An intended sociological analysis of energy and society

T.C.

SELÇUK ÜNİVERSİTESİ

SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ

SOSYOLOJİ ANA BİLİM DALI

YÜKSEK LİSANS PROGRAMI

İngilizce Tez adı: An intended sociological analysis of energy and society

Türkçe Tez adı:

Enerji ve Topluma Yönelik Sosyolojik Bir Analiz

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

Hazırlayan

Öğrenci: Atique Ur Rahman Öğrenci No : 134205001001

DANIŞMAN

Prof.Dr. MAHMUT ATAY

iv

T.C.

SELÇUK ÜNİVERSİTESİ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Müdürlüğü

Ö

ğr

enc

ini

n Adı Soyadı ATİQUE UR RAHMAN Numarası 134205001001 Ana Bilim /

Bilim Dalı

SOSYOLOJİ

Danışmanı PROF. DR. MAHMUT ATAY

Tezin Adı ENERJİ VE TOPLUMA YÖNELİK SOSYOLOJİK

BİR ANALİZ ÖZET

Bugün yaşanmakta olan modern dünyada işleyişinde enerji hayati bir rol oynamaktadır. 21. yüzyılda satın alınabilir ya da sürdürülebilir enerji kaynakları ve bunlara ulaşım ülkeler açısından da hayatı öneme sahiptir.

Bu çalışmada sosyal bilimlerle, doğa ve mühendislik bilimleri arasında bir işbirliği gerçekleştirilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Enerji araştırmalarında doğal ve mühendislik bilimleri uygun rekabet edebilir ve tamamlayıcı geleneksel araştırmalarla, bilimsel katılık ve yararlılık yönünden ele alınmalıdır.

Hızlı bir şekilde değişen dünyada enerji özel olarak zenginliği ve ileri bir hayat tarzını çağrıştırmaktadır. Burada tüketim, talebin son noktasıdır ve talebi de ortaya çıkaran sistemdir. Dünyanın enerjiye olan talebi son yüz yılda giderek büyümüştür. Geçmiş yüzyılda enerji tüketimi sayılamayacak derecede yararlı bir toplumsal ortam oluşturmuştur. Örneğin ulaşımda elektrik enerjisinin kullanılması, eğitim ve tıp alanındaki gelişmeler, sağlığı beslenmeyi ve yaşam beklentisini yükseltmiştir.

Tüketim talebini karşılamak için belirli kaynaklara sahip olunması gerekir. Aynı zamanda enerji, kaynaklara sahip olan ülkelerle, bu kaynaklara ihtiyaç duyan ülkeler arasında yeni ilişki biçimlerinin gelişmesine de neden olur. Gerçekte enerjiye dayalı ilişkiler pek çok anlamda jeo-politik ilişkiler üzerine oturur. Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyinin beş daimi üyesinden sadece Rusya hariç diğerleri ile birlikte 150 ülke petrol ithal etme konumundadır. Gelişmekte olan ülkelerde giderek büyüyen enerji ticareti muazzam bir ağ oluşturmaktadır. Enerji jeo-politikaları basit bir fikri mücadelenin ötesinde kaynaklar üzerinde muazzam bir rekabeti gerektirmektedir.

Bütün bu ekonomik ve politik faktörlere rağmen, enerji kaynaklarının iklim değişimi ve çevre kirliliği başta olmak üzere, çevre üzerinde negatif yönde muazzam bir etkisi olduğu görülmektedir. İklim değişimi doğal seleksiyon gibi büyük bir teori anlamına gelmez ancak son yirmi yılda enerji bölgelerinden elde edilen testler, büyük olumsuz sonuçlara yol açacağını ima etmektedir. Bu çalışmada biz iklim değişimi ve muhtemel çözüm yolları gibi çeşitli konuları da ele alarak tartışmaya çalıştık.

v

T.C.

SELÇUK ÜNİVERSİTESİ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Müdürlüğü

Ö

ğr

enc

ini

n Adı Soyadı ATİQUE UR RAHMAN Numarası 134205001001 Ana Bilim /

Bilim Dalı

SOCİOLOGY

Danışmanı PROF. DR. MAHMUT ATAY

Tezin Adı AN INTENDED SOCİOLOGİCAL ANALYSİS OF

ENERGY AND SOCİETY

SUMMARY

In the modern society, Energy plays the most vital role in running the World. And to bring about a transition to more efficient, affordable and sustainable energy sources, carriers and Technologies for all of humanity is one of the key challenges of 21st century.

This research work supports the equal collaboration of the social sciences with the physical, natural and engineering sciences in energy research by demonstrating their relevance, compatibility and complementarity with conventional research, their policy usefulness and their scientific rigidity.

As energy especially run the prosperity and lifestyles of advanced and rapidly modernizing nations, here consumption is the end point of demand and demand drives the system. The world’s thirst for energy over last 100 years has been growing. Energy expansion over the past century has brought innumerable advances of a wholly beneficial kind from electric power to modern transport, from improved education to healthcare, nutrition and greater life expectancy.

And to meet the demand for consumption, there develps a politics to acquire resources. For this energy relations, which needs to be developed between the country owning the energy resources and the country inneed of acquiring those resources. And in reality energy relations are geopolitical in many ways. Over 150 nations including every permanent member of UN security council except Russia, are importer of one of the important sources of energy in the contemporary World- that is Petroleum. A huge web of vulnerability that willl only grow as energy trade expands in developing countries.The geopolitics of energy is more a struggle of ideas than a simple contest over resources.

Despite all these economic and political factors, there is an adverse effect on environment as well and it results in climate change. Climate change is not a grand theory like natural selection, but a vast conclusion drawing on data from a host of fields and twenty years of dispute and accumulated testimony. Here, we discussed about various problems arising from climate change and its possible solutions to tackle these problems.

vi

ÖNSÖZ

Bu çalışma, Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Sosyoloji Ana Bilim Dalında Prof. Dr. Mahmut Atay danışmanlığında yüksek lisans Tez olarak hazırlanmıştır. Bu Çalışma Enerji ve Topluma yönelik Sosyolojik bir analizdir. Bu çalışma’da enerji’nin önem ve bunu sahip olmak için kuresel bir dünya’da zengin ve bunu ihtiyaç olan ülkeler nasıl bir politika yapılır.Bu şeylerle ilgili bir çalışma bulunmaktadır.

Enerji hakkında Fen bilimler ve iktisat’ta çok çalışma oluyor ama sosyolojik bir bakışla çalışmak istediğimde ayrı bir tecrübe kazandım.Çünkü güncel hayatamızda enerji çok etkili bir rol oynar ve bu modern hayatta enerjisiz başarlı ve comforlu bir hayat hayal edemez.

Bu çalışma, yalnızca benim emek ve gayretlerim sonucunda oluşmuş bir çalışma değildir. En başta değerli fikir ve önerilerini işlerinin tüm yoğunluğuna rağmen benimle paylaşan ve kapısını çaldığımda beni hiçbir zaman geri çevirmeyen ve her anda memleketimden uzak olduğum halde her türlü destek veren değerli danışman hocam Prof. Dr. Mahmut ATAY’a teşekkür ederim. Henüz yazı yazma alışkanlığı edinmemişken, beni bu konuda cesaretlendiren aynı zamanda kalemimin gelişmesine öncülük eden hocam Doç. Dr. Ertan Özensel’e de teşekkür ederim.

