TECHNOLOGY AND THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
Walter E. KRETCHIK*
ABSTRACT
This study discusses the changes in military operations that are called "Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)". Technological RMA is viewed in several ways within the literature. Some see them as a military revolution combining technical advances in command, control, communications, and intelligence. Others argue that the radical change contains new operational concepts, and increases in information warfare. Others still observe that military revolution consists of joint military operations that cover an entire theater of operations and thus deny the enemy sanctuary.
Technology-based RMA occurs throughout history and is going to continue well into the future. But there are some requirements for generating a successful RMA through technology are listed from an historical viewpoint in this article. The historical record suggests that an RMA occurs during a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations and from paradoxical conceptual breakthroughs.
Technology-based RMA still depends upon the human beings that know the inner workings of a military establishment. Yet, it is the individual who is willing to challenge the accepted paradigm. Each person must gauge their own capacity for assuming personal risk, a willingness to explore and promote new ideas, and accessing support from those who advocate change. As this essay argued, technology-driven RMA also depends upon personal boldness to shape a military in meeting the complex tasks of the twenty-first century.
Recent advances in technology since the 1991 Gulf War have brought about dramatic changes in military operations. The use of low-observable aircraft to negate air defenses, smart weapons for precision conventional-strike operations, and the employment of both ballistic missiles and antiballistic missiles have had their affect upon the way wars are conceived of and conducted. The dramatic technology-driven changes in military operations have been called a "Revolution in Military Affairs" or RMA (Scales, 1994:360-361 ). RMA are not unique to the history of warfare but merely represent the latest in a chain of improving technologies extending back over time. Past technology that affected wars included the ironclad during the American Civil War, the machinegun of the 1890s-1910s, manned aircraft, poison gas and the tank of World War I, the aircraft carrier and RADAR of World War II, and the nuclear devices of the 1940s and the recent Cold War.
Although the human factor remai'ns paramount in warfare, technology-driven breakthroughs in military operations will continue to occur. Furthermore, they will maintain a military advantage for the first nation to develop and use them. Accordingly, those individuals who are concerned with national defense and
*
Dr.Bilkent Oniversitesi Tarih Bolumu, kretchik@bilkent.edu.trwaging future war as well as the States that develop technology for military use must remain on top of the cutting edge technologies that could revolutionize future military operations. This article seeks to illuminate the subject of technology-driven RMA and its cumulative affect upon warfare and the organizations that wage it by asking some basic questions. First, What characterizes a technology-driven RMA? Second, What causes one to occur? Lastly, How does a military organization successfully bring one about? These questions seem vital for strategists and scientists who are concerned with national defense.
Characteristics of Technology-Driven RMA
Although the American pundit Ralph Peters has argued that the world is undergoing an amazing RMA due to computerization and the breakdown of the nation-State, technology-driven changes in military operations are not recent phenomena (Peters,1995:7-14). Indeed, technological developments have brought about dramatic changes in the nature of warfare since the dawn of history. Historians have provided historical overviews of the changes in military technology over the last 4000 years, from the earliest developments such as the chariot to the more recent destructive power of nuclear weapons (Keegan, 1994 ; Preston and Wise, 1979).
More recently, beginning with the former Soviet Union's focus on the military-technological revolution, government and private research groups have concerned themselves with the current revolution in military affairs. Such research has paid considerable attention to the sometimes-revolutionar~ advances in military technology, with particular focus on events in the 201 century. This in turn has led to an increase in scholarly writing upon the subject (Williams and Lind, 1999 ; Libicki and Hazlett, 1994). Thus, the long sweep of military technology and the military revolutions of the last century both serve to provide some insight into what characterizes an RMA.
Technological RMA have been viewed in several ways. Some see them as a military revolution combining technical advances in surveillance, command, control, communications, and intelligence. Others have argued that the radical change contains precision munitions, new operational concepts, and iclcreases in information warfare. Others still have observed that military revolution consists of joint military operations that cover an entire theater of operations and thus deny the enemy sanctuary. While many people have written about such events in the modern sense, the literature does not shed much light on RMA characteristics. To grasp what characterizes an RMA over what the historian Fernand Braudel labeled "the long duree" of history, one must turn to the historical record of technology-driven changes in military operations {Tilford, 1995 ; Rogers, 1995 ; Marsh,2001 ).
