Francis Bacon on the question of knowledge

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FRANCIS BACON ON THE QUESTION OF KNOWLEDGE

ILGIN AKSOY

109679007

İSTANBUL BİLGİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ

SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ

FELSEFE VE TOPLUMSAL DÜŞÜNCE YÜKSEK LİSANS

PROGRAMI

FERDA KESKİN

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iii Thesis Abstract

Ilgın Aksoy, “Francis Bacon on the Question of Knowledge”

Francis Bacon stands out as the precursor of modern philosophy and modern science. His conception of knowledge, his ideas concerning science,

experimentation, induction, methodology, Man’s dominion over Nature have become idiosyncrasies of what has been known as modern philosophy. This novel conception of knowledge has brought out an important shift from the traditional conception of knowledge developed by ancient and medieval philosophers on one hand, and it led to new epistemological problems in modern philosophy on the other.

This shift had huge practical and theoretical consequences. In this thesis we will try to assess the meaning of this shift and its consequences in the light of Horkheimer’s concepts of ‘Objective Reason’ and ‘Subjective Reason’. In the meantime, we will refer to Plato and Aristotle to illuminate Bacon’s disengagement from the philosophical tradition on one hand; and refer to Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Quine to clarify the problems promulgated from the Baconian conception of knowledge.

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iv Tez Özeti

Ilgın Aksoy, “Francis Bacon ve Bilgi Sorunu”

Francis Bacon modern felsefe ve modern bilimin habercisi olarak göze çarpar. Bacon'ın bilgi tasarımı; bilim, deneycilik, tümevarım, metodoloji, İnsan'ın Doğa üstündeki tahakkümü hakkındaki fikirleri modern felsefenin hususi nitelikleri olagelmiştir. Bu yeni bilgi tasarımı, bir yandan antik ve orta çağ felsefecileri tarafından geliştirilmiş bilgi tasarımından ciddi bir kopuşa işaret ederken, bir yandan da yeni epistemoloik sorunlara yol açacaktır.

Bu kopuşun muazzam teorik ve pratik sonuçları olmuştur. Bu tezde Horkheimer'ın 'Objektif Aklı' ve 'Subjektif Akıl' kavramlarının ışığında bu kopuşun ve onun sonuçlarının anlamlarını tahlil etmeye çalışacağız. Bu kopuşu tarihsel olarak aydınlatmak için felsefe geleneğiyle olan ilişkisini incelemek üzere Platon ve Aristoteles'e başvuruken, Bacon'cı bilgi tasarımından neşreden sorunları ortaya çıkarmak için Locke, Berkeley, Hume ve Quine'a başvuracağız.

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v To the freedom of Gaia..

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I. Introduction

Francis Bacon represents an important moment in history. This is a moment of an important shift in the conception and function of knowledge. In order to understand this shift we should compare the Baconian conception of knowledge with the philosophical and scientific traditions before and after him; and in order to accomplish this task we must first explicate Bacon's conception of knowledge. In this thesis, we will study Bacon's conception of knowledge and the understanding of reason and science immanent to this conception as portrayed in the Novum Organum (2002).

For Bacon, knowledge has two independent elements, which are experience and reason. Experience in its simplest form consists of sense-data. Sense-data are private, subjective, contingent and contradictory. However, if augmented by reason and obtained through systematic experimentation it becomes public and objective. Reason, on the other hand, is a mental faculty having formal principles of its own. These principles constitute deduction on the one hand and induction on the other. There is general consent over the rules of deduction as collected under syllogistic logic. However, there is no such consensus over induction. One of the most important aims of the Novum Organum is to construct such rules, earn experience an empirical certainty and establish its objectivity, publicity and necessity.

In this framework, Nature stands as an entity outside experience and reason. It is the condition of possibility of objectivity, publicity and necessity in experience and can only be reached by the coordinated labour of experience and reason. That is to say, by collecting the content of knowledge via

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exhaustive experimentation systematized by reason and inferring theories through regulated induction, the knowledge of Nature can be attained. Through this labour, the mechanism of Nature can be unravelled.

When evaluated from the point of view of this conception of knowledge, the scientific or philosophical traditions before Bacon have not even

approximated knowledge. Proto-scientific disciplines lack and have not ever thought of constructing such a methodology as Bacon does. Instead, they proceeded through practice, and, therefore, Bacon characterised the progresses he observed in them as “chance”.

Philosophical tradition, on the other hand, has operated with an

understanding of reason which was in sharp contrast to Bacon's. According to this understanding, reason is not a private, mental faculty but a structure inherent in Nature. Theologico-philosophical doctrines tried to achieve this structure through God's word, while secular philosophical doctrines tried to achieve it through subjective reason.

These philosophical doctrines are regarded as fabrications of reason by Bacon. When left to itself, when induction is not limited by rules, reason may produce many contradictory ideas. The sciences which promulgate from these doctrines are not verified by empirical data, but rather assimilate empirical data according to their own. In this sense, philosophical tradition is speculative and dogmatic according to Bacon.

In contrast to these traditions, Baconian science prescribes a methodology for experimentation and induction: Elaborate experiments should be devised and data, which will supply the content of knowledge, should be collected

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from them, and a mechanism of regulated induction, which supply the form of knowledge acquisition, should be applied to these data. Eventually, this knowledge will provide Man's rightful dominion over Nature.

Similar conceptions of knowledge have been conceived since Bacon. Descartes' Rules for the Direction of the Mind (1954) is an important instance of the Baconian ideal of prescribing the limits of reason. However, when examined closely that ideal of devising what can be called

“empirically verified knowledge” turns out to be not-so-reliable.

John Locke, in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1999), starts with a similar premise as Bacon, namely, on the premise that all knowledge must be grounded on two valid faculties of the mind: sensation and reflection. However, if all our knowledge is grounded on these two mental and subjective faculties, then how can we say that objective

knowledge can be acquired by the mind? This is a problem which cannot be solved either by Bacon or Locke, and it practically means that no competing theory can be judged with respect empirical data.

Furthermore, Hume in his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1988) later observes that if we confine our knowledge to facts and

inferences made from these facts, then causality, induction and substance, in other words the most fundamental tools of science become untenable. This is because we can derive those tools neither from facts nor through

reflecting upon our collection facts. This has become another problem which cannot be solved by modern philosophy.

