Estienne de la boetie and the politics of obedience

ESTIENNE DE LA BOËTIE AND THE POLITICS OF OBEDIENCE

Author(s): Efraim Podoksik

Source: Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, T. 65, No. 1 (2003), pp. 83-95

Published by: Librairie Droz

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Librairie Droz

Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance

ESTIENNE DE LA BO?TIE

AND THE POLITICS OF OBEDIENCE

I. CONTROVERSY ON

'DE LA SERVITUDE VOLONTAIRE91

In the essay De amiti? Montaigne refers to a work of his late friend Estienne de La Bo?tie. The treatise, says Montaigne, was given the title La servitude volontaire and was written 'par maniere d'essay [...] ? l'honneur

de la libert? contre les tyrants'2. Montaigne intended to publish this treatise

within the first volume of his essays but changed his mind, having discov ered 'que cet ouvrage a est? depuis mis en lumiere, et ? mauvaise fin, par

ceux qui cherchent ? troubler et changer Test?t de nostre police'3.

However, in the beginning of the reign of Henry III the treatise was already widely circulating in France, even before the publication of Mon

tainge's essays, and radical Huguenots saw it as an incendiary revolutionary pamphlet against monarchy4. During the Revolution of 1789, it again became a very popular piece of text5. Later the treatise was highly valued by

Marxists and anarchists, being grasped as an unambiguous call for popular

resistance against authority and domination6.

Yet the circumstances of the composition and publication of this text

have remained a mystery and its meaning and intention unclear. First of all

Montaigne insisted that La Bo?tie was by no means a revolutionary. In writ

ing the treatise he did not pursue any political aim and 'ce subject fut traict?

par luy en son enfance, par maniere d'exercitation seulement, comme sub

1 The French text can be found in Estienne de la Bo?tie, De la Servitude volontaire ou con

tr'un, ed. by Malcolm Smith (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1987; hereafter DSV). For the

sake of consistency I always spell the author's name as La Bo?tie, though it is sometimes

spelled as La Bo?tie or Boitie.

2 Michel de Montaigne, Essais, 3 vols (Paris, Garnier-Flammarion, 1969-1979), i, 231.

3 Ibid., 242.

4 Louis Desgrave, 'Introduction', in uevres Compl?tes d'Estienne de la Bo?tie, 2 vols (Bordeaux, William Blake & Co., 1991), i, 9-39 (pp. 25-27).

5 Ibid., 28-29.

6 Pierre Birnbaum, 'Sur le origines de la domination politique: a propos d'Etienne de la Bo?tie et de Pierre Clastret', Revue Fran?aise de Science Politique, 27 (1977), 5-21,

84

ject vulgaire et tracass? en mille endroits des livres'7. According to Mon taigne, La Bo?tie had a maxim 'd'obeyr et de se soubmettre tr?s-religiuse

ment aux lois sous lesquelles il estoi nay. Il ne fut jamais un meilleur

citoyen, ny plus affectionn? au repos de son pa?s, ny plus ennemy des remeuments et nouvelletez de son temps'8.

In 1917 Paul Bonnefon found another text attributed to La Bo?tie by Montaigne. This text, named M?moires sur V?dit de janvier 1562 and con

cerned with the policy of tolerance towards the Protestants, had until then been considered lost9. Later Malcolm Smith convincingly proved the

authenticity of the text10. However this work posed an additional problem for scholars. The outlook of Memoire is completely different from that of

De la servitude volontaire. Here La Bo?tie opposes the line on tolerance since he fears that it will lead to a growing demise of royal authority, the cre

ation of rival religious factions and the outbreak of a civil war. Though proposing to adopt the policy of a reformation in the Catholic Church in order to achieve civil peace, he stands against any recognition of Protes

tants' rights in the public sphere and seems to adhere to the old principle of

One law, one king, one faith'. He also recommends to punish severely the leaders of Protestants.