The historical record suggests that an RMA occurs during a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations under three conditions. First, change either renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies of a dominant actor. Second, something occurs to create one or more new core competencies in some new dimension of warfare. Third, both the first and second conditions occur near simultaneously. A paradigm consists of the accepted model for the basic pattern of contemporary military operations. The operational paradigm for Napoleonic Warfare consisted of opposing infantry units arranged in orderly ranks that maneuvered to engage each other through direct fire at close quarters with artillery in support. A core competency is a fundamental ability that provides the foundation for a set of military capabilities. One example might be the United States Air Force's ability to detect vehicle targets from the air and attack them with precision weapons. A dominant actor is a military organization that possesses a commanding set of capabilities in a particular area of military operations. For example, the United States Air Force is the dominant actor in the world today regarding air-to-air combat and air-to-ground attack. Dimension of warfare is the physical location within which war is conducted, the most ancient being land, the second being the sea, the third air, and the fourth, although not yet fought over,· being space. A paradigm shift means a radical change in the fundamental model that underlies a segment of military operations. A paradigm shift occurred during World War II when the German blitzkrieg became the ultimate expression of combined arms warfare, virtually eliminating the strength of static defenses and well-prepared positions in favor of maneuver1 •
There are other characteristics of RMA. Dominant players rarely cause one to occur. During the period between World War I and World War II, the previously dominant French and British militaries did not develop blitzkrieg methods nor adopt a new type of armored warfare. Moreover, RMA frequently bestow an enormous and immediate military advantage upon the first nation to exploit them in combat. The German blitzkrieg into Poland and France serves as one example and the US use of stealth technology in Iraq during the Gulf War is yet another (Kier, 1997 ; Scales, 1994). Yet, RMA are often adopted and fully exploited by someone other than the nation that invented the new technology. For example, the British invented the aircraft carrier but it was the Japanese and American navies that exploited its use in the four major carrier battles of World War II.
1 These conclusions were derived from a variety of sources. See Parker, Geoffrey ed. (2000), Warfare,
Cambridge University Press; Hagan, Kenneth J. (1984), In Peace and War: Interpretations of American
Naval History, 1775-1984, 2d ed., Greenwood Press. Jones, Archer. (1987), The Art of War in the Western World, Oxford University Press. Addington, Larry H. (1994), The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century, 2d ed., Indiana University Press. Paret, Peter ed. (1986), Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton University Press.
RMAs are not always technology-driven. Combat tactics during the American Revolution shifted from fighting in the open to engaging an opponent behind cover, bringing about a revolutionary change in land combat without any change in technology (Neimeyer,1996:145; Higginbotham,1983:196-197). When technology-driven RMAs do occur, combinations of technologies usually bring them about. Systems not individual technologies cause an RMA to occur. Systems include the ICBM that fused three technologies: long-range ballistic missiles, lightweight fusion warheads, and highly accurate guidance devices (Morelock, 1994:150-151; Paret, 1986:735-778). And, not all RMAs involve weapons, for the railroad changed warfare by enhancing strategic mobility. Further, successful revolutions usually mean changes in technology, doctrine and organization. An RMA requires the right doctrinal ideas to employ it, and the right military organization to take advantage of technological
capabilities. ·
There are as many failed RMA as successful ones. Failures can be attributed to a variety of reasons to include human failings and the lack of sufficient technology. Furthermore, they often take a long time to develop, for many ideas conceived in 1914 regarding combined arms warfare failed to mature until World War II produced the technology (Odom, 1999:54-59). Lastly, RMA are frequently controversial and viewed as highly theoretical until proven or disproved in battle.
How Technology-Driven RMA Occur
RMA result from paradoxical conceptual breakthroughs. In other words, they almost always occur when a conceptual breakthrough happens that was not anticipated in advance and often was not sought after in the first place. These unexpected revolutions generally progress through phases. In the preparatory phase, one or more technology developments and various unmet military challenges set the stage for a subsequent intellectual breakthrough. The key creative event or breakthrough phase follows, usually by accident. The next phase, the exploitation and selling phase, means that someone realizes that something new has occurred, that it must be exploited, and the idea has to be "sold" to the old order of bureaucrats who can say "no" to the idea. The last phase is the payoff phase, where the new weapon or weapon system is used in combat and shows its potential. Theory now becomes reality.
