Ekonometrik Model Sonuçları

underwent numerous changes and refinements over the years. For present purposes, however, rehearsing a few basic points will suffice.¹⁷

As I shall construe the term here, perceptual givenness is a mode of

15 See Alston (1976); Pollock (1986); and Pryor (2000).

16 Drummond denies that Husserl endorses moderate foundationalism, on the presumed grounds that, for Husserl, any supposedly foundational experience will be “associatively

informed” by previously made judgements, which, Drummond argues, implies that “foundations present themselves in the form of a hermeneutic circle” (1991, 62). I believe this denial to be unfounded for two reasons. First, it flies in the face of the seemingly unequivocal commitment to foundationalism expressed in passages like the above. Second, as Hopp points out,

Drummond’s argument for the denial fails, since the fact that supposedly foundational perceptual experiences may, and perhaps always do, depend on previous judgements for their content does not entail that they also depend on them for their justification (2008a, 200). That said, I believe Drummond is gesturing towards a cogent argument to the effect that, given Husserl’s account of perception, perception cannot, in fact, provide immediate justification, an argument akin to the one I will present in Section 8. Unlike Drummond, however, I regard the conclusion to this argument, not as expressive of, but as contrary to, Husserl’s official view, which, on my construal, is that his account of perception is not only consistent with holding that perception provides immediate justification, but actually serves to clarify the sense in which it does so.

17 After 1906, or thereabouts, Husserl conducted most of his analyses of perception, and intentionality in general, within the framework supposedly established by the so called

“transcendental-phenomenological reduction”—very roughly, an operation whereby one refrains from making use of positings of physical and other worldly objects in order to study the essential structures of those positings. The exact nature of this operation, as well as its motivation and implications, are controversial, however. And since the points I will be making are both insensitive to any particular view of the operation, and articulable without reference to it, for simplicity!I will refrain from any such reference in what follows.

givenness of physical objects, in the sense of spatio-temporal individuals.¹⁸ More specifically, perceptual givenness is the mode of givenness in which physical objects are present when they figure as the intentional objects of “outer perceptual intuitions” (äußere Perzeptionen), or perceptual intuitions for short (cf. XXIII 353).¹⁹ Following Husserl, I shall be focusing on visual perceptual intuition, with the understanding that the points I will be making apply, mutatatis mutandis, to his view of perceptual intuition in the other sense-modalities as well.

Perceptual givenness is an example of “bodily selfgivenness” (leibhafte Selbstgegebenheit), which can be characterized in terms of two contrasting modes of givenness. As selfgivenness it differs from representational modes, modes in which objects are present, not “as themselves”, but only as represented by other objects, like signs or images (III/1 90). And as bodily selfgivenness it differs from so called “presentiating” (vergegenwärtigende) modes, modes in which, although not represented by others objects, objects are not present “in the flesh”, but only “as if” they were present in the flesh, as they are when they are present as, say, remembered or phantasized (III/1 90; XXV 169).

Husserl characterizes bodily selfgivenness as “originary givenness”

(originäre Gegebenheit) on the grounds that it constitutes the most basic mode of givenness of intentional objects, a mode on which all other modes, in one way or another, depend for their possibility: The possibility of objects being bodily selfgiven is necessary for the possibility of objects being given as presentiated, since an object’s givenness as presentiated—its being present “as if” present in the flesh—has the inherent character of being a modification of bodily

selfgivenness (III/1 233). The possibility of objects being bodily selfgiven is also necessary for the possibility of objects being given in representational modes,

18 Husserl draws a distinction between two senses of ‘physical object’, or, rather, between two levels of perceived spatio-temporal individuals: “phantoms” (Phantome) or “sense-things”

(Sinnendinge), by which he means individuals that, in addition to extension and duration, are possessed only of sensuous qualities like colour and texture (IV 37); and “substances”

(Substanzen) or “material things” (materielle Dinge), by which he means individuals possessed of causal properties like elasticity and penetrability (IV 44). Of these two, the former is taken to be the more fundamental, in the sense, roughly, that substances attain to givenness only on the basis of the givenness of systematically co-varying phantoms (cf. IV 41 ff.). Although I do not make this explicit, the points to follow apply most immediately to the givenness of phantoms.