It is not an easy task to reconcile La Bo?tie 's anti-tyrannical polemics in La servitude volontaire with his policy against tolerance in Memoire^. Yet even

before the publication of Memoire the treatise on servitude had become an

enigma. There is no agreement among scholars either on the date of the writ ing of this treatise or on the circumstances of its publication12. In the begin ning of the twentieth century M. Armaingaud claimed that a substantial part of the treatise had been written by Montaigne himself, who had attributed it to his late friend in order to avoid prosecution, and that the tyrant described in the work had been Henry III13. This thesis was rejected by other scholars14.

7 Montaigne, Essais, i, 242.

8 Ibid.

9 Paul Bonnefon, 'Une uvre inconnue de La Bo?tie: les M?moires sur l'?dit de janvier 1562\ Revue d'histoire litt?raire de la France, 24 (1917), 1-33, 307-319. For a more authentic edition see Estienne de La Bo?tie, Memoire sur la pacification des troubles

(Geneva, Librairie Droz, 1983).

10 Malcolm Smith, 'Introduction', in La Bo?tie, Memoire, 7-34 (pp. 33-34).

11 For such attempt see Nannerl O. Keohane, 'The Radical Humanism of ?tienne de la

Bo?tie', Journal of the History of Ideas, 38 (1977), 119-130.

12 See Desgraves, 'Introduction', 22-25; Smith, 'Introduction', in De la servitude volon

taire, 8-11 ; Jacques Joseph Desplat, La Bo?tie: le magistrat aux nombreux myst?res (Le

Bugue, PLB, 1992), 98-100.

13 M. Armaingaud, Montaigne pamphl?taire: l'?nigme du contr'un (Paris, Librairie Hachette, 1910).

14 See, for example, Edmond Labl?nie, 'L'?nigme de la "Servitude Volontaire'", Revue du seizi?me si?cle, 17 (1930), 203-227.

Nevertheless the controversy has not been resolved. Several scholars

recently published an elegant and provocative book where they not only res urrected Armaingaud's thesis but also presented it in a more radical fashion. Three of its contributors suggest that Montaigne wrote not only De la servi

tude volontaire but also all other works he published in La Bo?tie's name15.

According to Schaefer, if this argument is correct it may challenge 'the widespread belief that Montaigne was a political conservative'16.

The discrepancy between De la servitude volontaire and Memoire is

one, though not a central, argument in favour of this thesis. As R?gine Reynolds-Cornell claims, 'the Memoire and On Voluntary Servitude cannot

have been penned by the same person, assuming any intellectual consis

tency on his part, as they expound quite divergent political and ideological

standpoints. If [...] Montaigne himself wrote On Voluntary Servitude, then

La Bo?tie is left as the author only of the Memoire'11. Daniel Martin favours the same argument, agreeing with the description of the policies defended in

Memoire as 'an apologia for State-controlled terrorism'18. Arguing against

the authority of Paul Bonnefon, the great La Bo?tie scholar, Martin claims that 'for Bonnefon and the critics of the Right, On Voluntary Servitude is an artistic monument that must be kept in a museum and prevented from get

ting mixed up into politics'19. He also suggests a sociological explanation of the difference between La Bo?tie and Montaigne based on the assumption

that the two 'came from different social backgrounds'20.

Bonnefon's political sympathies aside, however, it is Martin's and

Reynolds-Cornell's approach which is biased towards an ideological inter

pretation of the text. Even if one accepts that the two works are incompati ble, it is wrong to suggest that texts expressing different or even contradic

tory views cannot be written by the same author. Yet I intend to go further

and suggest that the alleged contradiction between the radicalism of De la servitude volontaire and the conservatism of Memoire is not real. On the

15 David L. Schaefer, 'Montaigne and La Bo?tie'; R?gine Reynolds-Cornell, 'Smoke and

Mirrors : Covert Dissent in Montaigne's Essays and Overt Dissent in the Discourse On Voluntary Servitude'; Daniel Martin, 'Montaigne, Author of On Voluntary Servitude'; in Freedom Over Servitude : Montaigne, La Bo?tie and On Servitude Volontaire, ed. by D.L.

Schaefer (Westpoint, Greenwood Press, 1998), 1-30,115-126,127-187.