The above simple phasing model, based upon historical analysis, suggests that one technology can spark an RMA. The historical record, however, shows that each change required innovation in technology, doctrine, and
organization2• RMAs are complex, and thus a second historically-based model reveals the impact of multiple innovations. In this model, a new technology or several technologies allow for the development of devices or systems that were not previously imagined. The new device does something that was not previously achievable. Thus, a new system is created. The new system performs a military function dramatically different than before. A new operational concept arises that describes how to use the new · system effectively, spawning a new doctrine and force structure that officially sanctions the new system. A new military reality emerges, the result of a paradigm shift in some segment of the military arena.
Other findings also arise. Unmet military challenges drive creativity. Without challenges, technologies are unlikely to combine into devices, devices into systems, and systems into new operational concepts, doctrine, and force structures. Moreover, innovations may occur out of sequence, with the operational concept being theorized well before the development of the technology, device, or system that transforms theory into reality. Another finding is that a revolution can fail to occur in the face of obstacles at any step in the chain of events. In the 1950s, for example, the US Army sought to take advantage of tactical nuclear weapons by creating the Pentomic Division, a formation based upon five platoons within five companies that were organized into five battalions and regiments. Although the US Army reorganized its divisional structure, modified its doctrine, and deployed tactical nuclear weapons, no RMA occurred. The Pentomic concept proved unworkable due to improper command and control structures and the lack of political will to allow unrestricted use of tactical nuclear devices without civilian release authority (Bacevich, 1986).
Those individuals concerned with promoting successful RMA should pay some attention to why some fail to meet their potential. One such case occurs when the necessary technology exists but contemplated devices prove impractical. In the 1950s, military strategists and scientists considered a nuclear-powered aircraft with virtually unlimited range and endurance as having the potential to revolutionize aerial warfare. Such aircraft never came to the fore, even though the .nuclear reactor and energy conversion technologies existed. The nuclear engine proved much too heavy to be practical and the aircraft was unable to take flight. Scientists were unable to reduce the size of the engine and its weight, thus human limitations in designing a practical nuclear jet engine ended the nuclear-powered aircraft
(Scientific American.
2001 ).2 Such as revealed by Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. (1993), War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21•1
Another case exists in the 1970s and 1980s where the US military contemplated an electromagnetic gun that was believed to be a superior antitank, antimissile, and antiaircraft weapon. The US developed the weapon but the gun proved impractical due to maintenance problems. While the gun exists, turning it into a usable weapon system seems to be futile, at least for the moment (U.S. Government. 2001 ).
Another AMA failure happened when the wrong or incomplete operational concept was used. On 25 December 1914, the British conducted the first aircraft carrier air raid in history. By the end of World War I, the Royal Navy had three years experience with carrier operations and nearly a dozen aircraft carriers when no other naval power had even one. Yet, British naval experts completely missed the realization that the aircraft carrier was revolutionary. Why did the British fail to understand that an AMA was within their grasp? Historians argue that one small detail escaped them, the concept of a "deck park." British strategists did not fathom that one could stow aircraft on the flight deck, as well as conduct rearming and refueling operations there. Instead, the British stowed, refueled, and rearmed their aircraft on the hanger deck below. Thus, in 1939, the British could only carry 24-30 aircraft, while the Japanese and US carried 80-100 aircraft. The decisive operational task was to launch large numbers of aircraft in a single strike, followed by successive strikes generated faster than an ,opponent was capable of. The Japanese and US carriers launched more aircraft and turn them around faster than the British, a feature that made a great deal of difference in sea warfare (Prange,1988:128-129,373-374).
Another failure occurs when a military organization lacks the doctrine and force structure to exploit an operational concept when it proves unacceptable to the prevailing military organizational culture. For example, by the 1880s, the British high command understood how to employ machineguns in combat to achieve devastating effect as direct-fire weapons. But, those weapons were used against "barbarous heathens," not "civilized" European armies. English military officers and gentlemen could not conceive of using such weapons against other officers and gentlemen. Thus, the British army failed to develop the doctrine and force structure necessary to exploit its potential.
