THE NEW TERRORISM AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY’S SECURITY
A Master’s Thesis
by
NAİL TÜRE
Department of
International Relations
Bilkent University
Ankara
June 2004
To Sublime Martyrs who has died while serving the integrity of the
Turkish State
THE NEW TERRORISM AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY’S SECURITY
A Master’s Thesis
by
NAİL TÜRE
Department of
International Relations
Bilkent University
Ankara
June 2004
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.
---Asst. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı Thesis Supervisor
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.
---Asst. Prof. Ali Tekin
Examining Committee Member
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.
---Asst. Prof. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya Examining Committee Member
Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
---Prof. Dr. Kürsat Aydogan Director
ABSTRACT
THE NEW TERRORISM AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY
TÜRE, NAİL
M.A., Department of International Relations Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı
June 2004
This thesis analyzes the consequences of the American National Security Strategy, carried out as part of the post September 11 ‘war on terrorism’, in terms of Turkey’s security. Whether the reasons or aims of a declaration of war on terrorism are right or not, the reality is that the U.S. has made important steps with significant implications for the whole world as well as for Turkey. Terrorism, which has changed some of its features by the help of elements of globalization, hit the U.S. The U.S. perceived that fighting against terrorism could not be successful by traditional retaliation as had been done by the U.S. before September 11. This new enemy required a new plan, and therefore, a new security strategy began to be carried out. Undoubtedly, Turkey has been affected by the NSS of the U.S., due not only to her geographic position that is next to the Middle East chosen as a target place by the U.S. but also to her close relationship with the U.S. the America’s new strategy has forced Turkey to reevaluate her security priorities and threat perceptions that have been shaped by the end of Cold War. In the assessment, it is seen that the new American NSS has increased Turkey’s security anxieties.
Keywords: Turkey’s Security, American National Security Strategy, New Terrorism, Greater Middle East , Threats for Turkey.
ÖZET
YENİ TERORİZM VE AMERİKAN ULUSAL GÜVENLIK STRATEJİSİ: TÜRKİYE’NİN GÜVENLİĞİ İÇİN SONUÇLARI
TÜRE, NAİL
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı
Haziran 2004
Bu tezde, 11 Eylül saldırılarından sonra uygulamaya başlanan Amerikan Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisinin Türkiye’nin güvenliği açısından ortaya çıkardığı sonuçlar incelenmektedir. Teröre karşı ilan edilen savaşın sebepleri veya amaçları haklı olsun veya olmasın, Amerika’nın tüm dünya ve özellikle de Türkiye için önemli sonuçlar doğuran adımlar atmaya başladığı gerçeği ortadadır. Küreselleşmenin yardımıyla bazı özellikleri değişen terörizm Amerika’yı vurmuştur. Bu saldırılarla Amerika , 11 Eylül saldırılarına kadar başvurduğu klasik misilleme yöntemi ile teröre karşı savaşın başarılı olamayacağını anlamıştır. Yeni düşman yeni bir plan gerektirdiğinden yeni güvenlik stratejisi uygulanmaya başlanmıştır. Hiç şüphesiz Türkiye, hem hedef olarak seçilen Orta Doğu’ya komşu olan coğrafi konumu, hem de Amerika ile yakın ilişkileri nedeniyle bu yeni güvenlik stratejisinden etkilenmektedir. Bu strateji Türkiye’yi, soğuk savaşın bitmesiyle şekillenen güvenlik önceliklerini ve tehdit algılamalarını yeniden değerlendirmeye zorlamıştır. Değerlendirmede, stratejinin Türkiye’nin güvenlik endişelerini arttırdığı görülmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye’nin Güvenliği, Amerikan Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi, Yeni Terörizm, Büyük Orta Doğu, Türkiye için Tehditler.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Above all, I am very indebted to the Turkish Ground Forces for giving me such an unprecedented opportunity to pursue my career. I am also grateful to the academic staff of Bilkent University for sharing their unique knowledge throughout my two-year academic tenure in and out of class.
I would like to express my special thanks to my supervisor Assistant Professor Ersel Aydınlı whose invaluable guidance, encouragement and immense scope of knowledge is the cornerstone of this study.
I would like to thank to all my classmates and academic staff for their contribution throughout the completion of this thesis.
Finally, I am deeply grateful to my wife Nihal Türe and for her sustained patience, support, and love.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ... iii ÖZET... iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS... v TABLE OF CONTENTS……... vi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS... ix CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION... 1CHAPTER 2: NEW THREAT: THE MEANING OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS AND NEW TERRORISM………... 5
2.1. What is New Terrorism? ………... 6
2.1.1. Terrorism in the Cold War era……… 6
2.1.2. Terrorism in the post-Cold War Era………... 8
2.1.3. Transformation of War………... 12
2.1.4. Characteristics of New Terrorism……... 13
2.1.5. Difficulties of Dealing with New Terrorism………18
2.2. Sep.11 in the perspective of New Terrorism………...19
2.2.1. September 11 Attacks………..19
2.2.2. Messages of September 11 Attacks………. 23
CHAPTER 3: THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE U.S. AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 11 ……… 28
3.1. Struggle of the U.S. with the Terrorism before September 11……… 29
3.2. War against New Terrorism after the September 11………34
3.3. American new National Security Strategy……….. 42
3.3.1. What is the National Security Strategy?...42
3.3.2. Historical background of the new Security Strategy…………..43
3.3.3. Summary of the new Security Strategy………..45
3.3.4. Main parameters of the new Security Strategy………...48
3.3.4.1. Preemptive Strike……….. 49
3.3.4.2. Unilateralism……….50
3.3.4.3. Primacy of Power………..52
3.3.4.4. Miscellaneous………... 53
3.4. Directions of the U.S. Foreign Policy within the Frame of Realist New Security Strategy………..54
3.5. Heading towards Middle East to Implement the New Strategy……....57
CHAPTER 4: SECURITY POLICY AND THREAT PERCEPTION OF TURKEY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA……… 64
4.1. Post-Cold War Developments Causing to Change Turkey’s Security Assessments………65
4.2. Main Threats to Turkey’s Security after the Cold War……….69
4.2.1. Terrorism……….69
4.2.2. ‘Kurdish State’ Threat……….71
4.2.3. Weapons of Mass Destruction………72
4.2.5. Other Security Problems with Syria, Iraq and Iran……….74
4.3. Official National Security Policy and Military Strategy of Turkey…..76
4.4. Measures taken by Turkey against threats………81
CHAPTER 5: EFFECTS OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY ON TURKEY’S SECURITY………...86
5.1. Negative Results………...88
5.1.1. A ‘Kurdish State’………88
5.1.2. The Situation of the PKK Terrorist Organization………...95
5.1.3. New Terror Events Seen in Turkey………99
5.1.4. Invalidation of ‘Red Lines’………...101
5.1.5. Damaged Relations with the U.S………..103
5.2. Positive Results……….. 104
5.2.1. Approach of Iran………...105
5.2.2. Approach of Syria……….105
5.3. Situations emerged with the ‘Greater Middle East’ Project…………106
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION………111
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BLACKSEAFOR Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force CBRN Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CPA Coalition Provisional Authority
EU European Union
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
GME Greater Middle East
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IFOR Implementation Force
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
KADEK Kongreya Azad-ü Demokrasiya Kurdistan / Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress
KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party
KFOR Kosovo Force
MC Military Committee
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MPFSEE Multinational Peace Force South East Europe NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC Nuclear Biological Chemical
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NSC National Security Council
NSS National Security Strategy
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PKK Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan / Kurdish Workers’ Party
PLO Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review Report
SEECP South-East European Coordination Process
SFOR Stabilization Force
UN United Nations
U.S. United States
U.S.C. United States’ Constitution
WMD Weapons of Mass Destructions
CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION
There are many debates about whether the current United States (U.S.) policy is right or not, and discussions about the sincerity of the U.S. concerning the fight against terrorism. Whether one agrees with it or not, there is a reality that the U.S. launched her new National Security Strategy (NSS) under the name of the ‘war against terrorism’. The entire world system is affected by this war. Since Turkey certainly has been affected by this era in world politics, it is important to try and understand what kinds of outcomes have emerged for Turkey’s security as a result of the new NSS of the U.S. This thesis analyses the effects of the NSS of the U.S. on the security of Turkey.
