in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Fine Arts in Visual Arts & Visual Communication Design

We estab- lish that, in our setting the complete and efficient network can be obtained in subgame perfect equilibrium with various dynamic network formation games: (1) We show that

We observe that φ(u {2} ) > p 1 , and agent 1 does not join the coalition whenever the social welfare function is population monotonic and the bargaining rule is preference

In this research based on a case study of the relationship of migrant domestic workers from the Former Soviet Union countries to their employers in Ġstanbul, I try to

Moreover, it should be emphasized that the subgame perfect equi- librium outcome of two player alternating offers bargaining games (with discounting) converges to the unique

In terms of individual investment levels (i) under EA, compared to the simultaneous-move game, both agents invest more under the sequential setting, independent of the identity of

In this study, I consider optimal redistributive income taxation under a Mirrleesian framework while adding utility interdependence over labor choice and analyze whether the optimal

It proposes that the member states which have implemented more multicultural policies (the UK and the Netherlands) are staunch supporters of Turkey at the governmental level

For a dynamic situation with two agents and two periods, Turhan (2009) has showed that given that the discount factors of the agents are not equal to each other and at each period