awhole, weseeanegativerelationshipbetweenhavingreligious and related beliefs and the ability and willingness to reflect [27]. That is, more intelligent and reflective people are more likelyto reject religious doctrines and paranormalbeliefs.Nevertheless,evidencefrom experi-mental findings is mixed. Recent high-powered tests revealedeitheranulleffect[60,61]oraself-questioning effectof analyticcognitive style[62].Overall,thereis needforadditional,high-powered,especially experimen-talandlongitudinalstudiestoreachaclearerviewonthis issue.
Author
notes
I thank Hasan G. Bahc¸ekapili, Ozan Isler, and S. Adil Saribayfortheirhelpfulcommentsontheearlierversions ofthemanuscript.
Funding
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in thepublic, commercial, or not-for-profitsectors.
Conflict
of
interest
statement
Nothing declared.References
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