16 Schaefer, Freedom Over Servitude, vii. On the interpretation of Montaigne as a conser vative see Frieda S. Brown, Religious and Political Conservatism in the Essays of Mon taigne (Geneva, Librairie Droz, 1963) ; see also the account on different interpretations of Montaigne in John Christian Laursen, The Politics of Skepticism in the Ancients, Mon

taigne, Hume and Kant (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1992), 125-144.

17 Reynolds-Cornell, 'Smoke and Mirrors', 120-121.

18 Martin, 'Montaigne, Author of On Voluntary Servitude', 180.

19 Ibid., 175.

86

contrary I argue here that the politics of obedience may turn out to be a log

ical conclusion of De la servitude volontaire.

I will not engage in the controversy over the authorship of the treatise

since it would be irrelevant to the central claim of this article which is to show how and why De la servitude volontaire can be interpreted as a justi fication of the obedience of its author. As a matter of convenience I will

assume that La Bo?tie is the author of the treatise, though I will also refer at

some points to Montaigne's essays, given the recognised affinity between the views of the author of De la servitude volontaire and those of Mon

taigne.

II. AGAINST OBEDIENCE

What are the political views of the author of De la servitude volontaire!

It is clear that he opposes tyranny and favours liberty. It is also clear that he

rejects a classical distinction between king and tyrant. Although La Bo?tie once uses the distinction rhetorically and, in another place, he makes a rather ironical exception for French kings21, everywhere else he leaves no doubt that the rule of one is an evil. Thus he rebukes Ulysses for his state ment 'qu'un seul soit le Roy'22, saying that those who appoint someone to

be king for his merits are unwise since it would mean 'qu'on l'oste de l? o?

il faisoit bien pour l'avancer en lieu o? il pourra mal faire'23. Later he denies any substantial difference between those princes who came to power either by popular election, or the force of arms, or as heirs to the throne24. Any rule

of one man is bad. La Bo?tie questions whether monarchy should be ranked at all among various regimes 'pource qu'il est malais? de croire qu'il y ait

rien de public en ce go vernement o? tout est ? un'25.

But what kind of regime does La Bo?tie prefer? He himself abstains

from discussing the merits of various regimes26. However many scholars try

to find implications of his political views in the text. Thus Malcolm Smith

argues that La Bo?tie would prefer oligarchy since 'la d?mocratie lui inspire

peu de confiance'27. According to Smith, La Bo?tie regards the Venetian

aristocratic republic as the best political system.

21 DSV, 46 : 'se feit de cappitaine, Roy, et de Roy tiran.' About the French kings see pp. 63 _65.

22 Ibid., 33. 23 Ibid.,35. 24 Ibid., 44-45. 25 Ibid., 34. 26 Ibid. 27 Smith, 'Introduction', in DSV, 17.

I will turn later to the role of Venice in this work. However there is little

evidence in the text to support Smith's claim. It is true that La Bo?tie

expresses contempt for the multitude who obey tyranny and speaks about the

few who preserved in themselves the taste for liberty28. Yet he explicitly

states that the rule of a few is not much better than the rule of one. At the very

beginning he cites Ulysses' phrase, 'D'avoirplusieurs seigneurs aucun bien je n'y voy: Qu'un sans plus soit le maistre, et qu'un seul soit le Roy\ while claiming that 's'il n'eust rien plus dit, sinon, D'avoir plusieurs seigneurs aucun bien je n'y voy, c'estoit autant bien dit que rien plus'29. So La Bo?tie

thinks that, while Ulysses is mistaken in advocating the rule of one, he is

right denying any good in the rule of few: 'D'avoir plusieurs maistres, c'est

autant qu'on en a, autant de fois estre extr?mement malheureux'30. Among

the examples of tyranny he mentions not only despotic governments of one but also the Athenian rule of Thirty31. For La Bo?tie, the rulership of a few people is not much better than the rulership of one. There is no reason to sup pose that he would advocate a government of a few good men. Being extremely well aware that power corrupts, he can hardly think that the power

given to several people would be less corrupting than that given to one.

Those who preserve in themselves the flame of liberty should not rule.

Does this mean that La Bo?tie supports the popular rule, that is to say, democracy, or at least a regime with a strong republican element? This assumption seems to be more plausible. La Bo?tie incessantly proclaims the

idea of natural liberty and exposes the artificial character of dominance.