This study argues that the implementation of the American NSS in the Middle East, and especially in Iraq, has increased Turkey’s security anxieties. In the post-Cold War era, Turkey has concentrated on the south in terms of her security, because threats to Turkey’s integrity have tended to come from the south, not north. After the realization of the American NSS, some of these threats became to be felt more intensely. The main aim of this study is to be able to clarify which threats emerged with the new situation.
In addition, in order to support and better analyze the issue, this thesis will initially attempt to provide answers to the following questions: How has ‘new
terrorism’ differed from classical terrorism and assumed the character of a non-state actor after the Cold War? What kinds of changes have taken place in American foreign and security policies after the September 11 attacks? What are the main elements of the new American NSS? What are the security policies and threat perceptions of Turkey after the Cold War?
The September 11 attacks, targeting the homeland of the U.S., shocked the entire world. It was a phenomenon, which nobody had dared to attempt since the Pearl Harbor assault. In nearly all assessments made after the September 11 attacks, the concept of ‘new terrorism’ can easily be seen. Indeed, the concept of ‘new terror’, emerged with the end of the Cold War, had already existed but it became ‘popular’ with September 11. Many evaluations about ‘new terrorism’ have been made before and after September 11, some going so far as to perceive the attacks as a ‘polar’ capable of balancing the unipolar international system after the Cold War. In the attacks of September 11, all characteristics of ‘new terrorism’ can be seen; moreover there is a challenge to the hegemon. Chapter II clarifies the characteristics of ‘new terrorism’ as a starting point, igniting a to new world order, and explores these features seen in the events of the September 11.
The U.S., as the only superpower in the post-Cold War era, felt obliged to take action because on the one hand her public was distressed on the other hand her superpower image was damaged. A big blow had been received and revenge had to be taken. At this point, President Bush declared the war against terrorism and the world was divided between ‘others’ and ‘US’. This declaration of war necessitated a new plan and a new strategy. The U.S. gave up its method of retaliation, which had been used by previous presidents as a tool of war against terrorism. The new NSS of the U.S. was now put into action. The main parameters of the strategy are based on
realistic foundations. They clearly indicate to paces of the U.S. carried out today and in the future. Considering that a superpower is unlikely to bluff about such a serious security issues, it is not so difficult to say ‘the world will be never same again’. In addition, turning towards the Middle East, the Iraq case proved that the U.S. is very serious about implementation of new NSS. Chapter III identifies US’s changing perceptions and methods about war against terrorism, main parameters of the new strategy and outcome of the idea of war against terrorism.
This American NSS undoubtedly would affect Turkey’s security. In order to clarify implications of the American NSS on Turkey’s security, the meaning of Turkey’s security should be explained. The end of the Cold War altered the security and threat perceptions of Turkey. Since the Soviet threat, which had been in the core of Turk’s anxiety, was disappeared and the Gulf War created several outcomes for Turkey’s new foreign and security policy, threat and security perception shifted. In the beginning of 1990s, they were directed to the south from the north. Consequences of the end of the Cold War, ethnic problems, nationalism, asymmetric threats such as terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) affected in the new threat assessments. Particularly terrorism became a major threat to the integrity of Turkey. In Chapter IV, pre-September 11 security and threat assessments and perceptions of Turkey are evaluated to make a concrete comparison with post-September 11 situations. So as to understand anxieties of Turkey correctly, cornerstones of her security policy, which were shaped after the Cold War, should be understood.
Not only because of her geographic position but also her close relations with the U.S., whether she wants or not, Turkey is involving in the new phase of new world order. Turkey has a significant role in the scenario because shaping of the world started right beside her. Radical changes, disagreements and problematic
events have emerged owing to the intentions of the U.S. In Chapter V, outcomes of the implementation of the American NSS in the Middle East regarding the Turkey’s security will be explained.
The methodology used in this thesis depends on descriptive and analytical research of the resources. The resources that are used in the thesis include; primary sources, including official documents and reports, interviews, intelligence reports, military field manuals. Especially, information about Turkey’s security and threat perceptions are based on military field manuals, which clearly point who the enemy for Turkey is. Secondary sources consist of reports, documents, and articles procured from edited books, periodicals, online databases, newspapers, and newsmagazines.
CHAPTER II:
NEW THREAT: THE MEANING OF THE SEPTEMBER 11
ATTACKS AND THE NEW TERRORISM
The world, which has already been observing a new structure and order after the Cold War, is witnessing new dimensions of changing politics after the attacks of the September 11. Terrorism, which is in all new threat assessments in the Post-Cold War era, proved to be yet more important. Moreover, terrorism has become an element directing the world politics and international relations. Terrorism used to be a tool for the actors of the world politics to reach their aims. But now it became itself an actor in the international arena. Once a tool in the hands of some states, terrorism has become a non-state actor. International relations began to rotate around terrorism. Events, after the September 11 attacks that hit the only superpower within her homeland, are the most remarkable examples of this fact. The U.S. has changed her foreign policy. She stated to pursue a more assertive and unilateral foreign policy at the global level against the new enemy (Cottey, 2002). War on terrorism started. September 11 is a turning point not only for U.S. but also for the whole world.
The U.S. has accepted terrorism as a threat and enemy. If so, who is the enemy? What are the characteristics of this ‘new enemy’? What makes it ‘new’? What are the reasons for which the U.S. started the war on terrorism? In order to understand the starting point of the U.S.’s current politics, evolution and
characteristics of the ‘new terrorism’ should be explored. In this chapter, the evolution of the terrorism with the end of the Cold War will be explained shortly to show its changing role in the world. Additionally, characteristics of new terrorism will be explained. After putting characteristics, how and why ‘new terrorism’ forms a global threat for all states will be elucidated. Then aspects of September 11 will be shown in the perspective of new terror. So features of new terror in September 11 will be pointed clearly. Lastly, the aim of the September 11, messages given by terrorists and taken by the world will be explained. Accordingly, the new global threat will be explained in detail which will provide us with an understanding of the roots of both the U.S.’s opinions and its current tough politics.
