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FREEDOM and SOLIDARITY PARTY (ÖZGÜRLÜK ve DAYANIŞMA PARTİSİ)

FROM THE PAST TO THE FUTURE; A SHORT HISTORY

A M aster’s Thesis

by BÜLENT EKEN

Department o f

Political Science and Public Administration Bilkent University

Ankara September 2000

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THE FREEDOM AND SOLID ARTY PARTY (ÖZGÜRLÜK VE DAYANIŞMA PARTİSİ)

FROM THE PAST TO THE FUTURE: A SHORT HISTORY

The Institute o f Economics and Social Sciences o f

Bilkent University

by

BÜLENT EKEN

In Partial Fulfillment o f the Requirements for the Degree o f

M ASTER OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

m

THE DEPARTMENT OF

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION BiLKENT UNIVERSITY

ANKARA

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I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree o f M aster o f Political Science and Public Administration.

Professor Ergun Ozbudun Supervisor

Assistant Professor Ahmet İçduygu Examining Commitee Member

k s s is ^ t Professor E. Fuat Keyman Examining Commitee Member

Approval o f the Institute o f Econpmics and Social Sciences

Ali Karaosmanoglu Director

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ABSTRACT

THE FREEDOM AND SOLIDARITY PARTY (ÖZGÜRLÜK VE DAYANIŞMA PARTİSİ) FROM THE PAST TO THE FUTURE: A SHORT HISTORY

Eken, Bülent

M aster o f Art, Department o f Political Science and Public Administration

Supervisor: Professor Ergun Özbudun

September 2000

This thesis analyses the political life o f the Freedom and Solidarity Party (Özgürlük ve

Dayamşma Partisi, ÖDP) in a historical context. Party’s establishment process, its political

identity, its discourse and mass actions, its performance in the general and local elections o f

April 1999 will be discussed. The thesis will also make political assumptions about the party’s

future.

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ÖZET

GEÇM İŞTEN GELECEĞE ÖZGÜRLÜK VE DAYANIŞM A PARTİSİ; BİR KISA TARİHÇE

Eken, Bülent

Master, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun

Eylül 2000

Bu çalışma, Özgürlük ve Dayamşma Partisi’nin siyasi hayatını tarihsel bir çerçeve içinde

incelemiştir. Partinin kuruluş süreci, siyasi kimliği, söylemi ve kitlesel eylemleri. Nisan 1999

Genel ve Yerel Ana Seçimlerindeki performansı tartışılmıştır. Bu çalışma, aynı zamanda,

partinin geleceği hakkında siyasal tahminler de yapmıştır.

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ACPCNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank to:

Professor Ergun Özbudun, for his supervision and for his trust in me.

Ass. Professor Tahire Erman, for her efforts to solve my technical questions.

Ass. Professor E. Fuat Keyman, for his friendly guidance in the problematic issues.

Ass. Professor Ahmet İçduygu, for his participation to the juiy,

Güvenay Kazmacı, for her intimate friendship.

Berkin Altmok, for his patience and for his sincere solidarity,

Hakan Eken, for his efforts to connect me with the right addresses,

Sadun Aren, for his conversation with me,

Ufuk Uras, for his politeness.

And..

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

The world continues to experience great agitations in the economic, social and

ideological surfaces as- well as in the

reel

politics at the very beginning o f the 2 U Century. The story was nothing new; the process o f the collapse o f the communist

bloc was initiated in 1989, accordingly, the arguments o f the liberal thinkers such as

“the end o f history” and/or “the end o f the ideology” covered all the political surfaces

in order to define the concept o f “New World- Order”. The last decade o f the 20***

century was dominated by the globalisation which is the practical side o f the

capitalism. The left was “defeated” after its seventy years o f power, and the ghost o f

the communism which was a threat for W estern Europe for y e a rs , was terminated.

However, Turkey also was affected from this world-scaled process directly,

alongside its own structural-based and fundamental economic, social and political

developments. Especially, the

coup-d'etat

o f 1980, the military junta, and the

constitution o f 1982 pacified the Turkish left. N ot only the left, but all the political

parties, labour unions, democratic mass organisations were annihilated by this “new”

political structure.

Under these circumstances, the political jargon o f the socialist left changed.

Concepts o f the Marxist terminology w ere replaced by more moderate discourses.

Generally, all the “new” socialist parties around the world, decided to use this new

jargon. Thus, “political revolution” was replaced by “radical change”, “proletarian

dictatorship” was replaced by “direct democracy”, and “worker-peasant alliance” was

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After the defeat o f 1980, the Turkish socialist left was preparing for a “new

life”, at the end o f a period o f political silence. However; just after the military

intervention, thousands o f socialists-whether militant or legal party members-left

Turkey with the fear o f getting arresting by the police. A great amount o f socialists

who stayed in Turkey became members o f the Social Democratic Party (Sosyal

Demokrasi Partisi, SODEP). The rest was arrested due to arbitrary decision-making

or political reasons and were sent to jail.

The most important event which was realised in the left, was the unification o f

the Turkish Communist Party (Türkiye Komünist Partisi, TKP) and W orkers Party o f

Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TİP) under the name o f Turkish United Communist Party

(Türkiye Birleşik Komünist Partisi, TBKP). The political inclinations o f the party

were based on legality, reformism and democracy. With these values, one can say that

TBKP constituted an antecedent o f the Socialist Unity Party (Sosyalist Birlik Partisi,

SBP) after its abolishment by the Constitutional Court. Whereas SBP transformed

into the United Socialist Party (Birleşik Sosyalist Party, BSP) and was to be the major

formation that constituted the Freedom and Solidarity Party (Özgürlük ve Dayanışma

Partisi), which is the subject o f this study.

Throughout this study, the author tries to examine ÖDP in an historical

context. The party’s four-year-old short political life will be taken into consideration,

in a theoretical and in a practical way. Appearance o f ÖDP in the Turkish political

scene as a new hope was very important for the leftists at the end o f a long process in

which the left was inefficient. However, there were also different socialist parties in

the political arena, but ÖDP seemed to be important because o f its members who

were came from the various socialist backgrounds. With the foundation o f ÖDP,

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socialist left, seemed to be solved. In other words, ODP was founded to be the party

for all the socialists in Turkey.

