Türkiye’s Role and Interests in Central Asia

Türkiye has the potential to become a second-tier emerging power. In spite of its lack of global reach and its lack of economic might, Türkiye is growing more and more important in conflict-torn regions of the globe. Examples of this presence include business connections, official as well as non-governmental backing, security cooperation, and diplomatic attempts to arbitrate between warring parties. Türkiye have a special interest in Central Asia, despite Ankara's waning interest in the area since the early 1990s, because of the region's Turkic-speaking population.

The Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia all saw new republics form when the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991. Turkish ties with Central Asian and Caspian states began a new era with the independence of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. In addition, the major powers of the world were interested in these territories.²²⁶ The United States' worldwide economic and political influence has grown steadily during the 1990s. Consequently, NATO's attention is drawn to Central Asia and the Caucasus, which are known for their vast energy resources, particularly the United States, NATO's most major member. According to several academics, Türkiye has been working since 1991 to create relations with the newly independent Central Asian governments on a historical, cultural, linguistic, and religious level.²²⁷The current Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

225 Ilke Toygur, “A New Way Forward for EU-Türkiye Relations”, Carnegie Europe, 2022, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/01/26/new-way-forward-for-eu-Türkiye-relations-pub-86264, (Accessed April 18, 2022).

226 Muhittin Ataman, Leadership Change: Özal Leadership and Restructuring in Turkish Foreign Policy, Alternatives Journal, And Vol. 1, No. 1 (2002): 127-133.

227 Ertan Efegil, Rationality Question of Türkiye’s Central Asia Policy, Bilgi Journal of Social Sciences, Vol.2, No.19, (2009), pp. 73-80.

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(MFA) and the previous Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) are in accord on foreign policy in this area (MFA). Russia's foreign policy in Central Asia has always been dictated by the aim for a stable, sovereign, and affluent region since 1991, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²²⁸ In light of its historical, linguistic and cultural links to the area, Türkiye has worked hard to enhance its involvement in a wide variety of topics. A firm foundation for expanding bilateral ties has been laid by the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council's work with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as well as the Cooperation Council's work with Tajikistan."

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When Justice and Development Party of Türkiye came into power in 2002, it was clear that the country's role in regional and global affairs was a top priority. As far as foreign policy is concerned, Ankara's attention is mostly drawn to the countries in its close vicinity, particularly those in Central Asia. It is because of Türkiye's strong linkages to the Middle East, the Caucasus and North Africa that Turkish officials consider their country as a "central force,"

a powerful and influential player in the area. Türkiye's 'central' position (or "strategic depth") is seen as suggesting that it can play a leading strategic part in this sometimes volatile terrain when dealing with international challenges.²³⁰

When all of Central Asia's nations declared their independence, Türkiye was the first to acknowledge them. On the basis of this, Ankara ramped up diplomatic relations, proposed potential commercial partnerships, and guaranteed unrestricted money flows in an attempt to boost bilateral monetary cooperation. A Turkish satellite television service and more frequent flights were also made accessible to the region. When the International Development and Cooperation Agency of Türkiye was founded, a large portion of its total foreign assistance was allocated to the newly constituted republics.²³¹

228 Efe Çaman, & Ali Akyurt, “Caucasus and Central Asia in Turkish Foreign Policy: The Time has come for a New Regional Policy”, Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 2-3, (2011), pp. 48-51.

229 Hakan Fidan, Turkish foreign policy towards Central Asia, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies,Vol.12, No.1, (2010):pp. 117-120.

230 Murat Yeşiltaş & Ali Balci, “AK Parti Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası Sözlüğü: Kavramsal Bir Harita, [The AK Party Era Turkish Foreign Policy Dictionary: A Conceptual Map]”, Bilgi Journal of Social Sciences, Vol.2, No.

2, (2011), pp. 13-14.

231 Bulent Aras, Türkiye’s Policy in the Former Soviet South: Assets and Options, Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2000): pp. 36-39.

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The Turkish government's current policy in Central Asia consists of five primary components. In the areas of energy, commerce, and other aspects of the economy/society, fostering bilateral, and multilateral collaboration help diplomatically de-escalate tensions in the area. Regional governments' attempts to grow their countries and states, and maintain good relations with other countries.²³² Mevlut Çavuşoğlu replaced the term "bridge" with "central power," shifting Türkiye's involvement in the region away from Western interestsand toward its own perception of itself as a global power.

Additionally, it is apparent that the Turkish government is planning to participate in conflict and security while simultaneously calling for open politics in order to achieve some of the stated aims above, since some of them are highlighted. "We have adopted a more functional strategy toward these countries," Türkiye's Foreign Minister says, stressing the aid of these countries in building their independence while remaining neutral during conflicts between or among Central Asia's states. When it comes to economic and energy cooperation, Türkiye has grown less ideological in its intervention in Central Asian countries (and Russia) internal affairs, such as those involving conflict. With more centralized regimes, the government is far more aware of its limitations when it comes to facilitating democratic politics.²³³ Despite several instances of security collaboration, Turkish engagement in regional conflict management is still a mystery. The fact that Turkish soldiers and reconstruction teams have been stationed as part of ISAF in Afghanistan means that Turkish diplomats have sought to arbitrate issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as Turkish funding utilized to help rebuild Afghanistan after the war. For Türkiye, Afghanistan and NATO's planned exit from the nation might have a crucial influence in its future ties with the country's northern Central Asian neighbors. The strength of its bilateral relations with important regional countries such as Russia, China, the United States, and the European Union will have a great impact on its position in the area.²³⁴ Central Asia's interstate and intrastate issues are likely to be affected by Türkiye's involvement in conflicts between major powers.

232 Philip Robin, “Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Türkiye's Policy toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 47, No. 4, (1993): 596-604.

233 Zeeshan Fida. “Central Asia’s Place in Türkiye’s Foreign Policy.” Policy Perspectives, Vol.15, No. 1, (2018):

pp.114– 121.

234 Thomas Wheeler, “Türkiye’s role and interests in Central Asia”, SaferWorld, 2013, pp. 2-7.

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Trade, infrastructural, energy, and communication links between Türkiye and Central Asia have been strengthened. FDI from Türkiye in 2010 was more than $4.7 billion, while Turkish contractor projects totaled $50 billion, with more than 2,000 Turkish enterprises operating in the field. A total of $6.5 billion was exchanged between Türkiye and the region in 2010.²³⁵ Central Asian nations are drawn to Türkiye because of its closeness to EU markets.

Middle East and North Africa are seeing an increase in the activity of organizations like the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON).²³⁶

Reports from Türkiye and the Central Asian republics indicate that Turkish concerns about "destabilizing factors such as extremist groups, drugs and weapons trafficking, and terrorist activities" are shared. As a consequence, the government provides financial assistance and military training to these countries in addition to its assistance in enhancing capabilities.

Only since the early 2000s have military exchanges taken place between Türkiye and Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan "to aid in the preparedness of their forces to confront insurgencies.”

237The Special Soldiers of both countries worked together with Turkish forces to train. The NATO Partnerships for Peace Training Center in Ankara, Türkiye, has been training Central Asian military personnel since 1999.²³⁸