2.1. What is New Terrorism?
2.1.1. Terrorism in the Cold War Era
In order to understand current different position of terrorism in the world arena, its Cold War role should be shortly mentioned. As has been known, terrorism is a cheap, low-risk and highly effective tool, which allows the weak to challenge the strong. These can be labeled as the fixed characteristics of terrorism. As the time passes, some modifications and additions on terrorism may be done according to world position. For instance, according to Brian Jenkins, in the 1970s and 1980a terrorism was driven largely by ideology or the ‘narrow nationalism’ that spawned separatist violence. He continues that toward the end of the century, proclaimed religious beliefs increasingly provided its contexts (Jenkins, 2001: 5). In the Cold War era, three important aspects of terrorism can be easily seen. These are first struggle for independence; second method used by some states in international politics and third rivalry tool of superpowers against to each other (Tuğtan, 2002).
During the Cold War, terrorism was viewed within a revolutionary context (Hoffman, 1998: 22). Many terrorists have defined themselves as “freedom fighters”. However, this form of the terrorism expanded to include nationalist and ethnic separatist groups (Pillar, 2001: 12). According to Hoffman, exiled nationalist minorities, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Basque ETA and even unknown South Moluccan irredentist group seeking independence from Indonesia, adopted terrorism as a means to draw an attention to themselves and their respective causes (Hoffman, 1998: 26).
As well, some states used terrorism in pursuing their foreign policy goals. According to Stohl, states may prefer to apply terrorism if they regard themselves powerless to pursue other policy instruments (Stohl, 1988: 161). It can be shortly said that state sponsored-terrorism was born due to this. Due to its fixed characteristics; cheap, low-risk, highly effective, challenge of weak, states are ready to use international terrorism as a form of covert warfare in order to undermine rival countries (Selvi, 2003: 28). Terrorism has been used as a weapon by some weak states that cannot compete with the rest of the world economically, politically, and militarily. These countries understood that applying terrorist strategies is an effective way of making political changes in the international system or challenging their rivals. This made terrorism a tool for state actors. This kind of terrorism has been used even after the Cold War and it was the most popular one until September 11.
Additionally, terrorism was also a tool of rivalry between superpowers. With the end of the World War II, well-known meaning of war, namely total war, turned out to be an action exceeding the capacity and budgets of states separately. The world was divided between two superpowers in a very strict manner and two blocs were formed around those. Given that any war in a traditional meaning was thought
as an end of the world due to the destruction power of the weapons, the total war became more risky and undesirable option for states. There was no direct armed-conflict between them because no side wanted to take such kind of a risk except for using terrorism (Stohl, 1988: 192). For that reason, as Tuğtan states, many of the wars after the World War II can be categorized as “low intensity conflict” (Tuğtan, 2002). Terrorism and regional wars were perceived as a reflection of a total war. Both sides used this option (Akgün, 2001: 116) because of both cost and demolishing damages of the total war to the whole world. Namely, terrorism was a tool of the Cold War period used by superpowers to implement their foreign policies. But after the Cold War, position of terrorism started to change. It started to take new role in the international arena.
2.1.2. Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era
The end of the Cold War brought to an end to the period of bipolarity. Since then, academics, journalists and policy-makers have tried to work out exactly what kind of power structure would replace it (Smith, 2001). At this point, position of terrorism changed. It started to try to fill up this gap emerged with disappear of the Soviet Union. In this part, changing process of the terrorism and emerge of ‘New Terrorism’ as a non-state actor will be clarified.
Disappear of one polar and accelerate of globalization ‘caused’ new problems, and some concepts gained new meanings. Security is one of them. Very simply Amitav Acharya defined security as “reducing vulnerability to threats” (Smith, Acharya, 2002: 16). It has gained new dimensions and its aspect was broadened with the end of Cold War. New threats and new enemies have been added to sense of security concept within the context of globalization. Ethnic nationalism and regional conflicts, proliferation of WMD, international terrorism, religious fundamentalism,
political and economic instabilities and uncertainties in the countries, smuggling all kinds of person and weapon can be listed as the main threats in the new era (National Position of Turkey, 2002). K. Jayasuriya argues that new language of the security reflects the fact that “globalization has changed the internal architecture of the state and this is clearly apparent in the increasing emphasis placed on aspects of 'risk' and 'security' across social life” (Jayasuriya, 2001).
In the light of these explanations, terrorism emerged as one of the main threats of new world order if the human security a concept clearly holding the key to the building of the international order in the 21st century is considered in a very simply and its basic manner as a protection of human life. Because, today terrorist attacks are horrifying indication of the pervasiveness of the threats to people's safety, rights and lives.
Of course, there is no doubt that terrorism threat existed in the Cold War era, but as Kostas argues, it had never been considered so seriously as an actor or even a polar in the world arena (Kostas, 2002: 101-115). New Terrorism can be accepted as an actor in world politics because: Their activity area is the world not a limited region in one part of the world. Even, their aim is to change the whole world system not to change political order in one country or not any independence claims. They are trying to direct world politics. Results of new terrorist actions have influenced not only a specific country but also the whole world affairs. For instance, September 11 changed all international politics. Besides, since they are mostly religious-motivated, terrorists have beyond nationalistic sensation. Religion became the primary motive for terrorists (Jenkins, 2001: 4-5). Lastly, it generally targets superpower and hegemon to challenge to her. It is usually dealing with the U.S. Religion and whole world became major issue of terrorism by replacing ideology and country.
Reactions of the states and the international organizations strengthen the non-state role of New Terrorism. For instance, after the attacks, the U.S. divided the world as the fighters against terrorism and terrorists. More simply, unique superpower has been determining her policy priorities according to terrorism. As well, although it was established for communism threat, North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) new mission in the post-Cold War era has been tried to be reshaped within the perspective of fight against terrorism. Even after the September 11 attacks, NATO put the Article V into action for the first time in its history. These examples can be increased. The important point is that today, international relations are dominantly determined between terrorism and the states struggle against terrorism; not between East and West, or NATO and Warsaw Pact. Therefore, it can be said that terrorism, which was method of “freedom fighters” and some states to implement their policies previously, can be seen as a non-state actor giving a route to the world politics.
New non-state actor, global terrorism started to rise under the name of ‘New Terrorism’ with its special characteristics. It does not completely resemble with nationalist, religious, state-sponsored, right wing or anarchist terrorism (Karagöz, 2002: 156). It can be said that new terrorism is both mixed of them and completely different from them. Main aim is to change or demolish world order (Whine, 2001). While pursuing this aim, they are not restricted by anybody and they can freely use any methods and any weapons, including WMD, whatever they want (Hoffman, 2001). Thus, dangers of the new kind of the threat are terrifying. As Laqueur argues, no society can fully protect all its members from such kind of terrorist attacks (Laqueur, 2001: 80). To be able to control or to prevent terrorism is very hard because it turned into an actor in world politics. From now on, it is not a tool of
actors but it became an actor. It is the evolution from being a tool to the actorness. Third world countries some of which were under the authority of communism in previous years suffered because they cannot manage to establish their social order due to terrorism. On the other hand, for the West, especially, for the U.S., new terror became a candidate for taking the place of communism.