Atique UR RAHMAN 2015

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

1.Introduction ...1

1.1 Brief history of the human use of energy ...2

1.2 Energy And Nations ... 12

1.3 Global Trends and what does it hold ... 17

2 Geopolitics and Energy policies of major energy consuming nations ... 23

2.2 Unique position of The U.S. ... 33

2.3 Rising Power and politics of Asia ... 36

2.4 Russia and The Caspian ... 40

2.5 Latin America: New İnstabilities and Stabilities ... 43

3 Energy and Climate change ... 49

3.1 The scientific dimension ... 51

3.2 The Political-ethical dimensions ... 56

3.3 The Energy Dimention ... 60

4. Conclusion ... 67

1

1.Introduction

Energy is a concept rather than an actual thing:we say people have energy when they can work or play hard.The manifestation of energy in material terms is ‘Fuel’, and these two terms, energy and fuel, tend to be used interchangeably.The concept of power is also often used as if it meant the same as energy. And it is very common to talk of ‘energy generation’ and ‘energy consumption’, strictly, energy is never created or consumed , it is just converted from one form to another. (Elliott, 2003, p. 19).

Bringing about a transition to more efficient , affordable and sustainable energy sources, carriers and technologies for all of humanity is one of the key challenges of the 21 st century. Addressing this challenge effectively requires a complex linkage between multiple perspectives to be assessed within a transdisciplinary framework. Even today, however, there is scant communication across disciplines and among the various actors affecting and affected by such transitions. This section highlights the diverse approaches of past programmes and policies aimed at facilitating energy transitions and discusses some of the key issues associated with their successes and failures. İt concludes with some thoughts on how such programmes and policies can be improved in the future by thinking in terms of processes rather than disciplines and taking into account multiple perspectives and the interdependencies between systems, as well as several important ethical dimentions.

Until now, in energy research, social sciences have tended to be used to research and boost public acceptance of technologies and to help facilitate their introduction in the market. There are a variety of reasons for this neglect. Research agendas tend to be framed by technoeconomic perspectives.Social sciences are presumed to be irrelevant or useless in the energy field, their approaches and assumptions may collide with the dominant technoeconomic paradigm and as such may be politically unacceptable easily; relativism and political instrumentalisation in practice have given the field a reputation for pseudoscience.This research work supports the equal collaboration of the social sciences with the physical, natural and engineering sciences in energy research by demonstrating their relevance, compatibility and complementarity with conventional research; their policy usefulness; and their scientific rigor.

The point of departure of this research is the neglect of the full range of social sciences in energy research, a field dominated by engineering and mainstream economics.where social sciences have been involved, they have tended to play a subordinate,often instrumentalised

2

role in the service of preordained technical fixes. Moreover, they have often been used to research public acceptance of these technologies or to help facilitate their introduction in the market. Limiting research questions primarily to commercial or technological objectives is in marked contrast with the central importance of energy production for economies and for society. The full range of the social sciences should be used to shed light on energy issues that are of vital future importance. Why is it that most of the social sciences have been neglected in the study of energy and energy-related problems.2(Spreng, Daniel, 2012, pp03-73) And my research is a theoretical work which aims to cover the effects of energy politics by different major energy producing and consuming nation around the globe.

1.1

Brief history of the human use of energy

Despite all the advancement and wealth, Fire still remains the fundamental form of energy in the society today. As the humanity began with fire from wood, for heating and cooking, sun for drying and warmth, wind and water for power and movement and animals for physical labour. And after so many milenia later we have today Fire from coal, natural gas, nuclear fuels, and biomass (plant material). Sun for solar power and heating, and in many parts of the world for drying and warming still. Wind for electricity, running wind mills and for sailing boats. Flowing water for electricity and to help work mills and animal in their inorganic form, as machines. Above all, we remain a world lit, built, and moved by fire. In myth, Prometheus was punished for bringing this power to humanity, whom Zeus wished to keep barbarous. But once fire was in its hands, humanity became the genie of invention, the maker and user of thermal energy first and last, homo ignipotens. It is fire that brings electricity and modern civilization into most of our lives, that powers our technology and our modes of transport. Indeed, discovering new forms of fire making defines a hallmark— perhaps the hallmark—of the modern energy era. The onset of this modern era, meanwhile, was extraordinary, breathtaking. How long did hominids burn wood as their only fuel? Archeologists now believe fire was first harnessed over a quarter of a million years ago— prior to the first true humans, who appeared about 160,000 years BCE 3(Balter, 2004 pp-663-664)1 . Homo ignipotens, in other words, long preceded homo sapiens. Eons were overthrown, then, when coal entered the scene after 1600 and became by 1850 the fuel of modernity. And if this change required a blink of the archeological eye, the next transition was yet more

3

sudden. Between 1900 and the end of World War II, petroleum took the mantle from coal until by 1970 it was dominant. therefore, the West (as modern energy leader) has undergone not one but two revolutions in fire making.3 ( Gibbons, 2003, 300:5626)2 How did this happen? What were the primary factors involved? The answers are complex, but a few elements seem clear and suggest application to our own time.

The story of coal: crisis, advantage, and fortuity

British towns of the sixteenth century were expanding rapidly, due to a great phase of population growth and agricultural productivity. Such expansion meant more building, thus growth in brick and glass making, the smelting and refining of ores, as well as other fire-hungry industries, like brewing, dyeing, and salt and soap making. Colonial exploration and conflict with Spain had brought about an arms race and the threat of war. England found itself swept up in a surge of ship building and weapons forging, which brought vast new demand for lumber and fuel. Nearly a thousand oaks were needed to build a single warship. Almost an equal number was required each month to generate charcoal (derived from the partial burning of wood in the absence of oxygen, to produce a nearly pure carbon fuel) for the forges then turning out canons, muskets, swords, armor, nails, and more. As the cities and navy grew, forests shrank at a frightening pace. Already in 1543, Parliament passed a Preservation of Woods Act in order to safeguard remaining timber. A period of scarcity ensued, a “wood famine,” that caused prices to soar. 4(Hatcher John, 1993, pp455-496)3 Coal, meanwhile, had been mined at the surface in limited amounts for centuries along the River Tyne, in northeast England. During the late Middle Ages, it was used as ballast in ships, as well as fuel in lime kilns, and was known as “sea coal” to distinguish it from “char-coal.” A resurgence of use began in Tudor times, toward the end of the 1400s, when brick making became a new industry in England to meet the demand for gigantic country homes and in-town mansions of the gentry. Yet, coal’s true ascent surely came with the deforestation crisis. It was not prized by blacksmiths and kiln owners—much of the coal used at this time was of lower quality