This natural liberty should be based on the intrinsic equality of all people :

'la nature [...] nous a tous fait de mesme forme et, comme il semble, ? mesme moule, afin de nous entreconnoistre tous pour compaignons ou plus

tost pour fr?res.'32 He mentions many examples from ancient history, treat ing favourably those who fought for their liberty against external enemies

and defended democracy and republic against tyrants and oligarchs. He admires Venice not as an oligarchy but rather as a regime which defends people's liberty33. And some interpreters have seen in his praise of friend

ship a deep democratic sentiment since, as Conley puts it, there is an 'equiv alence of friendship and political equality'34.

28 DSV, 51-52. 29 Ibid., 33. 30 Ibid., 33-34. 31 /Wd., 34. 32 /Wd.,41.

33 'ils ne reconnoissent point d'autre ambition sinon ? qui mielx advisera et plus soigneuse ment prendra garde ? entretenir la libert?.' Ibid., 47-48.

34 Tom Conley, "Friendship in a Local Vein: Montaigne's Servitude to La Bo?tie," The

88

However, one should be careful while analysing the seemingly republi

can views of La Bo?tie. He was brought up in the neo-Roman classical

humanist tradition35. The republican tradition, interpreted by Renaissance thinkers, emphasises the concept of common good and virtues based on civil duties36. But, whilst La Bo?tie always stresses the value of liberty, he almost completely ignores the concept of common good. His notion of lib erty is very individualistic. None of the examples from Greek and Roman

history, that he offers, refer to the way of living under a republican regime.

La Bo?tie is not preoccupied with differences between Sparta, Athens and Rome. All of them, according to him, demonstrate the virtue of freedom;

yet he never shows us how these people exercised their liberty. All the sto

ries are concerned only with their struggle for liberty. The ancients provide us with examples of their struggles against oppressors and not of their polit ical systems. La Bo?tie wants to show that the desire for freedom is natural. But it is natural not only for men but also for animals who fight for their own

liberty with all their strength37. Obviously, the desire of animals is apolitical and their struggle does not presuppose any idea of common good or free

government. This means that the struggle for liberty does not offer us any clue as to the character of the free political regime.

Sometimes it even seems that La Bo?tie is sharply opposed to the idea of

rule by a community. We have already seen him claiming that, as many mas ters as you have, you are that many times extremely unfortunate. But does this not mean that to live in a self-governing community is the most unfor

tunate thing since in such a community each is governed by all the rest? Another of his expressions may be interpreted as a rejection of the idea of

the unity of community: '[La nature] a monstr? en toutes choses qu'elle ne

vouloit pas tant nous faire tous unis que tous uns.'38

La Bo?tie refers to liberty as to an absolute value. His individualism is sharply contrasted with the classical political tradition and this sentiment seems to be intimated in his attitude to friendship. La Bo?tie mentions friendship as an almost sacred relationship between honourable men39. There is no element of political solidarity in his description of friendship.

35 Joseph Barrer?, L'Humanisme et la politique dans le 'Discourse de la servitude volon

taire ' (Paris, Librairie Ancienne Edouard Champion, 1923) ; L. Delaruelle, 'L'Inspiration antique dans le "Discourse de la servitude volontaire'", Revue d'histoire litt?raire de la

France 17 (1910), 34-72.

36 See, for example, Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modem Political Thought (Cam bridge University Press, 1978), i, 44; Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics 1250-1600 (Cambridge University Press, 1992), ch. 1.

37 DSV, 42-43. 38 Ibid., 42. 39 See ibid., 73-74.

Although he does not say much on this subject it seems that his views cor respond to those of Montaigne. Montaigne regarded friendship as a rare occurrence40. Friendship, of course, is based on equality and this is Aristo

tle's opinion as well41. But this view does not presuppose democracy. Friendship is between equals but it is so rare that it cannot lead to political

equality for all. It is true that the love of equality is the virtue of republics

and the idea of friendship is peculiar to a republican regime42. However friendship in such a regime is understood to be extended to the whole of community. In contrast, Montaigne and La Bo?tie see in friendship an indi vidual experience. Moreover, friendship may undermine civil obligations43. As Schaefer rightly points out, Montaigne's ideal of friendship challenges

political community and is, in effect, anti-political44. Therefore the approval

of friendship does not necessarily entail the 'democratic' sentiment.