From the perspective of terrorism, it needed to renew itself and adjust to the globalism. One polar disappeared and the other side was still standing. It must be defeated and disappeared because merely overcoming hegemon can change system. So as to accomplish this aim, terrorism decided to exploit the benefits of globalism (Nacos, 2002: 11) and attached new dimensions and peculiarities to its configuration. Global developments in recent years have helped terrorism to shape its modern face because they live in a global world (Roy, 2001). Diffusion of information technology and advanced communication, increased ease of movement across international boundaries are the main assists of globalization to terrorism. Shortly, what is good for international business is also good for international terrorists (Tucker, 2001).
Many experts and academicians saw these developments, and new terrorism has been frequently identified as a major threat in the new era. Many actions and developments proved that new terrorism would be a big headache for many states either directly or indirectly. Chief of those actions are the 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) bombings in New York, and related conspiracies; the 1996 Oklahoma City bombing; the 1998 East Africa bombings; the Tokyo sarin-gas attack in 1995, September 11 attacks in 2001, Istanbul and Madrid bombings in 2003. These attacks were, as Simon argues, the indications of a new and more threatening terrorism, one that aims to produce casualties on a massive scale (Simon: 2003). At this point,
Richard Shultz described such a big threat as one of the steps of war’s transformation (Shultz, Vogt, 2003: 5).
2.1.3. Transformation of War
Wars have been the reasons and the results of international relations. Today, since terrorism has been shaping the world politics, as Shultz argues, struggle with terrorism can be accepted as the last step of war. It is now generally accepted that struggle with terrorism is war.1 Thus, distinctiveness of terrorism as a war will be detailed.
New terrorism could be defined as a problem child who was gifted by globalism to the world after the Cold War (Shultz, Vogt, 2003:8). Simon Serfaty argues that there has been a renovation in the warfare with terrorism (Serfaty, 2001: 6). Even, Richard Shultz defined terrorism as the fourth step of transformation of war (Shultz, Vogt, 2003: 5). According to Shultz, the first generation of war had been perfected by Napoleon as classical nation-state war. This was followed by industrial-age wars of erosion based on massive firepower as in World War I. Maneuver warfare, introduced by the Germans in World War II and refined by the US in the 1980s, marked third generation. The last kind of war is against non-state actors and threats. This war has its own characteristics and Martin Creveld (Creveld, 1991:224) pointed them as follows:
* Warfare will be highly irregular, unconventional and decentralized in approach.
1In previous years, the states have avoided using ‘war’ word in their struggle with terrorists. Because
they have thought that war took place between two states or more. According to this idea, using the ‘war’ word against terrorists would strength terrorists’ arguments.
* Asymmetrical operations will be employed to bypass the superior military power.
* Both the organization operation of fourth-generation warriors will be masked by deception, denial, stealth and related techniques of intelligence tradecraft.
* Terrorist organizations and operations will be profoundly affected by information-age technologies.
* Modern communications and transportation technologies will have a profound impact on this new battlefield.
* Laws and conventions of war that apply to nation-states will not constrain terrorists and their state sponsor as they seek new and innovative means, including WMD, to attack civilians and nonmilitary targets.
* Fourth-generation warriors, frequently in the name of religiously based ideologies, will be remorseless enemies for the states they challenge.
* Countering terrorists and other violent non-state actors will be difficult for armies of post-modern states.
Indeed many academicians, experts has emphasized in their researches or analyses that new terrorism whose aim is to change world system completely is a growing threat for all world since their capacity and tendency to steer to world politics. Terrorism, which was also very dangerous as a tool in previous years, has become stronger and more dangerous with the help of its new characteristics. So its new characteristics should be understood in order to shape the danger in the minds.
2.1.4. Characteristics of New Terrorism
To identify the threat correctly, its characteristics have to be known very well. According to David Tucker (Tucker, 2001: 1) networked structure is good place to begin analyzing new terrorism. Terrorists are now able and willing to develop
network forms of organization for the same reason that businesses are. The information revolution, by lowering the cost of communication, allows organizations to push functions outside a controlling hierarchical structure. Organizations can control and approach a network form,2 a group of more or less autonomous, dispersed entities, linked by advanced communications and perhaps nothing more than a common purpose.
Motivating or compelling the move from hierarchy to network is the advantages that an organization acquires it for transformation. (Karstedt, 2002: 96-111). It becomes more flexible, adaptive and durable because of its loose coordination with the others. This is how non-stateness builds up. This multiplies the opportunities for the organization to learn, making it more flexible and adaptive. The organization becomes more flexible because if one or even several of its constituent entities are destroyed, the others carry on. As Hoffman points (Lesser, Hoffman, 1999: 41) a network, unlike a hierarchy, cannot be destroyed by execution. It is called as a “leaderless resistance” (Whine, 2001). Utilizing the leaderless resistance concept, all individuals in groups operate independently of each other, and never report to a central headquarters or single leader for directional instruction. Since current networks are very numerous and have a global reach, terrorism is not static but dynamic.
Secondly, Michael Whines (Whine, 2001) states that new terrorists are amateurs or operate on a part time basis. New terrorists can be anyone who
2 Michael Whine indicates Hamas as a case. According to him, Hamas constitutes example of the
network format, compared with, for instance, the hierarchical format of Arafat’s al-Fatah. Because, Hamas has separated its political and military wings, and its leadership is divided between Gaza and (until their exclusion) Jordan and now Syria. Yet, some of its political direction and most of its fund-raising has been carried out in the US whilst its publications are partly produced in the UK. Whine puts that Filistin al Muslima, the main Hamas paper is published in London, as is Palestine Times, the editorial line of which is pro-Hamas . (Whine, 2001).
sympathies to such kind of thoughts or actions and hates to his states or world system. Furthermore, amateurs come together with the like-minded to conduct a terrorist attack and then disband. They create ad hoc organizations to implement for one action. After the action, they disperse. Bombings in Istanbul in November 2003 are examples of it. Furthermore, terrorists do not receive training or other logistical support from state sponsors but rely on networks of supporters, learning what they need to know from publications or the World Wide Web or demobilized soldiers. They have only an informal organizational structure and no permanent existence.
Thirdly, the networked form is assisted by the growing use of information and communication technologies. In addition to facilitating networks, the communication revolution also facilitates finding political and individual support, reaching the knowledge and resources as well money that all terrorist organizations must do. The declining cost and increasing ease of communicating over great distances means that terrorist groups have greatly increased the potential pool of resources they can draw on. They can now more easily appeal to an ethnic or religious diasporas or to political sympathizers around the world (Elçi, 2002). They can also more easily get their message to a worldwide audience or to the people of the country or countries they deem most important in their struggle. Through the internet, they have access to important sources of the information. Paul Pillar alleges that computers and satellite phones have become a standard equipment in terrorists groups (Pillar, 2001: 47). Moreover, the know-how for making nuclear weapons is increasingly available over internet (Perry, 2001: 226).