However, due to the supposed relationship between phantoms and substances just indicated, mutatis mutandis the points also apply to the givenness of substances.

19 I translate Perzeption as ‘perceptual intuition’ to distinguish it from what Husserl calls Wahrnehmung, which I translate as ‘perception’. I return to this distinction in Section 4.

since the representing objects involved must be either bodily selfgiven or presentiated (cf. III/1 234).

Perceptual givenness, then, is the bodily selfgivenness of physical objects, the mode of givenness in which they are present as themselves, in the flesh. And it is therefore also the originary mode of givenness of physical objects, they mode in which they are most basically present as the kind of objects they are (III/1 11).

As an act whose object is originarily given, perceptual intuition is an

“originary giving intuition” (originär gebende Anschauung), or originary intuition for short (III/1 51). Originary intuitions are either “adequate” or

“inadequate” (cf. III/1 319 ff.). An adequate intuition is one whose intentional object is adequately given, where an object is so given just in case it is actually given with respect to all the features attributed to it. Husserl’s prime example of such intuition is “immanent perception” (immanente Wahrnehmung): the direct reflective experience that, he holds, I may have of my own current experiences (II 49 f.). By contrast, an inadequate intuition is one whose

intentional object is inadequately given, where to be thus given is to be actually given with respect only to a more or less restricted range of attributed features.

An example of such intuition is, precisely, perceptual intuition (M VII 115; XI 18 f.): As perceptually given, any physical object is intentionally present as a three-dimensional object having a number of different features pertaining to all of its different sides. But of these features only some will be actually given, in the sense of being sensuously present—namely, those pertaining to the currently exposed side of the object.²⁰

The features pertaining to the currently non-exposed sides of perceptually given objects are present as features that would become sensuously given, were future experience to take one of a range of specifiable possible courses (cf. I 82).

And so the awareness of non-sensuously given features involved in perceiving a physical object takes the form of anticipations of possible future perceptual

20 According to Husserl’s standard account, the sensuous presence of the sensuously present features of perceptually given objects is due to certain experiential contents called

“sensations” (Empfindungen) being “apprehended” (aufgefasst) as experiences of the features concerned (XVI 46 f.). This account has been heavily criticized by other phenomenologists. (See for instance Gurwitsch 1978, and Drummond 1990). However, since nothing in what follows hinges on the correctness of this or any other particular account of the determinants of sensuous presence, I will disregard both it and the debate over it.

intuitions or appearances of the object (cf. XXXII 135; EU 28; XIX/2 590).

These anticipations, for their part, are specifiable in terms of conditionals in which the appearances figure as consequents and possible subjectively

experienced bodily movements, or “kinaestheses”, on the part of the perceiving subject figure as antecedents (cf. XIII 84 f.; VI 164; XI 13 ff.).²¹

As the above already indicates, perceptual intuition is essentially

inadequate (cf. III/1 331; I 96). An inessentially inadequate intuition would be one involving only anticipations all of which could, in principle, be confirmed or

“fulfilled” (erfüllt) by the actual givenness of the features anticipated, in a finite course of experience. By contrast, an essentially inadequate intuition is one not all of whose constituent anticipations can, for essential reasons, be thus fulfilled.

In other words, essentially inadequate intuitions are inadequate intuitions that will exhibit a surplus of unfulfilled anticipations at any point of their duration.

And the reason why perceptual intuition fits this description is, most fundamentally, that physical objects are spatial (XVI 135 ff.). For, since any physical object must be perceived from a certain perspective—the one

determined by the location of the perceiving subject’s body—this implies that any perceived physical object will be present as having features that are only anticipatorily given: namely, those belonging to the sides of the object that are

“hidden” from the subject’s current perspective (cf. XI 18 f.).