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becomes an inconsistent system. However, this is not to say that it is totally meaningless. By conceiving knowledge as inductive inference from

experimental data about mechanical Nature, Bacon transforms knowledge to a shortcut of present practices in society. Of course, that society turns into a technocracy of scientists and engineers in time. With the claim that science is politically neutral, supported by the instrumental understanding of reason, the question of scientific practice is removed from the question of

knowledge. Scientific endeavour is left at the hands of prevalent power structures and the scientists and engineers operating within those structures. Lives of people and the future of Nature are concealed behind those

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In this chapter we will study Bacon's proclaimed opus for reconstructing science and knowledge from bottom to top, namely The Great Instauration. The work is never finished, but it nevertheless gives important insight into the Baconian design of science and its future inspirations.

The book was planned to consist of six parts: 1. The Divisions of the Sciences.

2. The New Organon; or Directions concerning the Interpretation of Nature. 3. The Phenomena of the Universe; or a Natural and Experimental History for the foundation of Philosophy.

4. The Ladder of Intellect.

5. The Forerunners; or Anticipations of the New Philosophy. 6. The New Philosophy; or Active Science.

In the Novum Organum, which constitutes the second part of “The Great Instauration”, Bacon tries to elucidate how science and philosophy current in his time are misleading for a genuine understanding of Nature, which he calls "Interpretation of Nature". To illuminate this "Novum Organum" or the new science, Bacon will first criticize the tradition of science and

philosophy prior to his work, which advances with rush “Anticipations of Nature”, and then he will explain how instead Novum Organum is possible.

During the course of this thesis, we will see how Bacon disengages from the tradition before him to re-engage with a new set of assumptions along with

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the problems that arise from them. We will also see that a certain ideology, which reveals itself even in the title “The Kingdom of Man”, is implied by and underlies these assumptions. The expression, “The Kingdom of Man”, implies the underlying agenda of what can be called modern philosophy: to subordinate Nature to Man's will through science. The claim for truth and genuine knowledge always finds its justification and its methodology with respect to this agenda.

We will investigate Bacon's Novum Organum in three episodes: firstly, on how Bacon distinguishes it from philosophical and scientific tradition by unravelling his criticisms against them; secondly, on its epistemological (on how genuine knowledge is possible) assumptions and thirdly on its

methodological (on how can genuine knowledge be acquired) assumptions.

II.I. Criticisms of Philosophy and Science

Bacon's design of a new science always holds hands with a critique of philosophy and of the old sciences. However, this critique is never directed to their contents but to their form. That is to say, Bacon does not criticize or reject any philosophy or science on the ground that they conceive the world falsely. He does think that they conceive the world falsely, but Bacon's fundamental criticism is on the methods they use in order to constitute these conceptions of the world. If the right methods are used, necessarily the right consequences will come. However, old methods should be fought first and, in this chapter, we are going to present Bacon's methodological rejection of

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philosophy and science. This rejection includes Plato and Aristotle on the one hand and early modern scientists such as Paracelsus and Telesio on the other.1

II.I.I. Errors of Philosophy and Science

Bacon starts his criticisms with an analysis of the errors committed while constructing false theories. At the basis of these errors stands syllogism. Bacon observes that philosophy and sciences work with syllogism. However syllogism, in its nature, is merely formal. Its content comes from already established axioms, by which Bacon means the basic assumptions of a body of knowledge conceived as a kind of pyramid where axioms stand at the top. These axioms are composed of many notions and these axioms and notions are formed through certain prejudices, or idola in Bacon's terms.

Primarily, Bacon claims that syllogism is inadequate:

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That this criticism was not unique to Bacon and was idiosyncratic to his era can be seen in the writings of Johannes Kepler:

[....] there is a sect of philosophers, who (to quote the judgment of Aristotle, unmerited however, about the doctrine of the Pythagoreans lately revived by Copernicus) do not start their ratiocinations with sense-perception or accommodate the causes of the things to experience: but who immediately and as if inspired (by some kind of enthusiasm) conceive and develop in their heads a certain opinion about the constitution of the world; once they have embraced it, they stick to it; and they drag in by the hair [things] which occur and are experienced every day in order to accommodate them to their axioms. These people want this new star and all others of its kind to descend little by little from the depths of nature, which, they assert, extend to an infinite altitude, until according to the laws of optics it becomes very large and attracts the eyes of men; then it goes back to an infinite altitude and every day [becomes] so much smaller as it moves higher.

Those who hold this opinion consider that the nature of the skies conforms to the law of the circle; therefore the descent is bound to engender the opposite ascent, as is the case with wheels.

But they can easily be refuted; they indulge indeed in their vision, born within them, with eyes closed, and their ideas and opinions are not received by them [from valid experience] but produced by themselves. (as cited in Koyré, 1957, p. 59)

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As the sciences in their present state are useless for the discovery of works, so logic in its present state is useless for the discovery of sciences. (Bacon, 2002, p.35)

The problem with syllogism, according to Bacon, is that it merely supplies a form to make valid inferences. But since the basic axioms (that are the premature assumptions about nature, regulated to a certain extent by the notions given in language) in sciences are problematic and doubtful, the middle axioms derived from them using syllogism will be so too. Therefore if one works with syllogism, one may only derive consequences consistent with one's basic axioms, but one cannot override them and reach truth:

The syllogism is not applied to the principles of the sciences, and is applied in vain to the middle axioms, since it is by no means equal to the subtlety of nature. It therefore compels assent without reference to things. (Bacon, 2002, p. 35)

The basic principles of sciences cannot be founded by syllogism either, for syllogism cannot give the content of the axioms:

The syllogism is not applied to the principles of the sciences, and is applied in vain to the middle axioms, since it is by no means equal to the subtlety of nature. It therefore compels assent without reference to things. (Bacon, 2002, p. 35)

And the basic principles of sciences are wrong, for they are derived from defectively formed notions through speculation or an alleged intuition about the world:

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words are counters for notions. Hence if the notions themselves (this is the basis of matter) are confused and abstracted from things without care, there is nothing sound in what is built on them. The only hope is true induction.