The first chapter focuses on the post communist era in Eastern Europe. While

elaborating on this subject, successor parties which were founded just after the

dismissal o f the communist parties o f the Eastern European countries, will be also

taken into consideration. The process o f the collapse o f communism, the 1989-1991

revolutions, and the early post communist era with its political conjecture, will

constitute the main body o f the chapter. At the very end o f the chapter, ODP is

assumed as “the” successor party in Turkish politics.

The second chapter bases upon the political identity o f ODP. The party’s

foundation process will be given in detail with putting a special importance to the

historical background. Additionally, the ideological orientation(s) o f ODP will be

taken into consideration from the opinions o f the members o f the party as well as the

opinions from the intellectual community. The author decided to label the identity o f

the party as ‘kaleidoscopic politics’. The basic reason for this is to show the different

‘colours’ and the ‘voices’ o f the party.

The third chapter focuses on the practical experiences o f ODP. The author

deals with the political theses o f the party at the first stage, whereas at the second

stage, O D P’s mass actions will be taken into account. Political discourse o f the party

was assumed as a re-interpretation o f the traditional, and mass actions were

elaborated as the products o f an original and authentic understanding o f ODP. The

“Rainbow Project” which is one o f the most important projects o f the party is also

included into the chapter.

Fourth chapter deals with the future o f ODP. The performance o f the party in

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landscape o f Turkey constitutes the first stage. Consequences o f the elections for

ODP form a benchmark o f the need o f a self-critique. The last issue about this final

chapter focuses on the opinions about the future o f the party. Party members, and

foremost persons from the intellectual community deal with the issue o f the future o f

the party.

In the conclusion, the author analyses ODP as a libertarian socialist party

within the political conjecture o f Turkey. A general elaboration o f the party within

Turkish politics, in other words, the political adventure o f a four-year-old socialist

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POST COMMUNIST ERA IN EASTERN EUROPE; SUCCESSORS OF

THE COMMUNIST PARTIES

CHAPTER 2

The end o f communism in the Soviet sphere meant that bureaucratised

socialism came to an end. The claim that an authoritarian political order could lead to

social equality is bankrupted. Accordingly, vanguardist and statist strategies which

were conceptualised by Lenin and applied as well as by Stalin, Khrushchev and

Breshnev, have long disappeared.

The centralised party based state required vanguards o f the ideology,

instrumental rationality and vigorous bureaucracy. Gorbachev policies o f

perestroika

and

glasnost

transformed the state system and economy. At the end, the Communist Party was bankrupt by the extreme reform measures like the other ruling parties o f

Eastern Europe which shared the same destiny.

In this chapter, post communist era will be analysed. The process o f the

collapse o f Communism, emergence o f the successors o f the communist parties after

1989-1991 revolutions and a general review o f the early post-communist era in

Eastern Europe will constitute the basis o f this theoretical framework.

Collapse of Communism; The End of Orthodox Marxism

The political force o f Marxism as an organised movement failed after the

Second International when World W ar I broke out, and after the war, the rise o f

fascism eliminated Marxist parties in the whole o f Europe. Douglas Kellner argues

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capitalism in the so-called democratic capitalist countries seemed to portend the

obsolescence o f Marxism.” ^ The state o f turbulence was not new, M acdsm has been

in crisis throughout the century.

The collapse o f Soviet Communism is a very significant epochal event that was

figured the inevitable end o f the Orthodox Marxism. The root o f Orthodox Marxism

was the idea that capitalism would be overthrowned by the revolutionary proletariat.

According to the Orthodox Marxists, such kind o f socialism was only produced in the

Soviet Union and the Soviet Communism provided the victory o f socialism in the

whole world.

At the beginning, theory and practice coincided. During the following seventy

years, communism continued to prevail. By the middle o f the 1980s, Mikhail

Gorbachev became the General Secretary o f the Communist Party and introduced

reforms in the economy and in politics. The result was the emergence o f

Perestroika

(Reestablishment) and

Glasnost

(Openness). M ost scholars agree that Gorbachev was a perfect reformer but not a revolutionary. Leslie Holmes argues that “a leader who

knew that the USSR needed significant change, but he continued to believe that the

necessary extent and type o f change required was possible within a socialist

framework”^ M oreover, Gorbachev gave permission to Eastern European States to

pursue their own affair and goals unlike the previous leaders o f the USSR. This

encouraged the so-called “Iron Curtain” countries to create their own pats

independent from Soviet Union. They also had the assumption that the USSR would

not interfere into their internal affairs under any circumstances.

' Kellner, Douglas. 1995. “The End o f Orthodox Marxism.” in Antonio Callari, Stephen Cullenberg and Carole Biewener, eds., Marxism in the Postmodern Age. New York; Guilford Press, 33

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The other factor o f the decline o f the Orthodox Marxism was economic

failure. The communist economy o f USSR was satisfactory in the beginning but

slowed down in due process. One o f the reasons o f this fall was due to lagging behind

the West, related to the unsatisfaction o f the consumers and declining overall grow th

rates. To Holmes, “Consumers were badly treated in comparison with W est

Europeans, and many East Europeans, plus a growing number o f Soviets, were

aware o f this.”^ According to highest- ranking officials o f the Soviet Union, rapid shift

from central planning to contractual applications, low wages and increasing demand

towards supply led to the economic chaos in USSR at the end o f 1980’s.

Third significant factor o f the collapse was social opposition. According to

Holmes, “There is no question that ordinary citizens vented their dissatisfaction with

their communist governments on numerous occasions in recent decades

(...Czechoslovakia in 1968...the USSR in 1962 etc.)”^ Towards the very end o f

1980’s this massive discontent became the common problem o f the communist states

and contributed to the collapse o f the Orthodox Marxism. With the rising opposition,

the notion o f “civil society” gained importance in the Iron Curtain. N ot surprisingly,

with bringing a strong challenge with itself

One o f the most important factor o f the collapse o f Orthodox Marxism was

the crisis o f legitimisation. When thinking with the conceptualisation o f Max Weber,

communist states had had an attempt to move to legal-rational leadership from

charismatic ones. But for the communists, legal-rational leadership was not

controllable. Holmes argues that “One o f the reasons why it became an uncontrollable

force in the USSR was precisely because the masses appropriated it and expected

^ ibid, 26 ibid, 27

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more than the leadership had intended: this phenomenon was repeated to a limited

extent in some o f the East European countries.”^

In tro d u c tio n to Post C om m unism : T he Revolutions o f 1989-1991 an d the

Em ergence of th e Successor Parties

Between 1989 and 1991, alt the communist states o f the Eastern Europe

moved to the era o f post communism by several revolutions. At this stage, firstly,

these revolutions will be analysed in a theoretical and comparative way one by one,

and secondly, successors o f the old communist parties will be taken into

consideration.