2

Oldest Members of Homo sapiens are discussed by Ann Gibbons, “Oldest members of Homo Sapiens discovered in Africa,” (2003)

3 _{John Hatcher, The History of the British Coal Industry, Volume 1: Before 1700, Towards the Age of Coal}

300_notes to pages 16 – 27 (London: Oxford University Press, 1993); Robert Galloway, A History of Coal Miningin Great Britain (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2007; originally published 1882); and Rolfe P. Sieferle, The Subterranean Forest: Energy Systems and the Industrial Revolution (Conway, NH: White Horse Press, 2001). See also James A. Galloway, Derek Keene, and Margaret Murphy, “Fueling the City: Production and Distribution of Firewood and Fuel in London’s Region, 1290–1400,” Economic History Review 49 (1996), 455–496

4

(high sulfur and ash content) and could produce unwanted side effects, such as increased brittleness in finished iron. But coal had three things in its favor: it was plentiful in easily accessible areas; it could be transported rapidly by water to any port (wood had to move slowly and cumbrously over poor roads, and charcoal would pulverize and so had to be made close to its site of use); and it burned with a flame as hot or hotter than charcoal, the supreme fuel of the day. By the early years of Elizabeth’s reign (1550s and ’60s), the price of firewood had reached several times that of coal, with charcoal even more costly, and as the country entered the 1600s, its population, commerce, and industry at unprecedented levels, wood and charcoal prices grew a full order of magnitude further, well beyond that of any other common commodity. When the Great Fire of 1666 destroyed the greater part of old medieval London, cremating over 13,000 houses and 85 churches, there was little debate about what fuel might be employed to make the millions of bricks that would be needed to rebuild. The stage was therefore set for a large-scale changeover in energy sources. This progressed rapidly, as coal was taken up by a range of industries, in London particularly, and eventually in households as well. London’s populace, a mere 70,000 or so in 1550, grew to nearly 350,000 by 1650 and, despite the Great Fire, to over 530,000 by the 1690s. Coal, then, rose in import just as London stepped into full urban eminence as Europe’s largest metropolis and the first home of the Scientific Revolution. Indeed, coal proved not merely a source of heat but an origin of innovation.

To reduce its unwanted effects on everything from bread to metal with various impurities, users were forced to improve existing ovens and furnaces to prevent direct contact with coal gases, and to invent a new type of fuel, coke, adapted from making charcoal (partial burning of coal in an oxygen-poor environment to drive off the unwanted volatile material). By the late 1600s, use of coal had helped spur a broad set of commercial innovations that were part of the rise of modern science. British natural philosophy (as science was then called) was both theoretical and practical in its work, engaged in experiments, but also in the making of instruments and machines.5(Nef U John, 1977, pp78-92) Steam soon came to define one such area of invention. Viewed as the moving power of water in vapor form, it was first harnessed successfully by Thomas Savery in 1698, and brought to practicality by Thomas Newcomen in 1712, to draw water out of coal mines. These had proliferated by this time, exhausting many of the shallower seams and were thus forced to go deeper where water drainage became a serious problem. The success of Newcomen’s engine proved crucial. A few decades later, when James Watt began work to improve the engine in the 1770s, the drainage problem had been largely solved, and London stood as a city of soot- blackened

5

stoves and chimneys. Watt’s innovations were nonetheless epochal, allowing the engine to work without interruption, at higher rates and efficiencies, thus with far more power. British capitalism harnessed Watt’s engine in dozens of potent ways—in mills and mines, factories, and soon the railroad and steamship—transforming England into “the workshop of Europe” by the early 1800s. Through such uses, steam became “the power of civilization,” and coal the fuel of economic, military, technological, and industrial expansion. In many standard histories, the rise of coal is made to seem inevitable. This was far from the case. Coal’s uptake was neither accidental nor ordained above. It had to substitute for an existing resource, which means it had to replace an entire infrastructural system—types of stoves/ boilers designed for firewood and charcoal; wood cutters and other human suppliers; delivery and storage methods; pricing structures; middlemen; and public habit. A new system of extraction, preparation, transportation, and use had to be created. In hindsight, too, we can see that the great turnover from a fuelwood society to a coal society was predicated on historical events, including intellectual and political ones. Had England given up its colonial ambitions, its longing for a naval empire, things might well have been different, for a time anyway. Coal proved an affordable and widespread source, available in many nations (England, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, and the U.S. all have deposits), therefore reliable in supply. Its advantages over wood were plain; it burned longer, needed no special preparation like charcoal, and yielded more work per unit volume. It was easier to transport and store, and lasted indefinitely (it did not rot). It gave off a more noxious smoke, but this could be partly “controlled” by higher chimney stacks and by the silent requirement that people simply adapt—we should perhaps recall that this was also the era when tobacco was viewed as healthful. Though dangerous to mine, and toxic to nearby areas, coal came with effects that were acceptable to most, even in line with the dangers of other operations, like the tin and copper mines of Cornwall. Success for the first energy resource of the modern era was thus due to a combination of market forces, practical advantage, acceptable risk, and fortuitous timing. The inventive enterprise we commonly call the Industrial Revolution seized hold of coal’s capabilities, rendering the new energy source a basis for machines of every kind, deeply integrating its use into all aspects of commercial, residential, and official life--an integration that had to be replaced, in turn, once petroleum arrived.

6

Here, the pivotal country was the U.S., and both urbanization and scarcity were again involved. Yet the need was different and the advantages, at first, narrower. As a modern fuel, petroleum had a modest beginning, as a lighter of lamps. By the mid 1800s, the Industrial Revolution and the selective prosperity it brought created a burgeoning demand for artificial lighting—new mines, factories, mills, stores, and offices remaining open into the evenings; an explosion of theaters, restaurants, bars, and other “after hours” entertainment in the growing cities; the homes of the expanding middle class. Before the 1850s, whale oil had been the fuel of choice. But whales were being harvested at too great a rate, and whalers had to sail much farther to get their catch, pushing prices ever higher. Other sources existed, to be sure—“town gas” and kerosene (both from coal)—but they had drawbacks. They were expensive, explosive, or low in quality (kerosene burned with a dull, smelly flame).6(Yergin, Daniel 1993 pp21-34) A small group of entrepreneurs, led by the intrepid George Bissell, saw an opportunity in “rock oil.” This flamed more brightly and with little odor. It was also abundant, even leaking from the ground in western Pennsylvania, where it had been used locally for medicine. The next step—and it was a crucial one—was to get the imprimatur of science. Enter the great Yale geologist and chemist Benjamin Silliman, Jr., contracted by Bissell’s group to analyze crude oil samples from Pennsylvania. Using distillation, Silliman generated a stunning variety of substances—naphtha, lamp oil, paraffin, waxes, lubricants, tar, showing that petroleum represented a raw material from which “very valuable products” may be made. Silliman’s endorsement brought legitimacy, investment, and (after a bumpy start) the first successful well in 1859. This established the new resource in great quantity and set off a true boom in drilling and discovery. The price of “rock oil” fell, capturing the lighting market and (the final rub) swelling demand beyond all expectation. Whale oil became a commodity of the past—thus, in a curious twist, petroleum did much to save the sperm whale from extinction. Within a mere fifteen years, annual output from the Pennsylvania fields was 10 million barrels (420 million gallons). Petroleum at this stage did not compete so directly with coal, which continued to underlie the Machine Age in nearly every domain except lighting. No true, full-scale energy transition had yet taken place. But then, in the 1890s, something new appeared to alter everything. As with steam, the internal combustion engine (or ICE, as it is often known) had been an object of invention and experiment for some time. Indeed, the idea of taking the piston-cylinder mechanism and giving it an interior source of power was but a matter of logic. Early attempts, between 1840 and 1870, sought mainly to mimic steam-based equipment and did not fare well, particularly since coal-gas, with its low burning temperature and restricted