There is nothing sound in the notions logic and physics: neither substance, nor

quality, nor action and passion, nor being itself are good notions; much less heavy, light, dense, rare, wet, dry, generation, corruption, attraction, repulsion, element, matter, form and so on; all fanciful and ill defined. (Bacon, 2002, p.35)

The reason for these defectively formed notions are, according to Bacon, based on four kinds of prejudices or idola that condition human understanding:

The illusions are false notions which have got a hold on men's intellects in the past and are now profoundly rooted in them, not only block their minds so that it is difficult for truth to gain access, but even when access has been granted and allowed, they will once again, in the very renewal of the sciences, offer resistance and do mischief unless men are forewarned and arm themselves against them as much as possible.

There are four kinds of illusions which block men's minds. For instructions sake, we have given them the following names: the first kind are called idols of

the tribe; the second idols of the cave; the third idols of the marketplace; the

fourth idols of the theatre. (Bacon, 2002, p. 40)

The “idols of the tribe” refers to conditions immanent in human nature:

The idols of the tribe are founded in human nature itself and in the very tribe or

race of mankind. (Bacon, 2002, p. 41)

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man which distort reality for a genuine understanding of Nature.

By sensualism is meant the reliance on sense data as a tool for acquiring knowledge. Bacon will criticize this reliance on the ground that genuine knowledge cannot be derived from senses, since the human faculty of sensation is a mis-representation of reality; it is not a blank sheet which passively receives rays from the world, but is like an 'uneven mirror' which distorts them:

The assertion that the human senses are the measure of things is false; to the contrary, all perceptions, both of sense and mind, are relative to man, not to the universe. The human understanding is like an uneven mirror receiving rays from things and merging its own nature with the nature of things, which thus distorts and corrupts it. (Bacon, 2002, p. 41)

Dogmatism is a strict ontological commitment to a certain idea. The peculiarity of a dogma is marked by its un-falsifiability and its power of generality. What we mean is that a dogma can never be falsified, because whenever any theory is tested, it is tested along with other theories, which can be called auxiliary theories. And whenever the theory is falsified the whole set of auxiliary theories along with the main theory is falsified. Thus, by making certain modifications on the set of auxiliary theories, one can save the main theory. This attitude towards dogma is also supported by the generality it possesses. The solidity of a theory is promoted by the cases it explains. So if a theory explains a large number of cases and a large number of other theories can be reduced to it, then it seems to be a pretty strong theory. But there is no logical necessity as to which cases can a theory be

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explanatorily related just as there is no logical necessity as to which theories are to be modified when the set is falsified.

Bacon observes that such is the case with the dogmatic slumber in philosophy and sciences in his age:

Once a man’s understanding has settled on something (either because it is an accepted belief or because it pleases him), it draws everything else also to support and agree with it. And if it encounters a larger number of more powerful countervailing examples, it either fails to notice them, or disregards them, or makes fine distinctions to dismiss and reject them, and all this with much dangerous prejudice, to preserve the authority of its first conceptions. So when someone was shown a votive tablet in a temple dedicated, in fulfilment of a vow, by some men who had escaped the danger of shipwreck, and was pressed to say whether he would now recognise the divinity of the gods, he made a good reply when he retorted: ‘Where are the offerings of those who made vows and perished?’ The same method is found perhaps in every superstition, like astrology, dreams, omens, divine judgements and so on: people who take pleasure in such vanities notice the results when they are fulfilled, but ignore and overlook them when they fail, though they do fail more often than not. This failing finds its way into the sciences and philosophies in a much more subtle way, in that once something has been settled, it infects everything else (even things that are much more certain and powerful), and brings them under its control. And even apart from the pleasure and vanity we mentioned, it is an innate and constant mistake in the human understanding to be much more moved and excited by affirmatives than by negatives, when rightly and properly it should make itself equally open to both; and in fact, to the contrary, in the formation of any true axiom, there is superior force in a negative instance.

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(Bacon, 2002, p. 43)

Speculation is the human endeavour to revealing reality through intellect. Bacon observes that the tendency of man to transgress the limits of experience estranges him from Nature:

The human understanding from its own peculiar nature willingly supposes a greater order and regularity in things than it finds, and though there are many things in nature which are unique and full of disparities, it invents parallels and correspondences and non-existent connections. Hence those false notions that in the heavens all things move in perfect circles and the total rejection of spiral lines and dragons (except in name). Hence the element of fire and its orbit have been introduced to make a quaternion with the other three elements, which are accessible to the senses. Also a ratio of ten to one is arbitrarily imposed on the elements (as they call them), which is the ratio of their respective rarities; and other such nonsense. This vanity prevails not only in dogmas but also in simple notions. (Bacon, 2002, p. 42)

The “idols of the cave” (an obvious allusion to Plato's allegory of the cave) refers to the problems caused by individual peculiarities. Every individual has a mind of its own, and in its mind distorts reality to a certain extent:

The idols of the cave are the illusions of the individual man. For (apart from the

aberrations of human nature in general) each man has a kind of individual cave or cavern which fragments and distorts the light of nature. This may happen either because of the unique and particular nature of each man; or because of his upbringing and the company he keeps; or because of his reading of books and the authority of those whom he respects and admires; or because of the different impressions things make on different minds, preoccupied and prejudiced

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perhaps, or calm and detached, and so on. The evident consequence is that the human spirit (in its different dispositions in different men) is variable thing, quite irregular, almost haphazard. Heraclitus well said that men seek knowledge in lesser, private worlds, not in the great or common world. (Bacon, 2002, p. 41)

The “idols of the marketplace” refers to the inadequacy of language in representing Nature. It is a critique of ordinary language. Bacon observes that the inadequacy in ordinary language is caused by poorly formed notions:

The illusions which are imposed on the understanding by words are of two kinds. They are either names of things that do not exist (for as there are things that lack names because they have not been observed, so there are also names that lack things because they have been imaginatively assumed), or they are the names of things which exist but are confused and badly defined, being abstracted from things rashly and unevenly. Of the former sort are fortune, the first mover, the orbs of the planets, the element of fire and fictions of that kind, which owe their origin to false and groundless theories. Idols of this kind are easily got rid of; they can be eradicated by constantly rejecting and outdating the theories.