Fourthly, the new terrorism does not confine itself to any boundaries and possesses a terrifying lethality. The new terrorism tends to go for the highest possible body count, (e.g., the Oklahoma City bombing, 1995; the WTC bombing, 1993; and
the Tokyo sarin gas attack, 1995; September 11 attacks, 2001 and two attacks in Istanbul, 2003). Of more than 10000 incidents of international terrorism recorded since 1968, only 14 prior to the September 11 had resulted in 100 or more fatalities (Jenkins, 2001: 4). Hoffman shows that although the total volume of terrorist incidents worldwide has declined in the 1990s, the percentage of terrorist incidents with fatalities has increased (Lesser, Hoffman, 1999: 11). According to the RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, a record 484 international terrorist incidents were recorded in 1991, the year of the Gulf War, followed by 343 incidents in 1992, 360 in 1993, 353 in 1994, falling to 278 incidents in 1995 and to only 250 in 1996. Indeed, the 1996 total was the lowest annual tally in 23 years. However, this declining was not reflected reducing the number of the fatalities. On the contrary, 1996 was one of the bloodiest years on record. A total of 510 persons were killed: 223 more than in 1995 and 91 more than in 1994. In fact, apart from the September 11, the 1996 death toll ranks as the fourth highest recorded in the chronology since it was monitoring international terrorism in 1968.3
According to Hoffman, there are some reasons accounts for terrorism’s increased lethality (Lesser, Hoffman, 1999: 13). First is that, terrorists want to attract more attention than earlier and do more dramatic in order to get their point across. Second terrorists have profited from past experience of their friends and have become more adept at killing. Third, meeting of new motivations, adversaries, and means (tactics) leads to higher lethality levels. The ideological nature of the terrorists’ causes lead to an ‘unlimited’ nature of their operations. Lastly, the proliferation of amateurs taking part in terrorist acts has also contributed to terrorism’s increasing lethality because the means and methods of terrorism can be
3 The reason of excluding September 11 is to be able to show emerge and the evolution of New
easily obtained at bookstores, from mail-order publishers, on CD-ROM, or over the Internet.
Fifth characteristic is that the new terrorists are mostly religious motivated. They differ from politically motivated terrorism (Simon, Benjamin, 2001/02:5). Jenkins asserts that this shift is significant because those convinced that they have the mandate of God to kill heir foes have fewer moral doubts about mass murder and care less about people (Jenkins, 2001: 4-5). For 1995, Hoffman's data shows that religiously motivated terrorists were responsible for a quarter of all incidents in that year, but caused nearly 60 percent of all fatalities (Lesser, Hoffman, 1999: 16). Moreover, he says that in 1996, the last year for which he has data, 'Groups driven in whole or in part by a salient religious or theological motive committed 10 of the 13 most lethal terrorists attacks'. Especially Islamic groups are dominant in the number of the international terrorist organizations. Ayşe Hür gives the information that 27 of 53 organizations, which are in the list of the international terrorist organization, express themselves as an Islamic (Hür, 2003). Although jihadists are a significant problem, the threat of intensified violence posed by terrorists motivated by other radical religious traditions, including the American Christian Patriot movement, Israel's Jewish messianic militants and Japan's Aum Shinrikyo, increased. All these share a worldview characterized by a life-or-death struggle with the 'other' in order to redeem the world. They die for the God. It can be concluded that religious motivation is pushing terrorists beyond nationalistic sensation.
Sixth, the new terrorists frequently do not claim responsibility for the action and may even deny it. The new terrorist intends to strike without publicity for himself or his cause, until he is caught. He does not need to claim responsibility
perhaps because he acknowledges only God as his master, and God has seen his action. Due to having no anxiety of any political message and performing with only hatred emotion, no one else matters (Küçük, 2003: 33-35). J. Stevenson states that what derives terrorist to kill is essentially hatred unlike the classical terrorist organizations that present their demands clearly and generally take direct responsibility for their acts in order to make it clear to their adversaries that the bloodletting will stop when those demands are met (Stevenson, 2001/02: 35). In a sense, it is facing patriotism about religious within the terrorist network just like a state.
2.1.5. Difficulties of Dealing with New Terrorism:
If states face with a threat or enemy, they take some measures for it. Nevertheless, characteristics of ‘New Terrorism’ make very difficult to deal with it. Loose tie and leaderless structure of organization make very difficult or more correctly impossible to dissolve the structure of organization. Arresting one or two, even many members of organization do not have any meaning to destroy the terrorist organization. Moreover, since members are amateur and they generally die in their first action, prevention of terrorist activities before performing is very complicated.
Additionally, advanced technology helps terrorists about not only concealing their identity but also gaining materials in order to use in their actions. Terrorists, who do not have any political purpose and are motivated by religious emotions, do not limit themselves about death numbers in their action. More corpses mean success. Indeed, it is the most dangerous side of new. The idea and the aim of killing as many people as they can succeed is the main reason why new terrorism is thought to be as primary threat in the new era. Due to this idea, it is frightened that new terrorists are searching WMD. The action concept of new terrorists gives a hint that
if they gain or reach such kind of weapon, they will not hesitate to use it (Alexander, Hoenig, 2002). Experts and researchers are also of the same mind (Cameron, 1999: 51). It is alleged that terrorists seek to get such kind of weapons. Since those materials can be obtained easily from the ex-Soviet bloc states and third world countries, the world is extremely uneasy. In 1998, William C. Potter, administrator of Center for Nonproliferation Studies in California, stated that there were warehouses equal to 70,000 nuclear weapons without any protection in Russia (Küçük, 2003: 40). According to Steve Simon, acquisition and use of WMD by a terrorist group is near a certainty (Simon, Benjamin, 2001/02: 1-15).
Although it was pointed and warned about terrorism in whole world after the Cold War, war on terrorism has not been succeed multilaterally because of disagreement on what terrorism is.4 The world could not image and estimate how its dangers and damages are and the most importantly it was not perceived as a global threat so seriously until September 11.
2.2. September 11 in the Perspective of New Terrorism: 2.2.1. September 11 Attacks
On September 11, four terrorist groups, which were consisted of 19 men, hijacked four airlines. Two of planes crashed into the towers of WTC, one into the Pentagon and the last one, which could not succeed what it had aimed, targeted to the White House. Then everything started to change in the whole world. The world was shocked because the superpower was hit with massive casualties. New terrorism, which emerged after the Cold War, was on the highest point of world politics anymore. Many characteristics of it can be seen in the attacks of September 11. For
4 Nearly 109 definitions of terrorism have been made and there is no exact definition of terrorism
accepted by the whole world. (Stratejik Araştırma ve Etüt Merkezi (SAREM).2002. Küresel Terör ve Türkiye. Ankara: ATASE Başkanlığı, 18.)
that reason, the new terror was accepted as a global threat after those attacks. It became the most dominant actor in the world arena, especially due to targeting the U.S.’s homeland. If, the period between 1991 and September 11 is named as ‘incubation period’ for New Terrorism, it can be said that the birth in a real meaning existed in the September 11.