Firstly, I have to mention about the general and mostly common stages o f the

transition o f the ex-communist countries into the post communist era. There were

leadership problems, the role o f the communist parties was diminishing, and there was

a legalisation process o f the opposition forces, and changes within the communist

parties. There were also changes in the character o f the elections, as well as a change

o f name o f the countries and the implementation o f new constitutions. As one can see,

whether being labelled a revolution or not, all o f these transitions were realised with

very similar aspects in reality, hence, they have been called as “Revolutions o f 1989-

1991”.

H u n g a ry was the first actor o f the transition. The cause o f this

“championship” was Hungary itself as the

problem child

o f the socialism for decades^

^ ibid, 56

® Engin, Aydın. 1996. Solda Arayışlar (Searches in the Left). Istanbul: Güncel Yayinalik, 17. He claims that Himgary was the weakest side o f the Warsaw Pact especially in the 1980’s. The reason here, according to Engin, was the relative existence o f private sector in Hungary.

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as well as the early liberalisation process by Janos Kadar, president o f Hungary during

the preceding three decades. As being a member o f the Iron Curtain, Hungary had a

different situation among other Eastern European countries with the effects o f the

relatively early economic reforms by Kadar. But, when he became an old man, leading

communists removed Kadar and instituted a new team. The domestic Hungarian

market was faced with economic problems. Inflation was relatively high and

international debts were increasing. The new leaders introduced some economic

measures but they were not successful. In such an atmosphere, certain unoflBcial

organisations began to emerge. The most important o f them was nationalist-

conservative Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF). In this context, government

compromised and the Hungarian Parliament permitted such unofficial parties to enter

into official politics in 1989. Gorbachev had no objection towards the multi-party

system in Hungaiy. This radical political change brought the communists to a

junction; Holmes states that “...they could either attempt to turn back the clock by

reverting to coercion, like the Polish communists in 1981 or the Czechoslovak

communists in 1969, or else move forward and accept the consequences”’

The first outcome was the change o f the name o f the country. The People’s

Republic o f Hungary became the Hungarian Republic. At the same time, the

Communist Party became Hungarian Socialist Party and left Marxism-Leninism. In

the elections, HDF won the majority amount o f the seats whereas HSP experienced a

disaster.

The transition process to post communism in Hungary was realised smoothly,

because o f the indirect role o f the citizens. But this was only a matter o f choice. They

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was a sincere trust to the new opposition organisations to change the existing political

system.

After the transition process, Hungary lived a highly interesting political

experience where such an experience would be impossible to come for decades.

The most prominent successor party in Hungary during the post communist

era was

Socialist Party o f Hungary

(SPH) which was the direct successor o f

Socialist

Worker Party o f Hungary

(SWPH). This was a reformist party which take its

objectives from democratic socialism. Free market economy and free private

ownership were constituted the base o f its economic programme. Self-administration,

direct democracy and pragmatist flexibility were the principles o f this mass party.

(Class consciousness were underestimated unlike a communist party) Industrial

workers, intellectuals and petit-bourgeoisie were supported SPH for these principles.

In the beginning, SPH had a little success in the elections o f 1990. But in

1994, the party gained a incredible support from the public and came to power as the

big partner o f a coalition with a liberal left party.

Union o f Free Democrats

(UFD). The reason here, according to Aydin Engin, was the unusual propaganda style o f

Gyula Horn, the president o f SPH; According to Engin, ‘T o r example, he accepts

clearly that he could not prevent the high unemployment. He declared that to decrease

unemployment will be a success. H e was elected then. This was an unusual

Q

outspokenness.”

In Poland, the transition process began with an economic reform referendum

in 1987. “Seize the day” policy o f the communist government was rejected by the

public who wanted long-term commitment for economic improvements, stability and

reform. With this result, the clash between the regime and the public surfaced. Several

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strikes and the rise o f the popularity o f Walesa, a labour union leader, started to

threaten the regime. Consequently, the opposition in the elections defeated the

communists. With this defeat, communists lost the control o f the economy; thus the

country entered into a time o f crisis. Under these situations, a close friend o f Walesa,

Mazoviecki became Prime Minister as the head o f a coalition government where

communists were only a minority. M oreover in 1990, Walesa was elected president

and post communist era was started to flourish with all its institutions. Similar to

Hungary, the transition o f Poland to the post communism was realised in a peaceful

manner.

The successor party.

Social Democracy o f the Poland Republic{^T>?K)

founded from ashes o f the communist

United Labour Party o f Poland

(ULPP). First elections o f 1990 was a defeat for them, whereas in 1993, the alliance with other

leftist parties, namely

Democratic Leftist Union

(DLU) came to the power with a great public support.

The profile o f DLU was reformist like as SPH o f Hungary. Pragmatist policies

o f the alliance brought it to a liberal leftist perspective. This was very important for

the democratic transition to democracy in Poland. Both SDPR and DLU were

constituted by the members who came from distinct political perspectives just like

Freedom and Solidarity Party

(ÖDP) o f Turkey. Engin states that “...this mosaic, this ‘raggle-taggle’ group strengthens the party, and develops the creativity o f it.”^

Just like the other communist governments, the Czechoslovak government

believed that economic reforms would protect the system. However public opinion

demanded large-scale political reforms. Many people were in the streets to make

' Engin, Aydm. Solda Arayışlar. (Searches in the Left), 21

9 i-_{ibid, 27}

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demonstrations against the government. These demonstrations were proliferated

during the time and turned into harsh protests which were led by university students.

These extensive protests were suppressed by the authorities, however the result o f

these suppressions was large and organised strikes all over the country. At the same

time, Vaclav Havel, future president o f the country, formed the Civic Forum (CV).

With the great support o f the citizens, Prague became the scene o f protest in 1989.

