by LIRIKA AGUSHOLLI Submitted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Sabancı University July 2019

Since every school has same priority order over students and each student has same preferences over schools, the matchings under deferred acceptance algorithm with minority reserves

My second research question is “do Turkish voters cast their votes according to their issue ownership perception of certain political parties with regard to issues the voters

Commission Staff Working Document, Turkey 2006 Progress Report, Brussels Commission Staff Working Document, Turkey 2013 Progress Report, Brussels Commission Staff Working

Visual results of proposed method (with affine refinement), the bundle adjustment and Gracias’ method for Czyste, Munich Quarry and Savona Highway datasets are given in Figure 7,

At the right hand side of the equation, the inputs, schooling rate at primary level education, high school completion rates, tertiary level education completion rates, teacher-

We estab- lish that, in our setting the complete and efficient network can be obtained in subgame perfect equilibrium with various dynamic network formation games: (1) We show that

We observe that φ(u {2} ) > p 1 , and agent 1 does not join the coalition whenever the social welfare function is population monotonic and the bargaining rule is preference

Moreover, it should be emphasized that the subgame perfect equi- librium outcome of two player alternating offers bargaining games (with discounting) converges to the unique