After the attacks, everybody asked who did it. Many terrorist organizations were suspect. Japanese Red Army took the responsibility but the government of the U.S. and many people pointed out the Al-Qaeda (Karagöz, 2002: 152). As the time passed, Al-Qaeda was declared as a responsible. There is no doubt that the name of the organization is important but the characteristic and concept of the attacks are more significant.
Firstly, loose network organization can be seen in the attacks. Certainly, terrorists must have made a very detailed planning, but making clear about which organization they belonged took very long time. Their leader has not been captured. Many supporters both financially and logistically have been seized in different countries such as Germany or Philippines. According to Cottey, each operates autonomously with its members not knowing the identity of other cells. The pattern that has emerged is of a web of cells around the world that provide the intelligence and manpower to execute these terrorist attacks (Cottey, 2002).
Second, members of these attacks are commonly amateur and they created ad
hoc organization. They met for only one action. September 11 was their first and last
action. As well, they did not take the attention of the intelligence agencies although they had lived in the U.S. for two or three years. Shultz describes them as a ‘sleeper agents’ (Shultz, Vogt, 2003: 10) because they waited in the place where they would make an action ever since they were ordered. Pilot-terrorists, who used the planes
crashed into the WTC and Pentagon, had been trained unintentionally in the U.S. civil aviation organizations since 1999 (Millar, 2001). They were not in the terrorists or suspicious lists.
Third, September 11 terrorists did not have any headquarters in a physical sense. The center of a new terrorism is the internet and global cellular communications. Karagöz alleges that the September 11 attacks were accomplished by the help of open information (Karagöz, 2002: 162). By using the internet, they were able to accelerate mobilization and intensify communication between members. They reached flight plans of the airline companies and probably they might have learned the weak or defenseless sides of the Pentagon. Although the U.S. has very modern technology in defence technology and war industry, terrorists managed to pass all security measures of her or they made inefficient those measures. Thanks to using Information and Communication Technology (ICT), they could even hit Pentagon (Cottey, 2003).
Fourth, the September 11 attacks conformed to trend of escalating lethality even when the volume of the international terrorism declined (Jenkins, 2001: 1-15). In the attacks, nearly 3600 people died. It shows that they targeted to murder as many people as they could succeed. They did not limit themselves about killing that is the most dangerous feature of the new terrorism. They must have planned their action very carefully because they crashed into the middle of the Twin Towers, where was one of the most crowded places of New York, with oil-full planes.
Fifthly, attacks were explicitly religious motivated. Although Islam does not order or give permission to kill people, even it prohibits concluding life of any being, all terrorists were Muslim. They committed suicide because they probably saw themselves as a ‘sword of the Islam’ (Katzman, 2002). They used a faction of Islam
as an ideology. After the attacks, in the video cassette, which belonged to some of the terrorists, they declared that they were ready for dying for the God and they would punish the ‘big evil’, the U.S. (Berger, 2001: 123-129).5
Lastly, no organization has taken the responsibility of attacks. At first Japanese Red Army took but it was not insisted on this issue (Karagöz, 2002: 159). Although Al-Qaeda was seen as a guilty for the attacks neither any member of Al-Qaeda nor Osama Bin Laden has never taken the responsibility. However, Laden declared his pleasures for seeing demolishing the WTC and he commented these actions as, it was the first time the balance of terror has been close between Muslims and Americans (Nacos, 2003: 1-16). Taking responsibility is not matter for ‘new Terrorism’ because according to their opinion God saw their action. They did not have any anxiety to send a message (Küçük, 2003: 33-35).
Without any declaration, the world found the responsible for the attacks. Who was the responsible for September 11? New Terrorism. Which organization could be so bold or could dare to hit the U.S. within the homeland and fit with the characteristic of new terrorism? Al-Qaeda. The world accepted this name as a responsible and within 24 hours of the terrorist attacks, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and the Security Council adopted two resolutions unanimously.6 Likewise, the NATO Council agreed that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty covered these attacks.7 It was the first time such a decision about Article 5 was taken in NATO’s history. The entire world agreed on that new terrorism was the most dangerous threat for the world peace.
5 On the other hand, Jenkins alleges that 13 of 19 did not know it was a suicide mission (Jenkins,
2001: 1-15).
6 UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/56/1 and UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001) 7 North Atlantic Council Statement of 12 September 2001.
Taking such big decisions showed that the whole world took some messages from the September 11 attacks. People and states realized the seriousness of terrorism. Noelle Quenivet argues that the world discovered terrorism again (Quenivet, 2002). Taken messages were important for the future of world affairs.
2.2.2. Messages of September 11 Attacks:
All terrorist actions carry some messages (Hoffman, 1998: 41). September 11 also carried different messages. In order to understand future reaction of the world, particularly the U.S.’s, what kind of messages was taken in different level should be explained. Since the U.S. perceived new messages from attacks, they changed foreign policy priorities.
With the attacks, name of the child was given and new terrorism became very ‘popular’ in the whole world. Although there had been several attacks carrying the new terrorism’s features and many warnings were made about it, both the world and the U.S. were acquainted with terrorism in its real meaning (Nye, 2001: 199). However, its characteristics change, all terrorist actions want to give some messages. September 11 attacks had own aims and messages. Reasons of the attacks can be found in its messages.
If it is accepted that Al Qaeda did these attacks, some clear aims can be put. First aim can said as the removal the U.S. military and thus the reduction or removal of the U.S. interest from Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region; secondly, the end of the U.S. pressure on and sanctions against Iraq; thirdly, the destruction of the U.S.-Israeli alliance and strengthening of the Palestinians’ battle against Israel (Nacos,2003: 1-16). Moreover Karagöz argues that strategic goals of the Osama Bin Laden were that furthering the cause Islamic revolution within the Muslim world
itself and he tried to face-to-face Islam and the U.S. (Karagöz, 2002: 159). Similarly, Brian Jenkins asserts that Bin Laden knew that U.S. would give a fierce reply due to the September 11 attacks. Thus, their strategy was based on provoking the U.S to assault on Islam (Jenkins, 2001: 14). Michael Doran also alleges that polarizing the Islamic world between the umma and regimes allied with the U.S. would help achieve Laden’s primary goal, furthering the cause of Islamic revolution within the Islamic world itself (Doran, 2001: 32-33). He even asserts that goal is to help his brand of extremist Islam alive and flourishing among believers.
In a broadened perspective of terrorism not from the perspective of any terrorist organization, own messages of new terrorism are more important than what the name of organization is. Apart from the classical aims and messages of terrorism such as violence, panic and drawing attention, terrorists gave some extra messages relating to their aims to everyone for in every level while performing September 11 attacks. These levels can be categorized as individual, state and international level.