7

power output, was the fuel. The introduction of liquid petroleum made the difference. Such a fuel had huge advantages, recalling those of coal compared to wood, but were even greater. As a liquid, oil was even easier to transport and store, could be delivered via gravity, and generated far more heat per unit weight than coal itself. Improved liquid fuel engines of the late 1880s and early 1890s advanced the success of oil, even as oil ensured that the ICE would soon dominate motor transport. Early on, however, petroleum still had competitors. Cars powered by both steam and electricity existed, but were ultimately limited in crucial ways. “Steamers” needed warming up, frequent cleaning, and could only go about twenty-five to thirty miles before re-watering. Electric battery cars were silent, simple (no shifting of gears), clean, and dependable, but also slow (<20 mph was typical) and had a range of under fifteen miles. This was fine when the only good roads were in cities, and private cars were used for commuting and short trips about town. Once, however, the road system expanded to interurban and rural travel, the superior power and range of the ICE became majör advantages. Moreover, infrastructure for electricity was nearly nonexistent, that for oil half a century old by 1910. Other factors were economic; discovery of oil in Texas greatly lowered gasoline prices after 1912, while Ford’s assembly line brought ICE cars within the budgetary reach of millions. Technological improvements, such as Charles Kettering’s electric starter (which did away with the hand crank), also helped greatly. In little more than a generation, by 1930, the spread of trucks, tanks, jeeps, airplanes, oil-powered ships, and above all, cars secured the Hydrocarbon Age. Again, the process was neither immediate nor smooth. Nearly all the advanced countries of Europe had coal resources, while almost none had oil. They were therefore forced to import it, mainly from the U.S. at first. Petroleum brought with it, very soon, a shift in the geopolitical order of energy security. And there were other bumps. As with wood, large portions of the coal society had to be replaced. An entire new system of storage tanks, pipelines, tankers, gas stations had to be developed. But the advantages, again, were overwhelming. No less a voice than Winston Churchill took up the cause on the eve of the Great War, securing the changeover to oil for the entire British navy. By the 1920s, a new type of fire making had begun to power the industrial West.

What can we learn

Are there lessons to be gleaned from these potted histories? There may well be. In each case a new fuel gained ground due to scarcity in another. Market forces—supply, demand, and cost—were essential. But the power of need, expressed as demand, drove all. Technology was

8

vital too: King Coal was lifted to its throne by the piston of the steam engine, petroleum by internal combustion. In each case, energy advantage spawned an ever-widening array of invention, use, and (for oil) fuels, leading to new products, new vehicles, new industries, new modes of social existence, and an ever-deepening integration into modern reality. Thus, in total: two episodes of resource scarcity and “unsustainability,” two periods of economic struggle, two engines that remade the world. Or, to simplify the relationship still further: shortage + socioeconomic instability + technology _ new alternative change.7( Derry, T.K & Williams, Trevor 1960)

Do we then have the final formula for the process of energy change?

This would be welcome, indeed. More likely, we have a set of basic ingredients and conditions that have worked to create transformation. These include:

1) a major situation (economic, political, etc.) creating a perceived need for change;

2) an alternative resource that can be made abundant and reliable, usable on a large scale;

3) energy advantages to this resource/option—for example, higher efficiency or energy content, flexibility of use, perceptions of safety, reduced ill effects;

4) economic advantages, so that the new option can create and penetrate markets, win over the public (hearts and wallets), urge the building of infrastructure;

5) forms of technology to make the new resource practical, even superior, in performance, cost, applicability; and

6) promoters or paladins, as well as investors, that bring it to the notice of those able to develop and market it to the rest of us.

These conditions all seem essential. Are they sufficient, together, for a new energy source or era to develop? This is difficult to say. They definitely help explain some of the success and limits for more recent sources like nuclear energy, which, in real terms, satisfies most conditions but not those regarding a situation of necessity (electricity was not in a crisis state), economics (nuclear-generated electricity was cheap but nuclear power plants were very expensive to build), perceptions of safety, and consensual sponsorship. But the case of nuclear energy also suggests that something is missing from our list. In our world today, new energy options must also bring environmental advantages—indeed, advantages here are now perceived to be wholly critical. This was not true in the past—coal and oil were hardly vast improvements in this domain. Only if we add this criterion today, however, can we fully explain the situation that is urging alternative sources like renewables, hydrogen, and fusion.

9

None of these alternatives satisfy all six points above: wind and solar have reliability problems (they operate only some of the time); biofuels have less energy content than oil; hydrogen and fusion are not yet practical; nearly all of these sources remain expensive. Yet such considerations are now outweighed—perhaps “balanced” is a better word—by environmental benefits. Our world is not driven toward change by scarcity or the happy discovery of some new and marvelous energy source. Motives have much more to do with geopolitics, volatile prices, and concerns over pollution, public health, ecological damage, and climate change. Indeed, the transition we have entered in the twenty-first century could be the first in which social benefits take precedence over energy advantages. And if we look at the matter more holistically, we can see that enviro-benefits do translate into energy and economic terms, for the newer alternatives don’t come with the costs of coal/ petroleum pollution (which we now understand), military intervention in the Middle East, and other effects, and do promise at least the possibility of new industries, jobs, even lifestyles. The past may not, entirely, be a key to the present in all this. There are elements in our energy landscape today that render our list above a helpful but incomplete guide to the future. (Boyle, Godfrey, Everet, Bob & Ramage, Janet 2003)4

The meaning of energy progress

So how to define the idea of “energy progress”? In truth, modern energy has been an unending scene of transformation. The eras of coal and oil were themselves anything but static. There has never ceased to be a drive to improve existing technologies and discover new ones, plus new and more diverse applications. Coal began in the fireplace and the forge, but soon came to make glass and bricks and brew beer, each business utilizing its own type of boiler. From there it went on to power the steam engine, applied in a myriad of evolving innovations for industry and transport. Still it was far from done: coal vastly expanded the making of steel and cement, the flesh and bone of modern cities, then lit and powered them

4

These figures come from several sources: Godfrey Boyle, Bob Everett, and Janet Ramage, Energy Systems and Sustainability (London: Oxford University Press, 2003); Vaclav Smil, Energy in Nature and Society (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008); Daniel Williams, “Advanced System Controls and Energy Savings for Industrial Boilers,”Northeast-Midwest-institute(Washington,D.C)

http://www.cbboilers.com/Energy/Technical%20Articles/Citrus%20Engineering%20Confernce%20paper%20rev %20h.%20doc.doc.