Resistance to changes in force structure can also preempt an AMA when senior leaders perceive that change occurs too fast. Such a case existed in the early 1990s when US Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan tried to convince the service that post-Cold War peace operations required change. Senior army leaders, fearful that peace operations meant structural changes that would divert the service away from warfighting, clung to Cold War models. In the end, Sullivan throttled-back his changes under pressure from within,
delaying necessary force structure modifications that only now ·have resurfaced under the current US Army Chief of Staff (Kretchik,2001 :229; Romjue, 1996).
An RMA may also fail when the force structure and operational concepts do not match national strategy. Between World War I and II, the French army failed to develop an effective tank warfare concept because the French government and military high command saw offensive action as futile and fixated upon the defense. The French missed out on developing the Blitzkrieg RMA; they were on the receiving end of it in 1940 instead (Kier, 1997:38-55;89-108). Moreover, one nation may develop technology for another party without contemplating the client State's national strategy. The client might then acquire technology that it cannot use alone.
These examples serve to demonstrate that successful technology-driven RMA require not only technology but also doctrine and organizational change. Without alterations in all three areas, a military organization can fail to capitalize on an RMA. The cases also show that dominant actors do not necessarily bring about change. Many powerful organizations failed to understand that warfare changes constantly and instead relied more upon contemporary thinking as comfort for the future. The examples also demonstrate that RMA can spring up in nations that did not invent the technology because the inventing nation failed to realize its importance. To be successful, military institutions must be willing to develop a vision of future war. Without vision, military organizations will be incapable of taking advantage of new developments. Vision comes from senior leaders who must be willing to accept new ideas and at times jostle their superiors and peers within an entrenched bureaucracy to promote change. Therefore, institutional processes for experimenting with new technologies and ideas must exist for RMA to take hold.
Bringing About a Successful RMA Through Technology
While the list of criteria for generating a successful RMA through technology can be lengthy, historical analysis suggests that eight of them are very important. First, a military organization requires a fertile set of enabling technologies. While technology alone did not drive every revolution, the majority of them have been sparked by new technology. Thus, an RMA requires a national scientific base where fresh technologies emerge to challenge more mature ones. New and emerging technologies serve as breeding grounds for future developments (Brodie, 1959:176).
A second requirement is to have unmet military challenges, for formidable tasks are the breeding ground of creativity. Without one or more challenges, new technologies are unlikely to combine into devices and devices into the systems that give rise to new operational concepts, doctrine and force structure. Inferior military organizations, particularly those that lost the last war, are usually well supplied with unmet military challenges that can serve as the catalyst for change. This may not be the case for victorious military forces, for victory breeds comfort in what has been accomplished and discounts the ongoing change that occurs around them.
Third, military organizations must focus upon a definite "thing" or short list of "things." For an RMA to occur, technologies must combine into a device or system accompanied by a concept for operational employment. Thus, the more abundant the available technology, the more plausibility for using the technology exists. Focusing the organization upon the right combination of technologies to create a device or system and employ it properly is challenging. Yet, focus is essential for without it an RMA cannot occur.
Fourth, some of the core competencies of the military organization must be challenged. To create an RMA, someone must be bold enough to question the entrenched cultural system, even at great personal career risk. For non-dominant actors, contesting the old order might be easier to do. With non-dominant actors, challenging the core competencies becomes problematic because it may mean rendering something obsolete that contributed toward the organization's current success.
A fifth observation is that a military can develop numerous technologies, devices and systems but without a receptive organizational climate an RMA will not occur. Successful armed forces have an organizational climate that encourages open debate about future war and peacetime operations and how change affects the organization. A healthy organizational climate encourages its members to argue about change, seeks to alter the future while retaining some traditions of the past and welcomes change when it occurs. Historically, however, the majority of military establishments have been loath to do so. The British military historian, Sir Michael Howard, observed that military organizations are deeply conservative and its members often see change as risky (Howard, 1959:3-9). To successfully bring about change, the organization must value a climate that embraces change.
Possibly the most critical criterion is to have support from the top. Two types of top-driven support seem to be the most important. First, senior officers and officials with respected credentials must sponsor new ways of doing things even if it means removing the methods that made them successful. Second,
the promotion system must first recognize talented junior members who practice innovative ways of warfighting and then move them along through promotion and education opportunities. The "old" and "new" orders combine efforts to bring about an RMA.