Yet does La Bo?tie's admiration for Venice, where people are 'advised' and not dominated, indicate his preference for a republic? As Montaigne

says, 's'il eut eu ? choisir, il eut mieux aim? estre nay ? Venise qu'? Sarlat'45.

But what could Venice mean for a French humanist of the sixteenth cen

tury ? It might be contrasted with the regime of the French monarchy. And when compared thus, it might be understood as an island of freedom in a sea

of tyranny. It is Venetian freedom, perceived from abroad, and not its actual

regime that might attract him. The real Venetian republic could hardly be described as a place where people were 'advised' by their governors. Yet, according to Cremona, Seigneur de Villamont describes Venice as a city where people enjoy the greatest liberty in Italy, especially concerning free

dom of belief, and this is why it attracts so many French libertins46. Venice

is admired, foremost, as the symbol of personal freedom, not as an aristo cratic republic, especially by French ?migr?s who can enjoy a liberty alien

to them in comparison with France whilst not being obliged to perform the

duties of its citizens.

40 Montaigne, Essais, i, 241.

41 Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle (London : George Allen & Unwin, 1953), book 8, ch. 6,

pp. 212-214.

42 See Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State, 46-47.

43 Montaigne, Essais, i, 237 : 'ils estoient plus amis que citoyens'.

44 D.L. Schaefer, The Political Philosophy of Montaigne (Ithaca, Cornell University Press,

1990), 342-343. 45 Montaigne, Essais, i, 242.

46 'Qu'il n'y a lieu en tout l'Italie o? l'on vive en plus grande libert?... qu'il n'y a point d'in quisition pour la foy... chacun y vit ? sa fantasie et en libert? de conscience, qui est cause

que plusieurs Fran?oys libertins y demeurent.' Isida Cremona, 'Montaigne et la R?publique de Venise', in Montaigne et les Essais 1580 980, ed. by Fran?ois Moureau, Robert Granderoute and Claude Blum (Paris, Champion, 1983), 279-288 (pp. 284-285).

90

La Bo?tie regards liberty as natural and he expresses an idea similar to the notion of natural rights. According to him, 'si nous vivions avec les droits que la nature nous a donn? et avec les enseignements qu'elle nous apprend, nous serions naturellement obeissans aus parens, subjets ? la rai son et serfs de personne'47. A century later Locke would say the same48. However for La Bo?tie this description is not the first stage from which to

derive the formation of political society. He feels no need for a state. Nature itself pushes us towards a companionship where no one is subject to another49. Today people are brought up in a condition of slavery and become used to it but it is an unnatural condition. If everybody is born into his natu

ral state, liberty will prevail. La Bo?tie seems not to care about political

institutions which would ensure the liberty of citizens since he believes that in such a society no one would be in danger of being dominated by others.

This position may be called anarchistic in a broad sense since it rejects any form of domination and authority and believes in the natural compan

ionship of people. La Bo?tie seems to believe that in the natural state people

will be able to live in peace and liberty. This view is also apolitical since it

is opposed to any form of institutional rule. It is not clear whether La Bo?tie

sees this society as composed of all individuals or merely male heads of

families, while leaving the structure of the family intact. It is plain, however, that he does not propose any system of government which would unite those

individuals or families.

This view does not seem to be derived from the classical republican tra

dition. Its source may be rather found within stoic philosophy and the early

beliefs of Christians. La Bo?tie was an ardent Catholic and, like his friend Montaigne, was very well acquainted with Christian philosophy. In this

treatise he seems merely to repeat the idealised Christian vision of man. Thus St. Augustine in his description of the society of saints seems to pre

sent a similar view of an apolitical community. For him, man is created for the society in which everyone is free from the government of others50. How

ever, Augustine, as a Catholic priest, is sensitive to the fallen condition of

men and advocates a strong government able to control their sinful nature.