10

with electricity. More recently, it has been used itself as a source for natural gas and for generating liquid fuels too. Innovation, research, serendipity, and capitalistic enterprise have all worked their will. There was never any final satisfaction—nor for oil, whose multiform employment, from fuels to plastics, is even greater. Nonetheless, a certain psychological imprint from the past remains. Because of what coal and oil each became, we are perhaps to be forgiven for indulging the hope that there will come again, in the years ahead, some other great mono-source to open a promised land of near-limitless power. Certain possibilities— solar energy, fusion, the hydrogen economy—have been promoted in such terms. Indeed, there is a utopian aroma lingering around many questions posed about our energy future: “What will power our civilization in 2050?” “What will the car of tomorrow run on?” “There is more than enough solar energy striking the Earth at every moment to run the world—when will we put it to use?” The dream is that, in time, some Great Solution will arrive, to absolve us of all our energy woes, worries, and responsibilities. As we’ve noted several times, however, things have been headed in a very different direction. In 1930, the globe relied on coal, oil, and traditional biomass for over 95% of its energy use. By 1990, these fuels remained pivotal, yet the total portfolio making up that 95% now also included natural gas, nuclear power, hydroelectricity, wind power, solar energy, geothermal energy, and biofuels. Some of these sources, true enough, remained a small part of the whole. Yet on a nation-by-nation basis, they had become major, integrated options: hydropower in many countries; geothermal at over 15% of energy use in New Zealand, Iceland, the Philippines, and Kenya; wind supplying 7% of electricity in Germany, 10% in Spain, more in Denmark. Now think of land transport. As recently as 1970, only one type of car trod the roadways; the gasoline engine ruled all. Today, there are diesel, flex-fuel, hybrid, all-electric, and natural gas cars, with others like plug-in hybrids, compressed air, and fuel-cell vehicles in the wings. None of the new species is likely to swallow the global market whole; neither are all likely to survive. It is certainly possible that some represent transitions; hybrids, by their very nature, offer a bridge to full EVs, but could themselves advance and become central. The total variety of car types may narrow over time, to several superior options. But this still represents great diversity over the past. The future, I wager, belongs to energy pluralism. When we look at the totality of need—electricity, transport, industry, commerce, homes, agriculture—what we see developed over the past half-century is energy diversification, the exploration and expansion of new technological options. This has allowed for much localization, but of a complex type. Such localization, that is, depends not only on the country’s natural resources, but its politics, wealth, and culture, all of which are dynamic, subject to change. Culture, indeed, can be a

11

vital factor—if defined not only as traditional patterns and proclivities but adaptations of a rather anthropological sort. Taking Denmark as an intriguing instance, we might consider this contrast offered by David Nye in his excellent book Electrifying America:

Most Danish communities have built large power stations that use steam turbines to generate electricity and then pump the resulting boiling water through underground pipes to heat businesses and homes. This “cogeneration” is cheaper and less polluting than having inefficient furnaces in every home, and it has the secondary effect of binding the community more tightly together. In contrast, the combination of American individualism and a reliance on the market place to determine the shape of development produced the dominance of private utilities. 9(Nye , David 1992, p384) Does this suggest that Americans should become Danes or, God forbid, vice versa? But the point is that forms of energy use are deeply woven into the structure, outlook, and even identity of a society. The “Danish technological style,” as Nye calls it, also emerges from close-knit living, a lack of heavy industry, and one of the world’s most expansive social welfare states. Cogeneration (also known as combined heat and power, or CHP) is a natural fit for, and also an expression of, such a society of shared services. Throwing over one such system for another is not a simple matter of trading technologies, substituting machinery. It involves altering socioeconomic reality. Of course it can be done—has been done, and must be done again—but it can’t be achieved without changes of mind, space, and lifestyle. But such changes can go in a number of directions, especially when left to their own devices. Take the case of Danish bathrooms. Since the 1990s, households in Denmark have launched a renovation boom for this space. A large portion of the populace, turning away from simple Scandinavian styles previously the norm, have added more toilets, double sinks, vanities, spa-like tubs, independent showers with surround spray, and more, during an era of growing affluence and longer work hours. Social researchers Maj-Britt Quitzau and Inge Ropke help us comprehend the larger meaning here. It is an example, they say, proving “the complexity of drivers and other aspects involved in the construction of new normality.” [This involved] the increasing importance of the home as a core identity project and a symbol of the unity of the family. the convenience of more grooming capacity during the busy family’s rush hours, the perceived need for retreat and indulgence in a hectic everyday life, and the increased focus on body care and fitness. The case also illustrates that when people have the economic possibilities for increasing consumption, they will [be guided by] ideas that are closely integrated with their prevailing everyday concerns. 10(Quitzau, Maj-Britt & Ropke Inge, Journal 2008) Energy behavior

12

involving daily consumer preferences is not a mere matter of “private choice” alone, but is guided by pressures and possibilities that social reality creates. A far more demanding work life, with both parents busy outside the home, coupled with rising incomes and new standards for a healthful, controlled appearance, together helped transform the Danish bathroom into a site of cleansing need and sanctuary. But the effect has been big increases in energy and water use nationwide. Missing, imply the authors, is a norm that understands the bathroom as an environmental nexus—a core, no less than the kitchen, of energy flow and use (lights, hot water, hair dryers, etc.). Such a norm would obviously have to compete to succeed. It might even have to displace, or “shame,” the desire for touches of luxury. But this is exactly the point; changing energy reality means changing aspects of mind as well as machine. Energy use in the past and present is personal, social, and cultural all at the same time, thus so is its progress. Sustainability for every part of the globe is the ultimate goal (nearly all agree on this), but defined in flexible fashion. The grand trend toward energy diversity, meanwhile, will have its own limits. We can’t go on expanding the number of sources, or the types of cars and power plants, forever. Sustainability will depend upon further advancing some of the choices we already have, developing certain new ones, and creating an adaptable portfolio able to address not one or two but many challenges, from rising transport demand to national security. Moreover, this idea, “sustainability,” should not be understood in a doctrinaire way, as ruling out fossil fuels, for example, or large-scale power systems. Viewing fossil energy as a barbed impediment to the future would be a grave error. Oil, gas, and coal are what run the world today, and they are therefore required to advance all other options. Small may be beautiful, but populations and cities are huge and growing. By 2030, over half of humanity will live in urban areas. It is hard to imagine the new mega-metropoli running on solar and wind power alone. In the meantime, however, Robert Heffner is right. We will pass beyond the Hydrocarbon Age—not by chance but by need and necessity. Whether the world does this together or in competitive fashion is a critical question that cannot yet be answered. The final point history may offer is that over reliance on, and prophetic desire for, any single fuel or technology will prove misguided. It is our ideas that power our technology. An hourglass is fragile because so narrow at the pinch.