But the other kind of idol is complex and deep-seated, being caused by poor and unskilful abstraction. For example, let us take a word (‘wet’ if you like) and see how the things signified by this word go together; it will be found that the word ‘wet’ is simply an undiscriminating token for different actions which have no constancy or common denominator. For it signifies both what is easily poured around another object; and what is without its own boundaries and unstable; and what easily gives way all round; and what easily divides and disperses; and

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what easily combines and comes together; and what easily flows and is set in motion; and what easily adheres to another body and makes it wet; and what is easily reduced to a liquid, or liquefies, from a previous solid state. Hence when it comes to predicating and applying this word, if you take it one way, a flame is wet; if in another, air is not wet; if in another, a speck of dust is wet; if in another, glass is wet; it is easily seen that this notion has been rashly abstracted from water and common and ordinary liquids only, without any proper verification. (Bacon, 2002, p.48-49)

Instead Bacon suggests "a method and manner for forming notions and axioms" (Bacon, 2002, p. 48). This attitude is similar to the endeavours of the twentieth century logical positivists of constructing a "formal language". Both Bacon and logical positivists tried to construct a language from bottom up, by fixing every term (whether a word or a proposition) to sense-data. The “idols of the theatre” addresses philosophy. Bacon compares philosophy to theatre plays: as plays are fictions that resemble real life, but in a more eloquent and contemplated manner, so does philosophy resemble the world. Bacon divides philosophy into three types, which are sophistic, empirical and superstitious. But the basic problem with the three of them is that they all jump to conclusions without adequate empirical evidence:

In general, for the content of philosophy, either much is made of little or little is made of much, so that in both cases philosophy is built upon an excessively narrow basis of experience and natural history, and bases its statements on fewer instances than is proper. Philosophers of the rational type are diverted from experience by the variety of common phenomena, which have not been certainly understood or carefully examined and considered; they depend for the

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rest on reflection and intellectual exercise.

There are also philosophers of another type who have laboured carefully and faithfully over a few experiments, and have had the temerity to tease out their philosophies from them and build them up; the rest they twist to fit that pattern in wonderful ways.

There is also a third type, who from faith and respect mingle theology and traditions; some of them have been unfortunately misled by vanity to try to derive sciences from Spirits and Genii. And so the root of errors and false philosophy is of three kinds: Sophistic, Empirical and Superstitious. (Bacon, 2002, p. 50)

For the first of these types, namely the Sophistic, Bacon gives Aristotle as the most obvious example. He claims that Aristotle postulates his axioms first and then adapts experimental results to his axioms arbitrarily, and he also adds that these axioms are not for understanding reality as it is but for explaining phenomena in discourse:

The most obvious example of the first type is Aristotle, who spoils natural philosophy with his dialectic. [...] He was always more concerned with how one might explain oneself in replying, and to giving some positive response in words, than of the internal truth of things; and this shows up best if we compare his philosophy with other philosophies in repute among the Greeks. [...] Aristotle’s physics too often sound like mere terms of dialectic, which he rehashed under a more solemn name in his metaphysics, claiming to be more of a realist, not a nominalist. And no one should be impressed because in his books On Animals and in his Problems and other treatises there is often discussion of experiments. He had in fact made up his mind beforehand, and did not properly

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consult experience as the basis of his decisions and axioms; after making his decisions arbitrarily, he parades experience around, distorted to suit his opinions, a captive. (Bacon, 2002, p. 51-52)

Bacon's account of Aristotle indicates the rupture Horkheimer presents explicitly. For Aristotle, philosophy, empirical sciences and ethics had a common ground; namely metaphysics. According to Aristotle, metaphysics as the first philosophy could be established through a certain intuition about the world. However Bacon excludes this type of knowledge (i.e. a knowledge that can be reached by a reason immanent to the objective world) from the realm of knowledge.

Bacon's critique of empirical philosophy is interesting. Almost foreseeing Hume's argument on the impossibility of validation of inductive arguments, he claims that since it is not possible to reach any conclusions directly from experiment, empirical philosophy is dangerous. Hence he will regard empirical conclusions as fallacious:

The empirical brand of philosophy generates more deformed and freakish dogmas than the sophistic or rational kind, because it is not founded on the light of common notions (which though weak and superficial, is somehow universal and relevant to many things) but on the narrow and unilluminating basis of a handful of experiments. Such a philosophy seems probable and almost certain to those who are engaged every day in experiments of this kind and have corrupted their imagination with them; to others it seems unbelievable and empty. There is a notable example of this among the chemists and their dogmas; otherwise it scarcely exists at this time, except perhaps in the philosophy of Gilbert. However, we should not fail to give a warning about such philosophies.

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We already conceive and foresee that, if ever men take heed of our advice and seriously devote themselves to experience (having said goodbye to the sophistic doctrines), then this philosophy will at last be genuinely dangerous, because of the mind’s premature and precipitate haste, and its leaping or flying to general statements and the principles of things; even now we should be facing this problem. (Bacon, 2002, p. 52)

Finally, in superstitious philosophy, Bacon observes that by canonizing the defectively formed notions, philosophies put them beyond any analysis or objective assessment of their value with respect to Nature:

This kind of evil also occurs in parts of other philosophies by the introduction of abstract forms and final causes and first causes, and by frequent omission of intermediate causes and so on. We must give the strongest warning here. For the worst thing is the apotheosis of error; respect for foolish notions has to be regarded as a disease of the intellect. (Bacon, 2002, p. 53)

The final concept, which deceives Man's understanding of Nature, is the concept of final cause. Bacon assesses the idea of a final cause to be alien to Nature itself and that it has been falsely derived from human nature. It has no use in the effective understanding and manipulation of the world, so it must be excluded from the realm of knowledge.

It can be seen that in the modern era the idea of a final cause will be totally excluded from natural philosophy and science. Bacon shows this inclination with the claim that attributing final causes is only peculiar to human nature and extending this attribute to the Nature is an error:

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of the universe, and from this origin have wonderfully corrupted philosophy. It is as much a mark of an inept and superficial thinker to look for a cause in the most universal cases as not to feel the need of a cause in subordinate and derivative cases. (Bacon, 2002, p.44)

In another passage Bacon holds that final causes can explain nothing except human behaviour:

[...] in fact [final cause] actually distorts the sciences except in the case of human actions. (Bacon, 2002, p. 102)

II.I.II. Erroneous Philosophical and Scientific Traditions

We have noted that Bacon's criticisms are aimed at ancient as well as early modern philosophical and scientific traditions. All these criticisms arise from the analyses and assessments of the concepts used in those traditions. The first of these criticisms is directed at Aristotelian philosophy where a kind of axiomatic system can be seen. In this structure there are first principles at the ground of the system and all propositions concerning Nature are deduced -by means of syllogism- from these principles. First principles, on the other hand, are reached by means of an insight immanent to Nature. This capability is contained in human reason and can be enhanced to the point of understanding the objective reason in Nature since it is a part of it.