His political views are not based on his vision of saintliness. And what are

47 DSV AL

48 Compare with John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government', in Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, 1988), ?? 6,22-24,52-53.

49 ne faut pas faire doute que nous ne soions tous naturallement libres puis que nous

sommes tous compaignons. Et ne peut tomber en l'entendement de personne que nature ait mis aucun en servitude, nous aiant tous mis en compaignie.' DSV, 42.

50 Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans (Cambridge University Press, 1998),

19:15, p. 942: 'He did not intend that His rational creature, made in His image, should have lordship over any but irrational creature.'

the views of the Renaissance humanist La Bo?tie? Does he call for the cre ation of the ideal society ?

III. AGAINST DISOBEDIENCE

What is the treatise about? Montaigne mentions that La Bo?tie entitled

it La servitude volontaire but 'ceux qui Tont ignor?, l'ont bien proprement depuis rebaptis? Le Contre Un'51. Thus there are two possible ways of inter preting the treatise : one emphasising its idea of slavery, the other seeing the work as an anti-tyrannical pamphlet. Yet the first title - La servitude volon

taire - seems to correspond better to the author's intentions. If we look

through the treatise, we can see that servitude is its main issue. Most of the

work deals with the causes of such servitude and with its unnatural charac

ter. The miserable state and vices of tyrants are also shown but they play a relatively minor role in the whole treatise. The main subject of the pamphlet is not the tyrant but the people serving him.

There are various causes of voluntary servitude. People are frequently deceived. They are also tamed by their masters and are used to living in

slavery by custom. Yet these are not the main reasons. The most important

one, 'le ressort et le secret de la domination, le soustien et fondement de la

tirannie'52, is, in La Bo?tie's opinion, a network of interests and domination. The tyrant never rules alone ; he always has five or six near him to support

him in his crimes and pleasures. They are his eyes and ears. These six are assisted by six hundred who, in their turn, enjoy the support of six thou sands, and so on. Thus there is not only one tyrant in the despotic state.

There are millions of people who are tied together in the structure of oppres sion. The main tyrant can rule only because he is assisted by a multitude of little tyrants. People participate in tyranny because they profit from it. This

state is one where everybody is bound to take part in tyranny and almost everyone does it willingly. Therefore the people deserve not less but more

contempt than the tyrant himself.

But 'tousjours s'en trouve il quelques uns, mieulx n?s que les autres, qui sentent le pois du joug et ne se peuvent tenir de le secouer, qui ne s'ap privoisent jamais de la suj?tion, et qui tousjours, comme Ulisse [...] ne se peuvent tenir d'aviser ? leur naturels privileges et de souvenir de leurs pr? d?cesseurs et de leur premier estre'53. So, even in this condition, there are few who are born for freedom. What should they do? To appeal to the peo ple is unreasonable, since people are the collaborators of their ruler. Should

51 Montaigne, Essais, i, 231. 52 DSV, 66.

92

these few, then, act at their own risk and plot against the tyrant? Let us

notice that one of those born for freedom is the same Ulysses who is rebuked in the beginning of the treatise for proposing to submit to the rule of one

instead of the rule of a few. La Bo?tie suggests that Ulysses proposes this unwillingly for pragmatic reasons, accommodating the statement 'plus au

temps qu'? la v?rit?'54. Yet now Ulysses is included among the friends of

liberty. Why is this so? Did he suddenly turn from an advocate of authority

into a conspirator?

There are some indications in La Bo?tie's and Montaigne's writings that can confirm this suggestion. In De la servitude volontaire we are given examples of the plots led by Harmodius, Aristogeiton, Thrasybulus, Brutus

the Elder, Valerius, and Dion55. In the middle of De amiti? Montaigne dis cusses the friendship between Caius Blosius and Tiberius Gracchus. Caius

was asked whether he would have set fire to temples if Tiberius had ordered

him to do so. Blosius denies that he would have been asked to do such a

thing but, when pressed, confirms that he would have done anything for his friend56. Platt suspects that Montaigne or La Bo?tie call for tyrannicide or, at

least, that their writings could be interpreted in such a way by a monarch57. Is not the mystery of friendship just that of conspirators?