1.2

ENERGY AND NATİONS

Energy consumption is an absolutely necessary component of the industrial society. Before the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century, most energy use relied on three

13

sources: human and animal muscles,the chemical energy in firewood and the energy of wind and water available in nature. Since then, there have been three major historical transitions in the way we use energy. The first was the steam engine, for which the principal fuel was coal. The second was the development of electricity. Electricity provided a double benefit: It was the first form of energy in which the place where it is produced could be separated by many kilometers—indeed, many hundreds of kilometers—from the place where it is used. It is also the only energy source that is easily converted into light, heat, or mechanical work wherever it is used. The third major development was the internal combustion engine, which introduced an enormous mobility into society, but also a significant dependence on petroleum products. Petroleum gradually took over the position of being the dominant global energy source by the end of the twentieth century. At any particular time, there is a tendency for a correlation between income growth and growth in energy consumption among the countries of the world.

This relationship holds for many countries if income and energy use are examined over a period of years. The correlations are not perfect. Different countries may have different ways of reporting economic statistics. Some factors, such as fuel supplies obtained by bartering, may not even be counted in official statistics. Over a period of years, a country may change the way it collects and uses statistics. Even though these uncertainties exist, until about 1975, there seemed to be fairly good correlation between the economic well-being of a country, as measured by its total output of goods and services (i.e., its gross domestic product, GDP), and its energy consumption. The countries with the largest GDP tended to use the most energy, while undeveloped economies used less energy.

The ratio of energy consumption to GDP is defined as the energy intensity of the economy. Regardless of whether we consider the present energy situation, the history of energy use, or predictions of energy use in the future, we find that population growth, economic development, and technological progress are the major considerations affecting economic development. As a country develops over a period of time, growth of GDP occurs through an increase in population—with its consequent demand for housing, transportation, consumer goods, and services—and results in an increase in energy consumption too. During that time of development, the energy intensity of that country’s economy is nearly constant. The growth of GDP virtually parallels that of energy consumption.

14

The last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed a remarkable change in the relationship between GDP and energy use, especially in developed countries. This can be looked at from two different perspectives. The rate of energy consumption per dollar of GDP generated has been falling. A period of great change occurred between 1975 and 1985, when energy used per dollar of GDP dropped by one-fifth while GDP grew by 30%, based on data for the United States. Around the turn of the century, energy use per dollar of GDP was continuing to drop at about 2% per year. This parameter measures, essentially, the amount of energy required to generate a dollar of GDP. A decline means that, collectively, we are getting more efficient at generating goods and services from the amount of energy we use.

The alternative way of considering the same relationship between GDP and energy use is to look at GDP per unit of energy use. This parameter measures the number of dollars of GDP that can be produced for a given amount of energy consumed. This value should rise as we do a better job of producing goods and services from a given amount of energy (essentially, it is “upside down” from the parameter discussed in the previous paragraph). Indeed, it is doing exactly that—slowly, thanks to the world economic crisis that hit in 2008, but increasing nonetheless.

Several factors have contributed to this change, which has been experienced generally by most of the developed nations. First, from the end of the Second World War until the early 1970s, the cost of energy (referenced to one specific time, so as to adjust for inflation) dropped. During that period, many utilities encouraged consumers, even via cash incentives, to use as much electricity or natural gas as possible. The oil price shock in the early 1970s caused industries to develop ways of operating their various processes in ways that would reduce energy consumption (there had been no incentive to do this in an era when the cost of energy was dropping). A second major factor that “decouples” the use of energy from growth in GDP is the transition of the developed countries to the so-called postindustrial society. This change represents a transition from an industry-based economy to a service-based one, requiring much less energy. In addition, those industries that do remain tend to be ones, like making computers, that add considerable value to the raw materials or components but consume relatively little energy; the heavy, energy-intensive industries such as steel or cement move out.

We must recognize that these comments do not apply to all the countries or all the people of the world. There are enormous differences in the levels of economic development,

15

standards of living, and access to energy around the world. The richest one-fifth of the world’s population consumes about four-fifths of the world’s goods and services, and uses about half the world’s energy. The poorest one-fifth of the world’s people consume 1% of goods and services, and get by on about 5% of the world’s energy. Per capita GDP differences among countries reflect differences in economic structure—agricultural, industrial, or postindustrial—and in government.

Human development indicators (HDI) take into account not only per capita GDP but also such factors as longevity, quality of education, crime rates, and maternal and infant mortality. Currently, Australia and Norway top the HDI list—advanced modern economies with stable democratic governments. Zimbabwe, a heavily agricultural nation presently ruled by a brutal and corrupt government, is dead last.

Where we are going

Hopefully, this research will help dispel concerns that gaining an understanding of “energy” is either mysterious or difficult, and there is no need to feel overwhelmed or intimidated by politicians, salesmen, hucksters, or demagogues. What if, for example, an electric utility were to propose to construct a nuclear power plant in your town? Likely, you would be bombarded with an entire range of arguments, pro and con, ranging from the assurance that nothing can ever possibly go wrong to the assertion that if this reactor is built, you and your families will be exposed to so much radiation that you’ll glow in the dark. How can we determine where the truth lies? (In fact, rather than being at their mercy, you can become very frightening to the politicians, salesmen, hucksters, and demagogues of this world, because by far the most truly dangerous person is someone equipped to think for herself or himself.

Freedom of thought is the only guarantee against infection of people by mass myths, which, in the hands of treacherous hypocrites and demagogues, can be transformed bloody dictatorships.—Sakharov

Because the world and the way we use energy are changing at such an incredible pace, it is vital to be able to continue to learn throughout our lives. Fifty years ago, digital watches and calculators didn’t exist. Forty years ago, these items cost multiple hundreds of dollars each. Now, either can be purchased from displays at the checkout stands of discount stores for less than ten dollars. Fifty years ago, vinyl records dominated the music industry. Since then,

16

we have seen a progression from vinyl records to tape cassettes to compact disks to music downloaded from the “cloud.” Adding compounds of lead to improve gasoline performance was an industry standard for close to fifty years. Leaded gasoline vanished in about a decade. When we visit another country, we can better appreciate its culture and customs if we can understand something of the language. Unfortunately, it seems to many people that science itself has now become another country, or another culture. The technology of energy and the issues surrounding energy use are all around us. Many energy related terms are in common use: acid rain, greenhouse effect, cold fusion, the China syndrome, meltdown, and semiconductors are a few examples. The second point is that there are limits as to what can be accomplished with energy. We can’t create energy out of nothing. The best we can hope to do is to utilize the amount of energy available to us and convert it from one form to another. Ideally, we would hope to be able to convert energy completely from one form to another, with no waste or losses. As we’ll see, we’ll never really be able to attain the ideal of a device that is 100% efficient in converting energy from one form into another. Common electric motors come pretty close, changing about 90% of the electric energy we supply to them to doing the work we want done. An electric power plant that burns coal is much worse; only about 35% of the coal’s energy comes out of the plant as usable electricity. Steam locomotives, which at their zenith represented mighty examples of brawn and brute force, are terrible, with less than 10% of the energy of the coal fuel becoming available to drive these behemoths. The third point that will be made is that there are limits to what scientists and engineers can accomplish, and what they can tell us. Possible strategies for reducing environmental effects include, as examples, removing a potential pollutant from a fuel before it is burned or capturing it after the fuel is burned but before it can escape to the environment. Scientists can develop methods for removing or capturing potentially harmful materials before they can impact the environment. Engineers can design plants for carrying out these methods on a large scale. Economists can calculate the increase in costs that will result from building and operating these plants. But none of these people can tell you, or calculate for you, let alone dictate to you, what your optimum trade-off would be between increased electricity bills or fuel prices on one hand and accepting greater environmental degradation on the other hand. It is up to the individual citizen, or groups of citizens working together, to make the choice between, say, increased electricity costs vs. forest destruction from loosely regulated pollution from electric generating plants. Some people might be willing to accept substantially higher electric bills in exchange for protecting the environment. Others might adopt the “if you’ve seen one tree, you’ve seen ’em all” attitude. The choice is not something that comes from