The government could not manage to curb down the demonstrations and had no

chance other than resignation. The new communist government was no longer

stronger than its predecessors and began to loose control. Transition to post

communism was indeed in due process. In the very late 1989, Alexander Dubcek

elected as the chairperson o f the parliament whereas Havel became President o f

Czechoslovakia. In the general elections o f 1990, communists only gained a small

percentage o f the votes and transition were completed in a legitimate manner.

Unlike Hungary and Poland, in Czechoslovakia, public masses played an

important role in the process o f transition. Hence no violence occurred in the street

demonstrations. In other words, Czechoslovakian revolu(transi)tion was realised

without “blood” . Havel named the transition as “Velvet Revolution” . His description

became a famous conception later within the political history jargon.

Within this conjecture,

Czechoslovak Communist Party

(CCP) was separated. Two successor party,

Bohemian Communist Party

(BCP) o f Czech side and

Democratic Leftist Party

(DLP) o f Slovak side were founded in 1992. Both were not

successful during 1990’s unlike other successors o f the old communist countries’

communist parties.

In the late 1980’s the economy o f Romania was very poor. Ceausescu’s

government had a large amount o f foreign debt. Citizens were frustrated by the

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regime. M oreover, and unlike Czechoslovakia, the civil police was so efficient

therefore no one could rebel against the order. But in 1989, workers started the

transition period with civil strikes so as to protest the living and working conditions.

Events evolved into a huge protest all over the country. Thereafter, Ceausescu

declared a state o f emergency and gave order to the militaiy to oppress the citizens.

But the turning point o f the transition process was the military’s rejection o f

Ceausescu. Military took the side o f the citizen. This was the starting o f the end.

Ceausescu left Bucharest immediately but was captured soon after. Thus, his regime

was finally over with his execution. This dramatic end was also the end point o f the

Romanian Revolution. Ion Iliescu, as the leader o f the National Salvation Front (NSF)

took the control. In the general elections which was held in 1990, NSF gained a

majority number o f the seats and legitimised its position.

The collapse o f communism in Romania was relatively rapid than our previous

cases. The masses played a direct role just like in Czechoslovakia. But differently,

Romanian anti-Communist revolution was a very bloody one. The violent self-rule o f

Ceausescu and the repressive nature o f his interpretation o f the communist ideology

put citizens against the regime.

NSF gained a great support in the short-term. After the elections o f 1990, the

party was separated into two distinct group. In reality, this separation meant nothing.

In 1995,

Romanian Social Democratic Party

(RSDP) which was the most prominent successor party^®, made an alliance with three leftist party and constituted the “Red

Square” .

Socialist Party o f Labor

(SPL),

Romanian National Unity Party

(RNUP), and

Grand Romania Party

(GRP) were the other comers o f the Red Square. These four successor party o f RCP became prominent during 1990’s in Romania.

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In B ulgaria, transition was a gradual process rather than a rapid event. It was

much more peace&l and less violent, compared to Romania. Like in Czechoslovakia,

public role was significant (demonstrations) to raise opposition in order to demand

change. Consequently, Todor Jivkov was arrested and pacified.

Just after the dissolving process o f

Communist Party o f Bulgaria

(СРВ),

Socialist Party o f Bulgaria

(SPB) was founded as successor. SPB gained success in the elections o f both 1990 and 1994 and constitute a coalition government with the

ecologist action

Ekoglasnost

and peasant party

Alexandr StamboliskiJ^

By the end o f 1989, Y ugoslavia knew that the happenings o f the Eastern

Europe. Like other Eastern European countries, Yugoslavia also had economical

problems such as high inflation. M oreover, just like in Bulgaria, ethnic problems had

arisen from multi-cultural identity o f the country, which was about a significant a

fragile balance. In early 1990, inevitably (because o f the weakened government)

elections were held in Slovenia and in Croatia and a few months later in Macedonia

and Bosnia-H erzegovina, and in all o f them, non-communists parties won. Thus four

o f these regional nationalities successfully completed their transition towards post

communism whereas Montenegro and more importantly Serbia remained communist.

In early 1991, ethnical clashes began to appear in Yugoslavia. The country was facing

dissolution. W ar broke out between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and later

Croatian inclusion into war scene brought Yugoslavia to a crossroads. Only Serbia

wanted to remain in federation system. In mid 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared

independence, a few months later, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina made the

same move. W ar has still been continuing almost since. Thousands o f people were

RSDP was founded by the members o f NSF under Iliescu. " Engin, Aydın. Solda Arayışlar (Searches in the Left), 45

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killed. The transition o f Yugoslavia into post communism was the bloodiest one

among others. Today, post communist era is at full speed in Yugoslavia, but its initial

adaptation was very dramatic and violent.

In Serbia,

Serbian Socialist Party

(SSP) under Slobodan Milosevic founded as the successor party o f

Yugoslavian Communist Party

(YCP). This nationalistic (sometimes fascistic) party has also the ideals o f the old communist regime. Its

interesting side according to Engin, is the “mixed property model” ^^. According to

this model, private and public property compete between each other and develop the

economy.

In Macedonia,

Unity o f the Social Democrats

(USD) which constitute by old communists ruled. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was no efficiency o f the communists,

likewise in Croatia. Slovenia has got two successor:

United Leftists

’

Party

(ULP) and

Liberal Democratic Party

(LDP).

The history o f the transition within Russia is far more complex. It can be

another paper topic in and out o f itself I have mentioned about Gorbachev’s politics

at the very beginning o f this chapter. Here, at this point, the significance o f domestic

political changes is at the fore. Great political changes occurred in USSR in 1990. The

administrative power changed hands from the Communist Party to the state itself In

m id-1990, Boris Yeltsin became the president o f Russia by dethroning the legend o f

Gorbachev. This event was the final o f the collapse o f the Soviet communist power.