An active mechanism for experimentation constitutes another requirement. Military organizations must be able to discover, learn, test, and demonstrate. Through experimentation, military organizations discover what can be done with new technology and combinations of new technologies to uncover what works and what does not. Learning is essential for understanding what combinations of devices and systems work best and for devising promising operational concepts. Devices, systems, and operational concepts must then be put to the test to determine which of them is most likely to bring about change. Finally, a military organization must demonstrate that the selected devices, systems, and operational concepts offer the potential to revolutionize military capability when placed under the strains of armed conflict. Demonstrations in the absence of war include training exercises and computer-driven simulations.
A final observation is that a military organization must have some way of responding positively to the results of successful experiments. The organization must institutionalize change through new doctrine, the fielding of new equipment through acquisition, and the modification of force structure. Future-focused military organizations periodically review, rethink, refine, and revise operational doctrine or the RMA will sputter out and fail. Acquiring new devices and systems is risky, especially when promising devices and systems are unproven in battle. Yet, for RMA to succeed, the organization must allow for radical concepts and uncertainty. Without such a path, any number of obstacles can stop the RMA. The organizational force structure must also change to accommodate new units equipped with the new devices and systems that operate under new doctrinal principles. Through changes in doctrine, acquisition and force structure, the ·organization officially sanctions change.
Conclusion
This article has spent a great amount of time exploring technology-based RMA. What can we conclude that would be of use to those who are concerned with such matters? First of all, technology-based RMA occur throughout history and they are going to continue well into the future. A second finding is that the military organizations that recognize and react to them fair better during times of armed conflict than those that fail to do so. Third, military organizations are notoriously conservative; thus promoting new technologies that can lead to revolutionary change are normally viewed as risky with low
payoff. Yet, military organizations l"flUSt develop fertile technologies, focus on unmet challenges and a definitive "thing," challenge core competencies, institutionalize a receptive organizational climate, gain support from the top, develop mechanisms for experimentation, and respond favorably to success if the are to benefit. Without any one of these elements, it is highly likely that the most brilliant of ideas will fail to bring about an AMA and the process will collapse without attainment.
Technology-based AMA still depend upon the human beings that know the inner workings of a military establishment. Yet, it is the rare individual who is willing to challenge the accepted paradigm. Each person must gauge their own capacity for assuming personal risk, a willingness to explore and promote new ideas, and accessing support from those who advocate change. As this essay argued, technology-driven AMA also depend upon personal boldness to shape a military in meeting the complex tasks of the twenty-first century.
OZET
Bu cah~mada "Askeri Sahadaki KoklO Degi~imler" olarak adlandmlan askeri harekat tOrlerindeki degi~imler tart1~1lmaktad1r. Teknolojinin her gecen gun h1zla degi~imi neticesinde hayat bulan bu koklO degi~imler, literatOrde degi~ik ac1lardan ele ahnmaktad1r. Baz1 uzmanlar "askeri sahadaki koklO degi~imleri"; komuta, kontrol, haberle~me, bili~im sitemleri ve istihbaratta (C41) meydana gelen teknik degi~imlerle ac1klamaktad1r. Diger baz1 uzmanlar amlan degi~imlerin ana sebebi olarak yeni harekat konseptlerini ve bilgi harbindeki geli~meleri gosterirken, bir k1s1m uzman da askeri harekat alamm geni~leten ve dO~manm varhg1m ikinci plana iten geli~meleri askeri sahadaki koklO degi~imlerin ana sebebi olarak gormektedir.
"Askeri Sahadaki KoklO Degi~imler'' bir zaman sOreci icerisinde olu~maktad1r. Ancak bu olu~umun kendiliginden meydana geldigini varsaymak hatah olacakt1r. Bu degi~imlerin saglanmas1 icin gerekli olan onko~ullar makalede tart1~1lmakta ve bu degi~imlerin ancak askeri alandaki koklO paradigma degi~iklikleri ile saglanabilecegi vurgulanmaktad1r.
Bu cah~mada, askeri sahadaki koklO degi~imlerin belirleyici unsurunun ''teknoloji" oldugu vurgulanmakla birlikte; kapasitesini harekete gecirerek, yeni dO~Oncelere devamh olarak kap1s1m ac1k tutarak ve makul riskier alarak gelecegin harekat alamm ~ekillendiren "insanm" daima askeri alandaki koklO degi~imlerin esas aktorO ve itici unsuru olarak tarih sahnesindeki vazgecilmez yerini koruyacag1 savunulmaktad1r.
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