17

scientific or engineering calculations. The choice is something that each person must make individually by weighing many factors.

As another example, petroleum is used both as a source of fuels (such as gasoline, diesel fuel, and home heating oil) and as a source of many of the synthetic materials ubiquitous in daily life. Likely, petroleum availability will decline sometime in the middle of this century. If that happens, should we continue to burn scarce petroleum, or should we save it to make plastics? This question has no right answer—though zealots on one side or the other will claim there is. Each person will have to think through this issue carefully and then express an opinion by voting, or by attempting to persuade elected representatives to vote in some particular way.21(Schobert ,H. Harold, 2014 pp01-08)

1.3 Global Trends and what does it hold

Though we may doubt the virgin birth of U.S. presidents or Russian premiers, there is little question that the power they wield comes back, sooner or later, to matters of energy. Economic vitality, military readiness, and national security all depend on energy realities. No surprise, then, that more than a few organizations have taken on the job of analyzing relevant trends and making forecasts. What does seem unexpected, perhaps, is the degree to which these analyses tend to agree, at least to a first approximation. The Energy Information Administration in Washington D.C. (EIA, part of the U.S. Department of Energy), for example, and the International Energy Agency in Paris (IEA, an informational body for the OECD), though they may draw blood over acronym mixup, nonetheless share bread over how to generally interpret the global energy scene today. No less is this true of reports put out by a host of other disparate entities such as British Petroleum (BP), the Worldwatch Institute, and the World Energy Council.Why is this so? Consensus exists because analysts rely on similar sources of data that make up established “energy indicators.” Such indicators in graphical form are now widely in use, tracking and extrapolating levels of consumption and production (by fuel, region, country, economic sector), supply and demand, import dependence, carbon emissions, and more. How reliable are these measures? It depends on what we expect. Much data comes from official sources, what each country reports about its own energy activity. To a large extent, this is the way it has to be if we are to have frequent (annual) updates, since the

18

task of collecting such data independently is simply too gargantuan (oil alone is imported by over 150 nations). Problems methodological and otherwise certainly exist. Some exporters keep secret all detailed information about their oil/gas reserves and production others may have no central agency for gathering data or may suffer wartime conflict or breakdowns in the rule of law. Different systems of units and definitions of “reserves”operate in the larger world too. Without question, those who assemble and analyze energy data need to sometimes perform minor feats of numerical magic, or at least incantations to said effect. Ultimately, compilations like the very widely employed annuals World Energy Outlook by the IEA and BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy are approximations at best and chart data one or two years old by the time they are published. What emerges is admittedly incomplete—a rather blurry optic on a fast-moving landscape. But it is yeoman’s work, and lacking it we would be far more blind and unaware. With a few exceptions, data about the past and present are accepted by experts. Future projections are what attract debate, excitement, and disbelief. Any set of measures, however, brings its own set of assumptions and therefore caveats. In this case, we should point to a certain bias of scale. Measuring global trends in terms of thermal energy, e.g., tons of oil equivalent or British thermal units (1 Btu roughly equals a single burning match) inevitably highlights energy-rich fuels used by more advanced societies. Traditional sources, like wood and dung, much poorer in Btus, appear far less significant even though they remain the staple for billions of people. Much of this use, along with animal labor, as well as low-tech wind and water power, don’t show up at all. Such ancient forms are not part of any market system and can’t be tracked, though they are life to one-third of Africa and Asia. Forecasts, meanwhile, come with a different caution. Projecting today’s trends into later decades, even with modification, can make the future seem fixed by the present, as if the world were already hopelessly locked into more of the same. Analysts sometimes refer to the result as a“business-as-usual” or “reference” scenario and offer “alternative” versions that could happen if government policies change or technological breakthroughs occur. In recent years, such alternative scenarios, inspired by climate change, include dramatic shifts, with reductions in fossil fuel consumption. But even so, the overwhelming aggregative dominance of oil, gas, and coal forces discussion to focus here, giving short shrift to topics like nuclear power, renewables, and emerging areas of technology, whose development may have far-reaching consequences. Experts might note this as simple four-letter realism. But the truth is that painting with certain brushes can obscure the grain of reality. No group of graphs or savants foresaw the global economic meltdown in 2008, annus horribilis for all forecasts, economic and otherwise.Do such difficulties weaken the importance of these indicators?

19

No—for two reasons. First, though flawed, they offer an honest approximation of things we want to know; comparing past data with contemporary developments shows that indicators can have real explanatory power (as we will see). Indicators cannot see the future, but they do show where we have been and where existing trends are aiming us (forecasts, scientifically speaking, are not the same as predictions in any case; they provide hypothetical futures that reflect back on choices already made). Second,decision makers in both the public and private sectors rely on such data to help frame policy—no minor fact. In the end, how we measure the world determines, to a significant degree, how we comprehend and seek to change it. Indicators yield silhouettes, the outline of larger patterns,and force us to interpret them. This in itself is worthy of our interest.

What does the world want

The energy consumed by the world by 2007 on the order of 462 quadrillion Btus (EIA measure), or, in other terms, calling for around 11,200 million tonnes (81 billion bbls) of oil- equivalent (IEA measure) per year11 (IEA p-78 2008) Not surprisingly, no less than 80% came from fossil sources—oil (34%), coal (26%), and natural gas (22%).12(IEA P-78 table 2.1) In bare quantity, fossil energy runs the world, an ineluctable fact. It especially runs the prosperity and lifestyles of advanced and rapidly modernizing nations, from South Korea to Spain. Consumption is the endpoint of demand, and demand drives the system. The world’s thirst for energy over the last 100 years has been ever-growing. As recently as 1970–2000, despite periods of economic downturn, consumption literally doubled, far outstripping population growth over the same period. we see that since 1900, the world’s appetite for energy accelerated strikingly in the late 1940s with postwar economic growth in OECD nations, then began to cool in the 1990s, by which point these economies had matured and shifted away from heavy industry. This is merely a kind of pause before consumption takes off again in the 2010s, due this time to economic growth in the developing world. Experts today, however, only shift future rises a few years ahead, after the world recovers. To some, no doubt, all this spells “runaway train.” But we should stop and reconsider. Energy expansion over the past century has brought innumerable advances of a wholly beneficial kind—from electric power (and all this means) to modern transport, from improved education to healthcare, nutrition, and greater life expectancy. Yes, the potential problem of coming resource scarcity must be faced, though this is far from a mere matter of numbers and is not at