For the citizens of the U.S. or individual level hatred was the first message. They so hated from the Americans that they gave their own lives for killing them. After the attacks, there were many debates in America about why they hate from the U.S. Besides, the argument that U.S. creates such kind of terrorist attacks itself due to its policies it carries on was started to be increasingly spoken while searching the hatred against the U.S. Fear, insecurity was the second message in this level. These attacks showed that Americans are not completely in a safe in their homeland. Just before the September 11 attacks, Pillar stated that American homeland is the best place to inflict fear on Americans (Pillar, 2001: 58). Until the September 11, most Americans were clearly believing that U.S. had very good measures of protection from its enemies because oceans to the east and west and friendly neighbors to the
north and south had given a security from dangers. Most of the Americans will not get rid of the September 11 syndrome (Halliday, 2001: 256). It is not wrong to say that Americans faced with the realities of the world (Howard, 2002).
For the U.S. government or state level, vulnerability of the U.S. can be perceived as the first message. These attacks deteriorated the image of superpower by hitting homeland although this superpower has extremely big and strong military power. Punishment can be pointed as a second message at this stage. With relating to hatred, they tried to prove that policies of the U.S., which were not liked by them, would eventually be punished (Baranovsky, 2002: 21-28). Additionally, that terrorists tried to punish the U.S. in all fields could be seen in their target selections. White House carried political message, Pentagon carried military message and WTC carried economic message. In classical total war, war has military, economic and political aims. If one state is wanted to be defeated completely in a strategic level, its military and economic structures must be demolished so that enemy can be captured in political level.8 September 11 itself carried these messages on itself. As for the world or on international level, terrorism confirmed that it was the most dangerous enemy, which could use every kind of method to accomplish its aims. It also mean that such terrorist attacks may be executed in any country since it dared to assault to superpower because there is no authority who has capability to prevent or control the terrorism. After the attacks, French President Jacques Chirac said “This time it was New York; next time it could be Paris, Berlin or London.” (Serfaty, 2001: 8). Istanbul and Madrid bombings were proved this view. “United against terrorism” became the leading word in international affairs.
8 The level of the total war can be found in Field Manuel, MT 145-1 Müşterek Harekat Talimnamesi.
The challenge can be perceived as the most important message at the international level since it attacked the only polar of unipolar world system. September 11 proved that weak non-state actors can strike hard against even the strongest of today’s nation. With the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, no country could balance American military power. According to Joseph Nye in the September 11 attacks, terrorists tried to prove that this balance could be supplied (Nye, 2001: 200). September 11 showed that the weak balanced the strong and weak was not as weak as the U.S. thought. Each ‘successful’ terrorist operation against the U.S. demonstrates that it is vulnerable; it is not the hegemonic power of the world (Pillar, 2001: 56). Terrorists’ aim that is to remind the U.S. that they are not the only powerful actor in the international arena became successful and terrorism took the non-state actor role for world affairs. Indeed, due to this challenging message, U.S.’s policy started to change and the world became anxious about how the U.S. would give a reply to terrorists’ challenge.
Apart from the all aims, messages and reasons; conclusions of the attacks are the most important side for the world level. They triggered to change of international system. There had been many terrorist activities in the world targeting to Americans until September 11. For example, terrorists drove a truck filled with explosives into the basement of the WTC in New York City in 1993, followers of Osama Bin Laden killed American soldiers in an ambush on the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993, the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia was destroyed by a tanker-truck bomb in 1996, US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were simultaneously attacked by truck bombs in 1998 and the USS Cole was attacked in the port city of Yemen in 2000.9 But on the one point, the September 11 differentiated from those attacks as well as its
death toll. Targeting homeland of the U.S. is the most significant side because everybody knew that eventually the U.S. would normally respond and punish someone for these actions. Additionally, the U.S., would probably use and change this bad situation for the benefit of its interests due to overcoming the shock. At this point it can be said that September 11 attacks have given the U.S. the opportunity to attempt to hold the international arena under its leadership according to American priorities. So the world started to wait how the U.S. would respond September 11. In addition to terrorism fear, U.S. policy against this challenge became another anxiety of the states.
As a result, new terrorism, which appeared in the beginning of 1990s, developed and became an actor in the international arena. September 11 is a solid evidence for this idea. The emergence of new terrorism is a significant and new development in international politics because for the first time a terrorist organization with global pretensions has emerged and shown that it is capable of undertaking a campaign of violence against any states. Two aspects of new terrorism made it a worldwide actor; first is its global characteristics different from classical terrorism, second is targeting the homeland of U.S. with the September 11.
Now, threat of new terrorism is the most famous, well-known and active actor in the world arena. Due to the respond of the U.S., everybody knew that the world would never be the same again. Nobody was mistaken on this issue. The U.S. started from the Afghanistan. Then government prepared a new NSS for ‘war against terrorism’. The new strategy of the U.S. will be clarified in the next chapter in order to show the direction of the current U.S.’s policies.
CHAPTER III:
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE U.S. AFTER
THE SEPTEMBER 11
September 11 marked the start of a new era in American strategic thinking. The terrorist attacks have had an impact comparable to the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, that propelled the U.S. into World War II. Attacks changed both the U.S.’s war strategy with terrorism and its priorities concerning foreign and security policies. After the September 11, all Americans were convinced that new terrorism was new threat. War on terrorism has become the U.S.’s number one priority for foreign policy. Moreover, offensive policies started to be applied against terrorism instead of defensive ones. Such policies have affected foreign and global security policies of the U.S.
In this chapter, the changing strategy of the U.S. against terrorism and its reflections to the American security and foreign polices will be explained. In order to clarify the roots of current policies of the U.S.’s, firstly struggle of the U.S. with terrorism before September 11 will be explained. For many times, U.S. declared that they were in a war with terrorism. The defensive war method they used, their point of view about terrorism will be clarified. Secondly, changing minds about terrorism, decisions and measures for a war will be clarified. After the September 11, U.S. realized that terrorism could be very dangerous for the people of the U.S. and took some decisions for fighting with new type of terrorism. New Terrorism may have
taken the place of communism for foreign policy of the U.S. New type of enemy necessities new strategy since other previous methods did not work against it. Therefore, method had to be changed. Thirdly, characteristics and main parameters of the emerging new security strategy of the U.S. will be explained. It is worth noting that corrects or errors; neither negative nor positive critics to this strategy will not be analyzed. In other words, this research does not take normative stance with respect to American security. Only what the U.S. says in the strategy is tried to be clarified to draw the frame of war on terrorism. Lastly, selection of the U.S. to implement the NSS will be shown. For proving her seriousness, U.S. started to carry out her strategy in the Middle East, which is the convenient place to begin war against terrorism according to her priorities and opinion.
3.1. Struggle of the U.S. with Terrorism before September 11
As said by Paul Pillar, combating international terrorism had been one of the major objectives of the U.S. (Pillar, 2001: i) because in an average, 26 Americans had been killed per year by terrorists before September 11 (Office of Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2000: 1). George Tenet, director of Central Intelligence, argues in 2001 that the U.S. remained a number one target of international terrorism. According to numbers provided by him, close to one-third of all incidents worldwide in 2000 were directed against Americans. (Hoffman, 2001: 2). For that reason, there had also been a war against terrorism in previous years. In this part strategy of the U.S. against terrorism before September 11 will be clarified in order to putting differences with current policies.