In late 1990, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia announced their independence. Soon

after, Ukraine and Russia (itse lf!) declared sovereignty.

ibid, 47

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The transition to post-communism for the Russian people was different

process compared to the Eastern Europe experience. Holmes states that, “It was more

prolonged, for instance, although this should not be exaggerated, since the difference

was marginal in the grand scale o f history” *^

In 1991, Communist Party was abolished and its historical absolute power was

collapsed. Accordingly, political spectrum was filled by various political tendencies,

(i.e. fascistic, fundamentalist, tcharist, etc.) On the other hand, revitalisation process

o f the collapsed left was terminated in 1992 by the foundation o f the

Communist

Party o f the Russian Federation

(CPRF) with the participation o f half a million members. It became later the most prominent successor o f the old communist party,

because there were founded also other and relatively small successor parties such as

Russian Communist Proletarian Party

and

Bolshevik Unity Party.

They were both on the way o f Marxism-Leninism and constituted together a higher organisation which

named

Bolshevik Platform.

Another one.

Socialist Party o f the Workers

was differentiated itself from others by denying Leninist model and adopting only pure

Marxian ideology. Finally and differently.

Free Russian Party

founded with an idea o f denying traditional communist party principles. Its aim was to reform the socialist

ideology and economy. To Engin, “This party proclaimed its refusal towards being in

a co-operation with communists in any platform since it was founded, and has an

actual tendency to apply this refusal even today.

The political panorama o f Russian successor communist parties showed

inability to being under the same umbrella according to their programmes and ideals.

According to CPRF, unification between the communist parties was necessary to

Leslie Holmes. Post Communism: An Introduction, 114 Engin, Aydın. Solda Arayışlar (Searches in the Left), 15

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obtain a powerful communist alternative towards the government, but this unification

can not be accepted by the others.

For today, CPRF appears as the most powerful successor among others which

had obtained unsatisfactory results in the elections during 1990’s. Only CPRF can

obtain extensive votes from the old cadres o f military and state, and from the middle

class and intellectuals. But these votes are not sufficient to obtain the power, because

o f the lack o f interest o f the proletariat towards the party.

Transition process was slightly different in East Germany than the other

countries. The difference was the dissolving o f the “state” itself instead o f the

communist party. A socialist country accessed to a capitalist country voluntarily by

the destruction o f the Berlin Wall.

It is clear that all the successor parties have been differentiated from the

Leninist model. Instead o f ‘proletarian dictatorship’ and/or ‘cadre party’, ‘pluralism’

and ‘mass party’ were sovereign. These conceptions brought the successor parties to

the extend o f the social democracy.

Early Post Communism : Early (!) Victory of Capitalism

With the collapse o f communism, history brought us to an era in which there

were no more extreme ideologies in existence in reel politics. In theory, the

“disappearance” o f an ideology might be only a nascent thought. But in practice, after

the collapse o f the Orthodox, scientific Marxism and the past decline o f fascism with

the end o f World W ar Two, extreme right and left ideas persisted as opposition

ideologies almost all around the world.( Some countries like Cuba, N orth Korea etc.,

still governed by communism today).

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According to certain thinkers and scientists from the liberal front, liberal

democracy became the contemporary and inevitable condition o f the ideology.

M oreover, like Francis Fukuyama, many o f them believed that the liberal democracy

would be the dominant political form o f the future. (There exists a contradiction here:

I f Fukuyama believed that this is the end o f history, how he can allude to the future.

Because future is only meaningful only with its relation with the past and today... This

can be the subject o f an another discussion)

The end o f ideology brought the concept o f “normal politics” to the political

arena. According to Kenneth Minogue, “Normal politics is the politics o f liberal

democracy, in which an endless stream o f proposals is advanced, criticised and

implemented within the argumentative conditions o f parliamentary democracy.” *^ This

conception is not universally true o f course. Because it can directly be related to the

first world countries. However, every country has a different political culture and this

creates an inability to apply this conception o f “normal politics” for all conditions.

M oreover, certain scientists see the normal politics as a process o f cultural

imperialism. At the same time. Eastern European countries saw themselves culturally

European and assiduously continued to be much closer to the Western European

culture in terms o f social, economic and political affairs.

Under the light o f these opinions, the post communist world is abnormal

according to liberal democrats because o f its transitional and unclear conjecture. In

this conjecture, I can say that the major change between communist and post

communist era is the increase in the number o f the political parties. Essentially the

“New Left” movement started earlier, before the collapse o f the communism, but the

Minogue, Kenneth. 1994. “Ideology after the Collapse o f Communism”. In Alexandras Shtromas. ed., “The End o f ISMS”. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 5.

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change in number o f the political parties has accelerated by the time o f the collapse.

Thus, multi-party systems were established in the post communist world due to such

acceleration.

But, what is interesting, the transition period is never assumed as “return to

capitalism”. Instead o f this, the terms o f ‘liberalism’ or ‘free market economy’

became fashionable. At the beginning, countries o f the old communist bloc

transformed their policies into liberal ones within a change in their economic

structures. The consequence was generally the defeat because o f the historical

conformism o f the old communist countries. (Large social security, cheaper social

services etc.) This was the dark side o f the moon for capitalists. Successors o f the

communist parties gained successful results in the elections from the very beginning o f

1990’, some o f them came to power; whether uniquely or in a coalition, the worse

they became the main opposition. But with a difference: As I mentioned earlier, a

great amount o f these successor parties are in the way o f social democracy with

rejecting rigid principles o f Leninist model.

It is valid also for ÔDP. Freedom and Solidarity Party was the candidate o f the

social opposition when founded in 1996. The importance and difference o f ÔDP

among other Turkish socialist parties is its search efforts o f finding solutions for the

problems o f socialism. If ÔDP will found these solutions, a “new” socialism, in other

words, “21th Century Socialism” *^ can be structured.

The concept belongs to Ufuk Uras.

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CHAPTER 3 IDENTITY OF ÔDP; KALEIDOSCOPIC POLITICS

In this chapter, ÔDP will be analysed in terms o f its political identity. Firstly,

its historical background and establishment process, secondly, its ideological

orientations from the party programme including the ideas o f its founders, and thirdly,

contributions to these orientations from intellectual spheres will be taken into

consideration.

Historical Background and Establishment Process of ÔDP

The political dynamics in Turkey were very different when compared to the

Eastern European experience during the period o f the collapse o f communism.

Furthermore, the military coup d ’etat o f 1980 constituted a pre-obstacle for the

Turkish left. N one o f the political spheres was able to resist to the junta. Labor

unions, civil societal organisations and social movements were prohibited from

politics. Both ideologically and practically, the left entered into the crisis.