20

all imminent. Yet impugning the growth in energy use per se makes little sense. Even if the West can make due with less, the greater world needs more. Billions of people still wait to see their lives improved by what modern energy can bring. The years 1973 and 1979 saw two major oil shocks, due to the Arab Oil Embargo and the Iranian Revolution, that deepened economic recession in the West, leading to plunges in energy use. Jolts to the global economy also happened in 1991 (Gulf War), in 1997 (Asian financial crisis), and in 2001 (September 11). We know that the economic meltdown of 2008–2009 also lowered energy consumption worldwide. Yet, again, it’s the longterm picture that matters. we note that two world wars and even the Great Depression appear as brief interruptions. Beginning in the 2000s, after all, growth in demand was indeed taken over by developing nations (economists call a country “developing” if its GDP per capita is under $10,000). It needs to be said, however, that economies like China are no longer “developing”; they have already come forward on to the global stage; “emergent” seems a better label. These nations—minus the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—have been on track to surpass all advanced countries in energy use by about 2017. In truth, if we include every form of use, such as traditional fuel wood, animal dung, and other nonmarketed types, non- Western nations have already surpassed the West. Asia, especially, is where both population and economic growth have been centered. If the world is predicted to have about 1.7 billion more people by 2030, at least 7 (more likely 8) out of every 10 of these new persons will be born there,where modernization has been most rapid.13(UN population division New york 2008) These are among the reasons that the IEA forecast, even in 2008, that over 80% of new energy demand to 2030 will be in these emerging economies, fully half in China and India alone. Indeed, the IEA continues to say that all new demand for oil will come from non-Western states during this period.14( IEA world energy Outlook 2008 p77, pp80-81) By 2030, China’s GDP/capita could double or even triple; according to the International Monetary Fund, it had already grown from under $1,000 in 2000 to around $5,300 in 2007.15 (IMF Data and Statistics) Population growth isn’t the only key factor here. The U.S., after all, has less than a quarter the people that China does, yet consumes 70% more energy (as of 2008). It is technology and the level of economic development that matter—people using more energy-consuming devices, building and running new industries, abandoning poverty, adopting modern lifestyles. For China, call it a crash program; the world’s most populous nation entering not just the Industrial Age, but the Age of Electrification, Motorization, Mass Consumerism and Communication, the Nuclear Age, the Information Age, all at the same time. By 2030, hundreds of millions more might be able to attend school, live in lighted and heated domiciles, buy TVs and refrigerators and cars,

21

see movies and eat in restaurants, participate in all the elements of modernity. Meanwhile, we said that energy use in the world has risen nearly unabated since World War II. True in the aggregate, this isn’t so for every nation. The epic decline suffered by all post-Soviet states after collapse of the USSR in 1989–91, with levels still well below their peak even two decades later. This suggests the true struggle endured by these countries, even as the “emerging economies” soared ahead. It helps to understand the scale of devastation by recalling that Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea were all rebuilt and made prosperous within ten to fifteen years after major wars destroyed their cities, infrastructure, and millions of their people.

Who owns it and who needs it

Nature is not a democracy. Nor is it prone to reform. An area less than 7% of the globe, centered on the Persian Gulf, contains 60% of the world’s cheap, accessible petroleum and at least 40% of its natural gas. This unchangeable reality brings forth a dark logic, unrelieved by any subtlety. As demand for these sources grows, especially oil, the Gulf will come to command an ever-greater share of global supply. This logic also runs the other way, however. Gulf nations, which remain overwhelmingly reliant on oil and gas exports, are locked into dependence on importers. OPEC wealth is ultimately a function of petroleum demand, thus economic strength or weakness in importing nations. Now it is such a time in the world in which oil production just keeps rising. Such has been the official line of the EIA, IEA, and other organizations for over a decade, leading up to the economic crisis of 2008. An ailing global economy has imposed a correction on this, stalling demand. Yet, as we have said, any such correction will be temporary. Demand will grow again when economies recover, though perhaps with some changes from the past. Indeed, China’s own demand levels have continued to rise, as the financial crisis proved to be of very short duration there. New oil, meanwhile, must be found, extracted, transported, refined, and brought to market. This requires vast levels of investment, thus high-level planning, and also (let us not forget) sociopolitical stability. A few nations have launched such programs—notably Saudi Arabia, whose production capacity went from 7.5 Mbbls/d in 2002 to nearly 11 Mbbls/d by 2009. But Saudi Arabia can’t carry the world’s oil future by itself. Big growth in production can’t be done by a war-torn Iraq or an Iran closed to foreign firms or a Nigeria in the throes of civil war. It won’t be done purely by national oil companies (NOCs), which now control 80% of global proven reserves and that, as government monopolies, are often prey to inefficiency,

22

corruption, meddling by political leaders, and diversion of capital to other priorities. And yet, new investment in oil can’t be done without these entities either. In short, the world’s ability to supply petroleum is ultimately a matter of deliverability—what countries can produce—not only of what they have in the ground. Deliverability means politics, economics, and technology all at once. The political dimension is inescapable. By 2008, as we’ve said, oil import dependence was 60% for the U.S., 75% in Europe, 90% in Japan, 65% in India, and 50% in China. Figures for natural gas are also high (>50% for Europe, Japan, India, and China). Which highlights a simple truth. Talk of “energy independence” for any of these states is horse pucky. No amount of biofuel production, natural gas vehicles, or any other alternative will free us anytime soon from this truth. Major economies everywhere are deeply integrated into the global marketplace of energy, oil and gas above all. Indicators tell us that change is needed. But they also show that, for the foreseeable future, managing dependence is the name of the game. There are options; nations can try to influence supply through diplomacy, reduce demand at home, advance alternatives, or seek some hybrid of these. The first approach, applied by the West for much of the twentieth century, has involved meddling in the politics of petro-states, with (shall we say) mixed results overall. The second two strategies, controlling demand and developing alternatives, have been variably and inconsistently applied since the embargo of ’73, yet obviously hold the greatest long-term promise. The U.S. has chosen, above all, the first tactic. “Blood for oil” may be too simple an interpretation, but there is little doubt that America’s long-term military presence in the Middle East has been partly aimed at protecting oil flows for itself, its allies, and the global economy as well.16(Yergin, Daniel The Prize chap. 20-22) We should be mindful, too, that Gulf states do not ordinarily sell to individual countries any longer, but instead to a world market and so cannot easily punish nations of their specific dislike through embargoes. Yet this hardly seems reassuring. It simply means that no one is free of supply insecurities. Again, nations must find ways to deal with such insecurity, to manage and channel it,for it will not disappear.