I think this would be the wrong conclusion and that there is another, more subtle answer. La Bo?tie says that all those people succeeded in their

plotting since 'ils l'ont vertueusement pens?,' and 'en tel cas quasi jamais ?

bon vouloir ne d?faut la fortune'58. In contrast, those who plotted against the

Roman emperors were merely ambitious men who abused the name of lib erty and to whom La Bo?tie would have not wished 'qu'il leur en fut bien

succ?d?'59. The explanation seems to be somewhat misleading because what La Bo?tie actually shows is that the difference is not only between two

kinds of plotters but between two kinds of epochs. He approves the plots in

republican times and opposes them at the time of the empire. According to him, only ambitious men can conspire against emperors. Does he want to

say that, during the age of servitude, killing a tyrant is a futile enterprise and that no virtuous man would attempt it?

But may tyrannicide be required just as an act of integrity and obligation of friendship based on the love of liberty despite the futility of the action?

This is a double-edged matter. Sometimes friendship results in resistance.

54 Ibid., 33. 55 Ibid., 53.

56 Montaigne, Essais, i, 237.

57 Michael Platt, 'Montaigne, Of Friendship, and On Tyranny', in Freedom Over Servitude,

31-85 (pp. 40-45).

58 DSV, 53.

But what cornes after the plot? If it is successful, then a new system of authority should be built. It is 'les communs devoirs de amiti?', says La

Bo?tie, which sometimes cause people to submit to a person they admire60. But this act destroys friendship because this power will corrupt the ruler.

Friendship, for La Bo?tie, like for Montaigne is an essentially private rela

tionship and may come in conflict with public duties.

In ancient republican thought, friendship never acquires an absolute value. Cicero stresses that praiseworthy friendship must be based on the

love of virtue. Civil virtue is the essential part of virtue in general and so the

obligations towards the city should precede the obligations towards the

friend61. But to kill the tyrant is a civic duty so it should be preferred to friendship. Let us remember that the friendship of Brutus and Cassius put an end to another famous friendship - that of Brutus and Caesar.

For La Bo?tie and Montaigne, friendship precedes civic duties. There fore the adherence to friendship may lead to a decision even more serious

and more difficult: not to kill the tyrant. Friendship demands integrity and

La Bo?tie is inclined to think that secrecy destroys integrity. 'Et entre les meschans, quand ils s'assemblent, c'est un complot, non pas une compaig nie.'62 Here plot is contrasted with companionship. Friendship 's'entretient

non tant par bienfaits que par la bonne vie'63. The act of tyrannicide may be indeed a good deed (beinfait) but it is merely a singular event and not a way of life. In the non-republican age it will only destroy the integrity of friend

ship, being unable to achieve good results. This is why Montaigne stands against those who published this work '? mauvaise fin', by seeking '? trou

bler et changer Testat de nostre police, sans se soucier s'ils l'amenderont'64.

The answer is therefore not to engage in active resistance but to with

draw into the realm of the private. When liberty is entirely lost those who love it retreat into their thoughts so that they 'l'imaginent et la sentent en

leur esprit, et encore la savourent'65. They can only hope and pray that

tyrants will get a special treatment in Hell66.

Is such a position justifiable in the light of the whole treatise which is directed against those who serve tyrants? One should notice that La Bo?tie does not denounce every kind of servitude but only the willing one. He

stresses that 'si une nation est contrainte par la force de la guerre de servir ? 60 Ibid., 35.

61 Cicero, On Friendship', in Two Essays on Old Age & Friendship (London, Macmillan and Co., 1903), 150-157.

62 DSV, 74. 63 lbid.,13.

64 Montaigne, Essais, i, 242. (Italics mine - E.P.) 65 DSV, 52.

94

un' one should 'porter le mal patiemment, et se reserver ? advenir ?

meilleure fortune'67. So one can say that willing servitude is an evil pre cisely because it is willing, because it is based on deception and interest. When one is conscious of one's misfortune one is no longer blamed. Actu

ally, being able to love freedom in one's mind and not to submit to the tricks

of the tyrant, one still remains, in some sense, free. We can feel here the

overtones of the stoic concept of freedom68.