Especially after the Cold War, ‘war against terrorism’ has been heard more frequently. The commitment to the fight against terrorism was reflected in the statements of national leaders about the persistence and fortitude that the fight would
require. For instance, Clinton stated in 1998 that the U.S. was in “a long, ongoing struggle between freedom and fanaticism, between the rule of law and terrorism”.10 Opinions polls also showed the public support for counter terrorism. In a survey done in 1998, Americans cited international terrorism more often than any other issue as a critical threat to U.S.’s vital interests (Rielly, 1999: 15-16)11. In the same poll, 79 percent of the public said that fighting international terrorism should be a very important goal of the U.S. Thus, before September 11 the U.S. also used some methods against terrorism. Indeed, there are two different ways to struggle with terrorism; anti-terrorism and counterterrorism (Akgün, 2001: 117). Anti-terrorism means to take only some measures against the terrorist actions in order to minimize the risks for the public. On the other hand, counterterrorism comes to mean showing more active and aggressive attitude to suppress terrorist activities. It includes using physical force to destroy terrorist organization12. In this perspective, pre-September 11 period the method used was anti-terrorism. Its measures can be listed as economic, financial, political measures and sanctions, diplomatic pressure, intelligence and law enforcement cooperation and lastly military measures. They did not include major foreign policy transformations.
Believing that terrorism was one of the threats for the U.S., governments took some drastic measures for struggle against it. American analysts believed that new terrorism would persist for many years in the future and according to Simon and Benjamin, the resources, which the U.S. had devoted to combating the threat of
10 Address to the nation by President Bill Clinton, August 20, 1998. This address is available online at
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/strike/clinton980820.ahtr (December 20, 2002).
11 This survey was conducted between October and December 1998. In August 1998, the U.S.
embassies were bombed. For that reason, it may partly reflected feeling emerged with the bombings. However, it also showed that after such kind of attacks, American people could highly support the counter terrorism activities and measures.
12 More detailed information about the measures against terrorism can be found in Field Manuel Kara
Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı. 1998. İç Güvenlik Harekatı KKT 31-2 (Internal Security Operation). Ankara: K.K. Basımevi.
terrorism, reflected this view (Simon and Benjamin, 2000:59). In terms of financial measures, as said by them, the U.S. had doubled what it spent to fight terrorism since 1994, to more than $ 10 billion for fiscal year 2000. Already, the U.S. spent $ 1.4 bn each year on defensive measures against terrorist use of Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) weapons. In 1998, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director Louis Freeh made terrorism the top priority and his counterterrorism budget grew to $ 423 million by 2001 (Nye, 2001: 200). The U.S. had also frozen of assets belonging to individual terrorists, terrorist groups, or state sponsor and the prohibition of material support to terrorists.
In terms of diplomatic pressure, although it had a problem to take some strict measures against to terrorism, diplomacy was seen a method for fighting against terrorism by the U.S. Resolution 731 in the security council of UN against Libya and Resolution 1267 against the Afghanistan could be seen as a diplomatic sample of anti-terrorism efforts. Libya was enforced to make a cooperation to find responsible of the Pan Am action. Afghanistan was imposed a sanction to turnover the Osama bin Laden. Moreover, U.S. decided to take strict measures against some states, which were giving support to the international terrorism. She imposed four main sets of U.S. Government sanctions: A ban on arms-related exports and sales, controls over exports of dual use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist list country's military capability or ability to support terrorism, prohibitions on economic assistance; and imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.
In the state level, the U.S. amended some criminal laws. According to Stephen Flynn, application of criminal law had become an increasingly large part of U.S. efforts to anti-terrorism (Flynn, 2001: 191-193). Long sentences have the most
important side of this method. For instance Ramzi Yousef, who attacked the WTC in 1993, was sentenced to 240-year.
Intelligence and covert actions were other options for combating terrorism. The anti-terrorism contribution most often expected from intelligence is to detect terrorists’ plots in time for measures to be taken to remove threat. Once terrorists attacks occurs intelligence tackles with to determine responsibility for the crime and to locate and capture the perpetrators. FBI and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were used for these purposes in the phase of anti-terrorism. George Tenet stated in February 2000 that the U.S. agencies had assisted in the rendition of more than two dozen terrorists since July 1998.13 Moreover, he claimed that the counter-terrorism center at the CIA was strengthened and coordination between that agency and the FBI was improved.14
Regarding to military measures, retaliation has been the most important anti-terrorism method used by U.S. military force (Pillar, 2001: 100). As Paul Pillar indicates, she first employed it for this purpose against Libya in 1986 in response to the bombing of a nightclub in Berlin on April 4. American casualties at the nightclub included two killed and seventy-nine wounded. The U.S. response on April 14 was a strike by one hundred combat aircraft based on carriers or in the United Kingdom. The targets were several military sites in and around Tripoli and Benghazi as well as numerous surface-to-air missile installations. The second retaliatory use was against Iraq for having unsuccessfully attempted to use agents to assassinate Bush Senior while he was visiting Kuwait in April 1993. The retaliatory strike on June 26, twenty-three Tomahawk cruise missiles were used, aimed at the headquarters of the
13 The statement is available online at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speechs/dci_speech-020200.htlm (December 21, 2002)
14 However, the September 11 investigation showed that this coordination and cooperation could not
intelligence service in Baghdad. Third instance was a set of strikes on August 20, 1998 against targets associated with Osama bin Laden, in response to the bombings U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Several dozen cruise missiles were fired. Most of the missiles were targeted to eastern Afghanistan and some of them were targeted to Sudan. American sentiments about retaliation were reflected in another poll: 74 percent of the public and 77 percent of the smaller sample of leaders said they would support retaliatory air strikes against terrorists (Rielly, 1999: 27). Moreover, 57 percent of the public and 58 percent of the leaders even expressed support for the use of ground troops to respond to terrorist attacks.
Although these measures were taken and conducted, terrorist activities continued. Indeed financial, diplomatic, intelligence and criminal laws are standard measures which are taken by every country dealing with terrorism. For that reason, it may be wrong to expect that those measures would stop or control terrorism. They have not deterred the terrorists. Retaliation was perceived more concrete method for preventing or stopping terrorist activities for U.S. governments. Nevertheless, it could not be named as the perfect method of fighting with terrorism. Michael Hirsh indicates the inefficiency of this method and he claims, periodic cruise-missile strikes of Bill Clinton only seemed to encourage Bin Laden, who derided the U.S. as a ‘paper tiger’ (Hirsh, 2002). American retaliations can be perceived as a ‘make-up’ or ‘reactionary approach’ for mollifying own public opinion. If terrorists hit one, the U.S. hit back one or two.15 Retaliation means defense. In the perspective of this explanation, it is not wrong to say that U.S. used anti-terrorism method before September 11.
15 The Turkish army used the same method while struggling with PKK before 1993. Troops were
waiting in the stations and if they were attacked, they would start to defense. But this method was given up for taking the concrete successes against terrorists.