Bacon rejects the possibility of such a capability. According to him, reason merely consists of a formal capacity, and in the Aristotelian schema, it

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means that only syllogism is possible within humane intellectual

capabilities, in which case no possible intellectual capability may reach first principles. Rather, it may merely deduce propositions from them. Bacon presents Aristotle as the prototype of rationalist philosophers in this sense:

Philosophers of the rational type are diverted from experience by the variety of common phenomena, which have not been certainly understood or carefully examined and considered; they depend for the rest on reflection and intellectual exercise. (Bacon, 2002, p. 51)

Aristotle proposed specific axioms for various scientific disciplines;

however his thought was lacking in that it did not propose a master principle for the whole body of science. This lack is also effective in the

contemporary science according to Bacon. This master principle in question here is what can be called methodology. Although sciences had come to make a certain leap as Bacon admits, this leap seems to be inadequate for him. Because sciences do not come from systematized investigation, but from chance and common experience:

[...] the results which have been discovered already are due more to chance and experience than to sciences; for the sciences we now have are no more than elegant arrangements of things previously discovered, not methods of discovery or pointers to new results. (Bacon, 2002, p. 34)

Bacon extends this criticism to alchemy, magic and astrology as well as to his contemporary scientists such as Gilbert, Paracelsus and Telesio:

Mechanic, mathematician, physician, alchemist and magician do meddle with nature (for results); but all, as things are, to little effect and with slender

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success. (Bacon, 2002, p. 34)

This second type of approach to knowledge is what Bacon calls empirical philosophy. While rationalist philosophy is explicated by an analogy to spiders, the empirical scientists are explicated by an analogy to ants.

Rationalists, like spiders, spin webs and then make their sense-data comport to these webs; while empirical scientists merely collect sense-data randomly. However, the right method is that of the bee. The bee collects its material selectively and then makes its own product out of these materials:

Those who have treated of the sciences have been either empiricists or dogmatists. Empiricists, like ants, simply accumulate and use; Rationalists, like spiders, spin webs from themselves; the way of the bee is in between: it takes material from the flowers of the garden and the field; but it has the ability to convert and digest them. (Bacon, 2002, p. 79)

These criticisms against philosophical and scientific traditions promulgate from a certain analysis of knowledge, and now we will take a look at this epistemology.

II.II. Epistemological Assumptions

The basic epistemological assumption, which prevails throughout Novum Organum is that understanding Nature is possible only by collecting facts and making valid inferences from them:

Man is Nature's agent and interpreter; he does and understands only as much as he has observed of the order of nature in fact or by inference; he does not know and cannot do more. (Bacon, 2002, p. 33)

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Thus, according to Bacon's way, the answer to "what is genuine knowledge" is basically axioms induced from a collection of facts. There is a two-legged process of knowledge acquisition: the first leg is the collection of facts, and the second is the classification of the collected data, inferring from them axioms and computation of and deduction from those axioms new data. The former aspect of this process, namely collection of facts, determines the limits of experience. What Bacon understands from facts are sense-data augmented by experiment. As we have noted, he criticizes a crude sensualism. Senses are inconsistent and incomplete; they carry a lot of contradiction and errors. However, they also possess information about the structures and processes which engender those alleged contradictions and errors, which should be revealed through experimentation:

[...] even when the senses do grasp an object, their apprehensions of it are not always reliable. (Bacon, 2002, p. 18)

[...] we have many ways of scrutinising the information of the senses

themselves. For the senses often deceive, but they also give evidence of their own errors; however the errors are to hand, the evidence is far to seek. (p. 17) [...] the subtlety of experiments is far greater than that of the senses themselves even when assisted by carefully designed instruments; we speak of experiments which have been devised and applied specifically for the question under investigation with skill and good technique. (p. 18)

The latter aspect of the process determines the limits of reason, which is reduced to a role of classification, inference, computation and deduction. If experience transgresses its limits, it ends up with what may be called

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mysticism; and if reason transgresses its limits, it ends up with speculation. However, by staying within their prescribed borders they constitute the body of science and can reveal the structures and processes which govern Nature. In order to make reason stay within its borders and supply Man with good knowledge, science should have a methodology to prescribe rules on reason. We can summarize Bacon's epistemology thus:

1. There is a strict distinction between experience and reason. 2. Experience is nothing but the totality of sense-data augmented by

experimentation.

3. Reason consists of classification, inference, computation and deduction of data supplied by experience.

4. Experience and reason together constitute the body of science which reveals the structures and processes that govern Nature.

5. Science should have a methodology to prescribe rules on reason to fulfil its functions and hinder it from transgressing them.

Bacon's basic distinction between reason and experience foreshadows David Hume's distinction between relation of ideas and matters of fact and

Immanuel Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements. In order to interrogate what Bacon's epistemology amounts to theoretically, it would be a fine labour to dive briefly into Hume’s and Kant's work.

For Hume, relations of ideas denote propositions which are grounded in the pure operations of reason; while matters of fact denote propositions which are derived from experience:

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All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. [...]

Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. (Hume, 1988, p. 28)

Propositions concerning geometry, algebra and arithmetic, according to Hume, are demonstrative truths which depend solely on the operations of reason. However any proposition concerning the world must come either from sense-data (i.e. impressions) or some material provided by sense-data (i.e. ideas or thoughts):

[...] our thought [...] is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience (Hume, 1988 p. 21)

In Hume's conception, reason has the mere function of relating the most abstract features of experience and making necessary inferences on the one hand and augmenting on the material supplied by sense-data on the other. That is to say, reason is reduced to a merely formal function in the process of acquiring knowledge; it has no potential of ascertaining the content of truth, but only of augmenting the content supplied by experience.

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Kant defines analytic and synthetic judgements in a similar vein:

[…] there is [...] a distinction between [judgments] according to their content, by dint of which they are either merely explicative and add nothing to the content of the cognition, or amplicative and augment the given cognition; the first may be called analytic judgments, the second synthetic. (Kant, 2004, p. 16) In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought [...], this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies entirely outside the concept A, though to be sure it stands in connection with it. In the first case I call judgment analytic, in the second synthetic. (Kant, 1998, p. 130)

Analytic judgements, according to this conception, depend solely on the linguistic and logical operations of reason. "All bodies are extended" is an analytic judgement. I have to know merely the meaning of "body" and "extension" in order to assess the truth of this judgement; the rest depends on the logical principle of identity.