In such a period, in order to solve the problem, the Turkish left went through

an internal ideological self-criticism. Large amounts o f organisations o f armed-

struggle jettisoned their strategies. The concepts o f “revolution”, “dictatorship o f

proletariat”, and “worker-peasant alliance” was substituted by “radical change”,

“direct democracy”, and “patriotic people”.

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In 1986, the “Kuruçeşme Discussions” came to the scene to find a solution to

the question o f ‘T)oes the Constitution allow for a socialist party?”. The end result

was negative, a unique and constitutional left party could not be established. Instead

o f this.

Socialist Power Party

(Sosyalist iktidar Partisi, SIP),

Revolutionary Socialist

Bloc

(Devrimci Sosyalist Blok, DSB) and

United Socialist Party

(Birleşik Sosyalist Parti, BSP) were founded. SEP and DSB were inefficient whereas BSP became

prominent in the political scene and entered into the local elections o f 1994. BSP,

(having initially the foundational name o f

Socialist Unity Party,

Sosyalist Birlik Partisi, SBP) was a pluralist party unlike Soviet model. The party rejected both

capitalism and statist socialism and identified itself as internationalist, feminist and

ecologist.

The reason o f the defeat o f Kuruçeşme was its lack o f concrete organisational-

political ideas according to certain leftists. Kuruçeşme discussions, mainly constituted

a base for the debate between reforaiists and revolutionists. In other words, it was a

field research for the possibility o f a leftist pluralist party.

On the other hand.

Revolutionary Path

(Devrimci Yol, DY) which was one o f the main inclinations o f the Turkish left before the coup d’etat, stayed away from the

Kuruçeşme process. “ But a great amount o f DY supporters entered to a ‘renovation

search’ because o f the dissolution o f its central leadership and organisation” .*’

Consequently, within such a framework , DY spheres decided to establish a new legal

party with certain intellectual support. During the establishment process, this initiative

was called as “L et’s Establish The Future Together” (Geleceği Birlikte Kurahm,

GBK). Thereby, the initiative o f GBK decided to uniiy with BSP to form a

Mısır, Mustafa Bayram, and Mehmet Horuş. 1999. Tarihsel Seyri İçinde ÖDP. (ÖDP in its Historical Process) Ankara; Ütopya Yayınevi, 61

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widespread and powerful legal left party after the defeat o f 1980. The target was to

constitute the unity o f the Turkish leftists. The characteristic feature o f the Turkish

Left which was a decomposed culture replaced by the idea o f unification.

As a m atter o f fact, unification debates between BSP and GBK ended with an

agreement in September 1995, and just after a detailed process on unification, ÖDP

was founded in January 1996 under the leadership o f Uftik Uras.**

Among the founders o f ÖDP; old rifle socialists, intellectuals, workers,

traditional leadership ofD Y , political cadres o f BSP, cadres

o i Liberation

(Kurtuluş), publishers. Greens, defenders o f public rights, women, syndicalists were taken place.

As one can be seen, ÖDP occurred in the political scene as a consensus o f different

identities, political groups, social movements and initiatives. This pointed out that

ÖDP was founded as a pluralist party. The first common denominator between the

members o f the party was this pluralist identity. In other words, the pluralist

perspective was the reason o f coming together.

Ideological Orientations of ÖDP : A Bunch of Differences

ÖDP was founded by the different initiatives o f the left spectrum. This eclectic

structure brought various interpretations to the specific questions. The ideology(ies)

o f ÖDP occurred in such a situation. Normally, the party has a programme, and its

general political and ideological orientation are clearly cited in it, but this does not

constitute an obstacle to show the different colours o f the party.

From the foundation date o f ODP to present, Ufiik liras has been a focus o f interest because o f his critics towards the settled politics in Turkey. He concretised OOP’s new style o f politics within his character which portrayed him self as a “low profile” leader among other parties’ leaders.

19_{Mısır, Mustafa Bayram, and Mehmet Horuş. 1999.} _{Tarihsel Seyri İçinde ÖDP.}_{(ÖDP in its}

Historical Process) Ankara: Ütopya Yayınevi, 66-67.

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Whereas the general acceptance was unique: Ö D P’s ideology is different than

the classical left. There is no difference between the leader and a member. In other

words, there is no

primus inter pares

in the party, or no hierarchical relations. Party organisation is from below to above, party programme is based upon pluralist and

collectivist perspectives unlike the Leninist (vanguardist) model. According to Ufiik

liras, “This party is the central party o f the left. It is a project, which turned its face

towards an egalitarian and libertarian socialism. It is a multi-voiced, multi-coloured

party” .^*^ He pointed out that “ÖDP is just like a kaleidoscope. The colours designate

the political attitude o f the party. If the colours wilt, ÖDP became meaningless.”^^

It will be more useful to look at to the party programme o f ÖDP to see its

ideological specifications. The programme says that “O O P’s purpose is eliminating

imperialism’s tyranny and capital powers’ sovereignty through a libertarian,

internationalist, democratic, anti-militarist and anti-gendered socialism”. As can be

seen, the programme includes certain contributions from new social movements such

as woman and environmental issues, whereas traditional aims o f socialism such as

proletarian dictatorship and liberation o f the working class were excluded from it.

M oreover, the programme mentions about the working class as ‘subordinates’ instead

o f a social class, and describes the party as the party o f freedom instead o f a class

party.

Just after the general acceptances and the principles o f the programme, it is

useful to refer to the opinion o f the founders about OOP’s political and ideological

orientations. Vice-president Bülent Forta believes that every member o f ÖDP thinks

? February 3, 1996 .InteiAdew with Ufuk Uras. “This is the Struggle o f Changing Mentality” . Express, in Alpat, İnönü. 1996. “Şimdi Solun Zamanı”. Ankara: Doruk Yayınevi, 289

Eken, Bülent. June 14, 2000. Interview' with Ufiık Uras. İstanbul, Turkey.