This does not mean that La Bo?tie calls for passive disobedience, for such disobedience is still a public act. On the contrary, he urges serving

authority loyally while preserving the flame of liberty in the heart. Liberty

in the public sphere seems to be impossible at such times. But there is another goal of political activity: the promotion of civil peace. La Bo?tie's Memoire is directed towards the achievement of that goal. La Bo?tie does not oppose the Protestant religion when it is exercised as a matter of per

sonal conscience. He is against the politics of toleration because it will

inevitably lead to demands of freedom for cults and to the creation of two

organised churches which, as he fears, will undermine peace69. Montaigne,

by contrast, later supports the policy of tolerance. However the main justifi cation he gives for this policy is, again, the preservation of peace70.

La Bo?tie and Montaigne prefer peace to the futile struggle for civil lib

erty. But one can ask why they think that civil peace under despotic govern ment is better than war. My suggestion is that this is closely connected with their understanding of liberty. Civil war destroys even the slightest remains of privacy. Everyone is coerced to declare his opinions and to be loyal to one

party or another. Civil war leaves no room for private beliefs expressed in the intimacy of friendship. One is obliged not only to serve but also to lie and thereby destroy the autonomy of conscience. So, ironically, Ulysses

turns out to be right - sometimes it is better to have one master and not sev

eral.

The only thing which can be done is not to overthrow despotism but to

make it more gentle, to give it a human face. David Quint presents a brilliant

analysis of the significance of Montaigne's Essais for the softening of the morals of his age and for the development of the qualities which would

characterise the people of noblesse de robe, one of whom was La Bo?tie71.

67 Ibid., 34-35.

68 See A.A. Long, Stoic Studies (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 195-196 ; on the stoic influence on Montaigne see Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, ii,

275-284.

69 La Bo?tie, Memoire, 50-55. On this point see also Malcolm C. Smith, Montaigne and Religious Freedom: The Dawn of Pluralism (Geneva, Librairie Droz, 1991), 113. 70 Montaigne, Essais, ii, 333.

71 David Quint, Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy: Ethical and Political Themes in the Essays (Princeton University Press, 1998).

This change gives to the educated elite the possibility of combining its ser

vice to the king with a sort of spiritual independence and scepticism.

La Bo?tie's concept of liberty is unambiguously individualistic but he

lived in an age where his aspirations could seem illusory and was brought up

in a cultural tradition which could not provide him with answers to this problem. One should hardly expect from La Bo?tie a liberal theory of gov ernment. Therefore the only logical conclusion of his views was a kind of private anarchism72. Liberty as an absolute value could be enjoyed only as a

matter of conscience for a small elite. Is this what Montaigne wanted to say

when he reported that the treatise 'court pie?a ?s mains des gens d'entende

ment'?73

Schaefer argues that to interpret La Bo?tie's thought in an anarchistic mode means to present him as 'politically na?ve'74. This is not necessarily

so. As we have seen, his argument is very sophisticated. Moreover La Bo?tie is one of the first writers in the French intellectual tradition of the fol

lowing two centuries, a tradition of aristocratic salons, where the educated class could enjoy quiet spiritual independence while being patronised by the absolutist state and serving it loyally.

The age of Enlightenment gives us plenty of examples of such fron deurs. Pierre-Augustin Car?n de Beaumarchais is perhaps the best. A bril

liant playwright whose Figaro both loyally serves his Count while making

fun of him, Beaumarchais was a good servant of royalty. He is not a prophet of the great tumult but rather one of the last heroes of that epoch when lib erty could be enjoyed tacitly, despotism was gentle, and revolution was just

a sweet tale. It is worth remembering that this was the tradition which La Bo?tie and Montaigne began by their unwilling servitude.

Ankara.

72 This definition may look somewhat anachronistic ; yet, it is the best way to describe La Bo?tie's position. Laursen uses the term 'private republicanism' ( in Laursen, The Poli

tics of Skepticism, 117) ; however, as I have shown, there are good reasons not to refer to

La Bo?tie as a 'republican'. 73 Montaigne, Essais, i, 231.