Synthetic judgements, on the other hand, are empirical judgements. "All bodies are heavy" is a synthetic judgement; I have to relate two distinct concepts to assess the truth of this judgement. According to Kant, we have to distinguish two types of synthetic judgements: a priori and a posteriori. Kant uses the concepts of a priori and a posteriori in a novel sense. A priori means before experience and denotes truths which can be known without appealing to experience, while a posteriori means after experience and denotes truths which can be known by appealing to experience. The first

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type possesses a universal and necessary truth, while the second type is private and contingent.

Now analytic judgements are obviously a priori. "All bodies are extended", when analysed, is a judgement similar to A is A and A is A is a universal and necessary truth. It can never be given in possible experience, yet it

maintains a rule for any reasoning. It is devoid of any content, but any content may fit into it affirmatively or negatively. In this sense, it is pure form.

Likewise, synthetic judgements of the kind "Every alteration has its cause" are universal and necessary truths. They cannot be given in possible

experience, yet they maintain the rules for all possible experience. They determine the limits of possible experience. They are devoid of content, but consist in pure form. These are called synthetic a priori judgements.

Synthetic judgements of the kind "All bag are heavy", on the other hand, are contingent truths. These are synthetic a posteriori judgements. They are given in experience, but conditioned by synthetic a priori judgements; their limits are determined by them.

In order for me to have synthetic a priori judgements, Kant continues, there must be certain faculties in my mind which makes them possible. These are: Intuition and Understanding which successively provide the forms of space and time and the categories.

I know objects in space and time a posteriori, however I know space and time themselves a priori. Space and time are conditions of possibility of

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experience, for they are universal and necessary and any sense-data is given to me in the forms of space and time.

Likewise, I know the objects of causal relations for instance, a posteriori; however I know causality itself as a category a priori. The pure concept of causality is universal and necessary and I can understand any experience in the form of causality.

By denouncing the limits of legitimate knowledge as experience and the limits of experience as the forms supplied by reason, Kant shuts the door for any search of truth other than "scientific method". Therefore the pure

concepts of reason may merely apply to experience and its application to anything independent of experience is illicit:

[...] the pure concepts of the understanding can never be of transcendental, but always only of empirical use, and that the principles of pure understanding can be related to objects of the senses only in relation to the general conditions of a possible experience, but never to things in general. (Kant, 1998, p. 345)

We have noted that Hume confined knowledge to experience augmented by reason and experience to the totality of sense-data. In a similar vein with Kant, but with more rage, he commits any claim of knowledge which transgress these borders to flames:

If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. (Hume, 1988, p. 149)

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Also in Bacon's criticisms of philosophy we have seen that the transgression of experience as sense-data augmented by experiment and reason's functions as categorization, inference, computation and deduction is regarded as a scientific heresy.

This tendency we see with these three philosophers of denying reason's capability of conceiving an objective content or denying it as a delusion or disease or madness3 is actually an idiosyncrasy of modern philosophy. It excludes any search for truth other than "scientific method" from the field of knowledge although this search has been an integral part of philosophy until then. Philosophy always had a function of a search for some truth which cannot be given in possible experience but which can be reached by an intellectual transcendence of experience into the immanent reason of

Nature. Now, however, with Bacon and later in Hume and Kant, we see that this possibility is abandoned.

Horkheimer wrote extensively on this rupture. He observes that reason used to connote an objective principle in reality, while according to the approach presented by Bacon reason is merely a formal faculty of the mind:

This view [objective reason] asserted the existence of reason as a force not only in the individual mind but also in the objective world – in relations among human beings and between social classes, in social institutions, and in nature and its manifestations. (Horkheimer, 2004, p. 4)

3_{This attitude can be explicitly observed in Hume:}

"The utmost we say of [ideas], even when they operate with greatest vigour, is, that they represent their object in so lively a manner, that we could almost say we feel or see it: But, except the mind be disordered by disease or madness, they never can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity, as to render these perceptions altogether undistinguishable." (Hume, 1988, p. 20)

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Although philosophy had a purpose of revealing this reason inherent in reality, with Bacon and his approach to philosophy, we see that this purpose is lost and even considered as a kind of heresy.

Instead, what we see with Bacon is a reason that has been reduced to a role of categorization, inference, computation and deduction of experimental work. As something completely alien to an objective understanding of reason, this is more or less what is going to be understood by science in modern philosophy:

The philosophical systems of objective reason implied the conviction that an all-embracing or fundamental structure of being could be discovered and a conception of human destination derived from it. They understood science, when worthy of this name, as an implementation of such reflection or speculation. They were opposed to any epistemology that would reduce the objective basis of our insight to a chaos of uncoordinated data, and identify our scientific work as the mere organization, classification, or computation of such data. (Horkheimer, 2004, p. 9)

However when reason is reduced to such a formal role, Bacon's schema of inferring from sense-data to the hidden structures and processes which govern them becomes problematic. This problem is explicated by Hume. We have treated of Hume's distinction between relation of ideas and matters of fact and stated that relation of ideas determine the truth of propositions concerning arithmetic, geometry, algebra or in other words the most abstract concepts of the mind. Matters of fact, on the other hand, determine the truth of propositions concerning what happens in this world.

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Hence, if we think about a proposition such as "from any point to any point a straight line can be drawn"; its truth can be assessed through relations of ideas. If we think about a proposition such as "this road is a straight line", I have to appeal to my impressions about the object in question to assess its truth.

When it comes to a proposition such as "if you walk this road you will reach Edinburgh", though I have to appeal to my impressions about the object, I cannot assess its truth by merely doing this. Since the fact that walking on the road and finally reaching Edinburgh are given as impressions to me, that walking on the road causes reaching Edinburgh is not given in my

experience:

Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its causes or effects. (Hume, 1988, p. 30)

Its truth can neither be assessed by relation of ideas, since the idea of reaching Edinburgh does not consist in the idea of walking this road. It would not be possible to derive where a certain road leads up to through merely analysing their ideas:

When we reason a priori, and consider merely any object or cause, as it appears to the mind, independent of all observation, it never could suggest to us the notion of any distinct object, such as its effect; much less, show us the inseparable and inviolable connexion between them. (Hume, 1988, p. 33)

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you will reach Edinburgh ", then it seems to be much harder to reach hidden processes or structures or universal laws such as "an object at rest remains at rest unless acted upon by a force". For in this case from particular matters of facts we leap to universal propositions. However, these universal

propositions can never be given in experience and again cannot be derived from relation of ideas.