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differently on Ö D P’s utopia. As Forta pointed out, “The first thing which came to my

mind when we talk about socialism, is a society that frees the individual’s

creativeness. From my point o f view, socialism is the regime which realises the

freedom, and fi-eedom is the big utopia”.^ He has also been labelled as-the founder o f

the famous concept o f “a party which is not a party” . (In reality, the concept belongs

to the German Greens.) To Forta, this means a political body which will be anti

centralist, anti-disciplinary and anti-hierarchical. Such concept received huge amounts

o f criticism both from the inside and fi’om the outside o f the party. However, the way

o f ÖDP was in this axis at the beginning, but just after the first general assembly, the

necessity o f a strong organisation occurred within the party.

ÖDP member and journalist M urat Çelikkan believes that the common

denominator o f the ÖDP members is the concept o f opposition. He supports the

necessity o f a large-scaled oppositon party; “I, personally, do not want that ÖDP to

be a socialist party. If I wanted to be in such a party, I would participate to a socialist

party in which I can find similar ideas and persons like me instead o f ÖDP in which

various oppositional tendencies exist” .^“*

Saruhan Oluç, foremost person o f GBK and ÖDP founder, believes that ÖDP

is a party which gives high importance to the opposition o f the streets; which are the

units o f work, life and production, universities and quarters. “ We are the party which

encourages the out-of parliamentary opposition. If we are against to increasing racist-

nationalism, discriminative fascism, political Islam, we must also resist political and

economic impositions which plaque the workers, must live in a world which has

“ ÖDP Program ve Tüzük, 2.

Demirer, Belgin. 1996. Interview with Bülent Forta. “Şimdi Yeni Bir ÖDP Tasarlamak Zorundayız” (Now, We Must Envisage a New ÖDP). In “ÖDP Kendini Anlatıyor” (ÖDP Revealing Itself) Istanbul; Güncel Yayinalik, 76.

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ecological balance, and must struggle against man-sovereign society; therefore we

have to encourage street opposition” .^*

Sitki Coşkun, old member o f

Turkish Communist Party

(Türkiye Komünist Partisi, TKP) activist, present ÖDP member, believes that ÖDP is a Marxist party,

which has the target o f proletarian dictatorship. According to him, “ÖDP aims for, (in

a Marxian way) the communist utopia in the basis o f scientific socialism”.^*

According to Tektas Agaoglu, old member o f

Worker’s Party o f Turkey

(Türkiye isçi Partisi, TIP) and BSP, present ÖDP member, it is unnecessary to pose

the question o f ‘is ÖDP socialist ?’. He believes that, “Socialists are in a process o f

realising unification with non-socialists and they want to struggle together against the

27

existing order” .

As everybody can see, ÖDP was constituted by different colours. One can say

that ÖDP is a Marxist party which sheltered all the principles o f the scientific

socialism, whereas another one believes in a libertarian socialism with its pluralistic

and participatory inclinations. A member supports a non-socialist ÖDP, whereas

according to another one, socialism is the common point o f all ÖDP members. These

¥

various leftist attempts to the ideology brought ÖDP to the problematic o f the

unification. H ow ever Kuruçeşme process made decreased the differentiation within

the leftists but it does not wholly prevent the revolutionist-reformist contradiction.

When ÖDP was founded, different ideas occurred about the possibility o f the

ibid. Interview with Murat Çelikkan. “Sosyalistler De Olsun” (Also Socialists Should Exist), 263 ibid. Interview with Saruhan Oluç. “Esnek ve Plastik Programlı Parti” (A Party With An Elastic and Plastic Programme), 355

“ ibid. Interview with Sıtkı Coşkun. “Daha Kızıla Boyamayana Aşkolsun!” (What a shame for the one who do not paint to the more red!), 368

ibid. Interview with Tektaş Ağaoğlu. “Bu zemini onlara sosoyalistler sunmadı tm?” (Wasn’t the socialists who introduced such a basis to them?), 380

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disunification according to these kind o f contradictions which existed also during the

whole history o f the left. Just after the foundation process, ÔDP realised a number o f

ideological debates to solve this problematic.

Ertugrul Kürkçü, former socialist activist, present ÔDP founder, believes that

the different ideological tendencies o f the different persons or/and groups within ÔDP

does not constitute a handicap for a union: “In the past, we were in different groups

when debating between each other, organising meetings, but today, we are doing such

things in ÔDP...ÔDP is an eclectic party which was founded by different groups, and

these groups constitute important blocks and prevents the dissolution o f the party” .

K ürkçü’s tolerant ideas are largely supported in ÔDP. As a pluralistic mass party,

ÔDP has to be pluralistic within as well.^^

Critics from Intellectuals: Contributions to the Dilemma

Naturally, ÔDP members were generally optimistic about their party and its

political orientations. But we have to analyse also the ideas o f the academicians and

authors who are interested in ÔDP. According to Serdar Sen, identity o f ÔDP is not

crystal clear even in the minds o f its members and because o f this bleak nature; several

problems can occur within ÔDP. “It is necessary to change immediately the image o f

being a consensus area o f various left groups... To being in the same space is still like

a problem because o f the culture o f disunification which has been very effective by

years’’.^® When saying this, he does not mean that annihilation o f the differences

within the party is necessary. But at the same time, he points out that creating a

ibid Interview with Ertuğrul Kürkçü. “ÖDP, Devrimci Yol, Kurtuluş ana akmuna oturduğu için başanlı” (ÖDP is successful because it is in the axis o f Revolutionary Path and Liberation), 124 ^ As an anti-monolitic structure, ÖDP sees different groups as the sources o f an ideological richness.

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general theoretical framework will prevent the possible problems o f differences which

can be seen wrongly as the natural specifications o f pluralism.

According to Ömer Türkes, ÖDP is a structure o f opposition in which

different politic tendencies came together indispensably without changing their

ideology to escape from the nihilism. Because o f this, ÖDP can not find a common

language to express itself truly: “Groups which constitute ÖDP still exist by using

their languages while at the same time rejecting the other ones’ languages...How can

one talk about richness, if being together will not be the cause o f theoretical, practical

and political syntheses for the groups”.^^

Mahmut Esitmez believes that the successors o f the Marxist movement have a

common initiative which became the foremost ideological wing in ÖDP. “Creating an

ideological and discursive atmosphere distanciare the difference between the

individuals and groups which do not use old references and the party” .^^ To Mahmut

Esitmez, an ideological hegemony o f Marxists which effected all the groups within

the internal structure o f ÖDP, occurred.

Yavuz Alogan deals with the problematic o f being a mass party and poses a

question in

Birikim.