According to Husserl, then, any perceptual intuition will involve two kinds of intentional directedness or “intentions” (Intentionen): sensuously informed or “filled” intentions, by virtue of which features pertaining to the currently exposed sides of the thing perceived are sensuously given; and “empty”

anticipations, by virtue of which features pertaining to the currently hidden sides of the thing are non-sensuously and anticipatorily given (XXXII 135; XI 5;

EU 136 f.). And any instance of perceptual givenness will, consequently, involve two different modes of givenness: the sensuous givenness of the former kind of features and the non-sensuous and anticipatory givenness of the latter. Any physical object that is sensuously given with regard to a range of its attributed features will, in other words, be thus given with what Husserl calls an “horizon”

21 For a detailed account of Husserl’s view of the role of bodily movement in perception, see Drummond (1979-80).

(Horizont) of merely anticipatorily given features (IX 181).²²

This means that perceptual givenness is what could be called a relative as opposed to an absolute form of originary givenness, where an instance of

originary givenness is absolute just in case it does not depend on the correctness of anticipations of further experiences of the object given, and relative if it does so depend. Adequate givenness is absolute in this sense: Being actually given with respect to all of their features, adequately given objects do not depend for their originary givenness on the course of further intentional experiences directed at them (cf. III/2 598). But perceptual givenness, and inadequate givenness in general, is not: Being actually given only with respect to a more or less restricted range of its features, perceptually given objects do depend for their originary givenness on the course of further experience, in the sense of being originarily given only if further perceptions will serve to fulfil, rather than disappoint, the anticipations by virtue of which its anticipatorily given features are present (XXXVI 82; cf. XXXII 138).²³

For Husserl, the relativity of perceptual givenness means that any instance of perceptual givenness will be “presumptive” (präsumptiv), in the sense of involving a presumption on the part of the perceiving subject to the effect that the further course of experience will be “harmonious” (einstimmig)—that is, roughly, be such that the anticipations involved will be fulfilled (III/2 598).

And, since any perceptual intuition will involve a surplus of relevant unfulfilled anticipations at any point of its duration, what is presumed is, ultimately, that the process of perception would remain harmonious even if, per impossible, it were to run off into infinity.²⁴ By virtue of this presumption, then, the adequate

22 On the current use of the term, horizons are characteristics of intentional objects, or, rather, of ways in which they may be given. For a sampling of other uses of the term, both in Husserl and among commentators, see Hopp (2011, 54 ff.).

23 Strictly speaking, the perceptual givenness of an object requires, not that all the anticipations involved be fulfilled, but only that a relevant set of them be fulfilled. For the disappointment of a set of anticipations would not necessarily mean that the object was not perceptually given. It could simply mean that the way in which it was previously perceptually given conflict, to a greater or lesser degree, with the way in which it is presently given, in the sense that some of its previously anticipatorily given features conflict with some of its presently actually given features. Which anticipations will be included in the relevant set—the set of anticipations such that, if they were to be disappointed, the object would not be perceptually given—will depend both on the type of the object concerned and the circumstances of the subject’s perceiving it, including her behaviour in relation to it. This point does not matter in what follows, and for the sake of simplicity, I will disregard it.

24 More precisely, it is a presumption both that the perceptual process would remain infinitely harmonious no matter which of the many mutually exclusive courses of perception

givenness of any perceptually given object is prefigured in its perceptual givenness in the form of an “Idea in the Kantian sense” (Idee im Kantischen Sinn)—a regulative ideal that any instance of perceptual givenness occurring in the course of a harmonious progress of perception approximates to a greater or lesser degree (III/1 330 ff.; XI 21).²⁵

I have delineated Husserl’s notion of perceptual givenness. Let us now return to what I have proposed to call his perceptual intuitionism, the view that the perceptual givenness of an object constitutes a justificatory ground for positing it.