Then Bacon's claim for revealing the hidden processes and structures which govern Nature through collecting facts and for making inferences from those facts are at risk. No certain knowledge of those processes and structures as claimed by Bacon can be assessed within such an epistemology.

Although epistemologically Bacon's schema is contradictory and incapable of revealing the alleged hidden processes and structures in Nature, it is always supported by the pragmatical ideal of "Man's dominion over

Nature". The core of this epistemology, namely its methodology, thus stands firm and finds its justification with respect to such an ambition.

Manipulating the world is the aim of this methodology, and truth and utility even become the same thing:

Truth therefore and utility are here the very same things, and works themselves are of greater value as pledges of truth than as contributing to the comforts of life. (Bacon, 1905, p. 298)

Therefore, in the next chapter, we will investigate this methodology and the kind of practice it imposes on this world.

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II.III. How to Acquire Knowledge

Bacon's most significant emphasis is that science, as a whole, must possess some master principles which regulate the roles of reason and experience.4 It should hinder them from transgressing their legitimate borders. After these borders are determined for sure, the whole body of knowledge from the most basic terms in language to the most fundamental axioms of all sciences will be reconstructed:

We need a thread to guide our steps; and the whole road, right from the first perceptions of sense, has to be made with a sure method. (Bacon, 2002, p. 10)

Bacon's methodology derives from this design of knowledge and prescribes an exhaustive experimentation, which will be called "experimentalism" by Horkheimer5. This attitude, which can be called the “ideal of science”, assumes that by augmenting senses with organized experimentation and constraining the work of intellect to inducing theories from experimentation and reorganizing experimentation according to these theories, genuine structures which regulate phenomena can be revealed:

[Our method] is to establish degrees of certainty, to preserve sensation by putting a kind of restraint on it, but to reject in general the work of the mind that

4_{Approximately eight years after Novum Organum was published, Descartes started}

working on his Rules for the Direction of the Mind, in which he tried to prescribe the rules for legitimate method for acquiring knowledge in much the same sense with Bacon:

Rule IV

We need a method if we are to investigate the truth of things.

Rule V

The whole method consists entirely in the ordering and arranging of the objects on which we must concentrate our mind's eye if we are to discover some truth. We shall be following this method exactly if we first reduce complicated and obscure propositions step by step to simpler ones, and then, starting with the intuition of the simplest ones of all, try to ascend through the same steps to a knowledge of all the rest. (Descartes, 1954)

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follows sensation, and rather to open and construct a new and certain road for the mind from the actual perception of the senses. (Bacon, 2002, p. 28)

To establish such a method, one must “elicit axioms from sense and particulars rising in a gradual and unbroken ascent to arrive at last at the most general axioms” (Bacon, 2002, p. 36). This schematization denotes an inductivist methodology. Bacon holds inductivism as the only possible path to truth, while claiming that no truth can possibly come out of devising the first principles primarily and then making deductions from them.

Instead, Bacon devises a pyramidal schema for ascending from senses and particulars (which constitutes the base of the pyramid) to linguistic terms, then to theories concerning specific areas of Nature, and finally to universal axioms concerning hidden processes and structures which stand at the top of the pyramid and constant for all phenomena concerning Nature.

So the first step to the new science should be reconstructing linguistic terms purely out of experience and denying all given notions:

There is no one yet found of such constancy and intellectual rigour that he has deliberately set himself to do completely without common theories and common notions, and apply afresh to particulars a scoured and level intellect. And thus the human reason which we now have is a heap of jumble built up from many beliefs and many stray events as well as from childish notions which we absorbed in our earliest years. (Bacon, 2002, p. 79)

This ideal of constructing concepts and axioms of sciences is familiar to us from positivism. Bacon suggests that science should collect its observation data systematically, reconstruct its linguistic terms in a precise manner, and

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should derive its theories from these terms in a valid form. In this sense, it can be said that he is the predecessor of logical positivism of the twentieth century.

In order to accomplish this task we need new methods of experimentation and induction, for current methods of experimentation and induction at hand are polluted by common sense:

Thus we must seek to acquire a greater stock of experiments, and experiments of a different kind than we have yet done; and we must also introduce a quite different method, order and process of connecting and advancing experience. For casual experience which follows only itself (as we said above) is merely groping in the dark, and rather bemuses men than informs them. But when experience shall proceed by sure rules, serially and continuously, something better may be expected from the sciences. (Bacon, 2002, p. 81)

Designating this method will be Bacon's main challenge from this point on:

In forming an axiom we need to work out a different form of induction from the one now in use; not only to demonstrate and prove so-called principles, but also lesser and intermediate axioms, in fact all axioms. For the induction which proceeds by simple enumeration is a childish thing, its conclusions are precarious, and it is exposed to the danger of the contrary instance; it normally bases its judgement on fewer instances than is appropriate, and merely on available instances. (Bacon, 2002, p. 83)

Thus true induction should not make inferences out of a number of observed instances no matter how large that number is, but it should rather make experiments in order to reveal every possibility for a nature to be separated

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out:

But the induction which will be useful for the discovery and proof of sciences and arts should separate out a nature, by appropriate rejections and exclusions; and then, after as many negatives as are required, conclude on the affirmatives. (Bacon, 2002, p. 84)

Bacon is also the inventor of the concept “crucial experiment” for the axioms formed by this kind of induction with a view to check if an axiom does or does not transgress the observations for the given nature:

In forming axioms by this kind of induction we need also to conduct an examination and trial as to whether the axiom being formed is only fitted and made to the measure of the particulars from which it is drawn, or whether it has a larger or wider scope. If it is larger and wider in scope, we must see whether, like a kind of surety, it gives confirmation of its scope and breadth by pointing to new particulars; so that we do not just stick to things that are known, nor on the other hand extend our reach too far and grasp at abstract forms and shadows, not at solid things clearly defined in the material. (Bacon, 2002, p. 84)

In order to achieve this, an adequate natural and experimental history first must be established and Bacon will give the prescriptions for establishing this history:

First we must compile a good, adequate natural and experimental history. This is the foundation of the matter. We must not invent or imagine what nature does or suffers; we must discover it.