It is on the possibility o f being a socialist mass party in a conjecture in which masses nourished fi-om right ideologies. According to Alogan,

concepts such as pluralism, multi-colours, multi-voices are available in developed

democracies. He points out that the army administrate the state in Turkey, and civil

Şen, Serdar. 1997. “Solda Arayışın Adı: ÖDP”. (The Name o f the Search in the Left: Ö D F ’). Birikim 103:65-66

ibid. 67

Türkeş, Ömer. 1997. “ÖDP Üzerine Dilsel Bir Analiz Denemesi”. (“A Linguistic Analytical Trial on Ö D P ”).^ir//ti7n 103: 84

Eşilmez, Mahmut. 199/. “ÖDP Fikriyatına Bir Özne Arayışı”. (“A Search o f Subject to the ÖDP’s Ideology”). Birikim. 103: 86

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societal organisations are constituted by fundamentalists, “It is the time o f leaving the

concepts such as ‘pluralism’, ’multi-colours’, ‘multi-voices’ and turning to the

concepts such as ‘socialist democracy’ or ‘intra-party democracy

As we see, ideological debates have generally focusing on the problematics o f

unification, on managing policies o f pluralism and on the types o f socialism. The

dynamics o f these problematics are very speculative. I would argue that what is

important here, is the authenticity o f these debates on ODP. Because it was founded

as an eclectic socialist party, various socialist wings exist in it, and these wings’

different understandings on political orientations, brought ODP to an original position

in the left spectrum o f Turkey where there had never been such kind o f debates

during the histoiy o f the left.

34

Alogan, Yavuz. 1997. “Kongre’den Sonra”. (After the Congress). Birikim 103; 93 28

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CHAPTER 4 PRACTISE OF ODP: POLITICAL THESES AND ACTIONS TILL THE

ELECTIONS OF APRIL 1999

In this chapter, the practise o f ODP will be analysed from its foundation till the

general elections o f April 1999. Political theses o f the party will constitute the first

part o f the chapter, whereas in the second part, massive actions o f ODP will be taken

into account.

Different theoretical backgrounds has not been an obstacle for ODP on the

issues o f political theses and actions. The will o f being together and common political

attitude brought stability to the practise o f the party. This can be interpreted as the

functioning o f the pluralist opinions within the ODP.

From its foundation, ODP perceived the elections, whether general or local, as

the main area in which political performance o f the party can be shown.^^ In the local

by-elections o f 1997, the party gained a relative success with its 1.7% vote. This

encouraged ODP for the general elections.

Political Theses of ODP: Re-Interpretation of the Traditional.

The members o f ODP have seen the April 1999 General and Local Elections

as a turning point in Turkish politics. Either Turkey was to be ruled by anti

democratic ways and by co-operation with Mafia organisations like the past, or by

honest persons who hate all kinds o f graft and corruption in politics according to

One o f the OOP’s main demands was early elections, especially just after the coup-like military intervention o f February 28, 1997.

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them. ÔDP believes that the reason for this ugly scene is right-wing parties and

centre-left parties which defend right-wing policies. According to ÔDP, for the

solution o f economic crisis, for the creation o f an egalitarian and democratic peace

order, and for the way for a libertarian laicism, “Turkey should be obliged to the left.

Yes, to the genuine left!”'’^

For ÔDP, the real cause o f the corrupted politics in Turkey is the exclusion o f

the public masses from politics. The desire o f the parties o f the existing order is to

elect their own members as deputies who are submissive to the interests o f their

leaders. Thus, politics have been closed to the participation o f the public, and their

free will has been interrupted according to ÔDP. Whereas, ÔDP members jettisoned

the domination o f the leader in the practise by their internal democracy.

ÔDP sees itself as the candidate for the opposition against the existing order.

According to the party, the existing order handicaps the reflection o f the public voice

within parliament, by the barrage system, and by the prohibition from the politics as

well as due to the anti-democratic applications.

During the election process, ÔDP worked for the active participation o f the

public into the politics. Their aim was to downgrade the power o f political Islam and

racist nationalism. Intellectuals, workers, civil servants, housewives and the leaders o f

ecological organisations, constituted the candidate profile o f ÔDP.

Démocratisation is the most significant part and is in the core o f the criticism

o f ÔDP. As far as ÔDP is concerned, the existing order insists on a social and state

structure that has a single identity, culture, language and belief, for the public.

Aday Dosyası. (Candidate Folder) 1999. Istanbul: Can Ofset, 5 Ufuk Uras as a “low profile” leader, shows this attitude in practise.

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However, ÖDP defends democratic social life with all its richness, diversity,

differences and colours.'’*

ÖDP has offered a new order in which the state does not interfere into

religious, ethnic and cultural preferences o f the citizen. The state is not to be “holy”

anymore, instead, its task must be solely to serve the people. Also, ÖDP demanded

from the government that whether civil or military, all responsible for corruption,

injustice, mafia relations, were to be brought in front o f Turkish democratic and

independent justice.

It is necessary to put forward O O P’s adamant political demands for

démocratisation. The party’s first desire is the abolition o f the Constitution o f 1982

and the establishment o f a new and frilly democratic one. Secondly, the force and

authorisation o f the National Assembly should be u p g r a d e d .M o re o v e r, secret

organisations like M IT (National Intelligence Agency) and

Özel Harekat Dairesi

(Special Bureau o f Operation) should be audited by the National Assembly and

abolished in time. Their members under suspicion o f political murders should be put

on trial.

The issue o f societal opposition is one o f the O O P’s foremost targets. Equal

representation o f the different social groups in the parliament can be realised by the

change in the Election Law. Abrogation o f the barrage system would pave the way for

the representation o f the various choices o f the public in the National Assembly.

ÖDP formulated the “Rainbow Project” which articulated the entrance o f all the parts o f the social opposition into the parliament. This project was accompanied by the aim to change the Election Law and Law o f Political Parties. At the end o f this chapter, the Rainbow Project w ill be elaborated in detail.

ÖDP is strictly against the establishment o f the presidential system which frequently comes to the fore in the political agenda.

"Özel Harekat Dairesi ” (Special Bureau o f Operation) is considered as one o f the non-ofiBcial military forces o f the state. This special troop has long been used in the war with PKK.