A natural and experimental history is so diverse and disconnected that it confounds and confuses the understanding unless it is stopped short, and

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presented in an appropriate order. So tables must be drawn up and a

coordination of instances made, in such a way and with such organisation that

the mind may be able to act upon them. (Bacon, 2002, p. 109)

We see that the first step to true induction for Bacon is an organized collection of data. But, of course, it is not possible to derive axioms merely by organizing data. Thus a certain method must be used for derivation from these data:

Even with these, the mind, left to itself and moving of its own accord, is incompetent and unequal to the formation of axioms unless it is governed and directed. And therefore, in the third place, a true and proper induction must be supplied, which is the very key of interpretation. (Bacon, 2002, p. 109)

Bacon says that the first step of induction, namely the experimental and natural history should be a presentation to the intellect concerning all known instances about a certain nature.

For establishing natural and experimental history, Bacon lists three steps. The first step is the table of existence and presence. Here, all the cases where the chosen concept is existent and present are listed. Bacon exemplifies this with the concept of heat and lists the situations where heat occurs.

The second step is the table of divergence. This is where one lists the instances where the absence of the chosen concept is observed. Bacon exemplifies this with observations of situations where heat is absent.

The third step is the table of degrees or table of comparison. Here one lists the observations of the chosen concept from lesser to greater and the

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situations where it increases or decreases. Bacon exemplifies this with heat gain and loss.

After these three tables are established, Bacon starts implementing his method of induction on these organized data:

After the presentation has been made, induction itself has to be put to work. For in addition to the presentation of each and every instance, we have to discover which nature appears constantly with a given nature or not, which grows with it or decreases with it; and which is a limitation (as we said above) of a more general nature. (Bacon, 2002, p. 126)

Bacon defines the task of induction as “to discover which nature appears constantly with a given nature or not, which grows with it or decreases with it; and which is a limitation (as we said above) of a more general nature” (Bacon, 2002, p. 126). To maintain this task, induction should produce propositions. But Bacon is aware that it is impossible to posit a proposition merely from collected data, however organized this data is. Bacon names this kind of derivation from data “affirmation” and claims that it is just speculation:

If the mind attempts to do this affirmatively from the beginning (as it always does if left to itself), fancies will arise and conjectures and poorly defined notions and axioms needing daily correction, unless one chooses (in the manner of the Schoolmen) to defend the indefensible. (Bacon, 2002, p. 126)

Instead, Bacon claims Man can only reach truth by continuous negation:

[Man] may proceed at first only through negatives and, after making every kind of exclusion, may arrive at affirmatives only at the end. (Bacon, 2002, p.127)

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So the first step in deriving axioms from organized data is rejecting the situations in which the chosen concept is not related:

The first task of true induction is the rejection or exclusion of singular natures which are not found in an instance in which the given nature is present; or which are found in an instance where the given nature is missing; or are found to increase in an instance where the given nature decreases; or to decrease when the given nature increases. (Bacon, 2002, p. 127)

Thus what Bacon means is that, as the first step of true induction, one should continuously reject all conjectures which contradict with observation data.

True induction starts, according to Bacon, with negating certain propositions, but it does not stop there. It stops when a proposition is affirmed as an axiom. Then after rejecting false propositions, one must try to reach a true proposition about the chosen concept. This first affirmative proposition is called the first harvest or preliminary interpretation.

Next, before reaching the final axioms, Bacon speaks of seven tools: first, privileged instances; second, supports for induction; third, the refinement of induction; fourth, the adaptation of the investigation to the nature of the subject; fifth, natures which are privileged so far as investigation is concerned, or which inquiries we should make first and which ones later; sixth, the limits of investigation, or a summary of all natures universally; seventh, deduction to practice, or how it relates to man; eighth, preparations for investigation; and finally the ascending and descending scale of axioms. (Bacon, 2002, p. 136)

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After counting twenty-seven kinds of privileged instances, we come to the end of Novum Organum. As we have noted above the book is never completed, so we have no idea of what Bacon was to suggest as the ultimate method of induction. But we still have some important remarks about Bacon's methodology.

First of all, we can see that following his epistemological distinction between experiential and inferential knowledge, he makes a strict methodological distinction between observation and theory. He regards observation data as if they can be collected without any preliminary theory, and he does not describe how those observation data will be collected but just treats them as given.

Secondly, using these observational data scientific language should be disambiguated such that every linguistic term should be precise and carry reference to observation.

Thirdly, from those precise terms the axioms of science should be established by a certain method of induction.

Finally, he observes a progress in science with respect to approximation to truth and by truth Bacon understands what is real, where what is real is of utility to Man. This is obvious in Bacon's analysis of signs of true knowledge.

Firstly he speaks of the products of a body of knowledge. By “products” he means the practical outcomes:

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products. For the discovery of products and results is like a warranty or guarantee of the truth of a philosophy. From these Greek philosophies and the specialised sciences derived from them, hardly a single experience can be cited after the passage of so many years which tends to ease and improve the human condition... (Bacon, 2002, p.60)

The second sign for true knowledge Bacon proposes is progress. By progress, he understands a certain growth of knowledge through experience. In this respect, he regards philosophical and scientific knowledge that have been established thus far as not progressing, since they are not submitted to the test of experience. They are posited in some place and time and never put through any experiment at all or very little. Mechanical arts, on the other hand, are progressing according to Bacon, because, unlike discursive knowledge, the knowledge of arts always exists in the world of practice. And, therefore, they are always tested in practice and progress in a pragmatic sense:

Signs should also be gathered from the growth and progress of philosophies and sciences. Those that are founded in nature grow and increase; those founded in opinion change but do not grow. Hence if those doctrines were not completely uprooted like a plant, but were connected to the womb of nature and nourished by her, what we see has been happening now for two thousand years would not have happened: the sciences stand still in their own footsteps and remain in practically the same state; they have made no notable progress; in fact they reached their peak in their earliest author, and have been on the decline ever since. We see the opposite evolution in the mechanical arts, which are founded in nature and the light of experience; as long as they are in fashion, they

Francis Bacon on the question of knowledge